

















Through the reconstruction of 
 Leibniz’s theory of the degrees of 
knowledge, this book investigates and 
explores the intrinsic relationship of 
imagination with space and time. The 
inquiry into this relationship defines 
the logic of imagination that charac-
terizes both human and non-human 
animals, albeit differently, making 
them two different species of imagina-
tive animals.
Lucia Oliveri explains how the emer-
gence of language in human animals 
goes hand in hand with the emergence 
of thought and a different form of 
rationality constituted by logical infer-
ences based on identity and contradic-
tion, principles that are out of reach of 
the imagination. The book concludes 
that the presence of innate principles 
in human animals transforms the 
way in which they sense-perceive the 
world, thereby constantly increasing 
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INTRODUCTION: THE LOGIC OF THE IMAGINATION:    
SPACE, TIME, PREDICTIONS 
I mindlessly leave my coffee cup on the edge of the table and my husband exclaims: 
“Look, it’s going to fall”. I turn on the TV and hear about what the future holds 
following the Coronavirus pandemic: how universities are going to change their in-
person activities; how shops are unable to reopen until new hygiene norms are ap-
plied; how travelling, shopping, and eating out will be affected following the most 
unprecedented of events. My sister calls and my niece pretends to talk to me using 
a toy phone. 
What these examples respectively emphasize is the extent to which we rely on 
our capacity to imagine past, present, and future states as connected. Indeed, it is 
through this capacity that we can anticipate, for example, how much influence one 
event bears on another, in both the immediate and distant future. This capacity is as 
various as the subject matter it concerns. My anticipation that the coffee cup will 
imminently fall differs enormously from predictions about the economic effects of 
a virus, which has put all quotidian activities to an end for months. The former is a 
quasi-sensory presentation of how the cup can change; the other is a survey of 
events and their potential consequences.1 Nevertheless, they have something in 
common: they connect a present or a past state with something that has not yet 
existed (and, indeed, may never), but which we nonetheless consider to be rele-
vantly related to a present or preceding state of affairs.  
This capacity to imagine or conceive of what is possible is normally thought to 
be the province of the imagination, a topic that this book tackles from a particular 
angle, viz. by unpacking Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s reflections on the cognitive 
dimensions of the imagination as it functions vis-à-vis human and non-human men-
tal processes. It therefore expounds Leibniz’s view that the imagination somehow 
permeates our cognitive life insofar as “human beings naturally tend (conantur) to 
explain through things that are subject to the imagination also those that they cannot 
imagine.”2 However, in spite of its pervasiveness, the analysis of the imagination 
 
1 This distinction is present in the contemporary literature, in which sensory imagining, such as 
when I imagine a flying pig, is counterpoised to conceiving of a “situation”, that is, a confor-
mation of objects and events, which verifies the truth of a proposition, such as when I consider 
which events might have been required for Germany to win World War II. Conceiving is non-
sensory. On this topic, see, for instance, Yablo (1993: 1–42) and Chalmers (2005: 145–200). 
2 De lingua philosophica (1687–88?), A VI 4 A 890. The full sentence is a remark about the use 
of prepositions. Leibniz remarks that prepositions seem to originally have spatial meaning. It 
is only through the use of tropes that they acquire metaphysical meaning, because these are less 
















































in cognition has sparked little attention by scholars for several reasons.3 One of 
these is that, during Leibniz’s time, the imagination was understood to be involved 
in the use and formation of signs (or any representative vehicles of thought), while 
today we do not think that the imagination has such scope. This caused scholars to 
overlook much of what Leibniz says about the use of signs, languages, and expres-
sions more generally, viz. in their connection to the imagination and its broader 
function within cognition.4 Writing to Bayle, for instance, Leibniz claims: 
Any time a human being reasons about abstract things that surpass the imagination, this does 
not happen without having in the imagination some signs that respond to them, such as letters 
and characters. There never is an understanding so pure that it is not accompanied by some 
imagination. So there always is in the body something mechanical that corresponds exactly to 
the series of thoughts that are in the mind of a human being insofar as what is imaginable is 
part of them, as a consequence the automaton of the body no more needs the influence of the 
soul, nor the supernatural assistance of God, than the bodies of non-human animals. (GP IV 
541) 
Indeed, the relation between the imagination and signs constituted my way into this 
topic. Thereafter, I realized that signs and languages were not the only domains 
presided over by the imagination. On the contrary, for Leibniz, the imagination is 
also relevantly involved in pre-linguistic and pre-conceptual forms of reasoning. 
More specifically, Leibniz’s general claim that we have a natural tendency to im-
aginatively represent what is not in fact subject to the imagination must be inter-
preted, I argue, as the following claim: the imagination has the ability to transform 
subject matters that are – for various reasons – initially cognitively off-limits to 
finite, cognizant agents. This imaginative transformation renders those matters cog-
nitively available to the agent. In other words, the imagination is the faculty respon-
sible for what Leibniz calls expression, an activity through which a cognizant agent 
 
surprise us, since ‘homines etiam ea quae imaginari non possunt per res imaginationi subjectas 
explicare conantur.’” For a discussion of prepositions, see Oliveri (2014). 
3 When I began my PhD thesis, “Imagination and Harmony in Leibniz’s Philosophy of Lan-
guage” (2016), the only work on the imagination known to me on this topic was Enrico Pasini’s 
PhD thesis, later published as “Corpo e funzioni cognitive in Leibniz” (1996). Pasini’s work 
has many merits, among others, its drawing attention to Leibniz’s interest in the body under-
stood as an organism. Other important works are De Risi (2007: Chapter 3) and a paper by 
Meier-Oeser (2011: 660–666), who explicitly connects the work of the imagination with the 
expression of sense-perceptions as bodies. Even in my PhD thesis, however, I neglected most 
of the cognitive work carried out by the imagination, focusing mainly on the function of signs 
for cognition. Indeed, as presented at the Harvard History of Philosophy Workshop – the first 
draft of a paper now developed into Chapters 3, 5, and 6 (2018) – there was little scholarship 
on the topic: papers by Garber (2015, although he does not explicitly link the geometrization 
of bodies to the imagination) and Leduc (2017). At the time, I did not know about some ground-
breaking scholarship by David Rabouin (2013: 109–130; 2017; 2018), whose work on the role 
that the imagination has in cognition highly influenced my own, as can be seen in Chapters 3, 
4, 5, and 6. Recent scholarship on this issue has been advanced by Jorati (2019), Tropper 
(2019), and Weckend (2019).  
















































 1. The Subject Matter of the Imagination 15 
extrapolates and processes information in order to form the idea of her world as 
composed of bodies, viz. four-dimensional objects whose respective states must be 
internally and externally compatible with the states of other, co-perceived (or co-
imagined) bodies. When they are not, these states are precluded from existence, 
although incompatible states may nonetheless be possible.  
I further argue here that the idea of a world and the bodies populating it qua 
spatiotemporal unities are required for the anticipation and prediction of events. If 
this use of the imagination is evident in natural sciences, then it is also constitutive 
of social interactions. This book therefore advances the thesis that, for Leibniz, im-
aginative processes are required for developing forms of intentionality into what 
Leibniz calls “abstracta” or “essences”. Through these acts, we constitute ourselves 
not merely as cognizant agents but as moral agents. Given the manifold role that 
this faculty plays in cognition, this introduction has the aim of unfolding the theo-
retical and historical context within which Leibniz developed his theory of the im-
agination, and, thereby, his relation to Thomas Hobbes (sect. 1). Through this short 
excursus, we shall set the stage for understanding how Leibniz transforms issues 
relating to the work of the imagination (sect. 2). I conclude with some brief remarks 
regarding my methodological approach to the history of philosophy.  
1. THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE IMAGINATION 
Each faculty has its own, peculiar subject matter that distinguishes it from other 
faculties. For example, the senses are directed towards what is present in our per-
ceptual environment, thereby making us aware of sensations (colors, smells, tastes, 
etc.). Memory, by contrast, presents to our minds something that was present in the 
past but now is not. Finally, the intellect is directed towards truth. The imagination 
makes present the absent, presenting to us what is possible but does not actually 
exist (and, most importantly of all, must not exist). The imagination is, therefore, 
the faculty of fiction. However, given its relation to what is possible (and so, its 
relation to the future), the imagination seems relevantly related to knowledge. This 
is not completely true for Leibniz, who assumes that the proper subject matter of 
the imagination is continuous quantity, sc. magnitude like space and time. Contin-
uous quantity is something abstract and ideal; it is for this relation to ideal magni-
tudes that the imagination is relevantly connected to what is possible, and hence to 
fictions. However, in order to understand why Leibniz takes a different stance (as 
well as the import of this change), we need to establish a link between the imagina-
tion and fiction, which can be understood in the early modern sense as “that which 
does not exist”.5  
 
5 Leibniz uses “fiction” in a technical sense. Fiction either refers to things that cannot exist be-
cause they are logically impossible, or to those things that cannot exist because a set of condi-
tions precludes them from being part of the world, although it does not therefore imply the 
logical impossibility of that fiction. In the early modern period, a fiction was a product of the 
















































The aforementioned cognitive states (for instance, my husband’s prediction about 
the falling coffee cup, causal connections between the virus and its effects, my 
niece’s pretense in using her toy phone), are manifestations of a cognitive agent’s 
reasoning, which furthermore relies upon imaginative skill. Some of these states 
result in new knowledge, as when we discover causal connections, while others do 
not. Still, they are all characteristic of a rational human being in her interactions 
with others. It seems that the same faculty is both constitutive of what we may de-
fine as “human rationality”, but also the source of our most intimate, irrational 
responses to the world, insofar as that involves entertaining fictions.6  
Early modern philosophers insisted on the Janus-faced quality of the imagina-
tion, which was easily singled out as the primary source of human error, but chal-
lenging to recognize as positively contributing to knowledge-acquisition.7 Recog-
nizing the imagination's positive, cognitive role requires acknowledging its relation 
to what is possible. For, if the imagination contributes to cognition by making pre-
sent the absent, then, it may also present to the mind’s eye things that are not only 
likely to happen, but have not happened yet. Indeed, the imagination may even bring 
to cognition ideal objects from which we can extrapolate knowledge (as in geome-
try and mathematics). The imagination also causes us to entertain things as if they 
were true or existent, although they are not. Thus, the simple fact that we can im-
agine them may explain why we believe them to be true.  
The irony here is that this line of argumentation is shared by those who view 
the imagination’s work positively (like Spinoza or Leibniz).8 Hence, the role that 
the imagination plays in cognition is not just controversial, but elusive; an elusive-
ness still recognized in contemporary discussions. This is partly owing to the range 
of abilities the imagination allegedly controls. Contemporary accounts acknowl-
edge the imagination’s multitasking nature: it seems to be the “junkyard of the 
 
6 Following on from this Janus-faced character, philosophers have recognized a puzzle: how is 
it possible to acquire knowledge from fiction? For a discussion, see Kind-Kung (2017). A dif-
ferent approach is adopted by Williamson (2017) who argues that the main business of the 
imagination is not to produce fictions: while it has this function, imagination is first and fore-
most devoted to the possible (understood as what can obtain). 
7 A wide-spread view in the early modern period was the idea that the senses never err, owing to 
which the source of error must be either the imagination or the will. The senses simply present 
aspects of external objects and hence do not deal with truth, which consists in a connection of 
ideas. For Descartes, the senses are the source of material falsity, but not formal falsity, for 
which the will is responsible. Senses therefore never err (see Meditations AT VII 56/ CSM II 
39; for a discussion of material falsity, see De Rosa, 2010). Leibniz thinks the work of the 
senses is a necessary distortion of the objects in order to render them available to the mind; 
they present some kind of illusion, as in optics, although they do not thereby deceive us (on 
this, see Favaretti Camposampiero 2016). Deception is the result of a judgment that lacks suf-
ficient consideration about the causes or reasons that account for its truth. This topic was also 
discussed by Leibniz in a short conversation with Gottlieb Samuel Treuer. On this, see Oliveri 
(2019: 83–109). 
















































 1. The Subject Matter of the Imagination 17 
mind”,9 the place – cognitively speaking – where we can project any state of mind. 
However, to focus on early modern discourse, both negative and positive attitudes 
toward the imagination are manifested in early modern philosophers’ vacillating 
between two extreme positions endorsed in order to exorcise the epistemic failings 
of the imagination. On this account, the imagination is either a useful capacity, al-
beit void of any epistemic role; or it is a pervasive power, whose tendency to lead 
cognizant agents astray needs accepting and, to whatever extent possible, manag-
ing.  
Descartes veers toward the first extreme and, in the Meditations on first philos-
ophy, denies that the imagination may be a source of knowledge. Despite early sym-
pathy for the contribution of this faculty to knowledge (especially in the twelfth rule 
for the direction of the mind), knowledge is understood by Descartes as the evidence 
and intuition of intellectual items, viz. ideas, which differ greatly from the presen-
tation of images, for which the corporeal imagination (phantasia) is responsible.10 
Even if the imagination is relevantly involved in reasoning, Descartes unburdens it 
from any epistemic responsibility – or so argues Leibniz, as we will soon see.11 To 
do justice to the Cartesian stance, however, we need to add that the contentious 
point regarding the contribution of the imagination to knowledge is not about 
whether or not the imagination contributes to factual knowledge, as when we ap-
prehend the distance between two objects or the shape of a book. Instead, the denial 
concerns the idea that the imagination may relevantly contribute to knowledge re-
garding the ideas we have about something, especially those ideas that are, on Des-
cartes’ view, innate, as the distinction between imagining and understanding in the 
VI Meditation proves. In there, Descartes makes clear that our capacity of repre-
senting extended figure is not tantamount to our capacity of understanding their 
constitutive properties and deriving truths from them, a task exclusive of the pure 
understanding.12 If Descartes denies this role to the imagination, then other figures 
 
9 See Kind (2016: 1).  
10 See Rule Twelve (AT X 414–416/CSM I 41–3) and Meditation VI (AT VII 74–5/CSM II 50–
54). 
11 For a more accurate discussion of the role of the imagination in Descartes, see Sepper (2001), 
whose final analysis is that the imagination is an aid to truth. As Chavez-Arvizo (1997: 143–4) 
notes, the fact that it is “an aid” does not amount to seeing it as an epistemic faculty. Indeed, 
this is a consequence of Descartes’ theory that truth depends on the intellect, which intuits ideas 
about objects. According to Bos (2011), this change of attitude towards the imagination is ow-
ing to Descartes’ discovery of the application of algebra in solving geometrical problems. On 
the imagination, also see Fotì (1986). 
12 AT VII 72/CSM II 50: “To make this clear, I will first examine the difference between imagi-
nation and pure understanding. When I imagine a triangle, for example, I do not merely under-
stand that it is a figure bounded by three lines, but at the same time I also see the three lines 
with my mind's eye as if they were present before me; and this is what I call imagining. […] 
Such a representation is useless for recognizing the properties which distinguish a chiliagon 
from other polygons. But suppose I am dealing with a pentagon: I can of course understand the 
figure of a pentagon, just as I can the figure of a chiliagon, without the help of the imagination; 
















































like Spinoza or Leibniz emerge as taking a more nuanced stance. In order to explain 
these positions, we first need to recall Hobbes’ contribution, which veers towards 
the opposite extreme.  
Hobbes considers any cognitive operation (except for sensation) as a form of 
imagination, generally defined as a “decaying sense”, or the impression left on the 
mind by the object when it is no longer present to the senses.13 Besides this general 
definition, the “decaying sense” takes several forms: there is memory, or the re-
calling of past sensations; the “compounded” imagination, or the formation of fic-
titious entities; and understanding, or imagination by means of signs.14 To confirm 
this position, Hobbes rejects Descartes’ notion of an idea as an intellectual item that 
presents itself to the understanding in a pure way, that is, deprived of a representa-
tive vehicle.15 Leibniz follows this lead, which we can deduce from his answer to 
Bayle (quoted above), as well as in a series of writings composed between 1675 
and 1684, whereby he rejects the Cartesian notion of a pure intellection, which con-
siders knowledge to consist in connections of ideas by means of representative ve-
hicles, such as images or the words of a language.16 This Hobbesian sympathy, 
however, does not amount to an endorsement of Hobbes’ ultra-nominalism, viz. 
that truth depends on names, a position that Leibniz criticizes in precisely the same 
years as when he was grappling with Descartes’ philosophy.17 These are also the 
years in which Leibniz – through a confrontation with Descartes and Hobbes, inter 
alia18 – settles on various matters relating to knowledge and cognition, as well as 
some metaphysical issues regarding the nature of the continuum and of mathemat-
ical fiction.19 Indeed, he does not change his position until being confronted with 
Locke’s philosophy. This shakes Leibniz’s epistemology to the point of prompting 
a book-length exposition (viz. New Essays on Human Understanding, published 
posthumously in 1765) of parts of his theory that had not yet been fully explicated 
nor adequately thought through. For this reason, it is worth contextualizing Leibniz 
 
within them. And in doing this I notice quite clearly that imagination requires a peculiar effort 
of mind which is not required for understanding; this additional effort of mind clearly shows 
the difference between imagination and pure understanding.” 
13 Hobbes’s definition of imagination is echoed in Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae, A 
VI 4 1394/LoC 237: “Imago est continuatio passionis in organo cessante licet actione objecti. 
Imaginatio est imagines perception. [An image is the continuation of a passion in an organ, 
despite the cessation of the action of the object. Imagination is the perception of the image.]”   
14 Hobbes, Leviathan, I 2 “On Imagination”. 
15 See Objections and replies, AT VIII 184/ CSM II 129–30. 
16 We will discuss these texts in Chapter I. 
17 He broaches this subject already in his introduction to Nizolius’ Antibarbarus (1671) and in 
Dialogus (1677; A VI 4 A 20–5), and then in Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas 
(1684; A VI 4 A 589–93/L 293–6). In Dialogus, Leibniz’s spokesman rejects the view that 
truth rests on the connection of names. 
18 They are not the only figures. We can moreover name Jungius, Plato, Aristotle, Thomasius, 
Spinoza, Malebranche, inter alia. However, Descartes and Hobbes are explicit points of refer-
ence in Leibniz’s most important writings on epistemology and cognition, such as MKTI. 















































 1. The Subject Matter of the Imagination 19 
within Hobbes’ discourse on the imagination, and especially the latter’s remarks 
about the so-called “train of thought”. 
There are many parts of Leibniz’s philosophy that evidence Hobbes’ legacy. 
One such part is the idea that human beings are not alone in being capable of rea-
soning, a claim highly controversial at the time.20 Although Leibniz is certainly 
more cautious than Hobbes – for instance, he never explicitly claims that non-hu-
man animals are capable of reasoning – he nevertheless does not deny to non-human 
animals some form of empirical reasoning, or a shadow of reasoning, which con-
sists in connecting experiential states to either expectations about the future or rec-
ollections of foregoing states. If we expect the sun to rise after night-time, then this 
is because we have had repeat experiences of day succeeding night. Since reasoning 
consists in connecting images or signs, non-human animals count as imaginative 
animals, just like human beings. The outstanding question thereafter becomes a 
matter of why human animals are capable of forms of reasoning precluded to other 
animals.  
That this approach is Hobbesian in spirit can be proved with a passage of the 
Leviathan. Here, Hobbes explains why human animals are capable of developing 
other forms of reasoning that differs from (and may even be superior to) those 
forms that are proper to non-human animals. Reasoning is not exhausted by repre-
sentational states of some sort, neither does it rest on a capacity for representing 
objects, nor their consciousness. Reasoning rather consists in the ability to feel a 
connection of quasi-dependence between images or representational states, such as 
when I see clouds in the sky and imagine that it is about to rain. In this way, Hobbes 
thinks we form a “train of thought”. These are not random, as when we move hap-
hazardly from one thought to the next. Rather, a train of thought may have a design, 
that is, a sort of certainty and necessity felt along with the connection between one 
thought (the clouds) and another (the rain); the latter being a consequence of the 
former:  
The train of regulated thoughts can be of two kinds: one, when of an effect imagined, we seek 
the causes, or means that produce it; and this is common to man and beast. The other is, when 
imagining anything whatsoever, we seek all the possible effects that can by it be produced; that 
is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when we have it. Of which I have not at any time 
seen any sign, but in man only; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living 
creature that has no other passion but sensual, such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In sum, 
the discourse of the mind, when it is governed by design, is nothing but seeking, or the faculty 
of invention, which the Latins called sagacitas, and solertia; a hunting out of the causes, of 
some effect, present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause. (Hobbes, Levia-
than, I, 3) 
 
20 The posthumous edition of Hieronymus Rorarius’s essay, That animals use reason better than 
man (1539), and the entry “Rorarius” in Bayle’s Dictionary of 1696 and then 1702, help to 
explain why the topic was intensely discussed. Another reason is the denial by Descartes and 
Cartesians that animals have a soul. Leibniz intervenes in the debate publicly with his com-
















































What distinguishes human and non-human animals, then, are the kinds of connec-
tions between images that human animals are capable of producing, viz. through 
their cognitive activity, which is invoked in two discrete moments (although both 
can be said to result from the faculty of invention). One such moment proceeds from 
effects to recalling a cause (i.e., memory or recollection), while the other begins 
with the cause to imagining the possible effects. To borrow Hobbes’ example, if I 
lose my keys, then I can recollect the places where I have been in attempting to 
retrieve them. In this case, I move from an effect to its cause. We can moreover 
imagine somebody doing something, e.g., my sister goes into the kitchen, and I can 
imagine what she is about to do, e.g., eat or cook something, talk to my mother, or 
innumerable other things. This act of imagining the future as having a link to a 
present state, and, more specifically, of deducing an effect through consideration of 
its cause, constitutes the anthropological difference between human and non-hu-
man animals. Why? Because, while recalling a cause by experiencing an effect does 
not imply that the subject has knowledge of the cause, the deduction of an effect 
from the cause implies both knowledge of what the cause is and an understanding 
that multiple effects can follow from the same thing, viz. one understands necessity 
and contingency – concepts not shared by non-human animals. The relation from 
the effect to the cause may be an extrinsic relation apprehended by circumstances, 
viz. habit and repetition, which fail to amount to knowledge, while the latter implies 
knowledge of the reasons why the effect follows. 
Knowledge of the cause requires some form of abstraction, of which non-hu-
man animals are incapable. The idea that non-human animals do not develop skills 
identical to (or at least similar to) those of rational beings owing to their limited 
faculties for abstraction is reiterated by early modern philosophers, for instance 
Locke, with whom Leibniz concurs (NE 142). However, these words of Hobbes’ 
are echoed and transformed in the writings of his eager readers, viz. Spinoza and 
Leibniz, and peculiarly too. Consider, for example, the first part of the Treatise on 
the emendation of the intellect. There, Spinoza explains what distinguishes the third 
from the fourth form of perception, viz. awareness of a connection as holding true. 
This insight is fairly Hobbesian insofar as the third form of perception consists in 
perceiving a connection from the effect to the cause, while the fourth form consists 
in the perception of the cause and what can follow from it. However, Spinoza also 
relevantly modifies Hobbes’ words: only the fourth form of perception is knowledge 
of the essence, that is, what the thing is in se and per se.21  
Leibniz, for his part, complicates Hobbes’ thought with his notions of possibil-
ity and existence, on the one hand, and abstract essences and concrete beings, on 
the other. The difference between human and non-human animals does not consist 
in the direction of the connection (sc. from cause to effect, nor from effect to cause). 
It consists in the contents connected through the cognitive activity of the agent. 
Such connections are not entirely extrinsic to the kinds of states they relate. Non-
 
21 See Spinoza, TdIE II/9 20–35. Interestingly, the idea of forms, or “degrees of knowledge”, is 
likewise picked up by Leibniz. On the differences between Spinoza’s treatise and Leibniz’s 















































 1. The Subject Matter of the Imagination 21 
human animals, understood as sentient, imaginative, and non-rational, are directed 
towards concrete existing beings and their states. This means that they connect 
states because they experience them as temporally and spatially related, owing to 
which they are empirical. By contrary, human sentient, imaginative, rational ani-
mals have the capacity to conceive of “the pure possible”, which, in Leibniz’s jar-
gon, means that they are capable of considering beings and their modifications in 
the abstract, viz. by isolating properties and considering them to be conceptual 
marks, which altogether constitute not the being but the essence expressing the be-
ing as a kind. This distinction is revolutionary when analyzed in the light of Leib-
niz’s reformation of the modalities required to resist necessitarianism, as we shall 
see in chapters V and VI. In short, Leibniz’s revolutionary metaphysics distin-
guishes between a notion of possibility as it is related to existence (according to 
which something is possible when, given a series of conditions, it can exist), and 
logical possibility (according to which something is per se possible when its es-
sence does not imply a contradiction). For now, it is sufficient to claim that Leibniz 
distinguishes between two cognitive acts: first, the act of apprehending a being; and 
second, that of apprehending an essence. Remarkably, however, Leibniz does not 
think of either of these acts as independent of the imagination. In short, they should 
be understood respectively as varieties of intentionality or conceivability: 
Terms are either simple or composite. Simple terms are those which cannot be made clear by 
more familiar terms, because they are given immediately to sense, that is they are themselves 
sensible qualities. That which has sensible qualities, or is perceptible, is called a being. So, with 
respect to us it can be said that the essence of a thing is for us the distinct conceptibility (or 
imaginability) of that thing, and the existence the distinct perceptibility (or sensibility) of it. 
Indeed, the compound of the qualities assumed simultaneously, that is conceptibility, consti-
tutes the essence of a thing; perceptibility proves its existence (as evidently it is not a thing’s 
fault that it is not actually sensed). (A VI 1 285)22 
The incipit of this passage recalls Leibniz’s claim that “terms” (that is, the words 
of a language) may either refer in concreto or in abstracto – a distinction that is, 
once again, Hobbesian.23 Terms may refer to concrete and so be analyzed into sim-
ples which are sensible qualities; or they may refer to abstracta, that is essences 
whose simple constituent are primitives.24 However, Leibniz attempts to couch this 
Hobbesian distinction within an ontological and epistemological framework that is 
 
22 This passage is a revised version of Leibniz’s Nova methodus discendae docendaeque juris-
prudentiae (1677). Between 1695 and 1708, Leibniz produced three distinct revisions of his 
printed version of Nova methodus. Indeed, Leibniz remarks on several occasions, such as in a 
letter to Placcius (1695), that he wished to publish a new version of the text. (A II 3 51: “Ego 
ante multo annos cogitaveram de Methodo mea recudenda et augenda, quin et subinde corri-
genda.”). The quotations and translations here constitute the latest version of the passage, as 
reconstructed using the various manuscripts and notes present in the critical edition (A VI 1 
285), which reproduce Leibniz’s three textual revisions. 
23 See Di Bella (2005). 
24 An analogue distinction can be found in MKTI, where Leibniz says that primitives are constit-
uents of notions that, in contrast to sensations, can be the object of an intuition. An example of 
















































decidedly non-Hobbesian, viz. within a distinction between beings and essences, 
the latter to be understood as connections of conceptual marks that do not depend 
on languages because they are ideas in God’s intellect. Leibniz defines a being as a 
bearer of sensible qualities or what can be known through perception. A being, 
however, is not an essence, viz. a cluster of qualities that are altogether conceived 
as possible or without contradiction. The result of this distinction is a variegated 
ontology that is characterized by a denial that abstract entities can exist, because 
abstracta cannot be beings, that is, things that can mechanically interact with a cog-
nizant agent’s sense organs and thereby be possible objects of perception. The es-
sence of a geometrical sphere cannot be a possible object of existence unless it is 
reified through expression, that is, transformed into a vehicle that can causally in-
teract with a cognizant agent’s sense organs, like a diagram, as Leibniz explains to 
Bayle. We will analyze the impact of this distinction at length. For now, we need 
to investigate the difference between two cognitive acts. The first being that through 
which an agent apprehends and predicts something’s possible existence; the second 
being that through which one evaluates the possibility of an essence (as well as what 
can be deduced from it). 
In other words, while nested within an eclectic nomenclature, “perceptibility”, 
“imaginability”, and “conceptibility”, understood as kinds of conceivability, which 
will be exhaustively unpacked herewith, correspond with distinctions between 
kinds of cognitive act. Unlike Hobbes, however, Leibniz explains the distinction 
between various cognitive acts in terms of their respective dependence upon differ-
ent faculties and not on the kinds of connections between cognitively-equivalent 
terms. Indeed, there is already a difference between the act of sense-perceiving a 
wolf and conceiving of (sc. conceptualizing) the essence of a wolf. The kinds of 
connection possible between sense-perceptual and conceptual states supervenes on 
this distinction. Sense-perceiving rests on principles analyzable into spatiotemporal 
constraints on beings that are apprehended as bodies, which simply cannot provide 
knowledge of essences, viz. clusters of conceptual marks that are joined by virtue 
of identity and contradiction. Prior experience of a wolf, for example, is required in 
order to recognize beings as wolves, although it is not sufficient for achieving 
knowledge of a wolf’s essence as a cluster of conceptual requisites necessary for 
defining its essence. Experience alone, therefore, does not afford knowledge of a 
wolf as a mammal with four legs of the genus “canis”, etc. As we will see in chapter 
IV, this claim is problematic insofar as Leibniz’s metaphysics – which is based on 
the harmony between body and soul (sc. between bodily states and cognitive states) 
– implies that cognitive states are first and foremost about those things that can 
causally interact with a cognitive agent’s sensory organs, that is, they are about 
beings. If this is the case, then how can minds conceive of essences, especially if 
essences are neither beings nor are they objects of possible sensory experience? The 
answer proffered by the present enquiry is that the work of the imagination fills the 
gap between perceiving and conceiving because both acts are in fact imaginative, 
and are therefore both relevantly related to possibility.  
To anticipate the argument developed at length in this book, both beings and 















































 1. The Subject Matter of the Imagination 23 
ideas in performing those acts. Perceptibility is the construction of a being as a body 
changing within given spatiotemporal parameters. Indeed, because space and time 
(understood as continuous quantities) are innate notions of common sense and are 
the proper subject matter of the imagination (as shall be argued in chapter II), the 
expression of beings as bodies that undergo alteration in fact rests on the synthetic 
(viz. expressive) character of the imagination and its native spatiotemporal logic. 
Meanwhile, conceptibility is a capacity for ordering and connecting conceptual 
marks by means of imagistic vehicles, such as the words in a language, which com-
bine to constitute definitions. To this act, the agent needs the expressive work of 
the imagination, which reassesses representative vehicles, that are subject to space 
and time, in order to express identity and contradiction between concepts. The syn-
thetic work of the imagination in processing perceptual data and their organization 
results in types, to be understood as acquired abilities to interpret a being as having 
a nature common with other, similar beings. Types, I argue, constitute a necessary 
step in a cognizant agent’s acquisition of concepts, which may in turn be couched 
as abilities to define abstract essences. 
The constitutive chapters of this monograph textually support and expound this 
theory in detail. Herewith, I argue that the distinction drawn by Leibniz between 
types and concepts constitutes an attempt to distinguish soundly between “percep-
tibility” and “conceptibility”. Leibniz’s aim in arguing for such a distinction is the 
attribution of a kind of reasoning to non-human animals, which is similar to pre-
conceptual forms of reasoning in human beings, owing to which it is a form of 
empirical reasoning. However, in spite of their similarities, non-human empirical 
reasoning differs from human empirical reasoning insofar as it is a “shadow of rea-
soning”, as Leibniz writes in the NE. Animals lack the innate ideas possessed by 
human beings, which are required for the formation of more specific types, as well 
as abstract concepts. These innate ideas include the ideas of substance, unity, and 
identity, which are intellectual ideas that are not shared by non-human animals, and 
allow for the cognitive activity of abstraction (again, enjoyed only by human be-
ings). 
The distinction between perception and thought is furthermore relevant to ex-
plaining a tenet of Leibniz’s theory of cognition that is, as demonstrated in chapter 
IV, intrinsically related to his theory of substance, viz. that both human and non-
human animals are cognitive agents, although the latter cannot be moral agents. 
Forms of action based on empirical reasoning, such as going to bed because we 
expect the sun will rise after the darkness of the night, is not moral action. The 
development of such inductive responses is indispensable to animal survival and 
explains why human beings (in this respect like their non-human counterparts) act 
like empirics for three-quarters of their lives. All animal action begins with habitual 
expectations of what will occur in the future. Unlike non-human animals, however, 
rational-agential action is characterized differently. Their actions can be free, owing 
to which their actions can be evaluated morally, viz. as either good or bad, just or 
unjust, since rational agents can establish civil and moral peer relationships. Their 
















































are able to develop social and civil interactions, an intuition that we again find in 
Hobbes:  
Which kind of thoughts [the thoughts that link the cause with the effect, L.O.], is called fore-
sight, and prudence, or providence; and sometimes wisdom; though such conjecture, through 
the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is certain; by how 
much one man has more experience of things past, than another; by so much also he is more 
prudent, and his expectations the seldomer fail him. The present only has a being in nature; 
things past have a being in the memory only, but things to come have no being at all; the future 
being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions past, to the actions that are 
present; which with most certainty is done by him that has most experience; but not with cer-
tainty enough. (Hobbes, Leviathan, Part. I Of Man, Chap. 3) 
The capacity to connect the present with the future is related to both the moral and 
civil domains of human action. For, in exercising this capacity, we are prudent; we 
foresee events and act providentially.25 These abilities ordinarily belong to the 
sphere of ethics and virtue. Why, then, is the capacity to imagine the future relevant 
to morality? To this, Hobbes proffers a perceptive reply: the future states imagined 
by human agents, as consequences of current states, constitute non-being, owing to 
which these states are a fiction; lacking certainty. While foregoing actions exist in 
the past – and the present obtains right now – the future does not and is not. Cogni-
zant agents’ acts of bestowing being upon imagined states of affairs is not only the 
source of anticipation (thanks to which we act in accordance with our expectations, 
such as when I see that the cup is going to fall and so I grab it): it is also constitutive 
of belief-ascription or mind-reading. This is at work, for instance, when I see my 
niece pick up the toy phone: I take this gesture as a sign that she believes to be 
talking to me through the phone.  
Moreover, at the end of foregoing passage, Hobbes remarks that humans are 
prophets (viz. people who are good at guessing thanks to their acquaintance with a 
certain domain, owing to which they recognize signs of things to come). Indeed, 
this latter remark explains the early modern tendency to link the use of signs to the 
work of the imagination. Mastering a language is a capacity to predict what another 
is thinking. This begins with the signs used to express thoughts, which is a capacity 
for establishing a connection between what one thinks and what one says through 
the production of phonemes with phonatory organs. When our imaginative capacity 
is analyzed in relation to issues concerning the origins of language (for example, 
how it is even possible that we agree on what signs mean before we have any shared 
language) and its normativity (why we defer to linguistic conventions at all),26 it 
looks like our capacity to imagine the future – or guess others’ actions and thoughts 
– must have played a decisive role in language development, through which we 
 
25 What does it mean to be providential? By anticipating what is going to happen, and on the 
condition that I feel love or philia towards someone, then I will act so as to protect them. Inter-
estingly, Leibniz does not exclude animals from being motivated by an instinctual apprehension 
of philia (see NE 93–4). 
















































 2. Content Summary 25 
establish a social, civic bond. Indeed, these skills altogether constitute what we call 
rationality.  
It therefore seems that the exercise of our intellectual skills goes hand-in-hand 
with our unique capacity for predicting what will happen next, viz. our tendency to 
imagine the future, even if (from the standpoint of the present) it is only a fiction. 
Our lower and higher cognitive abilities improve in tandem; a development to 
which the imagination contributes remarkably. However, Leibniz thinks that, in or-
der to comprehend the work of the imagination, thereby providing a sound theory 
of human and non-human cognition, we need to reject the idea that the imagination 
is first and foremost a faculty of fiction. 
2. CONTENT SUMMARY 
In developing his theory of the imagination, Leibniz expounds two fundamental 
ideas. The first is that the imagination is unfree: it follows its own logic in forming 
connections, this being distinct from the logic of the intellect, which rests on the 
ideas of identity and contradiction. By contrast with the intellect, the imagination’s 
logic is deduced from its peculiar subject matter. In fact, in believing that all rea-
soning constitutes an act of imagining, Leibniz takes the imagination to be an au-
tonomous faculty, which has its own subject matter just like any other faculty, alt-
hough it necessarily interacts with other faculties. For Leibniz, the subject matter 
of the imagination is continuous quantity or magnitude. Indeed, it is in virtue of its 
relation to continuous magnitude that the imagination is related to space and time, 
and thereby to possibility. Against this background, I shall argue that Leibniz is in 
a position to consider the imagination as both a cognitive and conative faculty.27 
Indeed, through his exposition of the imagination, Leibniz is able to explain how 
agents can learn from fictions (to which end the imagination is functionally indis-
pensable). This question necessarily arises when one assumes that the imagination 
is largely in the business of entertaining possible (but, as-yet, non-existent) states 
of affairs, although these are not (strictly speaking) fictional.  
Moreover, Leibniz thinks that it is its relation to magnitude that makes the im-
agination first and foremost a synthetic faculty of what Leibniz calls expressions 
(otherwise describable as a combinatoric faculty, or a faculty of invention). Expres-
sions are cognitive surrogates that make available to the mind an object of 
knowledge in a way that allows for easier extrapolation and connection of bits of 
information, which would otherwise remain off-limits to the cognizant agent. Ex-
pressions are Leibniz’s Hobbesian response to Descartes’ theory of cognition, as I 
will argue in chapter I. Both ideas – viz. the imagination having constraints derived 
from its peculiar subject matter (magnitude) and these constraints being active in 
the formation of expression-relations – constitute Leibniz’s way of transforming 
the imagination’s role within his broader theory of substance.  
 
















































We could not explain to what extent the imagination constitutes the expressive 
power of the mind were we not to explain what expressions are. To this end, chapter 
I constitutes an enquiry into the prevailing scholarship regarding the topic of ex-
pression. There, I also advance my own thesis, viz. that expression has the cognitive 
function of simplifying information that would otherwise be too complex or heter-
ogeneous to be an object of human-agential (sc. finite) cognition. Expression is a 
relation between an exprimendum and an exprimens, whereby the exprimens trans-
lates and unifies pieces of information into a form accessible to a cognizant agent, 
who can thereafter cognitively elaborate upon it. Any act of cognition – from sen-
sation to thought – is a form of expression. This has an enormous impact on the role 
of the imagination in developing other forms of expression.  
Chapter II explores the groundwork of the imagination. To this end, I argue that 
this groundwork consists in synthetizing sensations afforded by the senses into per-
ceptible wholes: extended shapes with sizes that are bearers of qualities. Perceptible 
wholes are confused expressions of variegated, discrete matter, which are trans-
formed into perceptions of a distinguished kind through a process of comparison, 
resulting in the interiorization of concrete beings as types of bodies. As already 
intimated, types are rules expressing the common nature of similar beings, encoding 
information about a being’s possible alterations qua type of phenomenon. Types 
are therefore rules for processing actually-experienced phenomena as similar to 
previously-experienced phenomena, thereby helping to anticipate and predict how 
things may or may not change. Chapters III–VI expound this theory. 
Chapter III constitutes an enquiry into issues arising from the ideality of ex-
pressions. Although expressions are ideal and abstract, and so depend upon the im-
agination, they are not fictions. This is because expressions are partially grounded 
in metaphysical facts and partially grounded in cognitive facts, insofar as the cog-
nizant agent is embodied. Chapter III explains the partial, metaphysical grounds of 
expression, while chapter IV constitutes an enquiry into their contrasting cognitive 
grounds. The latter presents an initial argument for types, as based on Leibniz’s idea 
that the degree of clarity enjoyed by sentient souls depends on their capacity for 
constructing filters that are necessary for storing, elaborating upon, and utilizing 
information, thanks to which agents can deploy more specific responses to the 
world. Chapter 4 further introduces the idea that a heightened perception has within 
it a sense of coherence or implicit judgment regarding the existence and reality of 
an experienced phenomenon. Through experience, cognizant agents enhance their 
capacity for distinguishing between real and imaginary phenomena.  
Chapter V and VI build upon the aforementioned Leibnizian notion of “coher-
ence”. There, I argue that coherence is to perception what identity and contradiction 
are to conceptual reasoning: ideal rules establishing possible and impossible com-
binations and successions of states. I further argue that we can distinguish between 
a first- and second-order coherence. In short, first-order coherence rests on space 
and time, thereby constituting what Leibniz calls “empiric reasoning”, while sec-
ond-order coherence rests on similarity and difference, which are required for inte-
riorizing types. Chapter V defends the idea that there is a distinguished kind of 















































 3. Methodology 27 
of knowledge based on concepts. Chapter VI introduces a relation between the im-
agination and modalities, thereby proving that the imagination cannot conceive of 
pure possibilities. The logic of the imagination is distinct from that of the intellect, 
which relies on identity and contradiction. Consequently, necessary truths cannot 
be learned through experience. 
The distinction between concepts and types is the object of chapters VII and 
VIII, whereby I link Leibniz’s rejection of nominalist theories of universals (under-
stood as “collective wholes”) with his discussion about similarity and essences. 
Similarities between beings, construed by Leibniz as necessary for conceiving of 
concepts, are not thereby constitutive of concepts. The outcome of our analysis is 
an intensional interpretation of concepts. This keeps the extension of the concept 
(viz. the recognition of particular instances as instances of a concept) “outside” the 
concept of a concept. This means that extensional interpretations of concepts 
(which are based on recognition) falls under the purview of types. Chapter VIII 
proffers a more detailed analysis of the metaphysical implications of this logical 
theory. It further provides an error theory for explaining why, although we take the 
imagination to be pervasive in cognitive life, it is still the primary source of epis-
temic error. 
In developing Leibniz’s discourse on the imagination, I advance the thesis that 
each faculty has its own constraints, understood as limits on the extent of its possi-
ble operation. Chapter IX provides a full account of Leibniz’s theory of innate ideas 
understood as such constraints, in particular on an agent’s cognitive powers. On my 
unpacking, innate ideas are active tendencies of the mind to form expressions. This 
activity results in a bootstrapping process: expressions produced through the inter-
play of the imagination with a lower cognitive faculty are reassessed and reused by 
the imagination when interacting with a higher faculty – both for reasons of econ-
omy and normativity. The bootstrapping process, which is evident in the use of 
tropes for establishing new meanings for names, underwrites the Leibnizian learn-
ing process from experience and provides an answer to the question of why non-
human animals do not develop skills similar to those of human animals, although 
they are capable of implementing lower forms of empirical reasoning. Chapter IX 
constitutes both the continuation and the conclusion of chapter I, providing thereby 
an answer to the issues raised in the present introduction. 
3. METHODOLOGY  
Leibniz does not use the word “type”. This is language that I invoke as a proxy for 
different Leibnizian expressions (including “possibilities inherent in the resem-
blances”, “nature”, or “distinct perception”). In the spirit of Leibniz’s teaching on 
languages – based on the idea that languages must be economical – I found a word 
that could express some of the features of “distinct perception” while not being a 
concept, with the aim of helping the reader to follow my reconstruction of Leibniz’s 
















































apprehended qua general instance of a similarity class. Types are involved in form-
ing expectations, but are not concepts. Chapters IV, V, and VI unfold the function 
of types in cognition, thereby assessing the extent to which reasoning based on types 
is imaginative in character.  
The word “type” in this work refer thus to a degree of knowledge which lies 
between clear and confused sensations and clear and distinct concepts, viz. what 
Leibniz calls clear and distinct perceptions. Chapter III reconstructs Leibniz’s the-
ory of degrees of cognition by confronting Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and 
Ideas (1684); Letter on What is Beyond Senses and Matter (1702) and Letter on the 
Element of Geometry of the Duke of Burgundy (1705). I argue that there seems to 
be a missing degree in MKTI which is in turn present in both letters. This step is 
clear and distinct perception, that is the apprehension of beings as a perceptible 
whole having parts and attributes. A perceptible whole is the expression of a being 
as a shape having size and qualities and it is a spontaneous product of the sense-
perceptual activity of the sentient soul expressing the affections of the body it is 
attached to. Sense-perception has a physiological and a cognitive component upon 
which the soul has no control, although it can be said nonetheless to be active in the 
process of sense-perceiving. Perceptible wholes are the simplest product of this ac-
tivity that is implemented by the cognitive agent’s capacity to compare and so learn 
through experience. Chapters II to VI are devoted to explaining how the cognitive 
agent move from perceiving beings as perceptible wholes (appearances of shape 
with size) to recognize them as bodies of a certain type. Bodies, as we will argue, 
is a more complex expression of beings not simply as appearances of shapes, but as 
objects composed by states varying in compliance with space and time constraints. 
A type is a more sophisticated expressions of a particular kind of body based on the 
cognitive agent’s capacity to recognize being’s common nature. A survey of texts 
contemporary to MKTI in chapter III will show that Leibniz endorsed such a view 
on the mind already when he wrote the MKTI. Leibniz’s theory remains coherent 
through the years.  
These considerations bring us to a further issue. Leibniz scholarship is sensitive 
to distinguishing between different periods within his philosophical production, as 
marked by an apparent change of heart on certain matters within his intellectual 
production. As aforementioned, I argue that Leibniz’s views about cognition settle 
around the time of his Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas (1684). Corrob-
oration for this view consists in Leibniz’s continuing reference to this text – even 
in his confrontation with Locke. As I will argue in chapter II, also the Letter on 
What is Beyond Senses and Matter basically reproduces the degrees of cognition 
exposed in MKTI simply adding what remained underdeveloped in MKTI but was 
already present in other texts. As a further proof of this unchanged core theory of 
cognition, consider that around the year 1695 Leibniz begins his project of revisions 
of his Nova methodus discendae docendaeque jurisprudentiae. The text was pub-
lished by Leibniz in 1667 and contains a theory on how to teach and learn jurispru-
dence based also on matter concerning cognition and languages. Between the years 
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the Academy Edition as footnotes signed with the letters D; E; F.28 As the Academy 
Editors report, Leibniz added pages to his copy of Nova methodus discendae do-
cendaeque jurisprudentiae and reported on these sheets his changes of the text. The 
editors explains that notes marked with D refers to the first set of revisions Leibniz 
carried on the complete texts. Notes marked as E and F correspond to partial revi-
sions of disparate parts.29 He basically takes the published work and adds pages in 
the book on which he corrects the text. Most of the revisions concern terminology. 
Especially, Leibniz seems to consistently substitute “sensations” with “percep-
tions”, where “perception” means a state of the cognizant mind that evaluate not 
simply the appearances of something, but the existence. Existence, as we will see, 
will consist in a distinct perception of a body as a type of body. The body is appre-
hended as a type when the cognizant agent recognizes the body as having a nature 
common to other bodies previously experienced and so forms expectation of how 
the body is going to change in agreement with its nature. This makes me think that 
while, over the years, Leibniz’s core theory underwent various expansions and re-
finements, it remains – in spirit – unchanged.  
The aim of this enquiry is to enable the emergence of Leibniz’s theory of im-
agination through various loci within his metaphysics, epistemology, theory of cog-
nition, and philosophy of language. The present introduction provides a synopsis of 
the range of abilities the Leibnizian imagination allegedly controls, while the task 
of each chapter is to present, through textual analysis, an accurate reconstruction of 
the topics addressed. It must be noted that Leibniz never dedicated a work to the 
imagination. However, this is not a reason to think that he did not have a distinctive 
theory regarding its role in cognition. As I have already stressed, the centrality given 
to expression, language, and perceptual processes all have links to the imagination, 
and especially to Leibniz’s theory of substance. 
Finally, allow me to make a remark about methodology. Philosophical recon-
struction, which captures my approach herewith, means that Leibniz’s writings 
should undergo a historically well-informed conceptual analysis, offering a coher-
ent presentation of his views about a subject by linking them to topics or other issues 
which, while not directly addressed by the texts, nonetheless aid our understanding 
thereto. This work serves to tease out, and make explicit, conceptual distinctions 
which, for various contingent reasons, remain hidden, or implicit, within the text. 
This is moreover owing to the distinctive Leibnizian attitude (well-known to Leib-
niz scholars) for adopting terminology familiar to the addressee of a text, while 
using it without deference to the philosophical doctrine from which it stems. Leib-
niz’s intention is to ameliorate his readers’ comprehension of why a term should be 
 
28 We know from different letters to Placcius June 25/July 5 1695 (A II 3 50), and a letter to 
Kettwig (June-October 1696), that Leibniz was working on the revision in those years, and, 
according to the Academy edition, he continued working intermittently until 1708. The edition 
in VI I lists three main revisions between the years 1691–1708. The revisions were so substan-
tial that the edition in VI I simply reports some of them as footnotes. Loemker translates the 
text from 1667 and some of the footnotes present in the Academy edition in VI I. 
















































understood differently from how it is presented according to prevailing philosoph-
ical doctrine. Hence, Leibniz aims mostly at imposing to the philosophical term his 
own concepts. The result is often a theoretical debacle, because it produces in his 
interlocutor (as well as in contemporary readers) a sort of lost in following the ar-
gument. This strategy is evident in Leibniz’s use of the terms “idea”, “perception”, 
“substance”, “extension”, among others, which he adopts with the intention of im-
buing them with new, philosophical meanings. This is often counterproductive in-
sofar as it results in a misunderstanding of Leibniz’s own arguments, which were 
of course read against the backdrop of prevailing concepts and definitions that he 
judged incorrect and erroneous, such as Cartesian categories. Conceptual analysis, 
on my view, aims at circumventing such pitfalls, not least as a direct consequence 















































I. THE EXPRESSIVE POWER OF THE MIND                             
AND ITS VARIETIES 
In virtue of different kinds of conceivability, the expressive power of the mind can 
either be directed towards concrete beings or abstract essences. As we pointed out 
in the introduction, on the one hand, perceptibility is the act by which the mind 
apprehends beings qua existent. On the other, conceptibility (or imaginability) ap-
prehends essences qua possible. The metaphysical constitution of the mind (under-
stood as a unity of an organic body and a bundle of cognitive faculties) determines 
the order in the manifestation of different kinds of directness: apprehension of be-
ings’ existence via perceptibility is spontaneously exercised by the mind before the 
mind can be directed towards possible abstract essences. In concluding the intro-
ductory chapter, we considered the heterogeneity of the concrete and the abstract – 
of being and essence – , and asked how the mind is able to develop distinct 
knowledge of essences, if, given the mind’s metaphysical constitution, it is fore-
most directed towards the existence of beings.  
The question is more compelling when we consider that, on Leibniz’s account, 
innate ideas do not function as representational devices that the mind simply apper-
ceives1 when there is a causal interaction with an object. Ideas are no objects of 
intentional acts; they are dispositions to form intentional contents or, as I am going 
to argue, to express what the cognizant agent tends to know.2 To borrow Leibniz’s 
metaphor, the mind has the power of drawing Hercules (that is, a distinct conceptual 
content) from a marble block (the raw experiential material) thanks to it being a 
“block of veined marble”, that is, disclosing its endowment of innate ideas (NE 
82/A VI 6 82). This is not to say that Hercules is readily seen by the mind. To this 
end, his extraction needs work. Leibniz denies that a particular mental state is about 
something because the mind already possesses ideas that will themselves become 
objects of reflection and provide information about features of the objects ideas 
represent.3 Leibnizian ideas do not represent; they express insofar as they are pow-
ers or abilities to form expressions. A particular mental state is about something in 
 
1 I use the term “apperceive” in this context as suggested by Barth (2011), that is as “noticing 
something” or “paying attention to something.” 
2 Most scholars endorse the view that ideas are for Leibniz tendencies or dispositions; they are 
not objects of thought themselves, see Ishiguro (1972: 23–7); Mugnai (1976; 1982); Bolton 
(2011a), Leduc (2011); Picone (2005); Poser (2016); Oliveri (2016; 2016a; 2016c). Most of 
scholars endorse as well that everything the mind can know is already inscribed in the mind as 
an idea. I reject this claim. I think that the mind has a set of necessary principles and ideas 
required to acquire concepts; these latter are only virtually innate; they are not innate as innate 
ideas are (see Oliveri, 2016: I.3.). I will address this topic in Chapter IX. 
3 I think however that the mind can reflect on its innate dispositions and understands which prin-
ciples and ideas are innate to the intellect in order for this latter to be the faculty of knowledge, 















































32 I. The Expressive Power of the Mind and its Varieties 
virtue of the mind having ideas (understood as dispositions) to form expressions 
and expressions become objects of reflection. An expression is any cognitive sur-
rogate – whether words, diagrams, images, etc. – that refers to either an existing 
being and its properties, or to an essence. The expression is an expression because 
it bears “a constant and regular relation between what can be said about one [the 
expression, L.O.] and about the other [the thing expressed L.O.]” (Leibniz to Ar-
nauld, September 1687, A II 2 231/L 339). Expressions are cognitive tools deployed 
by a rational agent to attain knowledge of something. On this view, knowledge is 
acquired by virtue of ideas, viz. through inspection of those expressions formed in 
virtue of the idea. Knowledge is not, therefore, acquired through a direct inspection 
of innate ideas. Ideas are cognitive powers that allow the mind to form expressions, 
which are then used by the mind to reason about diverse kinds of intentional ob-
jects.4 
I am aware of only one passage in which Leibniz claims that ideas are “un objet 
immediat interne”, “an immediate internal object” (NE 109/A VI 6 109). This def-
inition could cause us to believe that ideas are themselves intentional objects. What 
follows this claim, however, dismisses this interpretation: an object is “an expres-
sion of the nature or of the qualities of the thing” (NE 109/A VI 6 109). Expression, 
in this context, refers to cognitive surrogates that the mind deploys in thinking, such 
as signs, diagrams, images, or anything that is sense-perceived and processed by 
the mind as related to something else with the aim of extracting and deriving pieces 
of information, which are about the thing expressed. Therefore, ideas are not direct 
object of thought; only expressions can become objects of thought. For expressions 
are products of innate ideas as causal mental powers, namely, when a rational agent 
actually considers an expression and has the power to correctly interpret it, the agent 
takes the expression as if she is operating with the idea or the thing expressed itself. 
For Leibniz, ideas, understood as objective contents, are essences present only in 
God’s intellect (NE 256/A VI 6 256; Mugnai, 1990). They are that which we can 
only approximate by expressing the existing world using our God-given powers, 
our innate ideas.  
A full disclosure of Leibniz’s theory of ideas will find its place in chapter IX. 
The present chapter enquires into Leibniz’s technical term ‘expression’. To this end, 
it provides a survey of scholarly work on this notion, defending in turn the thesis 
that the mind has the power to be about an idea (i.e., an essence in God’s mind). 
This is owing to its having recourse to resources (viz., innate ideas of the rational 
agent’s mind) to invent expressions either of beings or essences. In outlining the 
cognitive dimensions of expressions, this chapter points to the decisive role of im-
agination in producing expressions, and so paves the way to our analysis of the logic 
of imagination in the next chapter. To this end, I shall begin by bringing in textual 
evidence such that, on Leibniz’s view, ideas are dispositions to form expressions. 
 
4 This distinction between ideas and concepts is a settled point in the literature. See, for instance, 
Mugnai (1990); Bolton (2006); Leduc (2011), in particular, insist upon this fundamental aspect 















































 1. Ideas as Dispositions to Form Expressions 33 
1. IDEAS AS DISPOSITIONS TO FORM EXPRESSIONS 
Scholars agree that Leibniz’s text Quid sit idea? is a kind of manifesto for his theory 
of innate ideas as dispositions. “In my opinion”, writes Leibniz, “an idea consists 
not in some act, but in the faculty of thinking, and we are said to have an idea of a 
thing even if we do not think of it, if only, on a given occasion, we can think of it” 
(A VI 4 B 1370/L 207). The text begins by equating ideas and faculties, concluding 
with the claim that the mind does not have ideas of complex objects. On the con-
trary, what we deploy in reasoning instead of ideas are expressions. As Leibniz 
remarks, “there must be something in me which not merely leads me to the thing 
but also expresses it” (A VI 4 B 1370/L 207). He elaborates as follows: 
That ideas of things are in us means therefore nothing but that God, the creator alike of the 
things and of the mind, has impressed a power of thinking upon the mind so that it can, by its 
own operations derive what corresponds perfectly to the nature of things. Although, therefore, 
the idea of a circle is not similar to the circle [the expression, i.e. the figure or equation we 
deploy in expressing the idea, L.O], truths can be derived from it [from the expression, L.O.] 
that would be confirmed beyond doubt by investigating a real circle (A VI 4 B 1370/L 208). 
This passage squares with a further passage, written some years earlier (1675), in a 
paper entitled On the mind, the Universe and God. It is difficult to underestimate 
the centrality of this text in the interpretation of Leibniz’s theory of cognition. Alt-
hough it is an early text, it nevertheless presents Leibniz’s skepticism about the 
Cartesian theory of ideas as both dispositions and contents.5 The basic thesis of the 
text is that the mind cannot intuit complex ideas, those ideas having more than one 
requisite.6 Therefore, the Cartesian theory of ideas as immediate objects of a mind’s 
perception is false. The only alternative to the Cartesian theory is to argue that ideas 
are “what is necessary to think of” a particular kind of essence (for instance, a 
square), because the mind can invent surrogates – like images or signs – which 
function as tools for deriving truths (Leduc, 2011). Here, Leibniz uses the same 
example of the idea of a circle, claiming that we do not have any idea of the circle, 
but only expressions of the circle and “anything necessary to think of a circle”: 
We do not have any idea of a circle, such as there is in God, who thinks all things at the same 
time. There is in us an image of a circle, and also the definition of a circle, and there are in us 
the ideas of those things that are necessary for a circle to be thought. We think about a circle, 
we provide demonstrations of a circle, we recognize a circle: its essence is known to us, part 
by part. (A VI 3 463/DSR 5) 
The passage is complex and so requires a detailed analysis, which will be offered 
in our chapter on innate ideas. For now, however, we need to bear in mind that, if 
ideas are faculties, then they cannot do the work of being representational devices 
 
5 As noted also by Belaval (1990), Bolton (2006; 2011a; 2011b), Picone (2005), Mugnai (1976), 
and Leduc (2011). 















































34 I. The Expressive Power of the Mind and its Varieties 
that the mind attentively considers and “observes with its mind’s eyes”.7 This can-
not be the way in which Leibnizian ideas represent. Leibniz’s ideas indeed express 
the nature of things, and they do so owing to there being something (an expression) 
that takes the place of the thing. The mind can then operate with the expression as 
if the mind was dealing with the thing itself.8 If this is correct, then the mind is 
directed either to concrete beings or to abstract essences in virtue of an expression 
taken as referring either to a being or to an essence. This is because the mind has 
ideas that allow it to form expressions, which refer either to concrete beings or ab-
stract essences.  
Looking at the problem of directedness from this perspective, I claim, suggests 
that intentional states develop gradually. Whether this is the right understanding 
can be assessed through an analysis of the way in which we develop our expressive 
devices – languages, diagrams, and anything that can count as an expression – be-
cause all that the mind can be about is mediated through kinds of expression. Unless 
the mind is dealing with what Leibniz calls “simple notions” – that is, notions com-
posed of a single requisite (such as the concept of unity), representing a simple 
essence – the mind cannot have intuitive knowledge of complex notions, viz. no-
tions composed of more than one conceptual requisite (such as the notion of a cir-
cle) whose essence is complex. The mind has no direct inspection of essences with-
out expressions playing a mediating role (see MKTI A VI 4 A 590/L 291).  
To fully appreciate the import of addressing the problem of intentionality in 
terms of a development of intentional capacities of the cognizant agent, which go 
hand-in-hand with a development of expressive devices, we should look into the 
 
7 I am following Leibniz in making a comparison with Descartes’ philosophy, at least as Leibniz 
understood it. For Descartes, ideas are dispositions “to see a content” and also the object of the 
content. This ambiguity lead to a famous controversy between Malebranche and Arnauld on 
the very nature of ideas: are they modifications of the mind or are they objects of the mind? 
Arnauld claimed they are modifications; Malebranche argued they are not, and that they should 
be thought of as objects that only an infinite mind like God can possess. Leibniz studied this 
controversy, criticizing Malebranche and Arnauld, and was evidently puzzled by the nature of 
ideas: if they are dispositions, then they cannot be objects (High 2008; Jolley 1988: 71–91; 
Perler 1996: 207–32; Oliveri 2016: I, 1) His solution was to argue that they are faculties or 
dispositions to form expressions of things and essences; the expressions can become the objects 
of thoughts, and hence, indirectly, they stay for ideas, i.e., essences, in the mind of God, thereby 
becoming objects of thought. To argue in this direction, Leibniz had to convince the Cartesians 
that what minds perceive are not ideas themselves, but expressions. Therefore, many of his 
writings on the topic of ideas begin with a denial that the mind enters in direct contact with 
ideas. His standard argument for denying that we possess ideas is that we talk and believe we 
have ideas of things, which turn out to be impossible, like the most rapid movement. See, for 
instance, the beginning of “On mind, the universe and God” (A VI 3 462/DSR 5); “What is an 
idea?” (A VI 4 1370–1/L 207–9); and MKTI in A VI 4 A 590/L 292–3).  
8 This formulation is typical of Leibniz’s description of an expression: an expression allows a 
subject to abstract or infer truth about another thing that remains in an expressive relation with 
the object of analysis, whereby the truth achieved is as valid as if we had known it through 















































 2. Expression and its Interpretation 35 
concept of expression. This will help us to understand what kind of relations ex-
pressions are and, more importantly, which cognitive functions expressions exer-
cise within mental processes. Leibniz’s distinction between natural and arbitrary 
kinds of expressions seems to hint at the same order of development of diverse 
kinds of intentionality. In short, the idea seems to be that when we conceive of 
essences, the mind does so thanks to its ability to invent arbitrary kind of expres-
sions, viz. signs composing into a language. Nonetheless, if the mind can invent 
arbitrary kinds of expressions, then it is because the mind already knows natural 
kinds of expressions and can extend them to other knowledge domains.9 To argue 
in this direction, then, we first need to make clear what an expression is and why 
intentionality rests on the human capacity to form expressions. 
2. EXPRESSION AND ITS INTERPRETATION 
The notion of expression permeates Leibniz’s philosophy: the mind expresses the 
body; the world expresses God; the individual mind expresses God and the world; 
and language expresses thought. Expressions are also multidisciplinary. We find 
them in mathematics, metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of language, and 
the theory of cognition. Expressions hence seem to theoretically unify these dispar-
ate disciplines. If this is correct, then we should be able to univocally define and 
model the notion of ‘expression’. 
A broad way of defining ‘expression’ is as of a relation that occurs between 
two relata, such that one relatum preserves information that structures or charac-
terizes the other. Scholars have defined a relation of expression as a kind of map-
ping of parts of the exprimendum (what must be expressed) onto parts of the expri-
mens (what expresses). The mapping allows for the “data mining” of relations and 
information characterizing the exprimendum by means of the exprimens. An exam-
ple of this is the relation between a geographical region and a map. The map is not 
the region, but by analyzing relations internal to the map (such as the distance be-
tween two dots on the map), we can infer distances between two places within the 
region (Swoyer, 1995). In so doing, we gain knowledge about the region that would 
have been very difficult (if not impossible) to acquire without the use of the map. 
The expression is a surrogate of the exprimendum, owing to which this kind of rea-
soning has been named “surrogative reasoning” (Swoyer, 1995). 
This analysis of the notion of expression, to the extent that it focusses on the epis-
temic force of the notion, is vouched for by some of the most cited Leibniz texts on 
the topic: 
One thing expresses another, in my usage, when there is a constant and regular relation between 
what can be said about one and about the other. It is in this way that a projection in perspective 
 
9 I argued for a developmental view of our expressive devices in Oliveri (2016: III.1–2), Oliveri 
(2016b) and Oliveri (2014) this latter with special focus on prepositions. The topic of language 















































36 I. The Expressive Power of the Mind and its Varieties 
expresses a geometric figure. Expression is common to all the forms and is a genus of which 
natural perception, animal feeling, and intellectual knowledge are species (Leibniz to Arnauld, 
September 1687, A II 2 240/L 339). 
Even if the definition of expression seems to be complete, I want to pay attention 
to what follows this definition: 
In natural perception and feeling, it suffices that what is divisible and material and found dis-
persed among several beings should be expressed or represented in a single indivisible being 
or in a substance endowed with true unity. The possibility of the representation of several things 
in one cannot be doubted, since our soul provides us with an example of it. (Leibniz to Arnauld, 
September 1687, A II 2 240–1/L 339) 
I invite the reader to bear in mind throughout the rest of our analysis that the clas-
sical passage, in which Leibniz defines expression, is normally construed as a kind 
of mapping, which continues by stressing that, in order to have an expression, it is 
sufficient that there is a kind of unity represented in the expression. This is so, for 
instance, in the case of simple sensations of sensory qualities, like colors. Colors 
appear to cognizant agents as simple and without parts, even if they are expressions 
of the causal changes of particles of matter interacting with the sense-organs of the 
perceivers. Because of harmony, the material changes are reflected or mirrored at 
the level of the cognizant agent as minute perceptual changes. The appearance of a 
color is a simple, confused notion that expresses the unification of minute percep-
tions changing in the perceivers (NE 53). On this understanding, the notion of color 
is simple and unanalyzable, whereby no mapping of parts onto other parts is possi-
ble. And, even if it were possible, there would not be the salient trait of this kind of 
expressions. Simple notions do not express because cognizant agents are aware of 
a mapping of parts of the expressions onto parts of the things expressed; they ex-
press because they present a multitude into a simpler unity available to the mind.10 
We will return later to the notion of unity. For now, we ought to focus on some 
scholarly work on expression. 
The overall assumption at work in the debate is that, in order to capture the 
epistemic force of expression, one needs to determine what kind of relation the ex-
pression-relation is. More specifically, what makes a relation between two items an 
expression relation? 
The literature on the topic has a venerable tradition, beginning at least with 
Menke (1925) and Cassirer, although the idea of focusing on epistemic force and 
capturing it by means of formal tools – modelling the kind of relation that expres-
sion consists in – was established by Kulstad (1977: 55–76). His analysis has given 
a welcome twist to the debate, provoking much scholarship on the notion. In short, 
 
10 On an interesting interpretation of monadic expression as a form of phenomenology, Poser 
(2000: 19–41), who insists on the synthetic/unifying activity of the monad resulting in various 
forms of phenomena. As it will result from the rest of the chapter and the inquiry in the next 
















































 2. Expression and its Interpretation 37 
Kulstad argues that the expression relation may be understood as a mapping rela-
tion/function between two sets associated to the exprimens and the exprimendum, 
respectively. The claim, “one thing expresses another” is an elliptical proxy for a 
five-place relation: there is a relation between two things such that there are two 
sets associated to the things that allow for a mapping of their items thanks to a 
certain relation that needs spelling out (see formulation D of the principle of ex-
pression in Kulstad, 1977: 70–76). 
Kulstad’s study has been criticized by Swoyer (1995), who highlights an aspect 
of the notion of expression which, I think, is decisive in understanding Leibniz’s 
account. Swoyer first notices that a mapping relation of this sort must be bijective, 
which may be possible for some kinds of expression, but not for just any kind of 
expression. Consider the circle and the ellipse that expresses it: the ellipse does not 
have all of the qualities of the circle (Swoyer, 1995). Swoyer’s central objection 
concerns the notion of mapping between sets: mapping loses its grip on Leibniz’s 
notion of expression since it misses the idea of what is preserved in the passage 
from the thing to the expression, viz., a structure that is reproduced by the expri-
mens, which is the same as, or similar to, that which characterizes the exprimendum. 
Recently, however, this conception of structural preservation has been criticized by 
Jorgensen (2019: 101–25), who sharpened Swoyer’s worry that there may be ex-
pressions where no structure is preserved, as in the case of an equation and the circle 
it expresses on a Cartesian plane.  
In analyzing the notion of expression, I will argue that expressions are devices 
of the human mind to apprehend the unity of one thing through the unity of another 
thing. Insistence upon the unity of the thing apprehended via the unity of the ex-
pression will turn out to be decisive for grasping both the nature and the cognitive 
function of the expression. And yet scholars seem to have paid less attention to the 
fact that what characterizes an expression-relation is not simply a certain relation 
between the parts of the exprimens and of the exprimendum, nor the structure, or 
information-preservation. Even if structure, mapping, and information-preservation 
are relevant to answering the question about what tools the mind has for finding 
expressions, they do not answer the question of why one thing expresses another.  
The epistemic force of an expression lies in the fact that the unity of the thing 
expressed is both produced and made available to a finite mind thanks to the de-
ployment of devices that present some cognitive advantages over the thing itself, 
which remains beyond the bounds of being grasped by a mind unless it is ex-
pressed.11 As I shall argue more extensively in chapter IV, the productive power of 
 
11 See for instance De Risi (2007: Chap. 3) who insists on the notion of unity; see also Debuiche 
(2013: 409–39) who insists on the dialectic between unity and multitude, finitude and infini-
tude, which is intrinsic to the notion of expression – especially in mathematics. As she con-
vincingly notes, however, despite the variety of models of expression that we find in mathe-
matics, none of these captures the notion of expression as a metaphysical relation. I am in 
agreement with Debuiche on this point, who thinks that discourse about expression in meta-
physics must be taken as a sort of infinitesimal approximation to the most perfect kind of 















































38 I. The Expressive Power of the Mind and its Varieties 
the mind bestows unity, and so being, onto the thing expressed, although the reality 
of the thing expressed may be mind-independent since there are metaphysical rea-
sons why the mind can conceive of that thing as singular and one. Expressions are 
mind-dependent, for there are no expressions – not even natural expressions – if 
there is no mind to take one thing as if it were another. The reality of the thing 
expressed, nonetheless, is somehow grounded in nature, an aspect that locates Leib-
niz’s epistemology beyond the categories of idealism/realism (more on this in chap-
ter IV). In any case, the theoretical achievement of this chapter is that the cognitive 
advantages offered by expressions rely heavily on the fact that expressions make 
available the unity of the thing expressed. Moreover, the unity of the expression is 
simpler (which may mean it is more abstract) than the thing itself, although it pre-
sents relations characterizing the thing in a way that makes them more comprehen-
sible (überschaubar) and more easily visualizable (anschaubar) for the mind. 
This discussion of the notion of expression is a propaedeutic to both under-
standing why sense-perception and thought are species of the genus expressions (as 
Leibniz explained to Arnauld), and for better focusing on the former species. Ex-
pressions concern any level of human cognitive capacity, the most basic form of 
which is the expressions of the world as if it had been made of bodies determined 
by shapes and sizes situated in space and time. As we will see from this and the 
next chapter, what Leibniz calls perceptibility is not only the work of sense-percep-
tion: it is the joint work of the imagination and sense-perception. Through its work, 
the mind gives unity to percepts. Moreover, in performing the spontaneous work of 
sense-perceiving the world, the mind expresses the world as made up of bodily phe-
nomena in space and time, which is the reason why it can move to conceive of the 
body as a body of a certain type. 
In what follows, I will reconstruct the theoretical kernel of Kulstad’s, Swoyer’s, 
and Jorgensen’s positions respectively in order to integrate them with aspects of the 
notion of expression highlighted by other scholars, for instance, Debuiche (2011: 
88–117; 2013: 409–39).  However, before proceeding to that analysis, I want to 
clarify that what I am going to say about expression is not a challenge to the strategy 
of capturing the epistemic force of expression through a formalization of the kind 
of relation that constitutes expression. Rather, I think of my analysis as concurrent 
with those strategies, especially to that recently offered by Jorgensen (2019), but 
also as a way of improving upon them, especially by clarifying the cognitive role 
played by expressions. Indeed, it is in virtue of their cognitive function that expres-
sions can exercise their epistemic force. In short, it is not simply the kind of relation 
that accounts for the epistemic force of expression relations, but rather a list of de-
siderata that an expression must fulfil, which rests on the structure of human cog-
nition.  
 
the notion of expression is used as an expression itself, as a kind of reflexive and metaphorical 
















































 3. Cognitive Desiderata for a Theory of Expression 39 
By insisting on these desiderata (most of which are already highlighted in the de-
bate, albeit not systematically), I hope to draw a conclusion of extraordinary im-
portance for the present enquiry. Expressions are productive tools (Bolton 2011b; 
Jorgensen 2019) that are either naturally or arbitrarily invented by the mind as 
means for selecting and translating information from one domain into another, in 
order to improve and facilitate the mind’s efforts in information-storage, pro-
cessing, and extrapolation. To some extent, I shall align my analysis with that re-
cently propounded by Jorgensen (2019: Chapter 5). However, I shall also modify 
that discussion to a different end: expressions are not tools of information-preser-
vation; they preserve information and make them available to a cognizant agent 
insofar as they produce a loss of information in favor of the re-assessment of salient 
traits characterizing the thing expressed from a perspective that, ontologically, does 
not directly inhere with the thing expressed in itself. Signs, for instance, allow for 
distinct knowledge of things via concepts since they allow for a loss of perceptual 
concreteness while permitting a gain in conceptual distinctness. Signs per se are 
not distinct knowledge and do not bear any necessary relation to essences per se. 
Nonetheless, by transfiguring the material aspect of signs, i.e., their being com-
posed of imagistic parts that can be sense-perceived by the human mind, into a 
symbol of something else, viz., the essence that exists as an idea in the mind of God, 
signs become an informative placeholder for the essence. This transfiguration per-
mits to express rapports12 that are abstract and, henceforth, not immediately infer-
able from sensory presentation of the being as it is apprehended by sense-percep-
tion. I do not ‘see’ Socrates’s “being a musician” in the same way as I ‘see’ Socra-
tes’s being white. Nevertheless, I can make the property of Socrates “being a mu-
sician” available to the mind through deploying signs. In so doing, the syntactic and 
semantic aspects of languages permit for the expression of what has rapports and 
yet not bodily parts, as thoughts, ideas, or individual substances, into a unity in the 
multitude that expresses some or the totality of the rapports characterizing what the 
stream of sign is about. Drawing a list of cognitive desiderata will help to make my 
position clearer. 
3. COGNITIVE DESIDERATA FOR A THEORY OF EXPRESSION 
Leibniz defines a relation of expression as a relation between parts and/or predicates 
(that is, what can be said) of the exprimendum and the exprimens. Thus far, 
Kulstad’s formal analysis tells us that this relation must be intended as a mapping 
relation between sets that hold for parts of the things respectively expressed. In 
commencing our discussion, let us begin with Kulstad and then move to Swoyer. 
 
 
12 Following Leibniz, I prefer to use the French word “rapports” instead of “relations” because a 
“rapport” means also ratio (proportion), similitude, resemblance, and connection. “Rapport” is 















































40 I. The Expressive Power of the Mind and its Varieties 
Kulstad analyzes the expressive relation as a mapping or function of ordered sets 
respectively associated with the exprimendum and the exprimens. By specifying the 
relation, namely the mapping relation between one set and the other, we can capture 
the way in which one thing expresses another, while also clarifying the epistemic 
force of the expression. For, by knowing the law that governs the mapping, we are 
able to infer what characterizes the exprimendum from an analysis of the exprimens. 
It is important that what properly makes a relation an expression-relation between 
two things is a peculiar kind of relation between two sets associated with the expri-
mens and exprimendum respectively: that is, a mapping relation. Only this mapping 
relation between associated sets corresponds to Kulstad’s formulation (D) of ex-
pression that escapes the objection formulations to which (A) and (E) are subject 
(Kulstad 2001: 414–5; Jorgensen 2019).  
I myself doubt that this mapping relation captures the nature of an expression. 
This is not because anything can be an expression-relation, but because even if the 
mapping relation puts some constraints on what can count as an expression, it still 
permits relations that should count as expressions because they respect the formula, 
but we would not ordinarily take them to be expressions. Consider two cases: (i) 
there may be two things associated with two sets that map onto one another, and 
yet there may be no proper relation of expression; (ii) expression is not always a 
symmetrical relation (Debuiche, 2011). One thing expresses another, but the other 
is not thereby an expression of the former. To argue for point (ii), we need to appeal 
to the cognitive functions of expression. Something can be an expression because 
it has some qualities that go beyond its capacity for mapping onto another thing.  
Let us start with (i). Consider a cactus and me. Suppose that my figure at the 
moment t1 of the universe presents the same colors as the cactus at the moment t1 
of the universe. My hair and eyes are dark like the earth; my clothes are green like 
the cactus, and my skin is of the same color of the cactus’s vase. Following Kulstad, 
we may say that there are two things associated with two sets (parts of the things 
divided by colors), and that there is a law of association between the sets, a similar-
ity of colors (i.e., we are fulfilling Kulstad’s criterion of spelling out in what respect 
the two things are similar, and not making a vague claim about general similarity), 
such that one set maps onto the other (Kulstad, 2011: 411). Can we say that the 
cactus is an expression of me or that I am an expression of the cactus? I do not think 
so. Why? The answer to this question echoes Swoyer’s objection to Kulstad: there 
is no preservation of structure (Swoyer 1995: 85). The cactus does not express me 
because there is no intra-relation between the parts of the things preserved by the 
mapping. 
To better grasp the notion of structure, consider the relation there is between 
parts of a map and parts of the region it depicts. The map preserves not just the 
correspondence between parts of the map and parts of the region, but also intra-
relations between the parts of the maps and parts of the region. The cactus fails 
exactly on account of this correspondence of intra-relations, which must be similar 















































 3. Cognitive Desiderata for a Theory of Expression 41 
As appealing as the idea of structural-preservation may be, Swoyer and others 
(Jorgensen 2019, for instance) note that there may be expression without the preser-
vation of any structure, as in the case of an algebraic equation, such as x2+y2=1, and 
the circle it represents on a Cartesian plane. Strictly speaking, the parts of the equa-
tion do not map onto the circle. Yet, Leibniz says that the equation is an expression 
of the circle (Jorgensen 2019). In discussing this problem, scholars have pointed 
out that, if it is true that the equation does not map onto the circle, then the set of its 
solutions, as an expression of the equation, does. So, when we say that an equation 
expresses a geometrical figure, we are referring to the set of solutions that maps 
onto the figure. 
Consider a further example of a flag and the country it represents. Leibniz tells 
us that arbitrary signs are expressions insofar as there is a habitual relation by which 
the sign becomes the sign for something else (see Quid sit idea, A VI 4 B 1370). It 
is an established habit that colors distributed on a rectangular surface through 
straight lines and other signs are used as symbols of countries. I would say that there 
is no mapping between the country and the parts of the flag. But the flag neverthe-
less counts as an expression of the country. Why? In short, the flag can become an 
expression of the country, although there is nothing in the structure of the flag that 
univocally refers to that country. The flag can express the country because it ex-
presses the unity of the country, meaning, the flag refers to only one country, albeit 
only conventionally. A flag is one thing (in having its own unity), referring as it 
does to one thing, a region. Stressing the unity of the expression aligns with what 
Leibniz says in what follows about the definition of expression in the letter to Ar-
nauld (September, 1687). In having an expression, it suffices that some kind of unity 
is represented by the expression. 
This point may sound trivial. However, if we now compare the example of the 
cactus and the example of the equation, we can see the convergence: in the case of 
the cactus, we have two things. The mapping, however, does not refer to the unity 
of the thing, only to parts of it and their correspondence. Therefore, although there 
is a mapping between sets, we do not thereby have an expression. In the case of the 
equation, the equation is a semantic and syntactic algebraic unity referring to the 
unity of that circle and only that circle. Therefore, we have an expression, although 
there is no mapping between the equation and the circle. The set associated with the 
equation is a natural expression of the equation because the equation is the principle 
of generation of all possible bits of information that are blindly expressed by the 
equation. I shall elaborate upon this below. 
“Blind thought”, cognitio caeca, is a terminus technicus of Leibniz’s philoso-
phy. A cognitio caeca is an expression that has some cognitive advantages when 
deployed in reasoning because it is simpler than the thing we have to reason about, 
and yet more informative than the thing itself. The cognitio caeca is more informa-















































42 I. The Expressive Power of the Mind and its Varieties 
easier to apprehend by the mind and, therefore, cognitively clearer than the thing 
itself.13  
These ideas about blind thought will ultimately provide the key for deriving the 
respective cognitive desiderata for a theory of expression. Before pursuing this fur-
ther, however, I want to point out that my analysis is sympathetic to that of Jorgen-
sen, who recently argued that we should reread Kulstad’s and Sowyer’s proposals 
as a way of pointing to the fact that an expression is a relation that, given a model, 
M, (i.e., the model according to which we can interpret the expression), we can 
extrapolate information about one thing to another. I would like, however, to add 
some constraints on this definition since it is too liberal in its current form. After 
all, not every system preserving information about another thing is about that thing. 
As in the example of the cactus, the cactus may preserve information about me (such 
as the colors I am wearing), but it is not for that reason about me. Something may 
be about parts of a thing and not be about that thing. Therefore, the relation of sim-
ilarity between me and the cactus is not an expression of me or, indeed, of the cac-
tus. On the other hand, a flag may carry very little information about the country, 
but in seeing the flag, and recognizing it as a flag, we know at least that it is asso-
ciated to one country, that is a territorial, political, and cultural identity; and yet, on 
account of its flag, we learn nothing more specific about the country. Still, the flag 
is about that country. Unless I have a way to relate any part of the expression to one 
thing, that part of the expression is not telling about that thing. 
For this reason, I think that what truly characterizes an expression as an expres-
sion of one thing is the fact that it preserves the unity of the thing and the multitude 
characterizing the thing in the sense that allows us to extrapolate and relate all the 
bits of information that we can achieve from analyzing the expression as ordered 
information about one thing. Moreover, if one thing is an expression of the other, 
this does not mean that the thing expressed functions as an expression of the expri-
mens: countries can exist even if flags do not, for flags are arbitrary kinds of ex-
pressions. On the other hand, expression may also be symmetric. For, the equation 
is an expression of the circle because it is simpler than the circle and the circle may 
express the equation because it makes visible all at once the relations of the points 
derivable from the equation. I shall elaborate on this shortly. 
To make my point about the desiderata of a theory of expression stronger, I will 
analyze the cognitive advantages offered by cognitio caecae. Any sagacious reader, 
however, will immediately notice that my analysis is tendentious: not every expres-
sion is a kind of cognitio caeca. The world expresses God; the mind expresses the 
universe; such expressions are unlike blind thoughts. Thus, I will offer a way of 
extending my analysis to cases of expressions that are not blind thoughts. I shall 
argue that Leibniz’s use of the term “expression” in a metaphysical context is ana-
logical, and, with this, I refer to medieval theories of analogy. The transposition of 
 
13 See MKTI in A VI 4 A 590/L 292. For an accurate analysis of cognitio caeca or symbolica in 















































 4. Expression and Blind Thought 43 
the use of the term in a non-cognitive and non-epistemic context, such as metaphys-
ics, is grounded in two basic functions of the expression: it is a combination and 
unification of a multitude of rapports in one thing which transfigures those rapports 
onto a different ontological plane. Therefore, the monad expresses the universe and 
God; the universe expresses God. Decisive to my analysis is the remark that expres-
sion requires not just the preservation/production of unity, but also its transposi-
tion/transformation of one genus into another kind of being, viz., a “metabasis eis 
allo genos” (a change to another genus, which does not imply a category mistake; 
see also Debuiche, 2013). While this metabasis causes a loss of information, it also 
creates new relations, like the reflection of something in a mirror. 
4. EXPRESSION AND BLIND THOUGHT 
So far, we have highlighted how ‘expression’ is a kind of relation that extends from 
metaphysics to epistemology and the theory of cognition. I shall use Leibniz’s dis-
course on blind thought to uncover the desiderata for a theory of expression, that is, 
what makes a certain relation expressive. My analysis, thus far, has not excluded 
the thought that there may be a form of mapping (or information-preservation) en-
tailed by the notion of expression. My analysis simply highlights what must be 
added to a mapping relation in order to fully disclose what makes an expression an 
expression of something. To this end, we shall look at a particular kind of expres-
sion: blind thought. 
The notion of blind thought or cognitio symbolica appears in the Meditation on 
Knowledge, Truth and Ideas in the context of Leibniz's discussion about degrees of 
knowledge.14 It refers to the kind of thinking permitted by distinct knowledge, as in 
the case of definition and/or algebraic formulae. The case of an equation, for in-
stance, falls under this category. Therefore, cases of blind thought are cases of ex-
pressions, although not all expressions are cases of blind thought.  
To understand how blind thoughts express, we need to bear in mind the distinc-
tion between clear and confused notions, on the one hand, and clear and distinct 
notions, on the other. Clear and confused knowledge rests on the apprehension of 
sensory qualities (colors, tastes, but also magnitude and figure), while distinct 
knowledge is knowledge that, once grasped, vouches for a decomposition of pred-
icates in conceptual marks, and hence in the formation of propositional structures 
usually known as definitions: G is F/G has F. If this kind of knowledge, although 
clear and distinct, is inadequate, then this is owing to the fact that, in decomposing 
distinct concepts, such as the concept GOLD, we cannot avoid meeting with sen-
sory qualities, which are clear and confused, and therefore not subject to a perfect 
analysis.15  
 
14 For a reconstruction of the reception of the notion, see Meier-Oeser (2019). 















































44 I. The Expressive Power of the Mind and its Varieties 
Despite the characterization of the degrees of knowledge, what is relevant for us is 
that Leibniz ties distinct knowledge to definition, as well as to symbolic cognition 
or blind thought. The use of definitions depends on their systematic formation via 
signs, which are blind. This is because, in deploying the sign, we refer to the thing 
without needing to grasp all the marks and relations characterizing the concept of 
the thing. Indeed, we assume that we know them and/or, on occasion, have the ca-
pacity for recovering our knowledge. As Leibniz puts it: 
Yet for the most part, especially in a longer analysis we do not intuit the entire nature of the 
subject matter at once but make use of signs instead of things, though we usually omit the 
explanation of the sign for the sake of brevity, knowing or believing that we have the power to 
do it. Thus when I think of a chiliagon, or a polygon of a thousand equal sides, I do not always 
consider the nature of a side and of equality and of a thousand (or the cube of ten), but I use 
these words, whose meaning appears obscurely and imperfectly to the mind, in place of the 
ideas which I have of them, because I remember that I know the meaning of the words but that 
their interpretations is not necessary for the present judgment. Such thinking I usually call blind 
or symbolic; we use it in algebra and in arithmetic, and indeed almost everywhere. When a 
concept is a very complex, we certainly cannot think simultaneously of all the concepts which 
compose it. [A VI 4 A 590/L 292; my italics] 
The reason why the mind must deploy blind thought is that it is structurally unable 
to consider (i.e., have an intuition of) the “entire nature of a subject matter”. To be 
more precise, the entire nature of the subject matter cannot be thought by the mind 
unless the mind uses surrogates, viz., blind signs, which stand for the entire nature 
of the subject matter. However, the mind can neglect to bring to bear a perfect anal-
ysis upon the subject matter (assuming that it in fact wields such powers of analysis, 
albeit imperfectly).  
I want to stress two points made in the above quotation. The expression (the 
sign, definition, etc.) refers to “entire nature”, that is, its unity. Nature is made avail-
able to the mind thanks to the expression being simpler and more affine to the mind, 
in a way that its unity qua entire nature is not. In other words, the expression func-
tions as a kind of trans-latio: a transposition of the exprimendum (the entire nature) 
onto a level that does not ontologically inhere with the thing per se, but which is 
accessible to the knowing mind. Notice that this translation is also appropriate to 
mathematical examples: even if the ellipse and circle belong to the same genus 
“curves”, they are two different species of curve.16 When the ellipsis expresses the 
circle, it does so because it is not the circle. Signs, on the other hand, carry “the 
nature of a thing” to the level of thought because they are not the thing; and, in so 
doing, become placeholders for that thing. What’s more, however, without signs – 
as a system ruled by syntax and semantics which allow us to form definitions – the 
“entire nature of the thing” is cognitively offline or unavailable – even unfathoma-
ble – to the mind. For, all that we can grasp of a thing’s nature are parts of the 
rapports characterizing it, owing to which we need a system of signs. Thus, nature 
 
16 Compare this passage with NE 308, where Leibniz talks of infinite homogeneous transfor-















































 4. Expression and Blind Thought 45 
is grasped by finite minds through its expression into conceptual networks (Bolton 
2011a). I will elaborate on this claim shortly. 
For now, let us turn to an early text of Leibniz, On Mind, the Universe and God. 
Here, Leibniz explicitly claims that the mind cannot conceive of “the entire nature 
of a thing” unless it deploys signs. The text is quite interesting, for its content and 
structure is reminiscent of Quid sit idea? and Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and 
Ideas, although the technical vocabulary of Leibniz is not yet at play. Indeed, there 
is no reference to either expression or symbolic knowledge. However, what Leibniz 
has in mind are exactly these two concepts, which he will formalize in the later 
texts, whereby “expression” and “blind thought” become technical vocabulary and 
pivotal concepts within Leibniz’s theory of human cognition. Leibniz declares that 
the human mind can by no means have knowledge of ideas because it cannot intuit 
one idea: the mind is not capable of grasping all the rapports defining the idea as 
the idea of a circle, for instance, in a single moment. For this immediate grasping 
of the entire nature is beyond human powers, the finite mind grasps the idea “part 
by part”, representing to itself those rapports by means of surrogates, which may 
either be symbolic or imagistic. The echoes of blind thought and of expressions 
become more explicit when one looks at Leibniz’s further remarks:  
If we were to think of the whole essence of the circle at the same time, then we would have the 
idea of a circle. Only God has the ideas of composite things; in the meantime, we know the 
essence of a circle by thinking of its requisites part by part. The deficiency of the idea that we 
have is made good by some sensible image, or by a definition; that is, by an aggregate of 
symbols, in which there is no need of similarity. The place of an idea is filled on each occasion 
by some phantasm, the whole of which is sensed at the same time. Images excite the senses, 
symbols excite thought; the former are more suitable for action, the latter for reasoning (A VI 
3 463 in DSR 6–7; my italics and bold) 
The “phantasm” the human mind can sense-perceive and use as a surrogate for an 
absent idea or essence clearly hints that, although the mind can extrapolate only bits 
of information, those bits are about one essence because the mind has resources to 
understand the unity of the whole essence. Definitions or images are ways to ex-
press the multitude of rapports into either a semantic or syntactic unity (given by 
definitional formats) or otherwise in the form of images. Such definitions or images 
constitute blind thoughts, for they present the thing “uno obtutu”, sc. all at once. 
Nevertheless, this is not a true intuition of the essence: it is merely a gloss.  
Thus, unity is not merely represented but produced in the expression. On one 
hand, it may be the case that the thing expressed has unity per se, as in the case of 
an essence, but this may not be available to the mind. On the other hand, when the 
thing has no unity per se, as in the case of a body (that for Leibniz is an aggregate 
per accidens), unity is nonetheless bestowed by the mind upon the thing. In each 
case, unity is produced by the mind, and, in producing it, the expression becomes a 
generative order of information about that thing. Hereby, the mind even creates new 
rapports, viz. rapports that are not in the world unless there are minds endowed 
with expressive rational power. Symbols, signs, and languages, for instance, be-















































46 I. The Expressive Power of the Mind and its Varieties 
and even imposes false ideas,17 producing new associations, for instance between 
terms that refer to abstractions. These invented objects also create new relations. 
I would like to stress that it is in virtue of the unity of the expression that the 
expression can fulfil its task of making something available to an epistemic subject. 
To emphasize the creative and productive powers of the mind, Leibniz writes: “A 
most perfect being […] is capable of ideas and of thoughts, for this multiplies the 
variety of things like a mirror” (DSR 9/A VI 3 464). Indeed, considering that Leib-
niz defines monads as “living mirrors”, rational monads multiply the variety of the 
created world thanks to having a limited power to produce new rapports exercising 
their expressive power. 
The pivotal point of the passage quoted above, however, lies in the unity of the 
multitude produced by the expression. The “whole of the phantasm”, as Leibniz 
writes there, it is sensed at once, and this is the reason why the “phantasm”, which 
nothing is but what later is called “expression” or “blind thought”, is better suitable 
for reasoning.  Expressions, I insist, function as cognitive tools if and only if they 
present an entire nature “uno obtutu”, “all at once”, supplementing the mind’s lack 
of intuitive power.18 If the nature and multitude of rapports characterizing that 
about which we want to gain knowledge is neither straightforwardly available nor 
cognizable by the human mind, then the expression makes it comprehensible and 
visualizable.19 In so doing, the mind amplifies its epistemic and cognitive power, 
increasing the degree of clarity of its knowledge. In a text dated to 1685, entitled 
“On the combination (complexione) of the varieties of all cognizable at once” (De 
totae cogitabilium varietatis uno obtutu complexione), Leibniz defines exactly the 
act of beholding a multitude “all at once” as the greatest moment of knowledge:  
“The greatest moment in thinking is when we can connect all at once the totality of 
the conceivable things that our minds are used to observe more frequently” (A VI 
4 A 595). So, in this way we understand comparisons and connections among 
things; we discover the proposed thing; and we compare one given thing with oth-
ers. He concludes affirming that the discovery of a lingua characteristica – com-
prised of true definitions – will serve this scope greatly (see A VI 4 A 595).  
All this points to the fact that the expression is a tool that produces and gener-
ates new information. A diagram describing a decrease of natality in Europe, for 
instance, may lead the mind to discover new facts, simply by connecting known 
data from which an improvement in knowledge can arise, which would not occur 
simply by reading the same data listed on a sheet of paper. The expression, moreo-
ver, must allow for the extrapolation of pieces of information in an ordered way. 
 
17 See the encyclopedia entry “imposition”, Oliveri (2020a). 
18 Belaval reads Leibnizian formalism as a substitute for Cartesian intuitionism and makes it the 
mark of the distinction between Leibniz’s and Descartes’ theories of cognition. If, for Des-
cartes, the mind intuits ideas, however complex they may be, Leibniz utterly rejects such a 
claim, arguing that the only thing minds can do is invent signs as if they allowed for the intuition 
of an idea. For a more detailed and accurate distinction, see Belaval (1960: 23–83). 















































 4. Expression and Blind Thought 47 
The best order would be the respective relevance of pieces of information for grasp-
ing the nature of something.  
Let us consider the case of definitions. Definitions, claims Leibniz, are “une 
expression distincte de l’idée de la chose” (A II 1 877), “a distinct expression of the 
idea of the thing”. In a different letter, he remarks that definitions are “pricipes de 
l’expression des veritez, c’est-à-dire les definitions sont principes des propositions” 
(A II 1 424), “principles of expression of truths, that is definitions are principles of 
propositions.” While later he claims that equations are a kind of definitions (A II 1 
424). 
I am intrigued by the word “principes”, meaning principles for the expression 
of truths. When we have a distinct expression (an expression that refers to the es-
sence of the thing in its totality), we grasp a principle for the extrapolation of bits 
of information according to a certain degree of relevance for that thing: we do not 
extract bits of information randomly, nor do we simply differentiate between true 
and false propositions; we order them on the basis of their pertinence for defining 
a certain essence.20 To use Leibniz’s metaphor, each definition is like a view on a 
city; a real definition equates to see the combinations and compositions among 
those views like on the city map. The real definition, hence, allows to derive the 
other views.21 We may even say that such a hierarchy of pieces of information con-
stitutes the “abstract” structure of rapports. This structure preserved and made 
 
20 A VI 6 293–4/NE 293–4: “L’essence dans le fonds n’est autre chose que la possibilité de ce 
qu’onpropose. Ce qu’on suppose possible est exprimé par la definition, mais cette definition 
n’est que nominale quand elle n’exprime point en même temps la possibilité, car alors on peut 
douter si cette definition exprime quelque chose de reel, c’est à dire de possible; jusqu’à ce que 
l’experience vienne à nostre secours pour nous faire connoistre cette realité a posteriori lorsque 
la chose se trouve effectivement dans le monde [.]”  [Essence is fundamentally nothing but the 
possibility of the thing under consideration. Something which is thought possible is expressed 
by a definition; but if this definition does not at the same time express this possibility then it is 
merely nominal, since in this case we can wonder whether the definition expresses anything 
real – that is, possible – until experience comes to our aid by acquainting us a posteriori with 
the reality (when the thing actually occurs in the world).] 
21 That perfect definitions give us a way of deriving other definitions is proved by the fact that 
non-perfect or merely nominal definitions do not provide us with a principle of definition, see 
A VI 6 267/NE 267: “l’or est un metal qui resiste à la coupelle et à l’eau forte, c’est une idée 
distincte, car elle donne des marques ou la definition de l’or. Mais elle n’est pas accomplie, car 
la nature de la coupellation, et de l’operation de l’eau forte ne nous est pas assez connue. D’où 
vient que lorsqu’il n’y a qu’une idée inaccomplie le même sujet est susceptible de plusieurs 
definitions independentes les unes des autres, en sorte qu’on ne sauroit tousjours tirer l’une de 
l’autre, ny prevoir qu’elles doivent appartenir à un meme sujet et alors la seule experience nous 
enseigne qu’elles luy appartiennent toutes à la fois. [Gold is a metal which resists cupellation 
and is insoluble in aquafortis; that is a distinct idea, for it gives the criteria or the definition of 
'gold'. But it is not a perfect idea, because we know too little about the nature of cupellation 
and about how aquafortis operates. The result of having only an imperfect idea of something is 
that the same subject admits of several mutually independent definitions: we shall sometimes 
be unable to derive one from another, or see in advance that they must belong to a single subject, 















































48 I. The Expressive Power of the Mind and its Varieties 
available to the mind in a blind way because of the expression taken as a real defi-
nition. This hierarchy consists in the relevance and importance of bits of infor-
mation in relation to the essence or nature that the expression is about.  
Considering things from this perspective, we can harmonize the interpretations 
offered by Jorgensen, Kulstad, and Swoyer by understanding “structure” not as im-
agistic, but as an abstract organization of rapports among parts, where “part” refers 
to something very abstract, such as informative sentences that we can formulate 
within a language, which are about the nature of a thing. Using Leibniz’s words: 
we learn to put the nominal essences of a thing in perspective order, just as we learn 
to discern from which vantage point a city is best represented. We learn to not 
simply express but compose such points of view. Only by representing nature via 
nominal definitions, which stand in an ordered relation to each other thanks to a 
definition that must be “real”, we reach the best-informative point of view. Any true 
or real definition, hence, is a definition that, like an equation, allows for the deriva-
tion of the set of what can be said about the thing expressed. In this sense, both a 
kind of mapping and a structuring among pieces of information is preserved in the 
expression. 
Leibniz indeed says that an essence may have an infinite number of nominal 
definitions, just as a city can be expressed from different viewpoints.22 These es-
sences, however, are not epistemically equivalent. In any case, they are all subordi-
nate to a real definition, something that remains beyond human powers.23 A real 
definition will give the very essence of the thing; its generation. If the construction 
of figures on a geometrical plane comes close to a real definition, then, when deal-
ing with other sorts of beings, such as natural kinds, real definitions are unavailable 
to the human mind.24 And yet, the human being is not without resources. The human 
subject can come close to real definitions because they can discover expressions 
referring to “the entire nature of a thing”, or they can ameliorate and re-assess def-
initions in a continuous process of approximation to the true nature of things. 
If this is correct, then some definitions are better expressions than others, even 
though they are still nominal and not real, and even if their relevance depends on 
the “series of thoughts” in which they occur. Consider the following example.  
(def1) A human being is a rational animal. 
(def2) A human being is capable of laughter. 
 
22 A VI 6 294/NE 294: “Pour mieux distinguer aussi l’Essence et la definition, il faut considerer 
qu’il n’y a qu’une essence de la chose, mais qu’il y a plusieurs definitions qui expriment une 
même essence, comme la même structure ou la même ville peut estre representée par des dif-
ferentes Scenographies, suivant les differens costés dont on la regarde.” [To reinforce the dis-
tinction between essence and definition bear in mind that although a thing has only one essence, 
this can be expressed by several definitions, just as the same structure or the same town can be 
represented by different drawings in perspective depending on the direction from which it is 
viewed.] 
23 MKTI A VI 4 A 591/L 293. 















































 4. Expression and Blind Thought 49 
According to the Aristotelian tradition, which Leibniz endorses, (def1) defines the 
essence of what it is to be a human being, while (def2) defines a proprium of man: 
something only human beings are capable of, but which does not fully capture the 
essence of man. Leibniz considers the definition, “human being is a rational ani-
mal”, a kind of real definition, for, “[in] the case of man, I believe that we have a 
definition which is at once nominal and real” (NE 313). The former definition, 
Leibniz tells us, is more informative than the latter, and hence is an expression of 
the essence, not simply because it pinpoints a trait that only human animals are 
supposed to have (reason), but because it allows for the extrapolation of other pieces 
of information that characterize human beings, which cannot be extrapolated by 
analyzing the attribute “capable of laughter”. If I grasp that a human being is ra-
tional, and furthermore grasp what “rational” means, then I can infer that a human 
being is capable of speaking, laughing, singing, and many other things, which are 
not straightforwardly derivable from other, merely nominal expressions, like 
(def2).
25  
Something is an expression, then, when it is about the entire nature of the thing, 
or when it is a partial expression, like any nominal definition, that is apprehended 
as expressing a part of an essence. Real definitions are in addition sources or prin-
ciples of partial expressions of the thing, or of propositions (whether true or false), 
which are about the thing.  
In the same spirit, an equation is an expression not because there is a mapping 
of the equation onto the circle, but because it is about the unity of the circle: it 
expresses the multitude of rapports into a simple formula, which is of a completely 
different kind to the circle (viz., composed of algebraic signs as opposed to points 
and lines). Yet, it is more informative, telling us something more about the circle, 
information that remains hidden from us absent its formula. The equation, then, 
preserves the circle’s unity, and is productive of information about the circle be-
cause it allows to derive numbers that represent points that, altogether, belong to 
the circle and retain its peculiar relations about a focal point.  
The foregoing analysis is not intended to contrast with any existing, formal ac-
count of expression. My aim is simply to highlight that, in order to have an expres-
sion, the following desiderata must be fulfilled:  
 
25 Leibniz is however aware that (def1) is not always the best definition. Its suitability depends on 
the context in which the definition occurs. One example is “Socrates is a musician. He can sing 
well” and “Socrates is a white-man. He can sing well”. The former definition of Socrates is 
better suited to extrapolate the property that Socrates is a good singer. Being a white-man is 
not straightforwardly a sign of being a good singer. See Di Bella S. (2004, 39). The passage Di 
Bella is referring to is a note to Temmik presented in Vorausedition (VE 1082) which says: 
“Albus Socrates, et Musicus Socrates, sunt unum idemque nam etsi Socrates qua Musicus bene 
canant, et qua albus non canant, verum tamen est album Socratem canare et quicquid de Musico 
Socrate, etiam de albo dici potest, nisi quod praedicationes hic excludimus reduplicativas, qui-
bus formales rationes praedicatorum albedo scilicet et Musicae peritia distinguuntur. Et sane 
revera Socrates qua Musicus bene canit est enuntiatio praegnans constans ex his Socrates canit, 
Socrates est Musicus, et Nisi Socrates esset Musicus non bene caneret. Itaque non semper alius 















































50 I. The Expressive Power of the Mind and its Varieties 
(i) There must be unity in the multitude. An expression must preserve the unity of the thing, 
meaning that it both refers and produces the unity of the exprimendum, while expressing the 
multitude of rapports that characterize the exprimendum;  
(ii) There must be simplicity. It is a transformation and re-assessment of a multitude in a simpler 
unity;  
(iii) There must be composition or connection (viz., the “uno obtutu” principle). The expression 
must allow for a better grasp of relations, which becomes a quasi-form of intuition;  
(iv) Expression must be capable of translation. Expression transposes one thing onto something 
of a different kind; a kind that does not ontologically belong to the exprimens; 
(v) There must be productivity and an ordering of information. The expression must allow for 
extrapolation of information in an ordered way; 
(vi) The expression must, finally, be available to the mind and taken up proactively as an ex-
pression of something else.  
We have already argued for points (i) - (v). Point (vi), however, states that expres-
sions are cognitive tools insofar as a rational agent invents them and recognizes 
them qua expressions of something else.26 To be recognized as expressions, expres-
sions must be available to the cognizant agent and therefore subject to cognitive 
constraints. A long string of signs, or an enormous figure, may function as expres-
sions of something else. If, however, the figure is so big, or the string so long, that 
the mind cannot perceive them as one figure, or one string, then they will not be 
available to the mind and are therefore not expressions.  
Moreover, in the case of equations or real definitions, these are merely ideal 
cases of expression. Expressions that are not as informative about the nature of the 
thing as real definitions, such as a flag or a nominal definition, still have cognitive 
functions that may serve diverse aims, like making available the unity of one thing 
through the unity of another owing to the latter’s cognitive availability to the agent, 
thanks to which information can be transposed on a level ontologically different 
from the thing expressed. Expressions are ways of transforming one thing into an-
other. This is the minimum condition of having an expression. All other expressions 
are particular and more complex cases of how one thing expresses another: trans-
formations, mappings, and projections are all cases in which the unity is preserved 
and we are capable of ordering what is true about one, and what it is true about the 
other, in an abstract order of rapports between what can be said of the one and what 
can be said of the other.  
 
26 In NE, Leibniz distinguishes truths which express God’s ideas and their relations from the ex-
pressions we, finite minds, use to think of them, a distinction already stated in Dialogus (1677, 
A VI 4 24–5). A VI 6 397/NE 397: “C’est donc dans ce rapport qu’on doit placer la verité, et 
nous pouvons distinguer entre les verités qui sont independantes de notre bon plaisir, et entre 















































 5. Expression and its Metaphysical Meaning 51 
5. EXPRESSION AND ITS METAPHYSICAL MEANING 
Now we need to tackle the question of whether our analysis of expression is limited 
to cognitive surrogates or whether it can also be extended to metaphysics. In what 
follows, I will simply gesture to an answer, leaving the issue for a future, more 
extensive study. 
Despite the cognitive and epistemic value of the notion of expression, as well 
as the fact that Leibniz analyzes it in epistemological terms, scholars report that 
expression, when used in a metaphysical context, cannot be reduced to either math-
ematical models – often deployed by Leibniz to describe expression – or to a simple 
mapping function. Despite the varieties of expressive models that we can find in 
mathematics, none of these captures expression as a metaphysical relation. This 
analysis is offered by Debuiche (2009: 88–117; 2013: 409–39), for instance, with 
whose account I am sympathetic. Discourse about expression in metaphysics must 
be taken as a sort of infinitesimal approximation to the kind of knowledge we can 
reach about God, substance, and the totality of the universe. In this sense, the notion 
of expression is used as an expression itself, a sort of reflexive and metaphorical 
meaning based on an analogical translation of the word from an epistemological 
domain to a metaphysical domain. It is a way of talking that blindly allows the 
human mind to understand the kind of relation there might be between God and the 
universe, or between the mind and God. It is a human being’s attempt to approxi-
mate the relation between God, the universe, and the mind. If we follow this lead, 
then we can extend the cognitive analysis already conducted about expression to its 
metaphysical nature, at least when we understand the term “expression” to signify 
analogically within metaphysical discourse.  
By ‘analogy’, I am here referring to those medieval theories of a word’s ana-
logical reference. Briefly, the medieval theory of semiotics posits the question of 
how it is possible that we can use the same term, for instance “being”, to refer both 
to creatures and to God, when (evidently) creatures and God are not beings of the 
same kind. The medieval solution was to argue that terms may be used either: uni-
vocally, i.e., with the same meaning; equivocally, i.e., with different meanings; or 
analogically, i.e., with related meanings (Ashworth, 2017). As regards analogy, 
there are three different forms: analogy of proportion, such as when we say that 
both a spring and a point are “principles”, because a point is to a line what a spring 
is to the river. In this case, the word “principle” is used with different, but related 
meanings. Another form of analogy is that of attribution, such as when we use the 
adjective ‘healthy’. On one count, ‘healthy’ describes the physical status of a living 
creature, while in describing food, we might say “fruit is healthy.” What we really 
mean is that this food makes a person healthy. Therefore, the person is healthy; the 
food is healthy on account of a secondary, derivative meaning. The third form of 
analogy is that of likeness: a creature is said to be good because it bears similarity 
to God.27  
 















































52 I. The Expressive Power of the Mind and its Varieties 
Among the three different forms of analogy, the first seems particularly useful in 
understanding how the word ‘expression’ is used in metaphysics, which is propor-
tional to the use we make of it in the theories of cognition and knowledge. There is 
a core semantic meaning – a sort of genus – that relates metaphysical and episte-
mological tokens of “expression”, so that “expression” may have different species 
and yet be related thanks to belonging to the same genus. This core semantic mean-
ing is given by the notion of the preservation of unity and its transposition into a 
different and better kind of being, which we argued lies at the core of this notion.  
Let us bring in some examples in order to improve clarity. When Leibniz says 
that “the mind expresses the universe or God”, the term ‘expression’ is transposed 
into metaphysical discourse because the relation and connection between those 
things mirrors certain aspects that characterize the cognitive aspects of the notion 
‘expression’ in epistemic discourse. The universe expresses God not because it is 
simpler than God, but because it is a complexion of the infinite nature of God. In 
this sense, the universe expresses God because there is a “metabasis eis allo genos” 
of God into something of a different kind that is certainly not identical to God, but 
which preserves the nature of God by being the effect of the cause (Jorgensen, 
2019). The universe expresses God, moreover, because the universe is, in part, 
available to the mind in a way that God is not. Although God is beyond direct 
knowledge for the human mind, knowledge of the effects of God’s infinite power, 
i.e., what exists in the actual world, can provide insight into God’s nature.  
The mind expresses God because (to repeat Leibniz’s words), “it has thought 
and ideas, and this multiplies the variety like in a mirror”. This means that the mind 
expresses God not simply by being an effect of God’s power, but by being similar 
to God and by presenting, albeit on a finite scale, some of the cognitive capacities 
that God has on an infinite scale.28 In this latter sense, the third form of analogy, 
that of likeliness, is also involved. 
I cannot pursue these ideas further here. However, the aspects of unity, simplic-
ity/finitude, and of a “metabasis eis allo genos” seem to form the grounds for why 
we may use the notion of expression in metaphysics analogically. In claiming that 
there is a relation of expression between two beings, we transpose the core of the 
epistemic notion (viz., its being a cognitive tool) and focus on those aspects of the 
expression that may also be called a metaphysical relation, viz., qualities like unity, 
ontological difference in existence, yet dependence among states and properties of 
the two things.29 
 
28 A VI 6 397/NE 397: “Il vaut donc mieux placer les verités dans le rapport entre les objets des 
idées, qui fait que l’une est comprise ou non comprise dans l’autre. Cela ne depend point des 
langues, et nous est commun avec Dieu et les Anges. Et lors que Dieu nous manifeste une verité 
nous acquerons celle qui est dans son entendement, car quoique il y ait une difference infinie 
entre ses idées et les nostres, quant à la perfection et à l’etendue, il est tousjours vray qu’on 
convient dans le même rapport.” 
29 The most extensive work that tries to isolate the peculiarity of the metaphysical notion of ex-















































 6. Is Cognitive and Epistemic Use of Expression Univocal? 53 
6. IS COGNITIVE AND EPISTEMIC USE OF EXPRESSION UNIVOCAL? 
Thus far, we have seen that, as a concept pivotal to both metaphysics and episte-
mology, “expression” has sparked scholarly work that focuses on giving a general 
and formal analysis of the relation that expression consists in. Moving from the 
most accurate definitions of expression in Quid sit idea (1677), but especially in the 
letter to Arnauld of 9 October 1987, scholars have attempted to isolate the structure 
of expressions, as well as their metaphysical and epistemological roles. Such schol-
ars are persuaded that an analysis of the term must lead to a univocal definition, 
which is ipso facto valid and preserved in any kind of expression. 
The final passage of my analysis, however, points to an analogical use of the 
term ‘expression’ by Leibniz, which may even gesture towards a pluralistic inter-
pretation of the term. In line with Kulstad’s remark (2011: 412), expressions must 
present some common features, although there may be different kinds of expres-
sions that do not rest on a univocal definition. The preservation of structure and 
mapping may be relevant to certain kinds of expression, such as perspectival pro-
jection on a geometrical plane, or expressions based on similarity, which are not 
essential to all kinds of expression, such as in the case of the equation and the circle. 
A derivative kind of mapping between “what can be said of one thing and what can 
be said of the other”, however, depends on the cognitive function for which the 
expression accounts. 
The idea of a pluralistic ground for expression may be desirable insofar as it 
permits us to move towards a plurality of reasons for why expressions are invoked, 
and how they can be developed into more abstract kinds. To be more specific, more 
imagistic traits, such as similarity of structure, may be the reason why the mind 
learns to take one thing as the expression of something else. Once the mind learns 
that there may be a substitution in reasoning of one thing through another, and that 
the latter amplifies the epistemic power of the mind, the mind learns to isolate other, 
more abstract traits that may serve to establish expression-relations between dis-
similar things. To this end, other tools like continuous transformation (such as be-
tween perspectival figures), or the analogical mapping of pieces of information (as 
in the case of equations) may serve as the basis for developing expression-relations, 
where the preservation of a unity in the multitude of rapports becomes a minimal 
trait for having an expression, even if it must be coupled with other desiderata, as 
listed above. Quid sit idea distinguishes expressions into natural and arbitrary ex-
pressions: 
It is also clear that some expressions have a basis in nature, while others are arbitrary, at least 
in part, such as the expressions that consist of words or characters. Those which are founded in 
nature, either require some similarity, such as that between a large and a small circle or that 
between a geographic region and a map of the region, or require some connection such as that 
between a circle and the ellipse which represents it optically, since any point whatever on the 
ellipse corresponds to some point on the circle according to a law. […] That the ideas of things 
are in us means therefore nothing but that God, the creator alike of things and of the mind, has 
impressed a power of thinking upon the mind so that it can by its own operations derive what 















































54 I. The Expressive Power of the Mind and its Varieties 
similar to the circle, truths can be derived from it which would be confirmed beyond doubt by 
investigating a real circle (A VI 4 B 1371/L 208). 
Given the “natural” character of some expressions, I wonder whether natural ex-
pressions are developed before arbitrary kinds of expression. I think that there are 
reasons to argue that Leibniz thinks that natural expressions are acquired before 
arbitrary expressions and serve as a preparation for the development of these latter. 
As I will argue in the next chapter, the denial of ideas as objects of the minds goes 
hand-in-hand with the theory of ideas as dispositions to form expressions. These 
dispositions, however, proceed in an ordered way from the natural to the arbitrary, 
even allowing for a plurality of grounds in the establishment of expressions.  
The next chapter will defend this claim at length. What we have gained through 
the present analysis is our having been given a key for understanding the importance 
of the synthetic power of the mind in cognition, i.e., the mind’s capacity to express 
a multitude of rapports into the unity and simplicity of cognitive surrogates. This 
power is already explicated in sense-perceiving, insofar as sensation consists in the 
unity in the multitude of minute perceptions. Moreover, in sense-perceiving, as we 
will soon see, the mind deploys expressions. In experiencing the world, minds ex-
perience bodies, i.e. simple notions, like colors and tastes, united into a shape, 
which is a form of expression of the variety of the world through something simpler 
and finite, and, therefore, available to the finite mind.30  
Minds, as I argue, first express the world as made up of bodies: determined 
shapes and sizes that undergo spatio-temporal variations. This apprehension is the 
groundwork of the imagination. If this is correct, then sense-perception expresses 
the world because it is the unity in the multitude of rapports that are made available 
to the human mind by translating the world into figures of a certain size, which 
change continuously through space and time. This translation of the world as if it is 
made up of bodies is the first productive operation of a cognizant agent in sense-
perceiving beings. This operation is the basis for any further development of more 
abstract and arbitrary expression-relations.  
7. CONCLUSION 
I have argued that the notion of unity is central to the notion of expression. Both 
Jorgensen and Kulstad overlook the idea that unity production and preservation are 
proper to expression. Swoyer sees this element as central, although the idea of struc-
tural-preservation may lead us astray, for it is too tied up with an imagistic under-
standing of structure, whereby parts of the exprimens map and are ordered in a way 
similar to the exprimendum.  
If we understand the notion of structure in this imagistic way, then we face 
problems, as in the case of the equation as an expression of a circle. If, on the other 
hand, we tied structure to the idea of unity of a multitude of rapports among pieces 
 















































 7. Conclusion 55 
of information, produced and preserved by the expression, we remain both faithful 
to the peculiarity of the expression-relation as presented by Leibniz, while also po-
tentially accounting for the epistemic force of the expression-relation in a non-im-
agistic way. An expression is anything that produces the unity of a thing, thereby 
rendering it available to the mind, producing some cognitive advantages in extrap-
olating and ordering pieces of information about the thing to be expressed.  What 
we further need to stress is that expressions of things that are per se not subject to 
the imagination (for instance, an equation) are presented by means of imagistic sur-
rogates. Expressions are signs, images, diagrams, sounds; indeed, anything that can 
be the object of sense-perception and imagination. Only in this way is an expression 
a cognitive surrogate that makes available the unity and multitude of the thing, per-
mitting the extrapolation, storage, and attribution also of pieces of information that 
characterize things, which, per se, are neither the subject matter of the senses nor 
the imagination. Thought, for instance, is subject neither to the imagination nor the 
senses. However, by being expressed through signs and language, thought becomes 
thereby subjected to those faculties, and moreover available to other minds. Expres-
sions, furthermore, are tools for selecting and ordering pieces of information that 
are more salient than others, depending on the context in which the expression is 
deployed by a rational agent. 
This analysis of expression will enable us to argue for a developmental story 
from sense-perceiving beings to conceiving essences. The mind is naturally capable 
of imagining existing beings it experiences via the senses as bodies in space and 
time. The unity and coherence that the mind detects in phenomenal bodies is 
grounded in the fact that the mind can express bodies through quantitative qualities, 
viz., as shapes of a certain size undergoing continuous variation in space and time. 
Once the mind apprehends bodies of this sort, the mind spontaneously compares 
and gathers them in classes of similarity by interiorizing what we call types. Types 
are interiorized by the imagination, which operates on perceptual presentations. 
Only when the mind learns to consider a present, existing being as a being of a 
certain type can it ask the question of what makes those similar beings beings of the 
same type. Based on this first task of categorization, led by what Leibniz calls the 
logic of imagination (A VI 4 A 513), rational agents can direct their attention to the 
nature of things. In so doing, they learn to conceive of essences and form concepts. 
In reconstructing the story of how minds form concepts from the perspective of how 
the human mind’s faculties work, we can thereby highlight the fundamental role the 
imagination plays in human rational processes. 
Imagination, so I shall argue, is the faculty mediating and synthetizing the basic 
activity of substances, viz. perceptions and endeavors, with innate ideas. The final 
result of this mediation is thought, while its various manifestations through a system 





























































































II. THE GROUNDWORK OF THE IMAGINATION 
The primary work of the imagination is commonly taken to consist in the reproduc-
tion of mental representations of things not presently perceived.1 While sense-per-
ception provides epistemic subjects with data about what is presently happening in 
their perceptual environment, the imagination enables them to mentally entertain 
possibilities rather than presently-obtaining actualities. For example, I sense-per-
ceive the keyboard I am typing on, but I can only imagine that I am now playing 
the piano, while in truth I am writing this text. In short, sense-perception deals with 
what is real, the imagination with what is fictional. 
Leibniz rejects this clear-cut distinction between sense-perceiving and imagin-
ing. He subscribes to a tradition that takes the imagination to be essentially involved 
in sense-perceiving the external world: the imagination is a schematic and synthetic 
faculty constructing phenomena on which the intellect can operate.2 At the percep-
tual level, its synthetic work consists in processing sense-perceptual information 
 
1 Philosophers’ attention to the powers and limits of the imagination has intensified over the last 
two decades. Much scholarly effort has been devoted to isolating the role and function of the 
imagination with regard to other capacities of the human mind, such as sense-perceiving, make-
believe, decision-making, and reflection. The problem of delimiting the object and function of 
the imagination emerges from the fact that this power seems to be related to each of these 
capacities. Imagining seems to be a sensory presentation of objects or events in the mind, and 
yet it is distinct from sense-perceiving. Indeed, the capacity of presenting the mind with possi-
ble objects and events seems to play a central role in belief-acquisition and decision-making, 
and yet imagining something does not imply believing what, or acting as, one imagines. It is 
furthermore unclear whether the act of imagining extends to the non-sensory conception of 
objects and events, as in the case of evaluating the possibility of counterfactual propositions. 
This, in turn, bears on the role imagining plays in acts of reflection. For an introduction to the 
topic within contemporary philosophy of mind, see Liao - Gendler (2020). 
2 It is commonly thought that imagination qua schematic capacity of the mind is a theory first 
put on the philosophical stage by Kant. As Rabouin (2018) explains, the idea of a schematic 
imagination is to be found already in Proclus, where “schema” refers to the Greek “figure”. 
Imagination is therefore the faculty by which the intellect projects geometrical figures onto 
perceptible and material forms by using points, lines, and surfaces organized in continuous 
space. This theory of imagination is seen in opposition to Aristotle’s theory of imagination as 
a faculty of abstracting homoiotes, similarities, among perceptible beings, producing thereby a 
first-level abstraction (Aristotle, De Anima, 2–3; for comment, see Schofield 1995: 250–79). 
The intellect operates on the general image produced by the imagination and abstracts a con-
cept. Aristotle’s theory is delivered to early modern readers through an incredible number of 
interpretations, which proliferated during the Middle Ages, both in Western and Arabic worlds. 
Various commentaries on De Anima have both revised and transformed the original Aristote-
lian doctrine. The relation between the imagination, memory, the active and passive intellect, 
and the apprehension of “intentiones” (meanings) is a complex story whose main figures may 















































58 II. The Groundwork of the Imagination 
and performing a certain groundwork for cognition: the imagination segments and 
synthetizes (or, in Leibniz’s jargon, expresses) the multitude of sense-perceptions 
into perceptible wholes and, in so doing, interiorizes rules for simplifying sense-
perceptual data. Through this, the imagination produces an initial generalization of 
particulars into similarity classes, which I call ‘types’, and for which Leibniz uses 
the phrase: “possibilities inherent in the resemblances” (NE 323). 
It is worth specifying that the kind of imagination we are dealing with here is 
pictorial, i.e., a cognizant agent’s capacity to entertain quasi-sensory representa-
tions of objects and events. The pictorial imagination differs from both conceiving 
and understanding insofar as, in the latter case, we do not entertain the scenario in 
a quasi-sensory way: rather, we canvass the conditions of a specific proposition’s 
being true or false. Even if this notion of conceiving still sounds obscure, the upshot 
of the present work is to show that the idea of a schematic imagination offers a 
framework for distinguishing between the pictorial, or iconic, imagination, and con-
ceiving, while also offering a unifying account of imagination as a specific mental 
power. Both imagining and conceiving rest upon the schematic imagination, despite 
depending on different “constraints”: similarity characterizes imagining; identity 
characterizes conceiving. 
The major contribution of the imagination with regard to the sensory apprehen-
sion of bodily phenomena is to interiorize what I call types. Types are shorthand for 
what Leibniz calls “distinct perceptions”. Types are rules for how various worldly 
phenomena may or may not be, although this knowledge still remains tied to sen-
sory and imagistic cognition. In this regulative function, types enable acts of simu-
lating and tracking sensory-motor apprehensions of bodies in space and time. This 
is because the mind apprehends them as bodies or sensory properties of certain 
types.  
The interiorization of types marks a decisive moment in a cognizant agent’s life 
because it grounds the initial expression of things’ common nature: once types for 
body or property are interiorized, the subject learns both to recognize a particular 
body as an instance of a type, and thereby to reproduce images, which are used as 
expressions of the type. When the mind takes the image of a Labrador not as similar 
to any particular Labrador, but as a surrogate expressing the type of body dogs, the 
mind makes an (initially-confused) reference to a possible essence.  
From now until chapter VI, we will work through the idea that types are a pre-
stage of imaginative knowledge. Indeed, types are required for the acquisition of 
conceptual knowledge. There are two basic moments in the interiorization of types. 
 
2000 on the active and passive intellect; also see Hasse 1999). The complex analysis that im-
agination undergoes in cognition during the Middle Ages makes it difficult to isolate a unique 
tradition to which Leibniz may have subscribed. Nevertheless, the analysis of Leibniz’s texts 
offered in this chapter hopes to provide a reliable basis for arguing that both the idea of the 
imagination as synthetic/schematic power, and as a faculty that recognizes similarities among 
beings, constitutes his theory of imagination. Imagination, moreover, seems to play the role of 
conciliating empiricism with an axiomatic theory of truth (as Leibniz claims in the letter to 















































 1. The Synthetic Work of Imagination 59 
The imagination segments unities of multitudes of parts by synthesizing the impres-
sions received by each sense into coherent wholes that are comprised of parts: a 
shape of a determinate size bearing various secondary qualities. Through this geo-
metrical expression of particular beings as body-shapes, the imagination tracks bod-
ies’ spatiotemporal variations as variations of the same bodies. Only when the im-
agination is dealing with unities can it further compare perceptual wholes based on 
qualitative and quantitative similarities. The result is the interiorization of types of 
bodies and/or properties corresponding to similarity classes. 
The second moment consists in the apprehension of a relation of coherence 
among phenomena. This is based both on the type of phenomena we interiorize and 
on the habitual circumstances in which we apprehend them. Through this, we con-
struct the idea of “nature”, or of “a world”, learning thereby to isolate the circum-
stances that variously allow for or impede the obtaining of phenomena’s changes 
based on knowledge of the types of phenomena they are. Thus far in the story, types 
are not yet conceptual knowledge. They nevertheless allow the subject to track bod-
ies and their properties, enabling predictions and expectations for how they behave 
based upon an unconscious activation of the type of body/property that they are.  
The remainder of this chapter fleshes out the first moment of the imagination’s 
work by reconstructing Leibniz’s argument for the claim that the imagination is 
involved in the sensory apprehension of bodies. In sect. 1, I shall introduce the syn-
thetic work of the imagination as presented in a letter to Sophie Charlotte, “On What 
is Independent of Senses and Matter”. In sect. 2, I will expand this analysis by put-
ting the letter into the context of Leibniz’s Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and 
Ideas and other texts on mathesis universalis and the logic of imagination from 
around the same time. Based on this analysis, sections III.1 to III.3 enrich our dis-
cussion through the analysis of Leibniz’s “Letter on the Element of Geometry of 
the Duke of Burgundy” (1705). There, the imagination’s synthetic work is pre-
sented peculiarly as a sort of segmentation of confused sensations into perceptible 
wholes. The three subsections provide a full account of what the work of segmen-
tation consists in.  
1. THE SYNTHETIC WORK OF IMAGINATION 
The senses provide information about particular beings: the cup in front of me; my 
coworker, Peter; my hands. These are all known by me insofar as I can sense-per-
ceive them. Beings as sense-perceived are collections of primary and secondary 
qualities, as we argued in chapter I. In what follows, we are going to revise this 
thesis somewhat. Sense-perception alone does not provide the mind with a repre-
sentation of one being. All that the senses provide are collections of sensations wait-
ing to be organized into perceptible wholes (toutes entiers or totum). By “wholes”, 
Leibniz means a totality of parts apprehended as belonging to the same body. At 
the sense-perceptual level, the body is nothing more than a shape enclosing parts of 
the body, detaching it from other perceptible wholes, which surround it. As argued 















































60 II. The Groundwork of the Imagination 
reasoning. The act by which the mind encloses parts into a whole, thereby produc-
ing a relation of parthood characterizing a body, is therefore an expression of the 
imagination that enables the cognizant agent to move forward in her path towards 
knowledge of essences.  
Perceptible wholes consist in confused notions of sensations, on the one hand, 
and clear and distinct notions of the imagination, on the other (Letter to Sophie 
Charlotte, 2 May 1702, A I 21 328 – 346/LSS 220 – 247). More specifically, the 
imagination’s clear and distinct notions roughly correspond to what are traditionally 
called primary qualities, that is to say, notions of sensations are akin to secondary 
qualities.  
It is worth noting at this point that primary and secondary qualities are not 
properly parts of a whole. Given that a whole is a body, its parts are those that have 
some sort of function within the body, which primary and secondary qualities 
simply help us to track. Thus, a human body may be distinguished into arms, legs, 
a head, eyes, and so forth, although these parts do not necessarily present disparate 
secondary qualities. To clarify the point, it would be instructive to focus on how 
secondary and primary qualities help us to detect bodies, leaving the topic of proper 
parthood for Chapter III. There, we will also be preoccupied with the role of motion 
in the interiorization of types.  
For now, let us focus upon secondary qualities. These are impressions originat-
ing in each sense: colors, tastes, smells, sounds, and tactile qualities. Primary qual-
ities, by contrast, are measurable qualities such as the shape and size that are the 
subject matter of what Leibniz calls “common sense” or “imagination”. The appre-
hension of a combination of primary and secondary qualities, like the sense-percep-
tion of a billiard ball, is what we call a perceptible whole. Its spherical shape is 
detectable through both touch and sight. The fact that this quality is both sensorially 
perceived and measurable makes it both an object of the senses and of the imagi-
nation.3 Imagination is the faculty that tracks quantity and quality. It is therefore 
naturally directed towards measurable qualities (indeed, to anything that can be re-
duced to a continuum divided into contiguous parts). The imagination is therefore 
sensitive to the distinct side of primary qualities, even if it does not yet apprehend 
them conceptually: in sense-perceiving wholes, the mind does not apprehend shape 
and size as clear and distinct geometrical figures, which bear a certain proportion 
or have certain geometrical properties. Rather, it is only when it begins to abstract 
and perform geometrical operations that the mind can acquire clear and distinct 
knowledge of such properties. Thus, the spherical form I perceive in seeing a bil-
liard ball is, on this level, no more than my capacity to trace the border of the ball, 
and, in so doing, “detaching” the ball from the perceptual environment in which it 
is embedded. This enables its differentiated apprehension, that is, perceiving the 
billiard ball as different from, for instance, the rectangular green table upon which 
it rests. The secondary qualities borne by the billiard ball (its being black and white, 
 
3 See, for instance, A VI 4 513, a text that we will discuss in more detail below. For an analysis 















































 1. The Synthetic Work of Imagination 61 
its bearing the number eight, its being smooth and cold) may help us in detecting it 
qua body as a unity separate from the rough, green table it sits upon. However, as 
will emerge in Chapter III, the ultimate proofs of bodily unity and parthood are 
given by observing their movements through space and time.4 
Let us stress, for now, that we are dealing with a developmental story of how 
the mind arrives at perceiving bodies as complex objects (composed of parts) bear-
ing diverse qualities. For instance, at an early developmental stage, we cannot say 
that a child has a notion of spherical shape distinguished from the sensory appre-
hension of its colors or tactile qualities.5 The apprehension of perceptible wholes 
is, at this stage of development, confused owing to its being merely a brute amalgam 
of qualities. Nonetheless, the imagination’s (albeit hampered) attempt to track 
shape permits the apprehension of basically-differentiated bodies.  
Thus, at the very beginning of the human being’s experience of bodies, the 
cognizant agent has neither the power to isolate nor abstract sensory qualities as 
qualities of a body. What seems to us a very simple and basic capacity of the mind 
is something that requires a great deal of cognitive practice, which begins with our 
capacity to analyze a complex sense-perceptual environment. Owing to the mind’s 
tendency to express the body, the senses (at least when they are working properly) 
afford an abundance of phenomenal provisions, which are sorted into simple and 
finite shapes of a certain size. When the imagination fixes a shape, it brings it to the 
foreground of other sensory perceptions, thereby helping to focus our attention, and, 
in so doing, allowing for the abstraction of information. The detection of shapes is, 
for Leibniz, the spontaneous work of the imagination. Indeed, as we shall soon see, 
because sense-perceptions of primary qualities are more distinct than other second-
 
4 We will return to this point extensively later. For now, see A VI 3 28: “Manifestum est corpus 
aliquod constitui definitum, unum, particulare, ab aliis distinctum, motu quodam suo vel conatu 
particulari, quo si careat, non erit separatum quoddam corpus, sed unum continuum cum eo 
cohaerens cuius solius motu movetur. Et hoc est quod alibi dixi cohaesionem esse a conatu 
motuve, ut quae uno motu moveantur, inter se cohaerere intelligantur.” 
5 Leibniz often compares the human infant’s degrees of knowledge to that of non-human animals, 
as in A VI 1 269: “Cum autem primis annis infantes parum à brutis differant (ratione sese ob 
defectum experientiae tanquam materiae in qua exerceatur, linguaeque seu symbolorum per 
quae exercentur, parum adhuc exerente), et pueri quoque adolescentesque (ne quid de viris 
dicam) sensibus affectibusque ad instar brutorum plurimum regantur [...].” A similar concep-
tion is again located by Christian Thomasius: “Nach der Geburt ist ein jedweder Mensch [...] 
gantz unwissend, sogar, daß wenn er in diesem Zustand von denen Menschen abgesondert auf-
erzogen werden solte, würde er ja so wenig, wo nicht weniger Vernunfft von sich spühren las-
sen, als manche Bestien” (see Christian Thomasius, Einleitung zur Vernunftlehre, Halle 1691, 
reprint Hildesheim 1968, p. 95: quoted and commented upon in Meier-Oeser (2007, 218)). 
Moreover, Leibniz distinguishes between the order of discoveries, which begins “par les idées 
plus composées et plus grossieres” (A VI 6 83/NE 83), and the order of nature, or the logical 
order of notions, which, on the contrary, begin with simple notions and eternal truths, consti-
tuting a proof of the dependence of our order of discoveries on what is simple and therefore 















































62 II. The Groundwork of the Imagination 
ary qualities, they are more distinct insofar as they are potential objects of mathe-
matics and geometry. As sense-perceived, however, primary qualities are also con-
fused. A child can see a square-form, but it cannot as-yet abstract it from all other 
sense-perceptual qualities, which such a form appears alongside. For the child, the 
square is not something distinguished from other qualities: it is not differentiated 
from the colors or tastes that the body appears with.6 Despite this confusion, the 
detection of shape is a fundamental operation of the imagination because it is an 
initial cognition of the unity of a multitude.7 This reduction of the multitude of the 
sense-perceptual magma into discrete unities (what Leibniz calls “perceptible 
wholes”), as demarcated by shape and size, is, in Leibniz’s view, that which allows 
the mind to interiorize types based on similarity, moreover producing a kind of 
‘mixed mathematics’, or what Leibniz calls mathematization of the natural world. 
I shall elaborate on this below. 
This line of argumentation is presented by Leibniz in two texts devoted to the 
distinction between degrees and kinds of knowledge: Letter on What it is Beyond 
the Senses and Matter (Letter to Sophie Charlotte, June 1702, henceforth abbrevi-
ated as BSM);8 and Letter on the Element of Geometry of the Duke of Burgundy 
(Letter to Sophie 31 October 1705, henceforth abbreviated as EGDB).9 It is worth 
noting that both letters share a common topic with Leibniz’s published paper on 
epistemology, the Meditation on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas (1984; henceforth 
MKTI), while also presenting a remarkable departure. In these texts, an analysis of 
the cognitive role of the imagination takes center stage, thus contrasting with 
MKTI, which conceals this aspect, limiting symbolic cognition to expressions 
through language.  
As anticipated in the foregoing chapters, in MKTI Leibniz marks out a distinc-
tion between the kind of knowledge the senses provide, i.e., clear and confused 
knowledge, and the kind of knowledge the intellect provides, i.e., clear and distinct.  
 
6 As will emerge later, the capacity for abstracting is, for Leibniz, related to the operation of 
analyzing something composite into its constituent parts, rather than purely generalizing. By 
analyzing, the mind fixes constituent parts, or attributes, as something distinct from the thing 
they are a part/attribute of. In so doing, the mind fixes the nature of the part/attribute as such. 
This will become clearer in 3.3., when we will analyze distinct perception. For textual refer-
ences, see both the passages quoted in n. 5 of this chapter, where Leibniz explicitly says that 
cognition begins with composite notions, and a passage from NE, where Leibniz denies that 
animals have abstraction. On his view, this is because they cannot have representations of sen-
sations distinct from the bodies they inhere in. Thus, an animal cannot have a representation of 
whiteness distinct from chalk or snow (see A VI 6 142/NE 142). 
7 Leibniz’s fundamental definition of perception is an exact expression of the many in the one. 
See, for instance, Specimen inventorum de admirandis naturae generalis arcanis, A VI 4 C 
1625. 
8 There are three different versions of the letter (L1; L2; l) edited in A I 21 N. 224 328 – 346 and 
translated in LSS 220 – 47. 
9 We have four different versions of the letter (one is lost). Three versions (L1; L2/L3, dated 31 
October 1705) are edited in: A II 4 N. 110 336–54/LSS 322–32; Leibniz drafted other two 
shorter versions on October 31, 1705 but finished them on November 24, 1705 (sent to Sophie 















































 1. The Synthetic Work of Imagination 63 
Fig. 1: Above described are those additions presented in BSM. The degrees of knowledge are 
those articulated in MKTI, while those in bold are what Leibniz adds in BSM. NB that the back-
ground demarks the distinction between beings and essences, as analyzed in chapter I. To remind 
the reader: perceptible wholes, which are composed of clear and confused notions of the senses 
and by distinct notions of the imagination, mark out a substantial step towards a midpoint between 















































64 II. The Groundwork of the Imagination 
The former concerns sensory qualities as delivered by each sense; the latter con-
cerns distinct, conceptual knowledge, which takes a propositional form, as ex-
pressed by definitions into language. In MKTI, however, Leibniz’s target is simply 
to contrast different degrees of knowledge, rather than giving an account of how 
minds move developmentally from one stage to the next. The question of how a 
mind expresses not just sensory qualities, but more specifically perceptible wholes, 
e.g., the appearance of a body as the computer in front of you, remains hidden in 
MKTI. This issue bothers Leibniz in the letters dated 1702 and 1705, almost twenty 
years after MKTI. There, remarkably, something substantial is added: a midpoint 
between clear and confused notions, and clear and distinct concepts. This stage con-
sists in clear and distinct notions of the imagination, which allows for the apprehen-
sion of bodies as shapes of a determinate size in space and time, or, better yet, 
shapes and sizes situated in spatiotemporal relations. This expression of bodies al-
lows the subject to move from sense-perceptual to the conceptual knowledge of 
essences (see Figure 1 above). 
Let us analyze BSM more closely in order to specifically address the work of 
the imagination. Here, Leibniz offers a distinction between three kinds of notion. 
Notions can be sensible, imaginable, and intellectual. The former are notions of the 
senses, such as colors, while imaginable notions are those that are subject to the 
imagination, such as shapes, sizes, or numbers. Meanwhile, intelligible notions are 
those of metaphysics and morality, such as substance and justice, which the mind 
apprehends as “objects of the understanding alone.”10  
Leibniz begins the letter by stressing both the importance and limits of the 
senses, which we use as a blind person uses a stick. This analogy simply means 
that secondary qualities provide some ‘first aid’ in orienting the cognizant agent in 
their knowledge of existing bodies, although they do not present things as they re-
ally are. While each sense can provide sensory notions peculiar to it – colors are 
expressions of changes in the eyes, tastes of changes in our mouth and tongue, etc. 
(more on this in sect. 3) – these qualities are clear but confused. The reason for their 
confusedness lies in the simple nature of the qualities themselves, which allows for 
recognition, but not for an analysis. Our acquaintance with red bodies allows for 
our ability to recognize red when we see it, an ability that cannot be provided by 
any definition of the simple notion “red”. I can say that “red is a color” or “red is a 
variation of light-rays of the frequency such and that”, but none of these definitions 
are sufficient to enable the subject to recognize a body as a red body.  By contrast, 
distinct notions are thus insofar as they allow one to know something in virtue of 
those definitional marks that characterize the notion. While a blind person can never 
recognize the color red, she may nevertheless have clear and distinct notions of the 
imagination, as in the case of geometrical knowledge. Shapes and sizes are qualities 
apprehended multimodally, that is, through a diversity of senses. Until this point, 
the text does not explicitly contrast with the claims of MKTI, except insofar as 
Leibniz introduces what seems to be a further, fine-grained distinction between 
 















































 1. The Synthetic Work of Imagination 65 
clear and confused notions of sense-perceptions, on the one hand, and clear and 
distinct notions, on the other. This further level consists in our representation of 
perceptible wholes, a task carried out by the imagination.11 
Leibniz clarifies that, despite the “occult” nature of secondary qualities, they 
can become subject to scientific explanation when unified in the imagination and 
analyzed by virtue of other distinct notions: numbers and shapes. Our notions of 
number and shape belong to the common sense because they are not proper to any 
single sense: we detect them through touch and sight, owing to which there must be 
something common to those notions. As Leibniz immediately clarifies, however, 
even if we were talking about an analysis of common-sense notions through the 
more refined lens of distinct notions, shapes and numbers (as experienced by the 
common sense) are not distinct per se, for “in order to conceive numbers and even 
shapes distinctly, and to form sciences of them, we must arrive at something which 
the senses could not provide, and which the understanding adds to the senses” (LSS 
239). Leibniz’s remark here is important because it underlines that, at this level, we 
are not dealing with conceptual knowledge: numbers and shapes, as perceived by 
the common sense, are particular manifestations of numbers and shapes, not con-
cepts. The imagination deals with presentations of particular shapes – material that 
only the senses can provide. Indeed, like our notions of secondary qualities, these 
presentations are necessarily clear and confused, since they denote only the sense-
perception of a shape. (Suppose you are presented with a 5-cube, a cube in 5-di-
mensional space: you see a shape, but you have no clear and distinct notion of that 
figure (assuming you are not an expert mathematician). You nonetheless see a de-
terminate shape.) Shapes and numbers can, however, become the objects of clear 
and distinct knowledge since the understanding can “add” something to them.  
Having delineated the distinction between clear and confused notions of the 
senses, and clear and distinct notions of the common sense, Leibniz proceeds to 
argue for the necessity of the synthetic work of the imagination. Each sense can 
receive impressions proper to its nature. Certain other kinds of impressions (for 
example, primary measurable qualities) can be detected multimodally, to use a con-
temporary term. In any case, we need a common sense that elaborates on those 
impressions. On their own, impressions are unconnected and disorganized. How-
ever, we may assume that there is a faculty, namely the imagination, whose work 
is to coherently organize impressions of the common sense and of the senses into 
“one whole”. A perceptible whole is an appearance; an image of one particular 
being. It could be, for example, the image of a book-shaped body in front of you, 
or of an apple-shaped body, or indeed anything perceptible to your senses in your 
surroundings, with such-and-such a quality, which is perceived as singular insofar 
as it is detachable from other appearances in the perceptual field. The apprehension 
of such wholes constitutes the commencement of acts of abstraction, as well as of 
recalling and comparing shapes, sizes, and properties.: 
 
















































66 II. The Groundwork of the Imagination 
Therefore, as our soul compares (for example) the numbers and shapes that exist in colors with 
the numbers and shapes that are found by touching, it must be the case that there is an internal 
sense in which the perceptions of these different external senses are reunited. This is what we 
call the imagination, which includes both the notions of the individual senses, which are clear 
but confused, and the notions of the common sense, which are clear and distinct. And these 
clear and distinct ideas which are subject to the imagination are the objects of the mathematical 
sciences, namely, of arithmetic and geometry, which are pure mathematical sciences, and of 
the application of these sciences to nature, which makes mixed mathematics. (LSS 239/A I 21 
339) 
Towards the end of this passage, Leibniz says something remarkable about this pro-
cess: the synthetic work of the imagination allows for the mathematical accounta-
bility of concrete bodies and the properties we confusedly apprehend. That is, the 
expression of concrete beings in terms of shape and size renders them objects of the 
quantifiable sciences. Owing to this, clear and confused qualities, such as the sec-
ondary ones, can thereby also find clarification, themselves becoming objects of the 
natural sciences and mathematics.12 
Shape and magnitude constitute a ‘middle way’ between what can be sense-
perceived and what can be conceptually apprehended: we see something as square 
even if we do not know what it is or how to define it, i.e., when we, as-yet, lack the 
relevant conceptual knowledge. Being both imaginary and conceptual, elements of 
both geometry and mathematics (as detected in bodies) allow us to reduce particular 
apprehensions of bodies to wholes, which accounts for the first stage of abstraction 
and generalization based on similarity, which is not as-yet of a conceptual kind. 
When I say that this generalization is not of the conceptual kind, I mean that it is 
not of a clear and distinct kind: it does not provide a definition of a whole, and it is 
yet a degree of knowledge potentially more distinct than simple sensation, as we 
are going to see in the rest of the chapter. 
While this stage is missing in the MKTI, Leibniz does bear witness to it in his 
writings on geometry and mathematics that are contemporaneous with MKTI. 
Clearly, something occurred between 1684 and 1702-4, likely something relating 
to Leibniz’s confrontation with Locke’s empiricism. This confrontation compelled 
Leibniz to work out a more sophisticated and detailed account of the relation be-
tween sense-perception and conceptual knowledge, on the one hand, and of the ac-
quisition of the latter as occasioned by the senses, on the other.13 As Leibniz himself 
puts it, the senses do not give us conceptual knowledge of necessary truths: they 
 
12 For commentary, see also Rabouin (2013); Leduc (2017). 
13 Leibniz had already claimed in MKTI that experience provides the human mind with a poste-
riori knowledge of the possibility of empirical concepts. Even if I can conceive of gold and its 
properties, and, in so doing, I am not capable of detecting any contradiction, I cannot have 
certainty of the real possibility of gold unless I experience something that I can categorize as 
gold, which proves the consistency of my concept (see MKTI in A VI 4 590/L 293). In Oliveri 
(2016: 1.1), I argue that Locke’s philosophy compels Leibniz to face a new body of problems: 
harmonizing his theory of human cognition with the fact that human non-conceptual and con-
ceptual apparatuses develop and change throughout an individual’s ontogentic and phyloge-















































 2. The Logic of the Imagination, its Cognitive Constraints 67 
provide the occasion for the mind’s coming to know them.14 Without sense-percep-
tual knowledge of the world, the mind would not develop conceptual knowledge of 
essences, although this knowledge ultimately depends upon the intellect’s contri-
bution. Locke’s account of abstraction causes him to confront this body of issues. 
Indeed, it is at this stage, in my opinion, that Leibniz forges the link between how 
the imagination works in the apprehension of mathematical and geometrical enti-
ties, and how it functions in apprehending sense-perceptual appearances. The result 
is the idea that human cognition has a geometrical and mathematical core, whereby 
innate knowledge constrains the imagination. The constrained (and schematic) im-
agination is activated in sense-perceiving worldly phenomena and allows for their 
categorization, an operation that Leibniz calls “mixed mathematics”: the reduction 
of beings to geometrical-like wholes, or, what he calls, “the mathematization of the 
natural world”. The imagination, namely the faculty that traditionally mediates be-
tween sense-perception and intellectual knowledge, therefore becomes in Leibniz a 
synthetic faculty constituting human sense-perceptual apprehension of those phe-
nomena that have a body. Beings, as we argued, are first represented as bodies, 
which have a certain shape and size, and bear various sensory qualities, which 
change depending upon spatiotemporal conditions. Our capacity to see one percep-
tible whole (the phenomenal appearance of a single being), however, is not given 
to the senses; it is rather a product of the joint work of faculties that are active in 
the cognizing agent. 
To summarize thus far, in BSM, Leibniz emphasizes the synthetic work of the 
imagination. If we can compare colors, shapes, and whatever else is apprehended 
through the senses, then this is on account of the imagination first synthetizing 
sense-perceptions into unities. Even though the letter does not elaborate on this syn-
thetic work, by further exploring EGDB and certain other early texts on geometry, 
we can demonstrate that the Leibnizian imagination’s synthetic work consists in 
segmenting the multitude of sense-perceptions into perceptible wholes.  
2. THE LOGIC OF THE IMAGINATION, ITS COGNITIVE CONSTRAINTS 
BSM offers a substantial link to Leibniz’s analysis of the work of the imagination 
in algebra and geometry, as in other early texts dedicated to geometry. It is here that 
Leibniz claims that the imagination has its own logic, governed by spatiotemporal 
constraints.15 Remarkably, such attention to the imagination is raised in a period 
following Leibniz’s most important discoveries in geometry and mathematics, in-
 
14 Leibniz to Sophie Charlotte (August – November 1702; in reply to John Toland: A I 21 667–
76/ LSS 257–277, for commentary, see Oliveri (2016: 240–270)). For a thorough analysis of 
Leibniz’s claim that the senses simply give occasion to knowledge of necessary, general truths, 
see Bolton (1996; 2011a; and 2017). 















































68 II. The Groundwork of the Imagination 
cluding analysis situs, i.e., the attempt to reduce geometry to a calculus of situa-
tions,16 as well as his infinitesimal calculus, in which the infinitesimal is presented 
as a fiction.17 To be more specific, Leibniz defines the work of categorization in the 
natural sciences as a mathesis generalis or a “mixed mathematics”, which expresses 
his idea that the mechanisms governing the imagination in fields like geometry and 
algebra is a model for understanding how the imagination underpins and “prepares” 
expressions of the natural world through concepts. The mathematical imagination 
uses mechanisms according to which we acquire knowledge, and which we likewise 
spontaneously deploy in the apprehension of the external world as presented in 
sense-perception. Therefore, the work of these mechanisms is more evident and 
explicit when the human mind deals with objects of pure mathematics, which is 
why analyzing how the imagination works in mathematics allows us to abstract 
models for a mathesis generalis (A VI 4 A 513; Rabouin 2017). 
The texts we are about to consider sees the emergence of an imaginative faculty 
that is not anarchic for Leibniz. By ‘anarchic’, I mean that it is not a faculty devoted 
simply to fictions or to the reproduction of what is not present to the senses.18 The 
imagination is first and foremost responsible for tracking regularities and similari-
ties in perceptual presentations, and for expressing those regularities through an 
ideal order. Hence, it does not operate independently from various principles of 
order that are, for Leibniz, innate, as he writes to Locke years later in NE: 
These ideas which are said to come from more than one sense  –  such as those of space, figure, 
motion, res – come rather from the common sense, that is, from the mind itself; for they are 
ideas of the pure understanding (though ones which relate to the external world and which the 
senses make us perceive), and so they admit of definitions and of demonstrations. (NE 128/A 
VI 6 128) 
Space, figure, motion, and rest are notions belonging to common sense, and come 
together to form what Leibniz calls the “logic of imagination”. The topic of a “logic 
of imagination” emerges very early on in Leibniz’s logical investigations. In the 
paper “Elementa Nova Matheos Universalis” (Summer 1683?, written less than a 
year before MKTI), Leibniz defines “mathesis universalis” as a science whose task 
 
16 According to the most extensive contribution on this topic (De Risi 2007), Leibniz’s definitions 
of space and time as ordering relations appears in 1677, the same year as Quid est idea, in 
which the relation of expression acquires a technical meaning.  
17 Leibniz to Antoin Verjus, Hannover 1698, A I 16 375. 
18 This is also evident in Leibniz’s use of the term “fiction”. This term is not synonymous with 
“made up” (as in “fabricated”), which may result from a combination of parts to form notions 
of nonexistent objects, as in the case of Descartes’ fictitious ideas. To the contrary, fiction, for 
Leibniz, is the act of “fingere”, imagining. It is an act performed in compliance with various 
modes of conceiving. It is true that what we conceive in the act of “fingere” is something that 
does not actually exist, or that may be impossible. Nonetheless, the fiction may help to clarify 
a concept or solve a problem. We will return to the meaning of fiction later. For now, it is worth 
noting that Leibniz’s theory of imagination allows him to positively assume arguments based 
















































 2. The Logic of the Imagination, its Cognitive Constraints 69 
is to provide the tools for an inquiry into those “things” that are properly subject to 
the imagination. This is what makes it a “logic of imagination” (A VI 4 A 513).19 
In a contemporaneous paper (A VI 4 A 509: De arte combinatoria usu in scientia 
generalis), Leibniz defines “mathesis universalis” as a “science of imaginary 
things”, which is distinct from both logic, as a general science, and from metaphys-
ics, considered as “the science of intellectual things”.20 While in Elementa rationis 
(1686, A VI 4 A 722) Leibniz warns that the imagination in metaphysics does not 
proceed as beautifully as when it concerns objects that are subject to it, as in the 
case of mathematics, a long passage there argues for the possibility of using an 
algebraic calculus to analyze intellecual notions:  
The science of similarities and dissimilarities, and of the combination of formulae and signs, 
as well as that generally accepted of the equal and unequal, can be taught by demonstrations; 
and it is spread out to such a point that it not only supports the mathesis, but it rules also the 
arts subject to the imagination (nor is it sufficiently observed in those either, although the same 
algebra has derived everything from it), but it also paves the way for the sensory expression of 
those things that seem to be not subject to the jurisdiction of the imagination, as will be achieved 
by our science. (Elementa Rationis A VI 4 A 723) 
Imagination, and especially the science of similarities and dissimilarities, of equal-
ity and inequality “praebeat viam”, will provide a way to handle intellectual no-
tions.21 In short, even if notions such as substance, unity, being, and so on are not 
imaginable, their imaginative surrogates – what we have been calling a perceptible 
whole – put minds on track for conceiving of those notions that are the proper sub-
ject-matter of the intellect alone. Imaginative surrogates play the role of necessary 
intermediaries in the mind’s progress towards metaphysical knowledge. They op-
erate through a mechanism that appears, albeit not problematically, to bootstrap the 
mind from a lower to a higher level of distinct knowledge. How? This mechanism 
relies on there being distinct notions implicit within the expression of those surro-
gates, albeit in a “blind” way (we will return to this claim in Chapter VI). For now, 
let us turn to the text, Elementa Nova Matheos Universalis (1683?), which concerns 
the “logic of imagination”, and analyzes similarities and dissimilarities.  
 
19 On this aspect of the imagination see Pasini (1996: 179); Rebouin (2018: 4751–83) remarks 
that the notion of a theory of imagination, as a kind of projection of intellectual knowledge in 
order to make this kind of knowledge visible to the mind by providing material anchoring, can 
be seen as a homage to Proclus’s theory of imagination and his analysis of Euclid’s Elements. 
On the topic of a logic of imagination and its role in mathematics, also see Leduc (2017). 
20 On the concept of mathesis universalis in Leibniz, see Rabouin (2009: Chapters 5 and 6). 
21 In describing his project of finding a universal characteristic, Leibniz writes that only few have 
tried to advance in other sciences a language that permits reasoning as if we were using an 
algebraic calculus, relying on the example given by the imagination in abstract mathematics 
(“Equidem fuere quanmquam pauci, qui quod princeps in logica fecit Aristoteles, in aliis quo-
que scientiis ab imaginatione abstractis mathematicorum exemplo tentarent.” Elementa rationis 















































70 II. The Groundwork of the Imagination 
According to this text, things are imaginary insofar as they are modes of matter,22 
which have parts. Owing to this, they are subject to the categories of quantity and 
quality (A VI 4 A 514).23 Leibniz makes explicit that what is purely intelligible, 
i.e., metaphysical notions of the intellect, is not straightforwardly subject to the im-
agination, as we have just seen. On the contrary, material bodies are subject to the 
logic of the imagination. Therefore, geometry is simply a special branch of the 
mathesis generalis, whose scope is wider than pure geometry since it concerns the 
apprehension of the naturally-existing world. But why does Leibniz think, in pro-
cessing perceptual presentations, that human minds appeal to the imagination and 
to its constraints? There is both a natural and theoretical answer to this question. 
The natural explanation goes as follows: since minds are embodied, attention and 
memory, which are necessary for all cognitive processes, are first and foremost 
controlled by sense-perceptual modifications (more on this in chapter IV). The im-
agination plays a central role in directing those two faculties in processing percep-
tual presentations, for it is the only faculty that shares a common subject-matter 
with the intellect: distinct notions. The theoretical explanation for this is that, 
through the imagination, we learn to construct relations between exprimens and ex-
primendum as based on similarity, just as through geometry we learn to conceive 
of perspectives or of one thing as proportionally related to another.24 Let us exam-
ine more closely this work of the imagination: 
The imagination in general is directed towards two [notions]: quality and quantity or magnitude 
and form, according to which things are said to be similar or dissimilar, equal or unequal. It is 
also true that the consideration of similarities, and of equalities too, belongs to a general math-
ematization; it follows that special mathematization, such as geometry, always investigates the 
similarities of figures. Similar are those things which cannot be distinguished per se one by one 
(singulatim); qualities or forms are what distinguish things per se. Similar things are nonethe-
less distinguished in an act of comparison, which consists both in the coperceptibility (coprae-
sentia) of the things to be compared, and in the coperceptibility (copraesentia) of a third thing 
with both. (A VI 4 A 513) 
According to this passage, the imagination is sensitive to two modes of material 
being: quality (viz. shape), and quantity (viz. size (magnitudo)). We should bear in 
mind that these two notions are the same invoked in the letter (BSM, 1702) that the 
 
22 I prefer here to say modes of matter, rather than extension. This is because, as we will see 
below, the two are different for Leibniz: matter qua existent is always discretely determined to 
the least of its parts; extension, as a continuum of uniform matter, cannot exist in reality. It is 
therefore a distinct notion of the imagination. I will discuss this in the next section. For detailed 
insights into this distinction, see Arthur (2019: Chap. 2). 
23 Rabouin (2018) acknowledges that this claim about quality is very significant. It bears witness 
to Leibniz’s project of renewing geometry: it is not simply a science of quantity, but of qualities 
among situated points, lines, and surfaces. The notions of congruence and of similarity become 
central to this reformation. On Leibniz’s theory of analysis situs, see De Risi (2007). 
24 As De Risi (2007) shows, the concepts of space and geometry, understood as the science of the 
projection of figures, is developed during the Renaissance thanks to the work of authors like 
Patrizi. However, geometry is, for Renaissance authors, a science of figures in space, whereas 















































 2. The Logic of the Imagination, its Cognitive Constraints 71 
imagination uses to organize perceptual presentations. After having delineated that 
the study (considerationem) of similarities and equalities is proper to both general 
mathematization and particular mathematics, such as geometry, Leibniz defines as 
“similar” those things that cannot be distinguished per se when taken one by one 
(singulatim), but only when they are put in a relation of co-presence with other 
things. To this end, “compraesentia” simply means that two numerically distinct 
bodies can be simultaneously perceived by a cognizant agent, owing to which she 
can also entertain spatiotemporal relations. On this view, two bodies can co-exist 
(that is, they are simultaneous) as distinct wholes that are related spatially (that is, 
they are a certain distance from one another). Note that this “compraesentia” corre-
sponds to what Leibniz calls “comperceptibilitas” in other passages, such as in Nova 
Methodus (A VI I 684). Indeed, it is the reason why he invokes the synthetic work 
of the imagination in BSM. For, unless the cognizant agent has the ability to detect 
unities, she will not have the capacity to compare them. 
Coperceptibility, then, is the act by which the mind compares bodies. Through 
comparison, the mind distinguishes bodies through the categories of shape and size. 
Leibniz’s idea seems to be the following: shape per se can distinguish one body 
from another, as in the case of a sphere and a cube. When one co-perceives a spher-
ical and a cubical body, in coperceiving them, she sees that they are different. In a 
second moment, the cubical and the spherical body need not be coperceived to be 
distinguished: they can be distinguished in virtue of shape alone. Let us change 
scenarios and conceive of two spherical bodies of different sizes. When two objects 
have the same shape, we can still distinguish them in an act of co-perception, even 
if we cannot distinguish them when perceived separately. Coperception of similar 
bodies enables minds to apprehend other bodily determinations, as that they have 
similar shapes but different sizes, for instance.  
In the rest of the paper, Leibniz analyzes cases in which shape and size cannot 
help in distinguishing between two objects, owing to which we need to appeal to 
other criteria. One case involves two spheres of the same size: one made of gold, 
the other of silver. In this case, they differ thanks to some property of matter, for 
instance, the color of their surfaces. When properties of matter cannot help, such as 
in the case of two perfectly congruent spheres of gold, an epistemic criterion for 
discerning both things consists in putting them in a space-time relation, that is, to 
coperceive them. In this case, things are congruent and can be distinguished “solo 
numero”. Leibniz specifies that the question regarding whether two perfectly iden-
tical objects can exist is a question for metaphysics. He seems not to deny that two 
things can appear perfectly congruent to us, and yet we use situation as a sufficiency 
criterion for the distinction of phenomena.25 The fact that they cannot occupy the 
 















































72 II. The Groundwork of the Imagination 
same space at the same time is a valid epistemic criterion to consider them similar, 
but nevertheless not identical.26;27;28 
The way in which Leibniz’s examples are organized suggests an attempt to de-
duce the fundamental relations that permit the tracking of bodies and their altera-
tion. If the similarity of qualities and quantities is the most evident, then, by strip-
ping away differences, the only phenomenological criterion left available is the sit-
uation of bodies in two different spatial positions at the same time. 
In summary, the text analyzes the way in which things are compared in the 
imagination. The condition of possibility for the comparison is the human capacity 
to co-perceive coexistents. The co-perceptibility of things is the act by which the 
imagination apprehends diverse perceptible wholes simultaneously as occupying 
different situations in space. This act allows the apprehension of quality and quan-
tity. When there is a perfect congruency between bodies, what remains for their 
distinction is their relation in space and time. Space-time relations are therefore 
prior and more fundamental to the apprehension of differences and similarities. For, 
comparison between bodies rests on the cognizant agent’s capacity to apprehend 
wholes that occupy different positions simultaneously. Therefore, we imagine 
things of different shapes and sizes as occupying a determinate situation in space, 
and as occupying different positions in time. We imagine bodies as bearing space-
time relations.29 These modes of conceiving bodies structure the work of the imag-
ination in the act of perceiving things simultaneously.  
 
26 Leibniz indeed considers the sameness of appearance and the identity principle (A = A) as two 
distinct, primitive truths, A VI 3 508: “Primae apud me veritates quae probari non possunt, ut: 
Ego habeo apparentias tales vel tales. Item: A est A, et definitiones.” 
27 A VI 4 514: “Numero differunt quae ne quidem comparatione inter se discerni possunt, sed 
referenda sunt ad externa locum scilicet et tempus, an autem possibile sit dari res solo numero 
differentes in natura, hoc solo scilicet quod revera non sunt unum, sed plura, non est hujus loci, 
sed ad Metaphysicam pertinet; nobis sufficit talia reperiri posse, quae imaginatione, sive sen-
suum apparentia discerni non possint.” 
28 Congruentia is, for Leibniz, a special case of similarity. Similarity is a spatial and metrical 
difference known through the coperception of two geometrical figures, as when we compare a 
larger circle with a smaller one. In case the two circles are perfectly similar, i.e., the same shape 
and size, they can be taken as two different figures only on account of our coperceiving them 
as being situated in a different space at the same time (Debuiche, 2013: 17). Congruentia is a 
decisive relation for constructing Leibniz’s analysis situs as an algebraic relation between sit-
uated points: points are, in this case, congruent and space is not the container of points, but 
constitutes the order of all possible situations of points. For more on this, see De Risi (2007). 
The notion of congruentia is fundamental for arguing that the imagination cannot provide any 
notion of identity: no matter how similar two things are, all the senses can offer us is a coper-
ception of them at the same time. However, if we can coperceive two congruent bodies, then 
we take them to be two, and hence distinct, not identical. Only the intellect can provide 
knowledge of identity as A = A. In chapter VI we will return on this point. For a discussion of 
the role of identity in Leibniz’s project during these years, see Rabouin (2013). 















































 3. Segmentation and Simplification 73 
Thus far, we have seen that the imagination is active in the sense-perceptual pro-
cessing of bodily expressions. Its synthetic work consists both in coherently unify-
ing information provided by each sense, or by the common sense, into one percep-
tible whole such that it can make possible comparisons between perceptible wholes. 
This synthetic work is nothing more than giving a position to two bodies appre-
hended simultaneously, i.e., it simply consists in coperceiving them as next to one 
another.  
Two further points deserve clarification. First, space and time, at this stage, are 
not concepts of which the subject is aware in dealing with her sense-perceptual en-
vironment. Perceptibility and coperceptibility must be available at an early devel-
opmental stage when conceptual knowledge has not yet burgeoned. Owing to this, 
children and animals must be capable of this kind of apprehension. Therefore, Leib-
niz must intend that space and time, as well as similarity and dissimilarity, function 
as kinds of constraints upon the spontaneous imagination in acts of early cogni-
tion.30 Second, the synthetic work of the imagination, as described thus far, is rather 
thin: a normal sentient subject is never in the presence of any single, perceptible 
whole, but is instead constantly surrounded by perceptibles. Owing to this, we need 
to further revise this interpretation, integrating it with what Leibniz says in his other 
letter: EGDB (October 31, 1705). There, the work of the imagination is presented 
as a kind of segmentation and simplification of the external world. Integrating these 
insights into the picture developed thus far will finally allow us to broach the theo-
retical core of Leibniz’s logic of the imagination. On this more refined reading, the 
imagination is not a reproductive but a productive faculty. To this end, the imagi-
nation expresses the overwhelming variety of the externally-perceived world 
through the simpler medium of what we may call ‘mental images’.31 
3. SEGMENTATION AND SIMPLIFICATION 
The Letter on the Element of Geometry of the Duke of Burgundy is the most succinct 
and explicit of Leibniz’s texts to tackle issues regarding (i) the role of imagination 
in perceiving bodies, and (ii) how clear and distinct notions of shape and size relate 
to the real world. Daniel Garber (2015: 231–54) sheds light on the core thesis of the 
text in a paper entitled “Leibniz’s transcendental aesthetics”. He explains that con-
crete, real bodies – that is, what exists independently of the expression of the human 
mind – are non-geometrical and non-mathematical. Nevertheless, their expression 
in human cognition is geometrically and mathematically construed: what the mind 
does in perceiving what we are calling “perceptible wholes” is to reduce concrete 
matter to its expression in a space-time continuum, which is not real but ideal. Con-
tinuous space-time magnitudes do not exist “outside the mind”; they are ideal and 
are used to express contiguous discrete matter because, being continuous and ideal, 
 
30 Various passages of NE argue in this direction, see NE 204/A VI 6 204. 















































74 II. The Groundwork of the Imagination 
space and time can receive any possible or actual modification of matter, transform-
ing it in modifications of extended homogeneous bodies delimited by points, lines, 
and surfaces. To put it more crudely, concrete beings do not exist as extended geo-
metrical entities (viz., shapes and sizes, and their modifications through a space-
time continuum). Rather, the mind idealizes and renders geometrical and mathe-
matical concrete beings. More precisely, the imagination is accountable for this 
cognitive feat. The idea of an idealized or mathematized natural world is the core 
idea of the letter, EGDB, which we shall now probe in greater depth. 
The distinction between discrete matter and continuous magnitudes provides 
the backdrop that enables us to point to a false belief that human agents tend to 
form, viz. that the concrete world is exactly as we perceive and conceive of it. For, 
we cannot but conceive of bodies spatiotemporally, that is, as continuous magni-
tudes, we believe that space and time are something existent outside of the mind, as 
absolute containers of things. Leibniz argues that this representation is misguided. 
Space and time are orders of situations deployed by the human mind in order to 
organize beings’ appearances (about which we will say more soon).32 To this end, 
Leibniz proffers the following argument. Space and time are continuous and ideal 
orders of all possible situations. Space, imagined as geometrical, can receive all 
kinds of figure and, qua continuum, can be divided ad infinitum. If space were a 
container of existing things, then matter would likewise be divisible ad infinitum, a 
condition that would lead to the labyrinth of the continuum. But how can we con-
ceive of unity as an indivisible component of things if space qua continuum implies 
that anything can be infinitely divided?33 The answer: space and time (as abstracts) 
are not real, but ideal, imaginary orders of expression. We will return to this issue 
in section 4.34  
Leibniz’s view is that our cognitive apprehension of being rests on a translation 
of concrete beings into measurable, ideal, and continuous quantities (shapes and 
sizes as the modifications of ideal space and time). Concrete beings qua concrete, 
by contrast, are modifications of matter whose nature is discrete, that is to say, they 
are actually divided and determined to the least of their parts. Beings are not, there-
fore, in space and time; our human, finite minds adopt notions of idealized quanti-
ties and qualities in order to apprehend them. Indeed, their expression through an 
ideal system is cognitively advantageous. Expression simplifies the determinacy 
of the concrete world by reducing matter to simple and detectable, (quasi)perfect 
 
32 EGDB in II 4 342–43/LSS 328–29. For discussion, see Arthur (2013). 
33 Arthur (2019) heeds Leibniz’s reflection on atoms (as evidenced in his early to late writings), 
arguing that Leibniz’s thread out of the continuum is the idea that extension as a continuum 
does not exist. What does exist is matter divided to infinity. The notion of infinity is syncate-
gorematic because there is no end to it: each part is further divided, and each part is “nested” 
in other parts while an entelechy diachronically (and not synchronically) provides unity to cor-
poreal substance (a real aggregate). 
34 According to Leibniz, “Tempus est Ens imaginarium, quemadmodum, locus, qualitates, aliaque 
multa.” [Time is an imaginary being, such as space, qualities, and many others.] (Definitiones 
notionum metaphysicarum atque logicarum, A VI 4 A 629). “Locus ordo coexistendi, Tempus 















































 3. Segmentation and Simplification 75 
geometrical lines, curves, and points. Reducing matter to shape and homogeneous 
surfaces, which are nothing other than the extremities of perceptible wholes/bodies, 
enables the mind to coperceive bodies as situated, i.e., bearing relations of similarity 
and congruency, as well as of distance and magnitude to other coperceived bodies. 
As Leibniz puts it: 
I reply that [...] space must be distinguished from matter. Space, or unchanging place, is an 
ideal thing, as is time, and concerns the possible as actual. This is what constitutes Quantum 
continuum (a magnitude in which there is no separation at all), which is indifferent to all pos-
sible divisions, just as number is in relation to all the fractions one can make from it. But matter, 
which is real, is Quantum discretum (a magnitude already divided), just as a whole number is 
in relation to unities, from which there results the divisions which can be made in matter by 
successive operations, being actually already made there from the outset by nature, which has 
distinguished from all time what will be able to be detached from another, and is different from 
it, whether one thinks of and notices the separation or not. It is this difference between space 
and matter which had not been well observed, and which had diverted men from the knowledge 
of unities, that is, of the true elements and principles of substance. (LSS 342/II 4 364) 
What does it mean to say that nature is determined to the least of its parts? What 
this means is that there are actual divisions in matter everywhere. If we fail to notice 
them, then this is because our sense-organs are limited and cannot receive modifi-
cations in a manner sufficiently-differentiated for the imagination’s purposes. For 
example, I cannot see a bottle of water placed too far away from my eyes, and my 
eyes do not have the power to detect its discreteness, which is, in this case, too 
distant to be seen. If we could implement our sight, for example, by using a micro-
scope or telescope, we would realize that nature is determined and organized eve-
rywhere to the least of its parts.35 As a consequence of the full-determination of 
nature, bodies (those perceptible wholes that we can detect through the imagination, 
owing to information provided by the senses) are less determined than that which 
acts upon the senses. Nonetheless, the simplification the imagination operates, in 
an act of enclosing those bodies into a shape, constitutes the act by which the mind 
apprehends bodies as situated in space and time. More precisely, following Leib-
niz’s notion of relational space, bodies are not individuated by their position in ab-
solute space, but by bearing ordered relations to other bodies. It is only when we 
undergo a segmenting of sense-perceptions into wholes that we can coperceive 
wholes simultaneously as close to one another. Before this act of segmentation, our 
sense-perceptions remain at the level of confused sensations: there are colors, tastes, 
 
35 A leitmotif in Leibniz is that, if we had a microscope, then we would see that every part of 
nature is replete with small animals, i.e., there is organization. In fact, Leibniz invokes this very 
example in EDGB: “Ainsi dans la matiere et dans les realités le tout est un resultat des parties, 
mais dans les notions ou dans les possibles le tout entier indeterminé est anterieur aux divisions, 
comme la notion de l’entier precede celle des fractions pour mieux concevoir les varietés et 
divisions actuelles et deja determinées, de la matiere. Car qu’on prenne un morceau de pierre, 
on le trouvera composé de certains grains, et prenant le microscope, on trouve que ces grains 
sont comme des montagnes, où il y a mille varietés, et si la force de nostre veue estoit tousjours 
augmentée, elle trouveroit tousjours de quoy s’exercer. Il y a là partout des varietés actuelles, 
et jamais une parfaite uniformité en tout, ny deux pieces de matiere entièrement semblables 















































76 II. The Groundwork of the Imagination 
and other secondary qualities, but these are as-yet undetectable by the human mind. 
We shall elaborate on this shortly. 
If this is correct, then the act of apprehending a body in space does not result 
from a simple act of sensation, but of co-perception: the mind can perceive one 
body because it “segments” the continuum of perception into wholes that are pre-
sented as neben-ein-einder (contiguous). Leibniz calls this expression of concrete 
beings via continuous magnitude, the “mathematization of the world”. As Leibniz 
writes: 
There are actual varieties everywhere and never a perfect uniformity, nor two pieces of matter 
completely similar to each other, in the great as in the small. Your Electoral Highness knew 
this well when she told the late Mr. D’Alvensleben in the garden of Herrenhausen to see if he 
could find two leaves whose resemblance was perfect, and he did not find any. Therefore there 
are always actual divisions and variations in the masses of existing bodies, however small we 
go. It is our imperfection and the shortcomings of our senses which make us conceive physical 
things as mathematical entities, in which there is indeterminacy. (LSS 328/II 4 352; my em-
phasis) 
These so-called “mathematical entities”, which bear “indeterminacy”, correspond 
to mathematical essences or species in NE (about which we will elaborate in chapter 
IX). We take general essences of natural kinds to be fixed and unchangeable be-
cause the slightest change in them causes a change in the very essence of the species 
in question. For example, if I take two leaves to be identical, then I consider the 
species LEAF and neglect the particular phenomenology characterizing two leaves 
as distinct particulars. LEAF is a mathematical notion and contains indeterminacy 
because, as we saw in chapter I, it expresses an essence, and essences qua possibil-
ities are indeterminate. Thus, the essence LEAF is indetermined about being an oak 
leaf, an apple tree leaf, or a birch leaf. This indeterminacy makes LEAF incapable 
of existing, for this is only possible for concrete things (which are determined to the 
least of their parts) (see chapter I).  
The point Leibniz is making in this passage, namely by confronting the inde-
terminacy of LEAF to the full determinacy of any leaf in the Garden of Herren-
hausenn (which resulted in Mr. D’Alvensleben’s inability to find two identical con-
crete leaves), is that the apprehension of particulars (as provided by the senses) runs 
in a different direction with respect to intellectual apprehension through essences. 
This is because two similar birch leaves, as presented to the senses and imagination, 
will always appear (provided that they are coperceived) as two distinguished leaves, 
even if we experience a perfect congruency between them (as Leibniz had argued 
in Elementa Nova Matheos Universalis). Although sense-perception is directed to 
what exists and is therefore particular, the very expression of bodies as shapes and 
sizes in space and time, which allows for the coperception of beings, constitutes a 
first step towards conceiving of mathematical essences, such as the essence LEAF. 
This is because mathematical essences are, structurally, a first-level simplification 
and abstraction from the discrete and complete determinacy of anything existent. 
This permits the comparison and apprehension of resemblance: birch leaves look 
similar between themselves, but different in the presence of maple leaves. And yet, 















































 4. Confused Sensation and Distinguished Perception 77 
any leaf as a type of body. If we are to fully comprehend the extent to which the 
individuation of collective bodies constitutes a first step towards essences, then we 
need to understand in what sense the imagination’s segmentary work constitutes a 
first level of simplification and abstraction from concrete matter. 
That concrete beings are discrete and therefore actually divided and determined 
to the least of their parts amounts to saying that the appearance of an apple-shaped, 
green body on a homogenous, smooth, wood-colored, rectangular surface (such as 
this table) is an imaginative expression of concrete matter. The real table may pre-
sent further divisions that my senses do not have the power to detect, but which 
would appear to me if I looked through a microscope. Neither the surface, nor the 
contours of the table, are as smooth and clear as they appear in perception. If, how-
ever, they appear in this way to me, then it is both owing to the limitations of the 
senses and because the imagination segments and translates the imperceptible de-
terminations of matter into an organized and uniform collection of points, lines, and 
extended surfaces bearing colors and/or other secondary qualities. But how does 
this segmentary work operate in detail? Moreover, how does a subject see a green 
apple on a desk, for instance? To answer these questions, we need to understand a 
passage from clear and confused sensations to clear and distinguished perceptions. 
4. CONFUSED SENSATION AND DISTINGUISHED PERCEPTION 
Before beginning the analysis, let us clarify a terminological point. I will use the 
term ‘sensations’ exclusively for simple sense-perceptions of colors, tastes, and 
whatever else the senses present to us. Under this rubric, clear and distinct sensa-
tions of shape and size also count as sensations because, when sense-perceived, 
they initially present themselves as simple and confused. Sensation is moreover 
opposed to perception, i.e., the appearance of a whole or body that can be distin-
guished into parts. Moreover, I have chosen to use the adjective distinguished in-
stead of distinct in conjunction with perception to keep clear and distinguished 
perceptions separate from clear and distinct thoughts. Leibniz occasionally em-
ploys the Latin “distincta perceptio”, and sometimes the French, “distinguée” (NE 
53). We will soon see that this distinction will turn out to be useful in tracking 
degrees of perception according to Leibniz.  
Besides this terminological choice, the dialectic between various degrees of 
perception is a decisive aspect of Leibniz’s epistemology. Indeed, the soundness of 
his theory rests on constructing an account of a continuous change with regard to 
degrees of perception.36 Leibniz indeed thinks that sensitive rational and non-ra-
tional souls are omniscient insofar as any single change in the outer world bears an 
 
36 Jorgensen (2009) has sparked scholarly attention to the issue of the continuity principle. For 
Leibniz, Jorgensen contends, any scientific theory must conform to the principle of continuity, 
the claim that nature does not make any leaps. This means that there cannot be a change that is 















































78 II. The Groundwork of the Imagination 
influence on a substance’s organs.37 As a consequence of this plenum thesis, and of 
Leibnizian harmony, the soul actually expresses single affections through minute 
perceptual modifications. Because the soul is not capable of expressing any minute 
change distinguishedly, there must be a gradual change at the perceptual level, and, 
when the change reaches a certain level of unity or confusedness of minute percep-
tions, the soul has more conscious sensations. As already argued in the introduction, 
my aim is to track Leibniz’s theory of the phenomenology of cognition apart from 
his theory of consciousness. It may be that the analysis we offer bears some conse-
quences on the latter debate as well, but that is not my target in this study. So, 
without entering into the intricate debate regarding Leibniz’s theory of conscious-
ness and self-consciousness, the minimum assumption I will make is that a sensa-
tion’s being conscious means that it can be perceived attentively by the mind.38 We 
will soon see what this implies. 
The sensitive soul is capable of minute perceptions of all changes that occur in 
the world, but it forms confused sensations of qualities of bodies that impress the 
senses in the right way (e.g., the body is not too far a distance from the sense organs, 
it is under the correct lighting or atmospheric conditions, etc.). Only objects that 
affect the organs in the right way are consciously expressed at a psychic level. This 
happens through an involuntary and spontaneous unification of the soul’s minute 
perceptual activity.39 This unification renders minute perceptions more intense and 
heightened, and, in so doing, produces a clear and confused sensation: a sensation 
that stands out and makes itself either “visible”, “audible”, “testable”, “touchable”, 
or “smellable” – in a word, sensible. The external world appears to us qua merely 
sensible: a multitude of simultaneously co-sensed sensations. Clear sensations of 
shapes and sizes are, at this stage, sensations of a confused kind because they pre-
sent themselves as potentially distinct, but not yet as such. In this process, there is 
a loss of information. Indeed, this is made explicit in Leibniz’s example of the color 
green (NE 53): the green we sense is composed of innumerable, minute yellow and 
blue parts, and, owing to a paucity of power in sight, a “visible” and homogeneous 
 
the scholarly work on Leibniz’s conception of self-consciousness rests on the idea that self-
consciousness is self-reflective and so consists in a kind of higher-order state that violates the 
aforementioned continuity principle. In recent years, scholars have tried to resist this criticism, 
for instance, Simmons (2011), who openly affirms that self-reflective consciousness must vio-
late the principle.  
37 See, for instance, the letter to Sophie (February 6, 1706) in A I 25 572–77/LSS 344–51. 
38 I follow the proposal of Barth (2011), who argues that “s’appercevoir de”, at least in the NE, is 
a non–technical term simply meaning that when the mind apperceives, it notices changes pre-
sented via the senses.  
39 We can say that the unification of minute perceptions is a consequence of harmony: the com-
plexity and major degree of nestedness of the animals composing the organism is the ground 
for their functional organization in the body; any change is then nested within other changes, 
and this “nestedness” is reflected at the psychic level with a first unification of minute percep-
tions: sensations. On the concept of nestedness, see Nachtomy – Shavit – Smith (2002). On this 
view, a high degree of nestedness and complexity in the body implies a high degree of clearness 















































 4. Confused Sensation and Distinguished Perception 79 
green color appears. Thus, a loss of perceptual information is nonetheless a gain in 
sense-perceptual distinguishedness: without this loss, the mind would not be capa-
ble of noticing something distinguished. The physical limits of the sense-organs 
represent the first constraint on what can become perceivable by the imagination. 
Now, Leibniz claims that homogeneous colored surfaces, which also bear other 
sensible qualities as detectable by other senses, are not the object of the imagination 
unless they are enclosed and segmented by the imagination into wholes. His idea 
seems to be that, unless the imagination analyzes the complexity of sensations into 
unities, the mind is not capable of coperceiving what is put before the senses. If the 
mind cannot coperceive anything, then it cannot apprehend relations, nor can it 
move forward in the process of knowing. What does it mean, then, to segment?  
The way in which I understand segmentation is not completely at odds with the 
analysis of synthesis, as advanced in BSM. The idea is that, in focusing on one part 
of the perceptual field, the imagination is spontaneously attracted to what is more 
affine to its nature, viz. shapes of a certain size. In focusing on shape, the imagina-
tion encloses some clear and confused sensations (such as colors) into a shape, and 
thereto provides unity to the multitude. This unity is nothing more than the emer-
gence of a body from the backdrop of an amalgam of clear and confused, and clear 
and distinct, sensations. Before the imagination focuses upon something, and seg-
ments various sensations into coherent wholes, the mind does not perceive bodies. 
Indeed, a body simpliciter is not perceivable by the senses alone. If you like, think 
of your imagination as a camera that is zooming in on diverse parts of the plenum 
of the scene representing your sense-perceptual environment. In so zooming, cer-
tain bodies become sharper than others, rendered more distinct from the confused 
backdrop. The imagination permits the emergence of what the senses present, and, 
in so zooming, it encloses a portion of the scene into a shape representing one body 
and, thereby, it constitutes the body as one: the imagination has an active part inso-
far as the shape attracts it over other aspects because it is “more affine” to its no-
tions. Moreover, until the imagination zooms in on and segments the scene into 
unities, whatever sensations there are are available only confusedly to the mind. 
Only when they are embedded into a whole can the mind move onto a more distin-
guished perception of whatever is put forth by the senses. Therefore, in zooming in 
on the green apple on the table, its shape appears before me. It may not be as smooth 
and linear in reality as it is presented to me, but I nonetheless present it in this way. 
Leibniz seems to refrain this idea of “zooming in on”, or focusing on, bodies in 
a short text entitled, “On distinguished (distincta) perception”. In clarifying the dif-
ference between having a confused sensation, on the one hand, and a distinguished 
perception, on the other, he draws upon several examples. Among these is that of 
seeing a human face: we have a distinguished (distincta) perception of the face in-
sofar as we apprehend it as part of a man, i.e., insofar as the face is, for us, part of 
a larger whole, viz. a human body. Otherwise, when our eyes glimpse a crowd of 
people, while we see faces, none is apprehended as distinguished from others, or as 
















































80 II. The Groundwork of the Imagination 
We perceive in a distinct way that whose parts or attributes we perceive as pertaining to it, e.g., 
when a man, of which we perceive the face, shows up, and we simultaneously think the face 
pertains to this man. Otherwise, when we direct our eyes to a crowd, we perceive men, and the 
faces of them singularly appear, although confusedly. And when we hear the water flowing 
from a distance, in fact we hear the crash of multiple waves, thus there is no reason why we 
hear one rather than the other; and, if there were none [i.e. no waves], surely we would hear 
none. In any case, this perception is confused.  (A VI 4 A 58) 
While this text is short, it is nevertheless extremely dense. Here, the contrast be-
tween the apprehension of a crowd and its analogy with the apprehension of the 
sound of waves (one of Leibniz’s classical examples of confused sensations (see 
NE 53)) provides us with a clue regarding the role that segmentation plays. While 
a confused sensation (like those of waves) presents itself as simple, i.e., not further 
distinguishable into parts, no matter how much I concentrate on the sound of it, the 
confused perception of a crowd may become more distinguished. For instance, if I 
zoomed in on one part of the crowd, then I would be capable of distinguishing 
whose face belongs to whose body. This imaginative work of segmentation is, 
therefore, a first step towards a distinguished perception of bodies as wholes, re-
spectively composed of parts, properties, and attributes.  
To sum up, both primary and secondary qualities appear to the mind as con-
fused, simple sensations because it is beyond the senses’ powers to further distin-
guish them into parts. However, the loss of information that renders a sensation 
confused is nonetheless a gain for the imagination insofar as confused sensations of 
primary and secondary qualities provide the material for the more distinguished 
perception of beings. Indeed, the imagination segments the amalgam of simple sen-
sations into wholes that express the shape and size of the body. Wholes constitute 
distinguished perceptions insofar as the imagination can further divide them into 
parts and attributes, which are considered as parts of the whole. Let us stress that, 
at the beginning of a cognizant agent’s experiential life, segmentation provides 
clear and confused perceptions of wholes, which are as-yet undistinguished. For 
instance, a perception of a billiard ball is, at first, like that of a crowd: the mind 
needs time to analyze it into parts and attributes. In the conclusion of the passage 
we have just read, after Leibniz makes a contrast between confused sensation and 
distinct perception, he glosses the role of distinguished perception thus: 
A perception is distinguished (distincta) in this way, insofar as we attribute something similar 
to our substances, we indeed know we are the subject of various attributes, so in a similar way 
we consider objects as if they were certain substances or things (res). And a distinct perception 
is that which is done with a judgment without negation or affirmation. A thought is a distinct 
imagination. (ibid.)40 
 
40 For commentary on thought as distinct imagination, see Oliveri 2020. There, I argue that the 
end of this passage offers a clue for understanding the passage from clear and distinct percep-
tion to clear and distinct thought as one of degree. In Chapter V, we will unpack this distinction 















































 4. Confused Sensation and Distinguished Perception 81 
The end of this passage is rather demanding. What Leibniz seems to be arguing is 
that we apprehend a similarity between our being and perceived beings. In acknowl-
edging a similarity, we confer onto what we perceive a kind of unity. This similarity 
consists in the property of being a corporeal substance: a bearer of diverse attrib-
utes. In this sense, even if the green apple is not a substance as I am, I nevertheless 
consider the apple as if it were substantial, and, in so doing, I understand that the 
apple is a bearer of attributes and parts, such as those that I experience in myself. 
Thus, a distinct perception seems to have the following three attributes: (i) it is 
a perception of something composite, viz. a whole; (ii) the subject has an implicit 
judgment that what is perceived is a whole composed of parts, or attributes that 
belong to, or constitute, the whole; and (iii) there are some further implicit judg-
ments about the whole, which are implicit insofar as they do not have a proposi-
tional form, that is, they do not put forth any kind of assertion or negation requiring 
assent or denial by the intellect. What Leibniz here calls a “judgment” seems to be 
a spontaneity on the subject’s part, whereby she unavoidably assumes that the outer 
unities she detects at least share with her the property of being corporeal substances. 
The end of the above passage may sound obscure for now, but it is very informative 
for the analysis we are going to lay down in chapter IV. It says that, when I focus 
on the table and see the green apple in front of me, the green apple is an amalgam 
of sensations of the clear and confused, and clear and distinguished kind. That is to 
say, unless I am capable of distinguishing different parts of this whole (the peel 
from the flesh, the petiole from the core), as well as the various attributes that parts 
of the whole may have (the different colors and tactile sensations as aspects of the 
peel, for instance), our perception of the apple remains at the level of confused and 
clear sensations. This capacity, however, is not knowledge the mind has ready-to-
hand, nor knowledge that the mind simply abstracts from the perceived being. What 
one is first able to detect are unities that are themselves clear and confused percep-
tions. Rendering a whole a distinguished kind of perception requires great efforts 
of observation, and moreover involves various kinds of assumptions (judgments 
that fall short of assertions), such as the temporal permanence of the body although 
it is changing and moving. Among the fundamental assumptions are various sub-
stantive aspects of the perceived unity, which are derived through acquaintance 
with our own selves.41 The further stages of distinguishedness nonetheless begin 
with the capacity to detach a certain shape from a background amalgam of confused 
sensations.  
As we will see in chapters V and VI, perception only becomes distinguished 
when it is accompanied by an interiorized type, which allows for the perceptual 
coherence of bodies. A clear and confused perception of some sort of unity becomes 
 
41 In NE 51/A VI 6 51, Leibniz says that we have certain ideas, as of substances, for instance, 
because we are substances, and because we are innate to ourselves. This expression simply 
means that we have an acquaintance with our own nature through which we know what does 
and does not belong to ourselves. This immediate acquaintance to ourselves is a filter through 
which we analyze the world, as we explain in the last chapter devoted to the question of how 















































82 II. The Groundwork of the Imagination 
a perception of a distinguished kind when the subject develops some form of ac-
quaintance with different types of bodies and their mereological relations (viz. 
whole-part constitution), as well as with the type of movements and alterations they 
may or may not undergo. These changing aspects of the newly-distinguished per-
ception are based on a first-order coherence, consisting in spatiotemporal con-
straints, as well as a second-order coherence, which is based on the interactions of 
various types of phenomena. 
If what we have said thus far is correct, then what we have called ‘segmenta-
tion’ is just perception of a clear and confused kind. Although it is only as-yet clear 
and confused, it constitutes an indispensable first step towards achieving clear and 
distinguished perceptions. To help the reader keep track of the degrees of perception 
we have analyzed thus far, we can revise Figure 1 by adding those degrees proffered 
in EDGB:  
 
DEGREES OF PERCEPTION 
 







Clear and confused 
sensations 
Clear and confused 
sensations 
 
 Clear and distinguished 
sensations of shape and 
size 
 
 Clear and confused per-
ception of a whole 
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 Comparison of wholes Coperception of 
wholes 
















































 5. Conclusion 83 
 
Now that we laid down the groundwork of the imagination in the chapter to come 
we will tackle it in more details grappling with problems and issue the theory raises. 
We begin with a metaphysical interlude dealing with the reality of segmentation. 
While it is true that there is no one-to-one correspondence between the ideal body 
and concrete divisions, nonetheless, in EDGB, Leibniz is adamant that our repre-
sentation of bodies is neither a fiction of the mind, which tracks something nonex-
istent, nor something ideal. It is not a mere fiction because it is an expression of 
actual modifications of substantial forces (Garber 2015: 232–36), which are ex-
pressed by the mind on a space-time continuum. In explaining why segmentation 
is not a fiction, the role of space and time for coherence of phenomena emerges.  
5. CONCLUSION 
The imagination has its own subject-matter: continuous magnitude that can be di-
vided and organized in whole-part relations through the apprehension of shapes and 
size. It is in virtue of its nature that the imagination is spontaneously activated in 
the process of sense-perceiving bodies and responds to its own logic, which rests 
on relations of shape and size, and is governed by the spatiotemporal relations of 
situations. If this is correct, then the contribution of the imagination in sense-per-
ception is to segment the amalgam of confused sensations and, in so doing, to ex-
press the discreteness of matter into the continuity of space and time. In segmenting, 
the imagination simplifies the perceptual surroundings into perceptible wholes, 
which are spontaneously coperceived and compared so that we may detect com-
monalities with regard to shape and size. The reason why the imagination is at-
tracted to similarities rather than differences lies in the fact that its natural subject-
matter are elements of geometry and mathematics; objects that appear more distin-
guished to it when they are compared to other perceptible properties of bodies, such 
as colors or tastes. 
The respective payoffs and pitfalls of the imagination’s segmentary work will 
preoccupy us in the next chapter. For now, though, let us stress that, in the light of 
the conducted analysis, we can understand why the imagination must perform this 
synthetic work. The imagination is the faculty of continuous magnitudes of two 
kinds: the continuum of space, and the continuum of time, which can receive any 
possible determination. Space and time qua infinite magnitudes are not objects of 
of whole-part rela-
tions as in space and 
time 
Clear and distinct 



















































84 II. The Groundwork of the Imagination 
the imagination, but of the pure understanding; only their positive and limited de-
termination can be the subject-matter of the imagination. Indeed, shapes and sizes, 
as bearers of similarity and equality, are apprehended imaginatively. Our senses are 
constantly affected by sensorial impressions of secondary and primary qualities 
(viz. shape and size). The imagination produces a first-order simplification by seg-
menting the actual divisions of concrete beings in compliance with the degree of 
distinguishedness that can be detected through our limited senses. This work of 
segmentation, which amounts to tracing the boundaries of concrete beings and their 
parts, constitutes a primary and necessary step towards the mathematization of re-
ality, for it translates discreteness on an ideal space and time continuum, thereby 
preparing the application of mathematics and geometry onto nature. This applica-
tion is very poor at the beginning, for it consists simply in the capacity to detect 















































III. INTERLUDE: IMAGINATION AND REALITY 
The concrete determinacy of existing beings eludes the eyes of the mind which see 
existing beings as shapes delimited by homogeneous surfaces, lines, and points, 
bearing secondary qualities. We called the appearance of a shape bearing qualities 
a perceptible whole and argued that it is an expression of the imagination that syn-
thesizes the multitude of what is sensible – – clear and confused, and clear and 
distinct notions – – into perceptible wholes: unities despite the multitude of their 
parts. This synthetic work must not be understood as a collection of parts into a 
whole, but rather as a segmentation of whole-parts units which is necessary for ap-
prehending concrete modifications. Despite I will focus on shape, perceptible 
wholes may be also non-spatial.1 The relevance of this operation is that the capacity 
of fixing wholes presents cognitive advantages over other confused sensory quali-
ties because, as I argue in this chapter, wholes express a certain unity of whatever 
acts upon the body of the cognizant agent: forces underlying bodies. In this way, 
we will show why what appears to a cognizant agent as a perceptible whole is real, 
in the sense that something in the world corresponds to the appearance, although it 
is at the same time imaginary.  
To understand the issue at stake, consider that the act of segmenting shapes 
translates concrete modifications into a format that is accessible to a finite mind. As 
an expression of the mind, the segmentation work of the imagination simplifies dis-
crete matter through the continuum of space and time. To the mind, bodies appear 
as continuous parts enclosed by a shape, and henceforth as unities that are contigu-
ous with other bodies. The shapes are not exactly discrete and determined as the 
things existing “outside” the mind and expressed through its constant activity. We 
can even say that bodies – –as we see them – – do not exist anywhere but in the 
mind that expresses them. If this is correct, what is the difference between real and 
imaginary bodily phenomena? In light of what we have said, all phenomena are to 
some extent imaginary insofar as their appearances hinge on the work of the imag-
ination. And yet, they are not imaginary in the sense of fictional. I see my dog and 
play with her; I assume that she exists and that her bodily movements express her 
excitement when playing with me, that she is healthy, and happy. But I can be far 
away from home and nevertheless still imagine playing with her. I can evidently 
tell both situations apart and infer that in the first case the dog is real in the sense 
that I am expressing actual modifications of my sense-organs accounting for her 
existence, whilst in the second case the phenomenon is fictional, in the sense that I 
 
1 Let’s specify that when I use the term “imaginary” I refer to non-pictorial sensory presentation, 
like sounds or tastes, as well. An imaginary whole can be a piece of music unified by a certain 
duration that the mind perceives as one. Duration, however, is something complex that the 















































86 III. Interlude: Imagination and Reality 
am reproductively imagining something which does not actually affect my senses. 
Therefore, when Leibniz asks about the imaginary status of phenomena, he is not 
asking the question of whether or not phenomena are ideal, that is cognitively de-
pendent on the simplification operated by the imagination. He is asking the question 
of whether phenomena are fictional, i.e. corresponding to anything existing in the 
actual world. When phenomena are both ideal and fictional, they are not real. But 
what are real phenomena?  
Real phenomena are ideal expressions of the mind partially grounded in meta-
physical facts about bodies and in cognitive facts about the mind. When there is this 
double ground, I contend, our expressions of perceptible wholes track something 
real and existent. Coherence, the subject matter of this chapter, provides for the 
reason as to why expressions of bodies as wholes are neither merely ideal nor fic-
tional, albeit their dependency on the work of the imagination. Phenomena can be 
said real insofar as they are well-grounded in metaphysical facts about the consti-
tution of bodies. These facts are expressed by minds as a coherence of bodily move-
ments. Coherence is a relational property of our expressions of bodily phenomena 
and concerns how bodies can move and change through space and over time.2  
The enquiry begins by introducing a distinction between perceptible wholes 
and concepts, arguing that the question about the reality of bodily phenomena 
amounts to the question of what corresponds to what appears as a whole. (sect. 1). 
Granted that expressions are always ideal and imaginary, we delineate two strate-
gies to argue that they are not fictional. The first strategy is to show that expressing 
external changes as perceptible wholes varying in the spatio-temporal relation be-
tween their parts and properties yield knowledge as result. The second strategy, 
completing the former, is to show that expressions of bodies as perceptible wholes 
respond to criteria determining their possible existence that are grounded in meta-
physical facts about the constitution of bodies. We will explain the different reasons 
by which sensations and segmentations of wholes are non-fictional. The chapter 
concludes with an excursus on how Leibniz modifies his view on bodily composi-
tion and coherence over the years: from being a property of the ontological status 
of bodily composition, he eventually treats coherence as a property of the appear-
ances of bodies to the mind (sect. 5). It is this relation to the minute perceptual 
activity that correlate coherence to motions and forces, and makes it a property of 
our expression that tracks what is persistent in bodies: forces. From here it follows 
 
2 As Mugnai (1992) argued, relations are not merely ideal for Leibniz insofar as they are 
grounded in the ontological constitution of beings, although they do not represent a being, i.e. 
something existent in the world, and are therefore mind-dependent as well. If the name “tree” 
for instance refers to a being possibly existing in the world, “being-father-of” is a relation be-
tween two beings that supervenes to their existent correlate, which is so because there is a mind 
perceiving it. Relations are syncategorematic and are expressed in languages through preposi-
tions or other particles (Oliveri, 2014). Leibniz defends the idea of the reality of relations and 
of phenomena in several texts and especially in NE, where the idea of “phaenomena bene fun-
data” is decisive to resist Locke’s (and any ultra-nominalist) view on the mere arbitrariness and 
conventionality of categorization. See for instance Mugnai (1976); Oliveri (2016: 2.1. – 2.3.; 















































 1. Segmentation, Simplification, and the Metaphysical Ground for Their Reality 87 
that coherence is grounded both in facts about the constitution of bodies and facts 
about the constitution of minds (sect. 6). We start with some consideration of the 
metaphysical ground of, what we call, the segmentation of wholes. 
1. SEGMENTATION, SIMPLIFICATION, AND THE METAPHYSICAL 
GROUND FOR THEIR REALITY 
The first reason why phenomena are real is that our expressions of them yield 
knowledge as result. When the mind expresses anything at the ontological level as 
a body possessing shape and size and which is situated in space and time, the ex-
pression is the reason why the cognizant agent’s states are more distinguished than 
simple sensations. Distinguished perception is also the requisite to acquire other 
forms of distinct knowledge. In compliance with Leibniz’s distinction between the 
sensory apprehension of beings and the conceptual apprehension of essences, dis-
tinguishedness concerns bodily appearances as in perception, while distinctness is 
a property of the conceptual cognition of essences.3  
Let me devote a few words to the distinction between distinguished perception 
and distinct thought, which I introduced in chapter II. Textual support for this dis-
tinction can be found in, for instance, NE 53, where Leibniz uses the French term 
“distingué” to refer to sensory qualities that can be recognized (apperceived) by the 
mind,4 while in texts dealing with conceptual knowledge he uses the adjective clear 
and distinct, a combination which has epistemic significance both for its Cartesian 
roots and for Leibniz’s intent of reforming it – which he explicitly declares in 
MKTI. Precisely in MKTI, he uses the term distinct notion to refer to knowledge of 
the conceptual kind: distinctions of conceptual marks represent an essence and are 
expressed as definitions in propositional form. Even if the distinction between “dis-
tinguished” and “distinct” is not altogether common in the literature,5 I think that it 
cannot be ignored for it is of significant technical import. As we will see soon, 
Leibniz claims that there is knowledge of a non-propositional kind, and that, there-
fore, cannot per se be distinct, not even to a minimum degree, because it does not 
have the proper form to actually be distinct: it is not conceptual. This difference has 
to do with the nature of perceptible wholes: perceptible wholes are homogeneous 
wholes because they are subject to a continuum which is both spatial and temporal. 
 
3 Bolton (2011a and 2011b; 2021) is the scholar who insists the most on making a distinction 
between sense-perception and thinking within Leibniz’s cognitive architectonic. 
4 Following Barth (2011a), I understand the term “apperception” to be synonymous with “paying 
attention to” or “noticing something”, and not as “reflection”. 
5 Simmons (2002) draws this distinction, but explicitly says that it is not a relevant one. Brandom 
(1981) already argued that to be consistent with Leibniz’s degrees of knowledge, one should 
distinguish between distinct perception and distinct concept or thought. According to his view, 
this distinction will help in understanding why non-human animals possess knowledge, on 
Leibniz’s account. I am following Brandom’s lead here, and have already argued in favour of 















































88 III. Interlude: Imagination and Reality 
Conceptual wholes are homogeneous because they are subject to identity and con-
tradiction, as we will see in chapter VIII.6 To be more specific, in Conspectus libelli 
elementorum physicae (Summer 1678/winter 1678–9?), Leibniz writes: 
Extended is what has size (magnitudinem) and situation (situm). Size is also a way to determine 
every part of the thing or those things with which the thing can be conceived (intelligi). The 
situation is the way of determining with which further things the thing can be perceived. The 
size of the thing cognized exactly is the cognition of the number of the parts congruent to the 
measure. We should treat of numbers both as determined (certis) or defined, as in arithmetic, 
and as undefined, as in algebra. This latter deals with equality and proportion (ratio). In fact, 
equal are those things that can be made congruent. Proportion is to equality what number is to 
unity. The situation of the parts of a thing among themselves is said shape (figura). From here 
originate similars which cannot be discerned unless we perceive them simultaneously. Homo-
geneous are those things that can be made similar. Any thing similar and equal is congruent. 
(A VI 4 C 1987) 
The imagination deals first with wholes which have shape and size, i.e. which are 
extended. Although in the passage size is specified as a distinct quality, something 
congruent to a measure expressed by numbers, as we saw in the last chapter appre-
hension of distinct qualities can also be confused: in being presented with two 
spheres, I see one bigger than the other. Extended means that wholes have parts that 
are extended, that is are homogeneous, i.e. they can be made similar through con-
stant and continuous transformations. Take, for instance, a circle: infinitely small 
changes can be made to the circle such that it can eventually be made into a square. 
This is a proof that the square and the circle belong to the same genus of extension. 
Conversely, no matter how many changes we make to one hour, an hour can never 
be transformed into a meter, i.e. spatial and temporal extensions are of a different 
kind.7 Parts are thus always contiguous to other parts that have a situation within 
the whole.  
Massimo Mugnai (2017) has shown that in the years 1686-89, Leibniz was de-
veloping a mereological calculus based on the notions of “homogeneity”, “par-
thood”, “similarity”, and “containment”. Leibniz’s studies were so advanced that 
he had developed, what Mugnai calls, following Varzi (2016), a “core mereology.” 
Mugnai further argues that the proper objects of this core mereology seem to be 
extended things and not concepts, even if Leibniz wanted to extend his mereological 
 
6 In A VI 4 394, Leibniz defines “cogitans” and “intelligens” as follows: “Cogitans (seu agens 
intra se). Concipiens id est cogitans aliquid. Imo videtur conceptus esse notio formata sponte 
ita ut ab alio possim discernere. Intelligens id est distincte concipiens, ita ut possim distincte 
considerare rei notas.” Another definition of “body” in A VI 4 180 says: “Corpus est substantia 
in qua partes intelligi possunt.” 
7 Leibniz uses this example in NE 63/A VI 6 63. We will discuss this extensively in Chapter 
VIII. As it appears from the example, the work of the imagination is involved in determination 
of being’s genus and species, and is therefore involved in conceptualization as well, but other 















































 1. Segmentation, Simplification, and the Metaphysical Ground for Their Reality 89 
calculus to a treatment of conceptual containments.8 This observation is very inter-
esting for our enquiry, first because it provides further proof that there is a logic of 
the imagination that deals primarily with extended whole-part unities. This means 
that there is a difference between how beings are apprehended in sense-perception, 
i.e. extended shapes with size, and how they are conceived via concepts, even if 
mereology may be used to understand logical containment: a concept is not a whole 
with parts, because it is not extended; however, it may be conceived as if it was a 
whole with parts where the parts are understood as conceptual marks. The concept 
of parthood in this respect is, nonetheless, different. In the case of concepts, we use 
the notion of parts in a metaphorical way, as there is some convenience in repre-
senting concepts as wholes. 9  
Leibniz’s awareness of a distinction between a logic of the imagination and an 
inferential logic of the intellect further points to different principles that govern 
them. As Mugnai shows, for instance, the logic of mereology rests on a distinction 
between sameness as identity and sameness as coincidence (congruency) in oppo-
sition to difference. The separation between sameness and identity has a huge im-
pact on the inference allowed by perceptible wholes and concepts. We reserve our 
effort to appreciate this difference to chapter V.10 For the present chapter, the dis-
tinction between wholes and concepts as well as the different logic to which they 
are subject bears relevance for the notion of coherence.  
Coherence is first connected with presentations of whole-part unities in sense-
perception. Any part that we distinguish in a perceived body is not a conceptual 
mark that defines its essence: “[...] If those things that inhere to homogeneous things 
are those things that are contained [in it], we call them parts and the container a 
whole (totum)” (GP VII, 245); that is, a part is something extended, which occupies 
a certain situation in the perceptible whole of which it is a part. This kind of 
knowledge cannot be distinct, but it can be distinguished, insofar as it allows to 
distinguish parts within a whole that vary with an order determined by spatio-tem-
poral constraints. As a further proof of this distinction, recall Leibniz’s motto that 
“alia est rerum, alia terminorum divisio”,11 and his comment on Dalgarno’s Ars 
 
8 On the development of this logic in light of Leibniz’s Analytica Generalissima Humanorum 
Cognitionum project, see also Rabouin (2013). 
9 In Oliveri (2016: 3.2 and 2016b), I argue that metaphors and tropes in general are cognitive 
tools for Leibniz used by human minds to expand languages from one knowledge domain to 
another. Linguistic references proceed from the signification of things which are the most con-
crete and closest to the senses, to the signification of notions of things that are the most abstract 
and, therefore, non-sensible. If this is correct, the capacity to sense-perceive shapes with parts 
as whole-part relations is a pre-stage of knowledge that is later used analogically by the mind 
to express what is not subject to the senses and the imagination: concepts. This is also interest-
ing because in these same years Leibniz was developing a diagrammatic calculus for conceptual 
containments based on lines. 
10 Rabouin (2013) also highlights this distinction and tracks the impact that it has on Leibniz’s 
logical and mathematical project. 
















































90 III. Interlude: Imagination and Reality 
Signorum: “one thing is to dissipate parts, another to consider them distinctly” (A 
VI 3 174–5), the latter act amounting to the apprehension of a being through a con-
cept.12 Despite this distinction between spatio-temporal apprehension of beings and 
non-spatiotemporal apprehension of concepts, the act of distinguishing parts which 
are coherently arranged according to spatio-temporal laws and to the nature of a 
body is a decisive step towards the distinct consideration of concepts and is itself a 
kind of knowledge, as we will see soon. 
Bearing the distinction of perceptible vs. conceptual wholes in mind means to 
be aware that when we ask the question of the reality of phenomena this very ques-
tion may be interpreted in different ways. One way is to wonder whether our con-
ceptual apparatus track real distinctions in nature, a question we reserve for chapter 
VIII. Another way is to ask whether there is correspondence between perceptible 
wholes and bodies existing independently from the mind. We deal now with this 
latter question and we notice that when declined in these terms, it seems that in light 
of Leibniz’s account there is no correspondence between perceptible wholes and 
whatever is external to the cognizant mind. Leibniz seems to deny that bodies exist 
as we sense-perceive them. Whatever exists independently from cognizant agents’ 
expressions is discrete and infinitely divided to the least of its parts, as we saw in 
the previous chapter. Bodies are like flocks of sheeps, lacking true unity. This chap-
ter argue that even if bodies lack true unity per se, they do not lack unity altogether.  
If bodies lacked any form of unity, they could not be expressed by the mind. If 
we insist hence on the fact that the expression of discrete matter as perceptible 
wholes is an epistemic achievement of the cognizant mind with respect to giving 
up determinacy and concreteness, we have a first argument in favour of the reality 
of phenomena, which reads as follows: phenomena are real because they allow the 
mind to acquire knowledge of the world that would otherwise remain precluded to 
finite minds. In simplifying and synthesizing concrete bodies into whole-part rela-
tions the cognizant agents acquire distinguished knowledge: the limitations of the 
senses make perceptible or noticeable minute changes that would otherwise remain 
unnoticeable to the mind if they were not united and synthesized in the expression 
of a homogeneous surface, a line, or a certain auditory frequency.13 As a result, real 
changes are far more complex at the material level, but we perceive them as simple 
and uniform.14 The uniformity of sensible qualities makes them both perceivable to 
the imagination and homogeneous to their subject matter – continuous magnitudes 
– and therefore noticeable for memory and attention. Only that which possesses 
limits, but which is complex can be perceived or imagined by the finite human mind 
 
12 For an introduction to Dalgarno and Leibniz, see Maat (2005). For a discussion of the passage, 
see Oliveri (2016, 190–92). 
13 For an extensive phenomenological analysis of auditory perception in Leibniz, see Sieroka 
(2015). 
14 Leibniz argues in favour of the complexity of simple notions of the senses against Locke in 
NE: what appears simple to us may be complex in itself, see NE 120/A VI 6 120. Already 















































 1. Segmentation, Simplification, and the Metaphysical Ground for Their Reality 91 
(with the infinite being an object of the understanding);15 if matter is actually infi-
nitely divided, as Leibniz argues,16 then only the reduction of actually infinitely 
divided matter into, what appears to be, a finitely divided whole can turn discrete 
matter into an intentional object of the finite mind. In sense-perceiving a whole with 
parts, like the appearance of a billiard ball, the mind has already carried out a deci-
sive cognitive performance. The simple act of isolating the ball from the rest of the 
perceptual environment and tracking its motion or change of colour with light var-
iations is a very complex cognitive act that requires considerable experience to be 
performed. 
By expressing bodies as perceptible wholes, moreover, cognizant agents move 
toward distinct knowledge because of the segmentation work of the imagination. 
By taking the perceptible surfaces and lines as the extremities of shapes, this effort 
simplifies the complexity of the world and allows for comparing wholes and recog-
nizing similarities among them. This comparative process will eventually result into 
interiorizations of types. Types are interiorized rules and the capacity of the mind 
to track the common nature of different phenomena. In a nutshell, when the mind 
interiorizes a type based on the similarity of bodies, the mind considers a particular 
apprehension of a body, for instance the billiard ball in front of me, as a round-type 
of body and – in virtue of this association – expects certain behaviours from that 
body; for instance, the tendency of a ball to roll rather than to stay in place when 
left on an inclined surface. We will extensively show how we interiorize types, what 
they are and how fine-grained they can be in chapters IV and V, but from what we 
have said up until now it is clear that the detection of bodies as shape is the begin-
ning of the story of how types are interiorized. 
The second reason why phenomena are real is that the mind cannot make any 
arbitrary and imaginary distinctions in nature, or, put otherwise, that any division 
made by the mind is made by nature as well (NE 309). Any division that the mind 
can make in nature is the result of a change in matter that bears an influence on 
human beings’ sense organs. As the mind mirrors the body, only a change on the 
bodily side can provide the reason for a distinction on the cognitive side. Because 
any change is grounded in forces at the metaphysical level, any cognitive change 
bears a relation of expression with the formal causes of those changes. It is this 
relation, as I will argue, that allows Leibniz to attribute a certain degree of reality 
to secondary qualities and to avoid the consequence that phenomena as we perceive 
them are misrepresentations of some real modifications. To argue for this point, we 
turn our attention to NE. 
 
15 Bolton (2006) argues for the impossibility of perceiving that which does not have parts. On the 
infinite, see also Rabouin (2018).  
16 Arthur (2018) extensively reconstructs Leibniz’s rejection of the notion that the continuum ex-
ists as the sum of parts, for small they may be. There is no minimum and maximum in material 















































92 III. Interlude: Imagination and Reality 
2. SENSATIONS AS EXPRESSIONS 
In his Essay, Locke objects that God could indifferently establish a connection be-
tween our sensation of, say, pain, and both the motion of particles in a piece of steel 
and in our flesh. In other words, our sensations have no resemblance with exterior 
changes in the object or in the subject’s senses, lacking so a unique ground. Leibniz, 
after summarizing Locke’s position, rejects this conclusion. He writes in NE: 
PHI L. § 13. Now, when certain particles strike our organs in various ways, they cause in us 
certain sensations of colours or of tastes, or of other secondary qualities which have the power 
to produce those sensations. ʻIt being no more impossible, to conceive, that God should annex 
such ideas [as that of heat] to such motions, with which they have no similitude; than that he 
should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which 
that idea hath no resemblance.ʼ  
THEO. It must not be thought that ideas such as those of colour and pain are arbitrary and that 
between them and their causes there is no relation or natural connection: it is not God’s way to 
act in such an unruly and unreasoned fashion. I would say, rather, that there is a resemblance 
of a kind - not a perfect one which holds all the way through, but a resemblance in which one 
thing expresses another through some orderly relationship between them. Thus an ellipse, and 
even a parabola or hyperbola, has some resemblance to the circle of which it is a projection on 
a plane, since there is a certain precise and natural relationship between what is projected and 
the projection which is made from it, with each point on the one corresponding through a certain 
relation with a point on the other. This is something which the Cartesians have overlooked; and 
on this occasion, sir, you have deferred to them more than is your wont and more than you had 
grounds for doing. (NE 131/A VI 6 131) 
A hyperbola and a circle differ, and yet, as we know, one can express the other 
through a ruled relationship. Likewise, secondary qualities are not arbitrary; they 
are not misrepresentations of some “real” bodily modifications as there is a constant 
and ruled relationship between secondary qualities as minds perceive them and their 
correlated causes, namely, motions as expression of forces. Despite sensations are 
not arbitrary, we need to keep in mind that we can use them simply in the way that 
“a blind person uses a stick” (to Sophie Charlotte (June 1702) A I 21 337), that is 
acknowledging that they have a ground in the object won’t change their being a 
confused kind of knowledge. Secondary qualities do not provide us with access to 
what is stable and constant about bodies. They are, nevertheless, inherently con-
nected with bodies such that they can be starting points for reaching a more stable 
kind of knowledge. 
A few pages later in NE, Leibniz argues that since a warm object appears cold 
when one’s hands are cold, so even primary qualities can be subject to deception, 
as when a sphere is touched in a certain way it appears double. This “shows […] 
that warmth is not a sensible quality (i.e. a power of being sensorily detected) of an 
entirely absolute kind, but rather depends upon the associated organs; for a move-
ment in the hand itself can combine with that of warmth, altering its appearance” 
(NE 133/A VI 6 133). And he concludes: 
So, from the fact that something does not always appear the same, it does not follow that it is 
not a quality of the object, or that its image does not resemble it. As for warmth: when our hand 















































 2. Sensations as Expressions 93 
moderate the warmth of the hand, so that the water appears to us to be cold; […] So there is a 
sense in which the warmth can be said to inhere in the water in a bath, even if the water appears 
cold to someone; just as we describe honey in absolute terms as sweet, and silver as white, even 
though to certain invalids one appears sour and the other yellow; for things are named accord-
ing to what is most usual. None of this alters the fact that when the organ and the intervening 
medium are properly constituted, the internal bodily motions and the ideas which represent 
them to the soul resemble the motions of the object which cause the colour, the warmth, the 
pain etc.; or - what is here the same thing - they express the object through some rather precise 
relationship; though this relation does not appear distinctly to us, because we cannot disentan-
gle this multitude of minute impressions, whether in our soul or in our body or in what lies 
outside us. (NE 1323/A VI 6 132–3, my emphasis) 
The expression-relation between changes in discrete matter and our representation 
of bodies has metaphysical significance. Since the mind needs to experience a cer-
tain similarity among distinguished phenomena more than once in order to notice 
them – or at least this is how Leibniz argues for a distinction between obscure and 
clear and confused knowledge in MKTI – , if the mind notices a modification and 
classifies it as a type of modification, this is because there are forces to which ma-
terial effects in the body and cognitive effects in the mind correspond. Since sensa-
tions consist of changes in minute perceptions that do express external changes 
through their interaction with the organs of the body attached to a soul (more on 
this in chapter IV), the water may feel cold despite its being warm because the state 
expresses also the interaction with the organs. Despite this instability of sense-per-
ceptions, they do track something in the body. If a cognizant subject recognizes a 
sensation as a type (warm rather than cold), there must be a certain type of power 
or formal cause active in nature, which bears some similarity to other formal causes 
that produced similar effects in the past. In this sense, we can say that the water is 
warm even if through a certain period it feels cold to someone whose sense-organs 
have underlying conditions that are reflected in the activity of minute perceptions. 
That is also why a cognizant agent whose sense-organs have been damaged will not 
have the same kind of sensations as a subject whose organs are well functioning.17 
Leibniz makes his point clearer in another passage, where he says that a formal 
cause must corresponds to our sensations: 
However, no matter what rules men make to govern how things are to be named and what 
entitlements go with names, provided that the system of rules is orderly (i.e. interconnected and 
intelligible) it will be founded in reality, and men will be able to imagine (figurer) only such 
species as have already been made or distinguished by nature – nature which even encom-
passes possibilities. As for what is inner: although every outer appearance is grounded in the 
inner constitution, it can nevertheless happen that two different constitutions result in the same 
 
17 A VI 6 132/NE 132: “La lumiere encor ne paroist point à des yeux mal constitués, et quand ils 
sont remplis eux mêmes d’une grande lumiere, une moindre ne leur est point sensible.” A VI 6 
137/NE 137: “Effectivement ce seroit quelque chose de fort curieux et même d’instructif de 
bien examiner les idées d’un aveugle né et d’entendre les descriptions qu’il fait des figures.” 
This means that a person who is born deaf and dumb, and who is therefore incapable of speak-
ing, cannot develop the language required for forming abstract notions (i.e. notions without 
shapes). And yet she would be probably capable of forming analogies, as we do between Latin 















































94 III. Interlude: Imagination and Reality 
appearance; yet there will be something in common, and that is what philosophers call the 
'immediate formal cause'. But even if that were not so, e.g. if M. Mariotte were right (I think 
he is wrong) in saying that the blue of a rainbow has an entirely different cause from the blue 
of a turquoise, with no common formal cause; and even if we agreed that some of the apparent 
natures which lead us to name things had nothing in common internally; our definitions would 
nevertheless be grounded in real species, for phenomena themselves are realities. It can be 
said, then, that whatever we truthfully distinguish or compare is also distinguished or made 
alike by nature, although nature has distinctions and comparisons which are unknown to us and 
which may be better than ours. (NE 309/ A VI 6 309, my emphasis) 
Leibniz’s heavily loaded metaphysical assumption here is the last piece of his the-
ory that he utilizes to warrant the reality of phenomena: layers of similarities among 
(i) forces or formal causes that are inferred from (ii) similarities among phenomena 
experienced both by (iiia) a single perceiver, x, and (iiib) any other perceiver, y, 
who is acknowledged by the perceiver x as being similar to herself guarantee the 
reality of the phenomena.18 The similarity between x and y allows one to infer that 
similar causes affecting x and y’s bodies will correspond to similar cognitive effects 
both in the x and y’s minds (unless one of the perceiver’s organs is malfunctioning), 
such that from observing the causes affecting y, x has reasons to infer what y’s 
cognitive states are about, at least at the moment in which y’s body is affected by 
the cause.19 Through x’s reflection upon her own nature, x can infer what other 
embodied perceivers can or cannot do. If the causes affecting y are signs of a lan-
guage – which, recall, are also bodies apprehended by the imagination – , then we 
begin to get a glimpse of the importance of these layers of similarities and this in-
tricately baroque mirroring game, to which we now turn our attention. The first 
thing to notice is that it corresponds to an analysis of what Leibniz calls reality 
defined as the harmony among a perceiver’s own states and those of other perceiv-
ers.20 We will now proceed to explain the first part of this claim, aware that explain-
ing the mechanisms by which cognizant agents process minute perceptions and so 
express changes in discrete matter is the key to understand how there can be har-
mony among different perceivers’ perceptual states. They express similar changes 
in similar ways.  
 
18 Acknowledgement is not transitive: that’s why a mind – for instance a human mind – can 
acknowledge a non-human soul, a dog for instance, as similar to itself under some respect – 
i.e., both are capable of sense-perceiving – and yet only the human mind can have reflective 
knowledge of itself and of the knowledge the animal can have – the human can think, according 
to Leibniz, that the animal is feeling pain, while the animal feels the pain, but cannot think that 
“I am feeling pain”. Lacking reflection, an animal is not capable of acknowledging the human 
being as similar under a certain respect. In Oliveri (2016: 1.5.) I argued that this acknowledge-
ment is what constitute Leibnizian conscientia. 
19 I argue extensively for this structure in my doctoral thesis, Oliveri (2016: 2.3. and 3.1.); a 
shorter version of this thesis can be found in Oliveri (2016a and 2016b).  
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3. SEGMENTATION AS EXPRESSION 
Leibniz has a special attitude towards categories constructed through opposition or 
as being mutually exclusive, such as arbitrary and natural:21 he analyses the reasons 
for holding either of each category to be true, and then looks for a third way to 
reconcile what is valuable about each, with the minimum loss of explanatory force 
possible. He manifests this aptitude – I think – in his definition of reality as harmony 
among perceivers’ states and the role that he attributes to coherence.  
We have seen so far that part of Leibniz’s explanatory effort with his theory of 
the imagination is to avoid the following consequence, namely, that if bodies expe-
rienced are in fact idealizations of the imagination, that what we believe to be real 
about them are merely mind-dependent properties of bodies. The first strategy for 
testing the thesis that the world minds experience is only an ideal construction, and 
yet that there is no reason to doubt the reality of phenomena can be found through 
the notion of expression: if sense-perceptions of bodies are expressions of forces, 
this is because matter is actually infinitely divided. As the world is like a plenum, 
any actual division of matter bears an influence on neighbouring material divisions 
and so changes propagate to any discrete part of matter for far it can be. This con-
stant affection of matter on the organic body is reflected in the mind through its 
minute perceptual activity. Variations of minute perceptions are in harmony with 
actual affections of divisions in matter on the body. This harmony warrants a ruled 
and analogical correspondence between what there is at the ontological level and 
what we experience at the phenomenological level, despite the change in kind be-
tween ontological and phenomenological levels. It is exactly this change in kind 
that by which the ontological level is knowable by a finite mind, insofar as it as-
similates it to categories (continuous magnitudes) which the mind can apprehend: 
if discrete matter divided to infinity cannot be an intentional and conscious object 
of the finite mind, finite bodies (wholes with parts) as caused by changes in infinite 
minute perceptions can. If there would have been no change in kind, no transfer of 
levels, the mind would simply not have known what there is in the actual world. 
What does this imply? There are bodies that we see as round. Spotting the 
roundness of the body functions as an explanation as to why that body can roll. We 
can use the same example to explain categorical vs. dispositional properties of bod-
ies, the intuition being that we can understand that a round body will roll without 
assuming metaphysically that the body has the power or disposition to roll; the ca-
pacities of a body supervene upon its categorical properties. I think that this view 
 
21 This was already noted in Zimmermann (1834) who argues that Leibniz tried to overcome the 
distinction between nominalism / realism about essences. The same tendency can be observed 
when he tries to settle the controversy between arbitrary and natural signs: the names of a lan-
guage are arbitrary, for there is no necessary relation between a name and a concept; but they 
are natural insofar as there were reasons to choose one name over others. See Oliveri (2016: 















































96 III. Interlude: Imagination and Reality 
is sympathetic to Leibniz’s conception of reasons, according to which the proper-
ties that we can identify as properties of a body or of an entity in general can serve 
as reasons for explaining why the body or the entity can undergo certain changes 
and states. Properties, however, must be reduced to forces and substances, but with-
out identity: that is the role of expression.22 The fact that a body can roll is meta-
physically grounded in substances and their forces; the fact that I see the body as 
round can serve as an explanation of why that body roles; but from my seeing the 
body as round I cannot infer that the force or the (Leibnizian) substance is round or 
that a power to roll exists in the body and this is the cause of the rolling. At a more 
fine-grained metaphysical analysis, bodies cannot be ultimate subject of activities; 
although properties we can conceive of them can serve as explanations for changes. 
In this respect, when we observe a change, all we can say is that there is a force 
correlated to the phenomenological appearance of being round and rolling, and that 
is so the reason for changes of the body, even if we may have no way of reducing 
the property of the body to the force: 
it must be borne in mind above all that the modifications which can occur to a single subject 
naturally and without miracles must arise from limitations and variations of a real genus, i.e. of 
a constant and absolute inherent nature. For that is how philosophers distinguish the modes of 
an absolute being from that being itself; just as we know that size, shape and motion are obvi-
ously limitations and variations of corporeal nature (for it is plain how a limited extension 
yields shapes, and that changes occurring in it are nothing but motion). Whenever we find some 
quality in a subject, we ought to believe that if we understood the nature of both the subject and 
the quality we would conceive how the quality could arise from it. So within the order of nature 
(miracles apart) it is not at God’s arbitrary discretion to attach this or that quality haphazardly 
to substances. He will never give them any which are not natural to them, that is, which cannot 
arise from their nature as explicable modifications. (NE 65–6/A VI 6 65–6, my italics) 
The quality we detect may simply be a gloss that we use as an index for predicting 
bodily behaviours due to the expression-relation between body and mind, even if 
the real body can only be said to have that property analogically. The body may be 
not as round as we conceive of it, since it undergoes constant modifications. Despite 
those modifications, there is some actions the body produces in its own way, 
through mechanical interactions, that we express as motion or a change correlated 
to observable properties.  
This distinction within attribution, hence, can help to determine what actually 
can serve as an explanation for the finite mind, even though the reconduction of that 
explanation back to its proper metaphysical ground will remain obscure to the finite 
human mind. As I will argue in chapter VIII, this warrants the autonomy of natural 
sciences from metaphysics. And yet this is exactly the force of what Leibniz calls 
expression, as we analysed in chapter I. Expression is the unification and synthesis 
of information insofar as it is translated and encoded into a format which (1) bears 
an ontological difference with the thing of which the expression is an expression 
and (2) makes the information available to a finite mind. Concrete material changes 
 
22 Already De Risi (2007: 329–30) notices that the relation between exprimens and exprimendum 















































 3. Segmentation as Expression 97 
might not be round as we conceive of them, but roundness is a property that allows 
us to predict some bodily changes (more on this in chapter V). 
The analogical correspondence between ontological and phenomenological 
levels guarantees that the imagination carries out segmentation and synthesis in a 
way that mirrors real divisions in nature, however undetermined and vague they 
might be. This theory of natural divisions does not imply that only “one order of 
nature is possible”; on the contrary. It does not exclude the fact that what we call 
nature may be divided in a variety of other ways, and which may even be incon-
sistent with the actual divisions we make because of the limits of our cognitive and 
sense-perceptual capacities. And yet, our divisions can be said to be arbitrary and 
natural at the same time. There are two ways, based on what we have said so far, in 
which this claim can be interpreted.  
First of all, divisions are proportional to our body because segmentation de-
pends on spatio-temporal relations; that is, on the proportion of our bodies to other 
bodies.23 If the dimensions of my body’s sense organs were to somehow drastically 
change, as if I suddenly shrank to the size of a bacterium, I wouldn’t be able to see 
a book. A bacterium, as a living organism, perhaps has the capacity to distinguish 
between different bodies in its environment – even if these are unimaginable to the 
human mind because of a lack of similar organs between the human body and the 
bacterium. If the bacterium could categorize and use names for those things, it 
would have categorized a completely different set of natural entities. Nevertheless, 
the bacterium’s categorization would still be in accordance with natural divisions, 
even though those divisions are unimaginable to human minds (more on this 
soon).24 Why? Because nature is actually divided to infinity in a way that always 
expresses forces or substantial forms, as Leibniz says in NE quoted above. To So-
phie Leibniz writes the following: 
At any rate, I conceive all natural things, even the invisible and those far away, just as one 
conceives those which are visible and nearby, the difference being only in the degrees of gran-
deur and perfection. This makes my system very straightforward, since everything is under-
stood in proportion to what we see. (LSS 331/II 4 347) 
The second way in which the divisions are not arbitrary is that there may be many 
criteria available to categorization. I can, for instance, organize my library by sort-
ing my books out in either alphabetic order, by which it is easier to find books, or 
by colours and shapes, so that they fit nicely into my living room. If I choose one 
order over another, it is because classifications depend on both pragmatic and con-
tingent reasons (I attribute more importance to the atmosphere they produce in my 
living room, rather than the easiness alphabetic order provides for finding books). 
 
23 A VI 6 58/NE 58: “Cette connoissance des perceptions insensibles sert aussi à expliquer pour-
quoy et comment deux ames humaines, ou autrement d’une même espece, ne sortent jamais 
parfaitement semblables des mains du Createur, et ont toujours chacune son rapport originaire 
aux points de veuë, qu’elles auront dans l’univers.” 
















































98 III. Interlude: Imagination and Reality 
The fact that I choose one order over another does not rule out the fact that I could 
have chosen the other, i.e. that nature may be divided in different ways. I cannot 
choose, however, the fact that I see book-shaped bodies bearing similarities to one 
another.25 
Despite the possibility of classifying phenomena in many ways, the divisions 
actually made by the mind through the imagination are not fictional either. We can 
certainly imagine divisions which are not actually given in our perceptual environ-
ment, and indeed we even have the power to conceive things that we will never 
experience, like monsters or unicorns.26 As a proof of its reliability, though, the 
imagination spontaneously develops a sense or capacity of drawing a line between 
real and fictional phenomena. This “capacity” is the result of perceiving a certain 
phenomena’s coherence. Coherence is a feeling of possible existence accompany-
ing the phenomena; it does not concern truth, as we point out in the next section.  
4. COMBINATORIC OF ELEMENTS VS PROPOSITIONAL CONTAINMENT 
Knowledge concerns either what is true or false, or what can or cannot obtain. True 
or false knowledge concerns propositions which are nothing but the connection of 
a subject and its predicates, as expressed by a categorical sentence in the form of “a 
is F”. When we say that expression of beings as bodies having a shape with size 
provides distinguished knowledge about phenomena, we do not intend knowledge 
of what is true or false. We are claiming rather that they allow the subject to expect 
states of affairs as likely or unlikely consequences of a cluster of phenomena: to 
predict their possible existence. Coherence, we argue, is a pre-propositional stage 
of knowledge, which concern how something may or may not change. Leibniz ar-
gues for a pre-propositional stage of knowledge in a passage of NE, specifically at 
the beginning of book 4, chapter 1, in response to Locke’s claim that knowledge 
consists in the agreement of ideas as given in a proposition: 
Knowledge can be taken even more generally, so that it is involved in ideas and terms before 
we come to propositions and truths. If someone looks attentively at more pictures of plants and 
animals than another person, and at more diagrams of machines and descriptions and depictions 
of houses and fortresses, and if he reads more imaginative novels and listens to more strange 
stories, then he can be said to have more knowledge than the other, even if there is not a word 
of truth in all that he has seen and heard. That is because the practice he has had in portraying 
in his mind a great many actual, explicit conceptions and ideas makes him better educated, 
better trained, and more capable than someone who has seen and read nothing – provided that 
he takes nothing in these stories and pictures to be true which really is not so, and that these 
 
25 See Mugnai (1976; 1982); Bolton (2017). I myself have argued for how the diversity of cate-
gorization does not make it completely arbitrary and conventional in Oliveri (2016: 2.2. and 
2016c). 
26 And it is exactly this capacity of conceiving possible species that Leibniz considers a resource 















































 4. Combinatoric of Elements vs Propositional Containment 99 
impressions do not prevent him in other context from distinguishing the real from the imagi-
nary, the existent from the possible. (NE 355–6/A VI 6 355–6) 
A pre-propositional stage of knowledge consists of the imagistic modifications of 
bodies and their entertained properties whether they be sensory, i.e. when the im-
aginative act begins with a modification of the sense-organs due to a material 
change affecting the senses (e.g. we see a fortress, a house, a plant, and so on), or 
imagery, i.e. when the imaginative act begins in the imagination as an input of non-
pictorial vehicles or words (e.g. cases like when we read a novel or when we are 
asked to mentally picture a scenario). The pre-propositional stage of knowledge is 
close to the manipulation of images where the images are taken to be images of 
certain types of bodies. It also possesses a further characteristic: the more one trains 
the imagination to imagine many bodies and changes simultaneously (at once, to 
use Leibniz’s jargon), the more prompt and prepared the mind will be to picture 
whether a certain combination of traits or parts is or is not coherent, or, to use an-
other of Leibniz’s peculiar philosophical terms, compossible. 
Coherence implied in the evaluation of reality concerns the (com)possible ex-
istence of a phenomenon in the world of which the epistemic subject is a part. Train-
ing the capacity of imagining, as Leibniz claims at the end of the aforementioned 
passage, provides the mind with knowledge even if that which is imagined is simply 
fictional; that is, if it refers to facts or entities which do not belong to the actual 
world. Why? This is because mere training enhances the mind’s capacity to under-
stand what is possible and because this capacity rests on a combinatoric of elements 
or the parts of a whole.  
In line with the distinction between propositional and non-propositional kinds 
of knowledge in NE, in “On the Method of Distinguishing Real from Imaginary 
Phenomena” (1683), Leibniz distinguishes between two different ways of acknowl-
edging the coherence of phenomena: (i) we form hypotheses about the phenomenon 
(a propositional understanding of coherence); and/or (ii) we see it as conform to the 
“customary” nature of a phenomenon:  
Let us now see by what criteria we may know which phenomena are real. We may judge this 
both from phenomena itself and from the phenomena which are antecedent and consequent to 
it as well. We conclude it from the phenomenon itself if it is vivid, complex, and internally 
coherent (congruum). It will be vivid if its qualities […] appear intense enough. It will be com-
plex if these qualities are varied and support us in undertaking many experiments and new 
observations. […] A phenomenon will be coherent when it consists of many phenomena, for 
which a reason can be given either within themselves or by some sufficiently simple hypothesis 
common to them; next, it is coherent if it conforms to (consuetudinem servat) the customary 
nature of other phenomena which have repeatedly occurred to us, so that its parts have the 
same position, order, and outcome in relation to the phenomenon which similar phenomena 
have had. Otherwise phenomena would be suspect, for if we were to see men moving through 
the air astride the hippogryph of Ariostus, it would, I believe, make us uncertain whether we 
were dreaming or awake. (L 363–4/ A VI 4 B 1502; my italics) 
Coherence is an intrinsic and extrinsic relational property of phenomena. It can ei-
ther involve one single phenomenon (as a coherence among its internal parts); or 















































100 III. Interlude: Imagination and Reality 
(i) to previous experiences of phenomena that we apprehend as being similar to a 
present one; (ii) or/and with concomitant co-varying phenomena constitutes our ca-
pacity to sense-perceive the phenomenon as coherent. The coherence of a phenom-
enon with previous or concomitant phenomena may be of two kinds: it can be of a 
propositional kind, i.e. reasons we detect which serve to devise a hypothesis for 
why a phenomenon is expected to behave in a certain way;27 or it can be of an 
imagistic form, i.e. it is a “feeling”28 or a sort of “consuetudo” accompanying the 
imagistic presentation of the experienced phenomenon. This feeling depends on ex-
periencing the phenomenon in conformity with previously experienced phenomena 
of the same type and/or to the way the present phenomenon reacts to concomitant 
phenomena. The mind expects what it considers to be typical behaviour of the phe-
nomenon based on past behaviours of similar phenomena. 
The imagistic kind of coherence, Leibniz tells us, consists of apprehending an 
order between a phenomenon and the position of its parts, as well as of some out-
come they can produce. This order is sense-perceived because it concerns extended 
parts that are actually perceived as though they are in space and time, and that we 
spontaneously apprehend as similar to those of previously experienced phenomena. 
To argue for this spontaneous comparison between actual and past phenomena, 
Leibniz introduces an ambiguous case: suspicious phenomena, i.e. phenomena 
which do not behave as they would typically and/or as we are used to them. If co-
herence is a sort of feeling (sentiment), a subject realizes that coherence accompa-
nies any perception when it does not perceive it because the phenomena are inco-
herent. We are used to seeing men walking on the street and we expect hippogryphs 
to appear in fairy tales; if I suddenly saw a man riding a hippogryph in the sky, I 
would infer that something has gone terribly wrong either with me or with the 
world. Consequently, I would start to look for causes of that phenomenon. To con-
struct an analogy, we can say that coherence is to sense-perceived phenomena what 
contradiction and identity are to truth. 
The pre-propositional form of coherence as described in the aforementioned 
passage is limited to, what we referred to as, perceptible wholes as shapes with size. 
The coherence of a phenomenon, in this case the sensory appearance of a body, 
depends on the organization of its parts as having a position into a whole. Consider 
a human body: one expects the feet to bear a certain distance from the head and the 
hands to occupy a certain position between the torso and the head. If one was to 
 
27 In Specimen hypotheseos demonstrativae (A VI 3 3), Leibniz defines a hypothesis as follows: 
“Hypothesis est causa Phaenomenorum possibilis. Et cum causa sit id quo posito aliud (Effec-
tus scilicet) existit, Hypothesis erit id quo posito phaenomena consequentur.” 
28 As Simmons (2011) argues, “feeling” or “sentiment” refers to a degree of cognition that in-
volves working memory: feeling is a sensation associated with a previous experience whose 
memory is spontaneously triggered by sense-perception. A dog that was beaten by its master – 
so Leibniz’s example goes – will remember the pain when seeing the stick. Feeling is therefore 
a certain connection between states. For a definition of “sentiment”, see PNGR § 4/L 637 and 
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find the hands having the position of the feet while the body is standing, she would 
be surprised, and the phenomenon would appear suspicious.  
The working hypothesis we will follow is that, to fulfil the task of discriminat-
ing between imaginary and real phenomena, coherence must rest on principles that 
are partially grounded in metaphysical facts about the constitution of bodies and 
cognitive fact about the mind. While the next two chapters analyze the cognitive 
ground for coherence, showing it depends on the continuity of space and time, the 
rest of this chapter argues that coherence can have this function of distinguishing 
real and imaginary phenomena because it tracks something persisting in bodies, 
forces expressed in motion. 
5. COHERENCE, MOTION, AND THE METAPHYSICAL CONSTITUTION 
OF BODIES 
Let us linger on the notion of coherence a bit and retrace its role within Leibniz’s 
theory of bodies. When talking about coherence, scholars commonly stress how it 
grounds the appearances of bodies, leading them to see coherence as a trait of men-
tal representations of bodies. However, if we trace the evolution of this notion 
within Leibniz’s system, we can also tell a different story. Leibniz first introduces 
his discourse about coherentia (coherence) in relation to bodies and their composi-
tion. In Specimen quaestionum philosophicarum (1666), a very young Leibniz – 
who already thinks that matter is infinitely divided29 – distinguishes between effor-
mation and composition. Efformation, he writes, is proper to a body endowed with 
only one form, while composition concerns bodies that are composed by various 
kinds of matter.30 This distinction seems to reflect what will later become a distinc-
tion between true unities and mere aggregates, but even more interesting are Leib-
niz’s further distinctions of the notion of “composition”.  
There are two ways of composing bodies: either through a conjunction of parts, 
i.e. when the parts are coherent; or through a commixtion of parts, i.e. when the 
parts do not cohere. Compositions of the first kind are masses of bodies, like the 
body of a man. This type of composition is similar to when we drop ink into water: 
we still see the ink and the water, but we cannot really separate them. This is an 
example of a coherent composition because our mind can distinguish different parts 
of what looks like a whole. Conversely, a commixtion is a composition without dis-
tinguishable parts. When we mix wine and water, there are parts, but we, observers, 
cannot notice them.31 Both kinds of compositions are confused, but in the latter we 
cannot identify different parts like in conjunction. This is an important distinction 
because it maps onto what Leibniz says in the text On Distinct Perception, which 
we analysed in the previous chapter where simple sensations, like colours, are con-
fused and cannot be further distinguished into parts. Coherence hence seems to be 
 
29 See Arthur (2018: 88). 
30 See A VI I 80. 















































102 III. Interlude: Imagination and Reality 
a relational property among the parts of a whole, that is the reason why bodily com-
mixtion cannot be said coherent. The physical mixture of wine and water seems to 
provide a rudimentary intuition of what would later be transferred into the soul as 
its internal distinctions: minute perceptions. Minute perceptions are indeed endeav-
ours too minute to be sensed as distinct by a cognizant agent, and nevertheless are 
they distinguished. Their being confused is not a limit, since they produce great 
effects when they are compacted and fused together. Besides speculation, we need 
to fix that only composites of noticeable parts can be coherent. 
A few years later, Leibniz revises this distinction and relates the notion of co-
herence to that of continuity and contiguity arising from the endeavour of indivisi-
ble points. Leibniz writes to Oldenburg (28 September 1670): 
Without a doubt Aristotle in the most correct way defines contiguous things as those things 
whose boundaries are at the same time, and continuous those things whose boundaries are one. 
Those things whose boundaries are one are hence connected or coherent in themselves, as long 
as the unity of the terms persists. But how can the bounds of two bodies be made one, and how 
on the contrary can two bodies be made from that indivisible one (the boundaries of things are 
indeed indivisible), connecting as much as dissolving in things? This depends on the subtle 
contemplation of the nature of points or indivisibles, from which originates many miracles in 
natural things. I claim therefore: those things are moved in this way that one endeavours to 
enter another place (locum), so during the endeavouring those things cohere. The endeavour 
(conatus) in fact – as Hobbes correctly observes – is the beginning of the motion, or endeavour 
is with respect to motion, what the point is to the line. If therefore one endeavours to enter into 
the place of the other, the other (since there is no penetration of dimensions) is expelled by that, 
it follows that in the first moment of time it already is in the place of the first point, it enters it 
through the extreme point of entrance; two points or extremities of bodies, expelling and im-
pelling (impellere), penetrates each other (there is penetration of points, not of bodies) and 
therefore are one. (Leibniz to Oldenburg, 28 September 1670, A II 1 64, partially translated in 
Arthur, 2018: 131, fn. 24)32 
During these years, coherence is a property of the minute and invisible composition 
of bodies. Bodies are composed by infinite moving points that interpenetrate be-
cause they push and expel each other; this is what produces the unity of the thing 
as long as the composition of the endeavours persists. Unity rests on the continuity 
of the points which, in striving and pushing against each other, share their bounda-
ries. Consequently, if a perceiver sees the body as continuous, as Leibniz held in 
these years, it is because the body is continuous or coherent. The body is the ulti-
mate subject of attribution, since when we say that the body is continuous, continu-
ity is a property of the external body. As he writes in A Demonstration of Incorpo-
real Substances (A VI 3 78–79): 
We experience that we see bodies also at a great distance only if they are big enough and bright 
enough and illuminated, and there is nothing in between. It is also necessary therefore that their 
parts, for they might be so small so that we do not see them distinctly, nonetheless act and 
gather in the vision of the whole, since every body however big (magnum) is an aggregate of 
parts however small, by which means that if no part acts, we won’t see the whole, since nothing 
 















































 5. Coherence, Motion, and the Metaphysical Constitution of Bodies 103 
however assumed remains nothing. It is also necessary that the parts whenever they push each 
other cohere. 
Indeed, what pushes endeavours (conatur) to enter in another place, per def. What endeavours 
to enter, begins to change its place, i.e. begins to be in a new place (locum), and ceases to be in 
the prior [place], i.e. there is a moment in which it is in both places. Ergo their extremities [i.e. 
of the two points pushing L.O.] are one or are in the same place (eodem loco) since one cannot 
impel without the other being in the same place, therefore they cohere. Bodies: Agents and 
patients, cohere or are sympathica. In fact, the bodies of which one acts on the other, of those 
one impels, since every action of the body is a movement def. 2. So, those that impel, cohere, 
per prop. 1. (A VI 3 78–79) 
If the body is seen as internally coherent and contiguous to other bodies that are 
internally coherent, this is due to the conatuses of the points endeavouring to enter 
each other, which thereby produces an actual continuum. The body, though being 
an aggregate of points, is coherent, which is why we see it as coherent. In another 
text he writes: 
Proposition 14. Any body is a grave distinct from a general mass moved under the parallel and 
meridian through its proper motion and conatus. It is evident that any body is constituted, de-
fined, one, particular, distinct from the other bodies through a certain motion or particular co-
natus of its own, since if it lacked [motion or conatus], it would not be a certain separated body, 
but one continuous coherent with the other [bodies] which moved with it of one sole motion. 
And this is what elsewhere I said to be cohesion from motion and conatus, for those things that 
move of one motion, those things are conceived (intelligantur) as internally coherent. Further, 
any body through its proper motion influence (turbat) the motion of the general mass. (Speci-
men hypotheseos demonstrative (1672), A VI 3 27–8) 
There is something intriguing about these passages. First of all, Leibniz intends for 
coherence of bodily apprehension that refers to a property of bodies grounded in 
conatus or motion which makes a body be and, therefore, appear one and distinct 
from any other bodies. The reason why a body is conceived as distinct is that its 
parts cohere and that it is detached from a general mass through “one motion”. In 
this way, the body simultaneously acts on the general mass that, while being acted 
upon, is also contiguously actually divided into other coherent bodies. Notice that 
even if Leibniz assumes that there is extension and continuity, he already thinks 
that extension is not the substance postulated by the Cartesians, since it is grounded 
in aggregates of points that constitute it. However, this is not the notion of coher-
ence that Leibniz adopts later on. As Arthur (2018: 124) notices: 
In any case, by 1676, Leibniz had “become a geometer”, and had abandoned his earlier theory 
of continuous bodies being composed of overlapping points. For once he has rejected his pre-
vious interpretation of the infinitely small as actual infinitesimal points, this explanation of 
original cohesion, and with it his theory of neo-Scaligerian mixtion, is in ruins. But he does not 
for this reason abandon atoms. Indeed, as we have seen, in numerous fragments he gives voice 
to a theory of spherical atoms whose solidity is now attributed directly to its containing a mind: 
“the solidity or unity of the body comes from mind” (16 April 1676; A VI 3 509/LLC 117). 
According to Arthur, during this period, Leibniz provides a solution to the issue of 
the labyrinth of the continuum: because the continuum is abstract, bodies cannot 















































104 III. Interlude: Imagination and Reality 
we can say that at some point in 1676 Leibniz changes his mind: bodies are not 
continua; continuous things are abstract and cannot exist. The years around 1676 
are decisive for Leibniz’s philosophy of mind and epistemology as well. In these 
years, he writes several important texts, notably some against Descartes (e.g. De 
Summa Rerum 1675) and particularly Quid sit idea (1677?), where he turns the 
notion of expression into a technical term. From here my hypothesis: What if the 
theory of continuity Leibniz held before 1676 – that is of points as endeavours pen-
etrating each other to produce continuity, coherence, and bodily unity – is trans-
ferred from being a physical theory of how bodies are composed materially to a 
cognitive theory of how minute perceptions compose in sensations and then percep-
tions of wholes? What if this kind of composition is assumed as the ground of ex-
pressing appearances of bodies as shapes enclosing homogeneous surfaces having 
sizes? More precisely, ideal and non-extended points cannot produce concrete ex-
isting things, but if they are ideal and immaterial – like minute perceptions – , why 
can they not explain the way in which the mind changes internally, co-varying with 
the actually infinite divisions in actually discrete matter established by harmony? 
After all, these are also the years of Leibniz’s Elementa de mente, which was his 
attempt to write a theory of the mind that is analogous to Hobbes’ Elements of Phi-
losophy. And almost fifteen years later, in NE, Leibniz writes to Locke: 
In short, insensible perceptions are as important to pneumatology as insensible corpuscles are 
to natural science, and it is just as unreasonable to reject the one as the other on the pretext that 
they are beyond the reach of our senses. Nothing takes place suddenly, and it is one of my great 
and best confirmed maxims that nature never makes leaps. I called this the Law of Continuity 
when I discussed it formerly in the Nouvelles de la republique des lettres.33 There is much 
work for this law to do in natural science. It implies that any change from small to large, or vice 
versa, passes through something which is, in respect of degrees as well as of parts, in between; 
and that no motion ever springs immediately from a state of rest, or passes into one except 
through a lesser motion; just as one could never traverse a certain line or distance without first 
traversing a shorter one. […N]oticeable perceptions arise by degrees from ones which are too 
minute to be noticed. To think otherwise is to be ignorant of the immeasurable fineness of 
things, which always and everywhere involves an actual infinity. (NE 56–7/A VI 6 56–7) 
A huge implication emerges, which characterizes this change in Leibniz’s concep-
tion of coherence: bodies cannot be the ultimate subject of attribution. If we see the 
body as coherent, it is not because matter is coherent and continuous. The appear-
ance of a body as coherent is an expression in minds of the infinite and constant 
divisions taking place in discrete matter as expressed by minute perceptual changes. 
 
33 Leibniz refers to his “Letter of Mr. Leibniz on a General Principle Useful in Explaining the 
Laws of Nature…” (see GP III 52/L 351–354) where he writes that: “On le peut enoncer ainsi 
[the law of continuity L.O.]: Lorsque la difference de deux cas peut estre diminuée au dessous 
de toute grandeur donnée in datis ou dans ce qui est posé, il faut quʼelle se puisse trouver aussi 
diminuée au dessous de toute grandeur donnée in quaesitis ou dans ce qui en resulte, ou pour 
parler plus familierement: Lorsque les cas (ou ce qui est donné) sʼapprochent continuellement 
et se perdent enfin lʼun dans lʼautre, il faut que les suites ou evenemens (ou ce qui est demandé) 
le fassent aussi. Ce qui depend encor dʼun principe plus general, sçavoir: Datis ordinatis etiam 















































 5. Coherence, Motion, and the Metaphysical Constitution of Bodies 105 
While constant divisions result from forces acting within matter, unification of mi-
nute perceptions results for compositions and strivings that in unifying, make them-
selves sensible or confusedly present to the cognizant agent. Our incapacity of being 
aware of all of these divisions because of the finitude of our mind is the source for 
apprehending changes in a clearer way, since the successive act of the agent is to 
unify sensations into wholes having shape and size. Shapes express bodies and what 
persists in them through spatial and temporal variations: forces. In the next chapter, 
we will enquiry into the cognitive advantage of this simplification in detail. What 
is relevant for us now is that the ultimate subject of those changes, hence, cannot 
be only matter; what persists must rather be the force, the unity, or the substance. 
And yet, that which attributes the changes cannot be an identity: force is not round, 
does not have speed xyz, and does not have a shape. Nor actually is the body as 
round as we conceive of it, nor accelerated exactly as we measure it. Our expres-
sions of bodies is an approximation or, as we said, an idealization that translates 
what there is at the ontological level, namely, discrete matter actually divided ac-
cording to forces inherent in substances, into intentional states that can serve as 
explanations for the human finite mind. Bodies are hence undetermined or vague34 
because they are not as determined and divided as they are in their actual changes; 
and yet our divisions, though neglecting some of those changes, makes them homo-
geneous and uniform surfaces enclosed by borders that the agent takes as one for 
advancing in her knowledge, the errors (viz. neglecting changes) be too small to 
harm the kind of knowledge she can achieve with this idealization.35 
In what follows, I try to flesh out this idea and provide an answer to the question 
why Leibniz position cannot be described as idealist about bodies or as merely phe-
nomenalist.36 As Arthur shows, bodies are actually infinitely divided (in the syn-
categorematic sense) and, only after 1676 does Leibniz maintain that they are uni-
fied by minds over time. Within this context, a question then arises: bodies are in-
ternally divided to infinity and therefore are not true unities. At each moment, the 
infinite divisions in matter express forces. If bodily changes consist of divisions 
which express forces, bodies do not persist across moments of change. What then 
 
34 See (Kostinen & Repo, 2002: 83–99); also Arthur (forthcoming) in private correspondence. 
35 Cf. Letter on the Elmenent of Geometry of the Duke of Burgoundy, 1705. 
36 Useful for our discussion is Rutherford (2008) who describes four forms of matter realism, 
claiming that three are hidden forms of matter idealism, while one is not. The three forms of 
matter idealism are: (1) phenomenalism claims that bodies are nothing over and above their 
being contents of harmonious perceptions among perceivers; (2) divine phenomenalism holds 
that bodies are God’s perceptions; the third position (3) holds bodies to be aggregates of mon-
ads. The only form of matter realism (4) is that which holds that matter is constituted by monads 
which means that we need to operate a reductionism from an ontological plane to a metaphys-
ical plane in which only monadic changes and states are admitted. Recently, Arthur criticised 
Rutherford by arguing that matter realism so presented is a hidden form of monadic aggregation 
(the third types of matter idealism) rather than a genuine account to matter realism in which 
matter is constituted by monads, which means that matter has its own status and is unified by 















































106 III. Interlude: Imagination and Reality 
makes the body persist? To answer this question, Leibniz changes his view on com-
position: Discrete divisions in bodies express forces that are inherent to true unities, 
i.e. substances, which are not homogeneous parts of the bodies; they constitute bod-
ies.37 What minds express, so I argue, is not just the force, but the confused union 
of the forces acting within the constant changes. They do so by expressing shapes 
that persist through their changes over space and time. So Leibniz writes to Sophie 
(19 November 1701) that even if it is correct to say that bodies are constituted by 
true unities, which in turn do not have the same properties as bodies, there is a 
relation between those unities, the properties of the body, and what we perceive: 
Now what has neither parts nor extension also has no shape, but it can have thought and force, 
or effort, the source of which we also know cannot come from extension or shapes.38 Conse-
quently we must look for this source in unities, because there are only unities and multitudes 
in nature. Or rather there is nothing real bar the unities; for every assemblage is only the mode 
and appearance of one being, but actually it is as many beings as it contains true unities. And 
just as in a flock of sheep, the beings are the sheep while the flock itself is only a mode of being, 
it can be said that in rigor of the truth the body of each sheep and every other body is itself a 
flock, and that being itself is only found in the perfect unity which is no longer a flock. It can 
be concluded from this that there are unities everywhere, or rather that everything is unities. 
And every unity has a mode of life and of perception, and can have only that. But in the regular 
assemblages of nature, that is, in the organized bodies like those of animals, there are dominant 
unities whose perceptions represent the whole; and these unities are what are called “souls,” or 
what each person means when he says “I.” And just as the body of an animal can be composed 
of other animals and plants, bodies have their souls or their own unities. It is clear that these 
animals, these unities, or these primitive forces, are dominant in their little sphere, although 
they are subjugated in the larger body in which they work together to form the organs, and from 
which they can be detached, because bodies are in a continual motion and flux. However there 
are grounds to think that every soul always retains a sphere that is fitting for it. (Leibniz to 
Sophie, 19 November 1701 LSS  208–9/A I 20 72–4) 
Bodies as we see them are composed of other parts, like in a flock. However, bodies 
are unities that for a limited duration are united by forces that constitute them. While 
these forces always persist and are indestructible, bodies constantly change and 
eventually are destroyed. Cognizant agents express the transitory unity in bodies 
constituted by forces or soul by detecting properties of bodies that are transitory, 
that is they persist for a certain amount of time and are taken as causative of other 
properties. A phenomenon like water, for instance, is a bulk of discrete material 
divisions that is unified by forces that cognizant agents express as a homogeneous 
transparent fluid liquid. But as soon as we analyze its bodily constitutions from a 
metaphysical point of view, we must observe that any part of water is composed of 
yet further bodies. This will lead to an infinite regress unless we assume that there 
are true unities, which cannot be minimal material parts; they are not homogeneous 
to bodies and are indeed simple, immaterial, and without parts. Unities or sub-
stances, as I understand them, are requisites of bodies in the sense that as soon as 
we can conceive of something as one, like a human body or a bacterium, or water 
 
37 Arthur (2018: chap. 3 and 4.) 
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molecules, we have to assume that unity cannot be provided for by matter or 
changes in matter; matter is like a flock, always discrete and constantly changing, 
but always organized. Matter always exists together with some form that makes it 
a particular kind of matter, with its own organization and structures – a mineral, a 
muscle, a lever cell, a water molecule, an atom of hydrogen – and, in this respect, 
it cannot be the mere composition of parts distinguished solely with respect to 
shape, size, and motion. The organization of matter is provided for by the unities, 
forces, or forms present within it. The more complex a given material organization 
is, as in, say, organisms, the more a unity is given by a multitude of other unities, 
accounting for the organization of each part, all of which are unified by a dominant 
substance; that, as Leibniz says, is subjugated by other unities, which account for 
its organs. The unification of changes provided for by organs on the mechanical 
level is reflected in the mind via minute perceptual changes. 
So even if these forces unify matter in – for us – mysterious ways, when sensi-
ble and rational souls express forces as shapes that persist through changes, they 
express both the material changes and the forces in the body even if, in rigore met-
aphysico, we cannot attribute shapes, sizes and motions to anything existing as a 
true unity simply because a true unity does not have parts and therefore does not 
have a shape; nor does the body have the ideal properties as we detect them because 
what there is are the discrete divisions. The fact that we track a ball as round hence 
can be used as an explanation for us of why the ball roles and we have epistemic 
reasons grounded in coherence to think that this is sufficient. However, as soon as 
we ask for metaphysical reasons for why the ball rolls, we need to provide a differ-
ent explanation. However, roundness remains a valid explanation because of its ex-
pressive relation to what we think there is at the metaphysical level. To conclude 
when tracking the properties of bodies and motion we track the forces acting within 
material changes. Without this transfer of information because of harmonious cor-
respondences between changes in forces, body-body interactions, and changes in 
minute perceptions, the external world and other substances will remain precluded 
to us, since we cannot directly know what is per se active.  
From what I said, does it follow that only forces are real in what cognizant 
agents apprehends as bodies? I do not think so. If forces were not embodied, that is 
reflected by actual changes in matter, then cognizant agents could not express 
forces; but what cognizant agents express is matter constituted by substances and 
their forces. As I clarified, even if there is a gap of attribution such that the way we 
conceive of phenomena are approximations of actual changes, both in their active 
and passive constituents, we are not allowed to say that only forces are real. So I 
agree with Garber that the idea of coherence is a turning point in Leibniz’s concep-
tion of bodies because it establishes bodily phenomena as “well grounded”; I 
slightly disagree with him that since they are mind-dependent, only forces are real 
in bodies:  
Leibniz very carefully remarks that if anything is real in body, it is just the force of acting and 
suffering. If there really are bodies on the other side of our sensations, Leibniz argues, then 















































108 III. Interlude: Imagination and Reality 
in the essay. And if they are not real, then bodies are just the phenomena of minds: real phe-
nomena, coherent phenomena, phenomena that allow for the prediction of the future and the 
regulation of life. But phenomena nonetheless. (Garber, 2009: 284–5) 
Garber calls this kind of phenomenalism extended-mind phenomenalism and it is 
characterized by a scepticism towards the existence of bodies. As Garber notices it 
has an epistemic dimension insofar as we cannot know by metaphysical necessity 
if bodies, as we know them, exist. Garber sees this form of phenomenalism as dif-
ferent from aggregate phenomenalism which is a metaphysical position claiming 
that bodies we detect as unities actually are composed by corporeal substances. I do 
not see these two forms as two distinct kinds of phenomenalism, but rather as two 
complementary stances.39 What I have argued for so far is a form of aggregate phe-
nomenalism, since, as I said, what we take to be one body is constantly many. Co-
herence is the ground of aggregate phenomenalism since “coherent appearance” 
simply means that, metaphysically speaking, bodies are actually divided down to 
their smallest parts and constantly change, and therefore the body does not retain 
all of its parts through momentaneous changes. Therefore bodies are “apparitiones 
coherentes”, coherent appearances. 
When cognizant agent, for reasons grounded in the continuity of space and 
time, as we will see in the next chapters, keeps the borders of the shape constant 
and persistent through changes, she tracks the changes and recognizes them as 
changes of the same body and hence of a same substance. The force is the only 
thing that persists over time because bodies constantly change. Therefore, if we 
consider matter per se, independently of any substance, the conjunction of parts is 
what identifies a body as a whole. This criterion cannot suffice to determine the 
identity of any given body over time, because the body loses and acquires new di-
visions constantly. Coherence first of bodily motion is the reason why we consider 
the body as the same. Coherence, even when analyzed in terms of continuity of 
motion, gives us epistemic certainty but not metaphysical knowledge that extension 
or continuity exists. Following my line of argumentation this leads, as Garber sug-
gests, to epistemic scepticism about whether bodies as extended homogeneous 
shapes, exist. If bodies are expressions, well the thing expressed can differ greatly 
from our expression. Therefore, the fact that there is coherence among our per-
ceived phenomena and the fact that our expressions agree with expressions by other 
perceivers; as well as the fact that I apply a mathematical calculus to a certain phe-
nomenon and it yields truth, all this is not sufficient to provide a cognizant subject 
with metaphysical necessity that any of the properties detected exist. But, I contend, 
this doubt does not concern that (1) something corresponds to bodies; (2) that this 
must be matter or something changing trough mechanical principles and a principle 
of activity.  
These two points, however, cannot be deduced from observational quality of 
bodies because we would make a category mistake. Therefore, I think that Garber 
is right to claim that Leibniz in texts like On the Distinction Between Real and 
 















































 5. Coherence, Motion, and the Metaphysical Constitution of Bodies 109 
Imaginary Phenomena does not provide a metaphysical argument for what corre-
sponds to bodies; what I contest is that we can take those texts as representative of 
Leibniz’s metaphysical positions about bodies. I think we cannot because what he 
is apt to, as it will result in chapter VIII, is to provide epistemic criteria for the 
temporal existence of bodies and their states which are not grounded in knowledge 
of what bodies metaphysically are. He tries to divorce metaphysics and the sciences 
by distinguishing epistemic criteria for existence of phenomena distinct from met-
aphysical arguments for their constitutions. Coherence alone is no ground for ruling 
out the hypothesis that bodies may be merely imaginary like an ordered dream. It 
does not mean that Leibniz has no absolute resources to argue for the reality of 
body, but for this he needs to introduce metaphysical reasons, like harmony and the 
constitution of sentient soul, as we will see in the next chapter; metaphysics is not 
the main concern of On the Method of Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phe-
nomena (and is, again, an attempt to criticise Descartes’ sixth meditation, where 
Descartes thinks to be capable of deducing the existence of bodily phenomena from 
epistemic facts about extension). 
So even if our seeing a shape does not allow us to infer that the body exists 
exactly as we see it – continuous, homogeneous, with smooth surfaces; but the fact 
that I am not allowed to say that the body exists as I see it does not allow me to 
infer that nothing exists or that only the force exists. It simply means that matter 
alone is nothing, a philosophers’ fiction, because matter alone, pure extension or 
pure passivity, could not produce any change. What does not act, does not exist. To 
act, however, matter needs a principle of action, a formal cause that determines 
matter to be something definite and what cognizant agents express is this something 
definite, that is its being attached to a formal cause.  
Cognizant agents express the unity of material changes and forces because they 
express their bodies modified by contiguous bodies. In conclusion, if actual modi-
fications in discrete matter correlated to forces did not act upon the body associated 
to the soul, cognizant agents could not express anything. The unity bestowed by 
expression to being is not imaginary; it simply tracks something different respect 
the constant material divisions; and yet correlated to it: the force or the persistence 
and change in bodies. That is the reason why coherence does not concern instanta-
neous change, as we will see; it is an evaluation about the consistency of spatio-
temporal change expressed through the law of continuity, as we argue in the next 
chapters. 
I insist that, for Leibniz, expression is a cognitive capacity that allows the mind 
to acquire knowledge of notions and things that are constitutively beyond our cog-
nitive reach if it otherwise did not express them. The idea of a chiliagon is as out of 
reach40 as the soul or the substance of my husband working next to me. And yet the 
movements of his body express changes in his soul. I can infer that he wants to eat 
when he approaches the fridge, or that he is happy when he laughs. I can also infer 
 
40 MKTI A VI 4 590/L 292, where Leibniz says that we cannot know the idea of a chiliagon via 
















































110 III. Interlude: Imagination and Reality 
what he thinks through his use of words or even a particular expression of his face. 
But I cannot infer that the force or the soul laughs, or that it wants to eat. The cor-
poreal substance, the union of the organic body and a soul, wants, thinks, laughs. 
By the same token, the constancy that we experience in a body, like the fact that my 
body remains the same size throughout constant changes, is an expression of what 
forces can do; but I cannot say that the force as such has a size. The perception of 
one perceptible whole changing through space and time is a confused apprehension 
of the union between matter and form. True substances and their forces are not of 
the proper ontological kind to be bearers of those properties, although intentional 
properties may be reduced to material changes and these further to substances and 
forces, even if only by an omnipotent mind like God. 
In other words, there was a Copernican turn in Leibniz’s conception of bodies 
that compelled him to give up his theory of cohesion and continuity as properties 
of material bodies. Matter is never one and continuous. The constitution of bodies 
is grounded in substances and their forces. As a consequence, that which metaphys-
ically exists is not continuous and coherent, but rather discrete matter that is actually 
infinitely divided and only unified by forces inhering to substances. The body ap-
pears continuous and coherent. In detecting a shape, like my husband’s face (the 
homogeneity of his skin, the distance between his eyes, and so on), and in keeping 
this whole-part relation constant through space and over time, the mind bestows 
coherence to the phenomenon, which serves as proof of its reality analyzed as ex-
istence. Coherence is now a property of the phenomenon as apprehended by the 
mind, but it has a ground also in what can persist: whatever force acts and produces 
the appearance of a homogeneous movement of one body independent of other bod-
ies. If motion can be used as proof of coherence, it is because in the plenum of what 
exists, any change bears an influence on the organic body of the perceiver which is 
reflected at the level of the soul in the minute perceptual activity internal to the 
cognizant agent. 
[H]e [God L.O.] made bodies in advance so that, following their laws and natural tendencies to 
movement, they will come to do what the soul will ask at the appropriate time; and he also 
made souls so that, following the natural tendencies of their appetite, they will also always 
come to the representations of the states of the body. For just as motion leads matter from 
shape to shape, the appetite leads the soul from image to image. So the soul is made dominant 
in advance, and is obeyed by bodies inasmuch as its appetite is accompanied by distinct per-
ceptions, which makes it think of suitable means when it wants something; but it is also sub-
jected to the body in advance in as much as has confused perceptions. For our experience is 
that all things tend to change, the body by the motive force and the soul by the appetite which 
leads it to distinct or confused perceptions, depending on whether it is more perfect or less 
perfect. (Leibniz to Sophie Charlotte, 8 May 1704 LSS 316/II 4 236–7) 
6. COHERENCE AND DISTINCT PERCEPTION 
As we saw in discussing On Distinct Perception in the previous chapter, a percep-















































 6. Coherence and Distinct Perception 111 
of the perceiving act, and the perception is accompanied by some judgments with-
out negation or affirmation, that is of the non-propositional kind, in the sense that 
they are not about the truth of the phenomena. The analysis conducted so far pro-
vides textual evidence that the implicit judgment may be the sense of coherence that 
accompany our experience of bodily phenomena.  
For Leibniz aggregates, insofar as they appear to us continuous bodies or 
wholes composed of parts, are not true substances. They are rather expressions of 
corporeal substances because we sense-perceive and cognize them as something 
persistent, as a unity (a substance) made up of a multitude of parts. This attribution 
is based on the implicit acquaintance of embodied minds to their bodies and the 
changes that bodies undergo in spite of remaining the same in appearance. Minds 
therefore assume that in detecting the shape of a thing, that thing is considered a 
substance – a unity with a multitude of parts that can change and act. With this 
simplification, the mind does not track the body; rather, it tracks and expresses the 
constitution or the force that actually divides matter such that what we experience 
or conceive the body as being capable of doing is an expression of what the force(s) 
acting in the world can do. Since the infinite is no sums of parts, nor something that 
the mind can access, we cannot experience forces directly, but God gave us a way 
to translate them into formats that are accessible to our finite minds: an organic 
body endowed with senses and an imagination. So Leibniz writes in another rele-
vant text, Distintiones cogitationesque metaphysicae (1677–83?): 
The unity of a thing persists as long as it can salva multitudine; this makes possible that we 
understand (intelliguntur) bodies as bending rather than dividing, as when a shaking chord is 
considered one, even though any part in it has a particular motion. Those who understand this 
proposition in a correct way will laugh as vane any question about the seat of the soul (A VI 4 
B 1401/LoC 251 translation slightly changed) 
My arm can move while my body remains at rest. If I consider the arm to be a 
moving part of a whole, and therefore bending rather than being divided from the 
rest of the body, this is due to the coherent way in which whole-parts move and the 
cohesion among them expresses the force in the mind. Therefore, it makes no sense 
to think of the soul as something located either in the brain, the heart, or the pineal 
gland. The unity of a body is the coherent co-moving among its parts.  
The boundaries of bodies are therefore both bona fide boundaries and fiat 
boundaries, to use a contemporary terminology.41 Bona fide boundaries are natural 
demarcations of bodies, like the actual boundaries of the apple sitting on my table. 
Fiat boundaries are human demarcations that are arbitrary and conventional, like 
the political borders of a country. Using this distinction, we can say that the distinc-
tions between bodies, my seeing the chord as though it is bending, is both a bona 
fide and a fiat boundary: it is a bona fide because it is grounded in nature and tracks 
what persists in bodies; it is a fiat boundary because its contour, its border or de-
marcation is one that the mind makes and uses for convenience. Because it is not 
independent from nature, it is both real and ideal. The body as a whole with parts 
 















































112 III. Interlude: Imagination and Reality 
becomes the expression of a natural change for the mind, which is grounded in 
forces and is therefore a division grounded in nature. Even if there is no one-to-one 
correspondence between the expression and the thing, we have grounds for seeing 
a chord as one thing, a lion as different from a cat or a table as similar to another 
one.42 
However eternal truths based on limited mathematical ideas are still useful to us in practice, in 
as much as it is acceptable to set aside the inequalities too small to be able to cause significant 
errors in relation to the proposed purpose; just as an engineer who draws a regular polygon on 
the ground is not bothered if one side is longer than another by a few inches. (Leibniz to Sophie, 
31 October 1705, LSS 338/II 4 353 ) 
The ideal [unities] represent a whole which is not a perfect unity, but which our understanding 
takes as one thing, even though it is an accumulation of several, in order to have the conven-
ience of reasoning about several things all at once, and that which is common to them and 
which has a connection not only to nature but also to existence. (Leibniz to Sophie, 31 October 
1705, LSS 328/II 4 344, my emphasis) 
Coherence is therefore a form of knowledge of the mind that rests on bodily move-
ments and is therefore connected to the apprehension of spatio-temporal changes of 
the body. And since spatio-temporal changes must be in accordance with the logic 
of the imagination, as shown in the previous chapter, our apprehension of bodies 
has one foot in the metaphysical constitution of bodies and one in the cognitive 
constitution of minds. This ground makes the harmony between world-mind states 
and mind-mind states less obscure: reality is the harmony among a perceiver’s own 
perceptual states, and other perceivers’ perceptual states. Since human minds share 
a world through their perceptual states and are likely subject to the same cognitive 
constraints, human minds will cognize the world in accordance with changes that 
are mediated by the way bodies acts on their own organs.43 Therefore, you may 
represent a chord as moving in an undulatory way if you look at it lengthwise while 
it is in motion, and I will express it as going up and down if I look at the chord from 
the front. Nevertheless, we have ways of agreeing that the same chord is moving.  
7. CONCLUSION 
Despite their being ideal, expressions of bodies as shapes with a given size are nei-
ther merely ideal, nor fictional. There are two main reasons why they are not so. 
First, as expressions of the mind, shapes simplify whatever there is at the ontologi-
cal level in a way that allows the human finite mind to acquire first distinguished, 
and then distinct knowledge. What we refer to as distinguished knowledge is a pre-
 
42 A VI 6 325–6/NE 325–26; we will come back to this topic in chap. VI. 
43 I first defended this thesis in Oliveri (2016 and 2016c) where I used the expression that minds 
categorize in “analogically similar ways”, meaning that even if categorization may vary from 
mind to mind due to differences in experiences and their points of view on the actual world, 
similarities among cognitive mechanisms and the fact that minds share a world guarantees an 















































 7. Conclusion 113 
propositional and pre-conceptual type of knowledge. The second reason why ex-
pressions of bodies in the mind are not fictional is that they track changes in forces 
and are, therefore, grounded in nature. 
The analysis of expression conducted in chapter I turned out to be decisive for 
understanding why phenomena are real. Expression is a cognitive performance of 
the mind that transfers changes from one level (in our case the ontological level of 
substances and forces in matter) into changes inherent to a vehicle of a kind differ-
ent from the thing to be expressed (in our case, extended shapes divided into parts). 
Whatever there is at the immaterial ontological level is not continuous, does not 
have shape, and does not have sizes, and yet changes in shapes, sizes, and motions 
can be taken as expressions of something else. Cognized phenomena do not present 
things as they are, but they are confused expressions of matter and form; discrete 
changes and forces. We have completed our analysis of coherence, how it changed 
within Leibniz’s theory of bodily composition. From being a property of continuous 
bodies, coherence become a property of phenomena. The link to this change lied in 
Leibniz’s theory of minute perceptions as expression of the constant affections in 
the organic body attached to a sentient soul. In the next chapter, we will move from 
here to explain what it is the cognitive ground for coherence: our innate capacity to 





























































































IV. FIRST- AND SECOND-ORDER COHERENCE I:               
TIME, SPACE, AND TYPES 
It is on account of the coherence of phenomena that cognizant agents are able to 
distinguish between what is real and imaginary. Coherence is partially grounded in 
metaphysical facts, and partially in facts regarding how the human mind cognizes 
phenomena. The foregoing chapter concluded that we need to postulate a form of 
knowledge that is not based on concepts and definitions, but rather on types. A type 
is an ability to track phenomenal appearances of bodies – shapes enclosing parts 
comoving as parts of a whole. Based on the sensory presentations of bodies, types 
encode rules regarding how phenomena behave.  
This chapter and the next seek to explain what types are and how, by inquiring 
into how spatiotemporal constraints serve to fix typical or habitual ways in which 
bodies behave when acting upon one another, we interiorize them. Types are inte-
riorized through our experience of bodies and their movements through space and 
time. The main result of this enquiry will be to prove that the intellect and imagina-
tion have their own, different constraints, which govern distinct logics underpinning 
different forms of inference. A survey of Leibniz’s texts will help us to deduce those 
constraints innate to the imagination, which are different from innate ideas that are 
proper to the intellect. This enquiry is divided into two moments, which respec-
tively constitute this and the following chapter. The two moments articulate the 
notion of coherence in first-order coherence, constituted by space, time, and asso-
ciative causation, and second order coherence, constituted by an apprehension of 
things’ common nature. First-order coherence provides a definition of body as an 
ability interiorized by cognizant agents to express beings as four-dimensional ex-
tended objects: the three dimensions of space and the diachronic dimension of time. 
Once a cognizant agent apprehends beings as bodies, she can distinguish more spe-
cific types within the general type “body”. More specific types are acquired abilities 
of the cognizant agent to express the common nature of phenomena, and they cor-
respond to a first attempt to categorize beings into similarity classes.  
Focusing more specifically on the present chapter, this completes the analysis 
undertaken in chapter III. There, we argued for a metaphysical partial ground of 
coherence: forces expressed by discrete divisions in matter. These changes are ex-
pressed by cognizant agents as perceptible wholes having parts co-varing in an or-
derly way with the whole. Coherence is a state accompanying sense-perception of 
wholes that tracks how perceptible wholes move in accordance with both spatio-
temporal constraints and then with the internal constitution of the whole and its 
parts. Coherence is hence a pre-conceptual confused expression of the unity of mat-
ter and form and can have various degrees.  
To this end, our analysis of types begins with a consideration of the cognitive 
necessity of a pre-conceptual form of knowledge, necessity derived from the con-















































116 IV. First- and Second-Order Coherence I: Time, Space, and Types 
organic body. By focusing on the constitution of the cognizant agent, we will ex-
plain why types are necessary: (i) they produce simplicity and control the analysis 
of ever-incoming sensory information; (ii) they give order to sensory information. 
This general argument for why cognizant agents need types will provide a thread 
guiding our analysis insofar as it establishes a link between coherence and the de-
velopment of cognitive attitudes by the agent – particularly suspicion – in pro-
cessing sense-perceptual states (sect. 2). In section 3, we shall probe Leibniz’s Met-
aphysical Definitions and Thoughts (1677–1681? in A VI 4 B 1392–1410). This 
will corroborate the claim that types are interiorized by experiencing changes of 
bodies that are primarily changes in the bodily states of motion and rest. From this 
textual survey, we will find that first-order coherence is grounded in the logic of the 
imagination and involves space, time, and associative causation. It tracks bodily 
motion through spatiotemporal changes, which is how bodies and their parts con-
sistently co-move through space and over time. The text furthermore highlights the 
importance of associative causation as a notion of the imagination that is involved 
in sense-perceiving bodily motion (sect. 4). I argue that space, time, and associative 
causation are necessary to what Leibniz calls the empirical principle: “what has 
happened will happen again in the same way” (NE 51). In section 3, I articulate five 
rules defining the principle and argue that they are necessary to express beings as 
bodies, but they are insufficient to ground the sense of reality required for distin-
guishing between real and fictional phenomena; second-order coherence is moreo-
ver required. Second order coherence is the subject matter of chapter V. 
1. WHAT ARE TYPES? 
The best way to understand what types are is to understand what function they ex-
ercise in cognition. This function is importantly related to the metaphysical consti-
tution of cognizant agents/souls.1 Through chapters I–III I have sought to highlight 
Leibniz’s theory of imagination and its relation to sensation and perception. I ar-
gued that his view on cognition settles around the time of MKTI and stays unvaried 
 
1 Leibniz’s metaphysics is in search of a correspondingly sound and detailed cognitive theory. 
Yet scholars have overall neglected or underestimated the importance of cognitive and episte-
mological issues for metaphysics. Bolton (writing about Kant and Leibniz (2021)) notices 
scholars’ general tendency to consider Leibniz’s theory of epistemology and cognition as bear-
ing little import with regard to his metaphysics. Meier-Oeser (2019) shows – through a careful 
and detailed reconstruction of the reception of Leibniz’s MKTI and epistemology – that, im-
mediately after Leibniz’s death, scholars tended to diminish the importance of Leibniz’s epis-
temology or considered the latter of marginal interest, to be subordinated to more relevant met-
aphysical questions, a claim that is evidently refuted by the extensive number of papers dedi-
cated to cognitive and epistemic issues in Leibniz’s own papers and letters. On my understand-
ing, metaphysical and cognitive issues are intertwined to offer a theory of cognition that is 
capable of explaining human and non-human agents’ complex and sophisticated skills. On this 















































 1. What are Types? 117 
in its core, solely refined by issues raised by other contemporaries, like Locke. In 
this chapter, I want to complicate my thesis by arguing that the cognitive function 
attributed to imagination is required also by Leibniz’s metaphysics of substances. 
To this aim, I will survey his most significant text, Monadology, and compare it to 
Leibniz’s confrontation with Toland in 1702. The link to this exchange is relevant 
because the confrontation with Toland is contemporary to the letter On What is 
Beyond Senses and Matter (1702) and establishes thus a link between Leibniz’s 
theory of cognition and its late metaphysics.2 
Leibniz holds the thesis that everything is full of living beings or small animals, 
that is, organic bodies are endowed with simple substances that are capable of per-
ception and appetite (Monadology §§ 66–9). While they are all cognitive insofar as 
they have perceptive and appetitive powers, simple substances differ from soul-like 
substances on account of the latter uniquely having the power to manifest height-
ened and distinguished perceptions. As we saw in Chapters II and III, heightened 
perceptions correspond to modifications in the sense-organs expressed in a soul’s 
cognitive apparatus through the unification of appetitive and perceptual changes. 
These result in sensations (Monadology §§ 7–17), such as the perception of color, 
and are transformed by a cognizant agent into more distinguished forms of percep-
tion insofar as the agent is capable of distinguishing parts and properties of what 
they sense-perceive as parts and attributes of one being (see On Distinct Percep-
tion). We want to show that this distinction is present also in Monadology. 
Leibniz refers to the basic perceptual activity of soul-like substances as “minute 
perceptions”, regularly stressing that those minute perceptions constitute higher de-
grees of perceptions, i.e., heightened or distinguished perceptions. Moreover, souls 
can take three different forms: vegetative; sensitive; and rational. Their kind is de-
termined in virtue of their intrinsic properties, which Leibniz frames in terms of 
changes that depend upon cognitive powers. Heightened perceptions, conscious 
perceptions, thoughts, and conscious thoughts, insofar as they are modifications of 
the minute perceptual activity of a soul, depend on the different types of cognitive 
power possessed by the soul (Monadology §§ 18–20). If the soul is capable of self-
conscious thought, for instance, then it must be endowed with intellect and rational 
powers. In Leibniz’s terminology, this kind of soul is a “spirit”. However, if it does 
not have self-conscious thought, but has heightened sense-perceptions, then it has 
sense-perceptual powers and is, therefore, a sensitive soul (Monadology § 29).3  
 
2 De Risi’s work (2007: chapter 3 Phenomenology) masterly argue that there is a tight link be-
tween the metaphysics of monads and Leibniz’s theory of idealism about bodies in Monadol-
ogy. Although I agree with De Risi and this general link, and I feel myself in tune also with his 
almost Kantian approach to cognition, I dissent with him on two points. The first is that the 
idealization of bodies is peculiar of Monadology. As I have argued so far it was a turn already 
present at the end of 1670. I also dissent that the idealisation of bodies corresponds to a denial 
of reality to matter and phenomena. 
3 The question of what the conditions are for the emergence of conscious thought has been greatly 















































118 IV. First- and Second-Order Coherence I: Time, Space, and Types 
On Leibniz’s account, different kinds of soul afford cognizant agents’ different de-
grees of perception, and this difference in degree explains – still within the frame-
work of Leibnizian metaphysics – why rational souls are more perfect than their 
vegetative and sensitive counterparts, but still less perfect than higher spirits, such 
as angels and God. In short, the degrees in perception of which a soul is capable 
determines the position that the soul occupies on a spectrum that moreover reflects 
their degree of knowledge: obscure knowledge lies on one side of the spectrum, 
while perfect knowledge is on the other. Clear and distinct knowledge lies in the 
middle, representing what human rational agents can do (MKTI A VI 4 A 589; 
Monadology §§ 20–25). If the soul is capable of clear and distinct knowledge, then 
it means that it has intellectual powers. If it lacks thought but can nonetheless sense-
perceive, then it bears sensitive apparatus. The more the soul approaches perfect 
knowledge, the closer it is to God (Monadology § 60).  
The idea of souls that differ in degrees of perfection is a hallmark of Leibniz’s 
metaphysics, owing to which it is intertwined with issues concerning individuation 
and a distinction of souls’ cognitive powers. More specifically, if this framework 
requires criteria for the individuation of cognitive powers, then a relation between 
powers and their manifested effects seems the logical way to structure a rigorous 
enquiry into souls’ kinds. Monadology, Principle of Nature and Grace, as well as 
other texts from around the same period, sketch an argument from introspection that 
– although it may sound unconvincing at first –  reflects this strategy.4 In introspect-
ing about their own mental states, rational agents can experience a great variety of 
changes. From here, Leibniz argues, rational agents need to assume that similar 
changes are likely to occur in other, lower substances. Even if we cannot directly 
experience other substances’ internal states, we can nevertheless infer from what 
other substances do or do not manifest through their states, specifically what kinds 
of cognitive powers they must possess. If a dog runs in front of its master holding 
a stick, and the dog was beaten in the past, for instance, one may infer that the dog 
does this because it is capable of making various natural inferences and expecta-
tions, which are not logical.5 The dog’s running must be related to internally-repre-
sented variations of the dog’s soul, and because perceptual variations cannot be 
 
memory and attention, it is conscious, while conscious thought moreover requires self-reflec-
tion, i.e., consciousness of the first-personal perspective: “I think that”. For a summary and 
overview of this distinction, see Simmons (2011). What remains debatable for many scholars 
are (i) what sorts of change in minute perceptual activity reflection consists in, and (ii) whether 
it leads to an inconsistent theory insofar as it is at odds with Leibniz’s principle of continuity 
(Jorgensen 2009).   
4 In a Letter to Samuel Gottlieb Treuer (after June 1st, 1708), Leibniz writes: “Porro omnis 
substantiae est agere; et quidem intime ex natura sua seu actu interno (quemadmodurn 
demonstrari potest), et actus rei internus quatenus ad multitudinem refertur, qualis in externis 
reperitur[,] repraesentationem eorum continet, atque hoc ipsum est quod perceptionem appello, 
repraesentationem nempe multitudinis in uno seu in Monade. Talem experimur in mente nostra, 
talem in omnibus aliis Monadibus ponere necesse est, etsi conscientia et ratio non adsint.” (LBr 
939, Bl. 3 ed. and trans. In Oliveri (2019)). 















































 1. What are Types? 119 
caused on account of mechanical changes (Monadology § 17): they must instead 
hinge upon the dog’s cognitive powers. Much ink has been spilt by scholars regard-
ing the soundness of the foregoing argument.6 What concerns us, however, is a cor-
ollary of these claims. If there are a variety of more or less perfect souls, then there 
are souls that do not manifest any powers; they are in a state of deep sleep, i.e., 
dormant. This, for instance, characterizes the status of souls after death (Monadol-
ogy § 20). 
Dormant souls are metaphysically and cognitively interesting. They do not 
manifest any form of knowledge whatsoever, nor do they have any power besides 
the capacity for basic perceptions and endeavors. Leibniz nevertheless calls them 
souls and distinguishes them from simple substances7 insofar as souls seem to have 
the power of awakening from their sleep and ascending to a higher degree of per-
fection. They are souls that can be transformed into different kinds of souls.8 How-
ever, if higher degrees of perception result from modifications in the basic activity 
of souls (endeavors and perceptions), and dormant souls indeed possess this basic 
capacity, then the explanatory burden regards why dormant souls do not manifest 
higher cognitive states. Leibniz’s answer is that sleeping souls are not capable of 
higher forms of knowledge because they are constantly stupefied.9 Understanding 
 
6 To be more precise, there are two different arguments involved here. One infers the existence 
of perceptual states in other substances from mental introspection (for discussion, see Bolton 
(2011b)). The other, which is based on the thought experiment of the mill, claims that mechan-
ical changes cannot bring about perceptual changes. One therefore needs to postulate causal 
relations that account for perceptual states, which are not mechanical and material. For a 
reconstruction, see Bobro and Lodge (1998); Lodge (2014). 
7 Monadology §§ 19–20 GP/L 644: “19. Si nous voulons appeller Ame tout ce qui a perceptions 
et appetits dans le sens general que je viens d’expliquer, toutes les substances simples ou Mo-
nades creées pourroient être appellées Ames; mais, comme le sentiment est quelque chose de 
plus qu’une simple perception, je consens, que le nom general de Monades et d’Entelechies 
suffise aux substances simples, qui n’auront que cela, et qu’on appelle Ames seulement celles, 
dont la perception est plus distincte et accompagnée de memoire. 20. Car nous experimentons 
en nous mêmes un Etat, où nous souvenons de rien et n’avons aucune perception distinguée, 
comme lorsque nous tombons en defaillance, ou quand nous sommes accablés d’un profond 
sommeil sans aucun songe. Dans cet état l’ame ne differe point sensiblement d’une simple 
Monade, mais comme cet état n’est point durable, et qu’elle s’en tire, elle est quelque chose de 
plus.” 
8 Discourse de Metaphysique A VI 4 1541–2/AG 42: “[…]qu’aucune substance ne sçauroit com-
mencer que par creation, ny perir que par annihilation. Qu’on ne divise pas une substance en 
deux, ny qu’on ne fait pas de deux une, et qu’ainsi le nombre des substances naturellement 
n’augmente et ne diminue pas, quoyqu’elles soyent souvent transformées.” 
9 Monadology § 21 GP VI 610/L 645: “21. Et il ne s’ensuit point, qu’alors la substance simple 
soit sans aucune perception. Cela ne se peut pas même, par les raisons susdites; car elle ne 
sauroit perir, elle ne sauroit aussi subsister sans quelque affection, qui n’est autre chose que sa 
perception: mais quand il y a une grande multitude de petites perceptions, où il y a rien de 
distingué, on est étourdi; comme quand on tourne continuellement d’un même sens plusieurs 
fois de suite, où il vient un vestige qui nous peut faire evanouir et qui ne nous laisse rien dis-















































120 IV. First- and Second-Order Coherence I: Time, Space, and Types 
what “stupefied” means will give us a grip on the function that types have within 
Leibniz’s theory of cognition. 
Being “stupefied” means that sleeping souls are in a constant state of stupor, 
which is an affection connected to other cognitive attitudes of the soul, like simple 
attention in non-human animals, and inspection (consideratio) in rational agents. 
When a cognizant agent perceives something new, or too intently, the result is stu-
por. The healthy cognitive reaction to stupor is consideratio (inspection, consider-
ation). Inspection is the cognitive attitude with which the mind seeks to normalize, 
or make sense of, the stupor. If one saw a man riding a hippogryph in the sky, for 
instance, one would be stupefied, owing to which one would begin to seek a reason 
for that phenomenon. Inspection is of course essential to scientific discovery be-
cause it diverts the mind’s attention to the cause of the stupor. 
In a text analyzing passions and their cognitive and conative functions in deter-
mining human minds to act,10 De Affectibus. Ubi de Potentie, Actione, Determina-
tione, Leibniz defines stupor by quoting Descartes’ Article 73 of The Passions of 
the Soul. On that account, stupor is “an excess of wonder (admiratio)” (A VI 4 B 
1411, cf. CSM I 354/AT XI 383). Consideratio is meanwhile defined there as a 
state combining memory with an attendance to a preceding state of soul. This pre-
vious state is recalled in order to be intellectually inspected:  
Inspection seems to be any more attentive thought to what must be thought thereafter what is 
searched. Or inspectioin is an attention of the soul to what must be contemplated. Or it is atten-
tion of the soul to what must be discovered and judged.  (A VI 4 B 1414) 
If the soul cannot exercise its conative/cognitive power, and so move from what 
causes a change (the passion of stupor) to the activity of inspection, then the soul 
will be permanently stupefied, as if in a state of sleep or death. As Leibniz writes, 
“[there] would be no will (voluptas), but stupor […] if we persisted in the same 
state, however honorable it may be” (De mundi perfectione continuo augente, 
1689–90, A VI 4 B 1642). Having delineated the cognitive/conative function of 
stupor, we can now attempt to explain why a constant state of stupor characterizes 
dormant souls. 
[…] [A] confused aggregate of many little perceptions, containing nothing elevated that excites 
attention, induces a stupor. (Dutens 232/RSB § 10) 
Since every present state of a simple substance is a natural consequence of its preceding state 
[…] since we perceive our perceptions when awaking from a stupor, it follows necessarily that 
we have had these perceptions immediately before, even though we did not then perceive them 
[…]. From this we can see that if we had nothing distinctive in our perceptions, and nothing 
lifted out, so to speak, and of a higher flavor, we should always be in a state of stupor. (Mona-
dology §§ 21-24/L 645) 
 
 
10 For a discussion of affects and actions, see Roinila (2015) and Oliveri (2016: 1.5). Schepers 
(2014: 170–90) considers the text to be a turning point towards Leibniz’s theory of substances 















































 1. What are Types? 121 
While stupor is a cognitively-healthy passion of the soul, at least when it is transi-
tory, it constitutes cognitive death when it is constant. Constant stupor bespeaks a 
paralysis of the soul insofar as it is incapable of moving onto other states in virtue 
of changes in cognitive/conative attitude. What, then, is required for something to 
be “distinct and lifted out” and hence accountable for changes in the soul’s cona-
tive/cognitive condition? The answer of Monadology is a well-formed organic bod-
ies.  
Leibniz already provided an answer to this question to John Toland, explaining 
that, when souls are attached to living organic bodies, which are endowed with 
functioning sense-organs, the soul awakens from its preceding state of stupor.11 He 
writes to Toland that he never denied  
that we need sense-organs in order to have our thoughts […] I believe that even the most ab-
stract thoughts are represented by some traces in the brain […]. The soul can never be without 
organs more or less expressive, in order to be more or less sensitive according to its different 
states” (Leibniz to Sophie Charlotte for John Toland, 9 December 1702, LSS 272/A I 21 718).  
In describing what the soul’s death consists in to Toland, Leibniz associates it with 
the privation of functioning sense-organs. Organic dysfunction – equivalent to 
death – causes states comparable to “étourdissement”, that is, when a sentient being 
is affected by prolonged, overwhelming noise: 
if the noise were always to continue in our ears, if we were to hear nothing else, and even if the 
rest of our organs and also our memory were to provide us with nothing more to notice, the 
noise itself would no longer be noticeable and we would be completely stupefied, even if the 
confused perception were nonetheless to continue: it is in this way that a person is stunned by 
a shot from a cannon, dazzled by a bright light, or seized by epileptic convulsions, the violence 
multiplying too much and confounding the motions of the organs. […] Now when this confu-
sion of perceptions is universal and of some duration, during which nothing can be distin-
guished, it passes in common opinion for a complete cessation of functions, and even for an 
extinction of the animal (Leibniz to Sophie Charlotte for John Toland, 9 December 1702, LSS 
273/A I 21 719) 
In summary, then, constant stupor constitutes a cognitive death that corresponds 
with the cessation of normal bodily functions.12 It does not, however, correspond 
 
11 Leibniz expresses the same concept in Reflections on the Souls of Beasts (1710, Dutens 
232/RSB): “Sed, inquies, corpus organicum posse destrui. Respondeo, etsi destrueretur corpus 
aptum ad sensionem; non ideo tamen anima destrueretur, maneret enim massa animata & anima 
continuaret agere intus & extra, etsi minus perfectè, seu non cum sensione. Et talem perceptio-
nem in somno profundo, apoplexia, & aliis casibus retinemus, licet sensus cesset. Sensio enim 
est perceptio, quae aliquid distincti involvit, & cum attentione & memoria conjuncta est. Sed 
aggregatum confusum multarum perceptionum parvarum nihil eminentis habentium, quod at-
tentionem excitet, stupore inducit.” 
12 Leibniz to Sophie Charlotte for John Toland, 9 December 1702 A I 21 719/LSS 273: “Ainsi 
quoyqu'elle se puisse trouver dans un Estat d'assoupissement elle ne laissera même alors d'avoir 
quelques sentimens, et quelque usage de certains organes, les quels ne recevant pas des impres-
sions assez fortes, ny assés ordonnées, l'ame aura aussi seulement des perceptions ou embrouil-
lées, ou trop petites et presque egales ou balancées entre elles, ou il n'y aura rien qui ait du 















































122 IV. First- and Second-Order Coherence I: Time, Space, and Types 
with a cessation of minute perceptual activity. Even when stupefied, the soul per-
ceives. This can only mean that the soul has neither knowledge nor any “distin-
guishing” power when faced with an incessant stream of perceptions. Anything can 
cause a stupor. Conversely, if the soul is not stupefied, it means that it is capable of 
some heightened and distinguished perceptions, i.e., ways of filtering and ordering 
ever-incoming information. 
From this analysis of stupor and dormant souls we can conclude that heightened 
and distinguished perceptions require the presence, on the side of the body, of fully-
fledged and functioning sensory apparatus (viz. organs connected by a nervous sys-
tem to the brain, where they converge). As we will see, however, the mere existence 
of organs is not enough. Substance also requires fully-fledged cognitive apparatus 
present on the side of the soul (attention, memory, imagination, and, in human ani-
mals, intellect). The cooperation of organic bodies and cognitive apparatuses 
through harmony affords the mind the capacity to acquire knowledge of actual and 
possible world(s). Consider this metaphor of Leibniz’s: 
Mariotte says that the human mind is like a bag: when you are thinking you are shaking the bag 
until something falls out of it. Hence there is no doubt that the result of thinking depends to 
some extent on chance. I would add that the human mind is more like a sieve: when you are 
thinking you are shaking the sieve until some minute things pass it. When they pass, the spying 
attention (ratio speculatrix) catches whatever it seems relevant. (On the Art of Discovery, A VI 
3 N. 49/ C 170)13 
Following the metaphor of the sieve, the state of constant stupor, which typically 
characterizes dormant souls, corresponds with a lack filtration between minute per-
ceptions and cognitive faculties, such as memory and attention. This absence of 
filtering causes the mind to attend persistently to changes in the soul. Since these 
changes are many and varied, without filters the mind is in a constant state of stupor. 
On the other hand, if the mind thinks, imagines, make-believes, or, in short, exer-
cises its conative and cognitive attitudes, then this is because there is a well-struc-
tured sieve, composed of layers, that fine-tunes and orders what can get through its 
holes, thereby becoming objects of memory and attention. Once something moves 
into the space of attention, the soul processes it through other filters and ordering 
principles, as afforded by two further psychic faculties, viz. imagination and intel-
lect. 
But how does this metaphorical sieve work? Each faculty provides its own 
mode of filtration. Correspondingly, well-functioning sense-organs are the barrier 
of which bodily modifications can catch an agent’s attention, as said in Monadol-
ogy: 
But a soul can read within itself only what it represents distinctly; it cannot all at once develop 
all that is enfolded within it, for this reaches to infinity. Thus, although each created monad 
 
souvenir. Tel est l'estat de l'enfance ou du temps qui la precede. C'est aussi l'estat d'un profond 
sommeil, de l'etourdissement et même de la mort.” 















































 1. What are Types? 123 
represents the whole universe, it represents more distinctly the body which is particularly af-
fected by it and of which it is the entelechy. And as this body expresses the whole universe by 
the connection between all matter in the plenum, the soul also represents the whole universe in 
representing the body which belongs to it in a particular way. (Monadology §§ 61–2/L 649). 
If, for instance, I have heightened sense-perceptions of the space and books in the 
library in which I am working, but I cannot sense-perceive the railway station that 
is half a mile away from here, this is because the organs of my body are interacting 
appropriately with what is in the vicinity, under proper sense-perceptual conditions. 
These bodies are not too far away from my own body. They are, moreover, under 
the right lighting and atmospheric conditions: I can see forms and colors; I can hear 
people talking at the reception. Whatever exists beyond my perceptual environment 
(that which my sense-organs cannot reach) only affects my body indirectly and 
therefore falls into the shadows of my heightened perceptions. As Leibniz explains: 
We too have minute perceptions of which we are not aware in our present state. We could in 
fact become thoroughly aware of them and reflect on them, if we were not distracted by their 
multiplicity, which scatters the mind, and if bigger ones did not obliterate them or rather put 
them in the shade. (NE 134/A VI 6 134) 
“[Bigger] sense-perceptions” are those that are united because they mirror the chan-
neling of bodily impressions by organs through nerves up to the brain. A soul ca-
pable of distinct knowledge uses the body as a filter for information. The body 
functions as a point of view on the world to which the substance belongs. We have 
thus laid the foundations for Leibniz’s mental sieve.  
Other cognitive filters, such as memory and attention, are then put to work in 
enhancing the mind’s point of view. The logic of the imagination is constituted by 
space and time, as well as other constraints that ground our apprehension of first- 
and second-order coherence. As we will soon see, the latter constitutes a further 
filter insofar as it regulates memory and attention. The joint work of the imagina-
tion, memory, and attention provides the soul with associations that are pre-propo-
sitional, as we have hitherto claimed, which merely mimic reasoning. This further 
layer explains why minds are able to focus on the cause of a stupor, “locating” it 
within the broader corpus of knowledge: 
Memory provides a kind of consecutiveness to souls which simulates reason but which must be 
distinguished from it. Thus we see that when animals have a perception of something which 
strikes them and of which they have had a similar perception previously, they are led by the 
representation of their memory to expect whatever was connected with it in this earlier percep-
tion and so come to have feelings like those which they had before. When one shows a stick to 
dogs, for example, they remember the pain it has caused them and whine or run away. (Mona-
dology, Prelim., Sec. 65.) 
The strong imagination which strikes and moves them comes either from the magnitude or from 
the number of the perceptions which preceded it. For often one single strong impression pro-
duces at once the effect of a long-formed habit or of many frequently repeated ordinary per-
ceptions. (Monadology §§ 26–27/L 645) 
Let us highlight the role that imagination plays in this passage. The imagination 















































124 IV. First- and Second-Order Coherence I: Time, Space, and Types 
attraction. This can either be owing to a more puissant impression, such as when 
something in dog’s body causes intense pain, thanks to which the dog is forced to 
pay attention, or because the regular occurrence of the same stimulus forms a habit, 
consisting in an established connection of successive events, such as when, in wit-
nessing a sunset, I expect nightfall to follow. I shall elaborate on these thoughts 
shortly. For now, we should understand the activation of memory and attention as 
the reason why information can be stored and readily recalled whenever the imagi-
nation processes new sense-perceptual data bearing similarities to previous data.  
With this picture now in mind, I will argue in the following chapter that the 
imagination functions as a kind of telescope that enhances the viewpoint and cog-
nitive filters of an agent. Leibniz often draws a parallel between formal procedures 
– as in geometry and mathematics – and the role that telescopes or microscopes 
play in enhancing our sense-organs. Just as those lenses improve the power of the 
eye to capture those details hidden in nature, so too formal means enhance human 
beings’ rational power to achieve more stable and higher forms of knowledge (El-
ementa Rationis, A VI 4 B 717).14 For, the imagination subsumes sense-perceptions 
under its own kind of geometrical logic, thus I think we can compare it to a kind of 
telescope insofar as – at least metaphorically – it crucially permits rational agents 
to see into the future, viz. by anticipating and predicting the behaviour of phenom-
ena. 
As we have already argued, the first basic operation of the imagination is to 
synthetize sensations into complex unities (what Leibniz calls “perceptible 
wholes”, which are nothing more than an expression of presently sense-perceived 
beings, viz. as shapes with sizes bearing sensory qualities, as argued in chapter II). 
In so doing, the imagination – interplaying with memory and attention – begins a 
process of comparison and information-ordering that enables cognizant agents to 
acquire similarity classes for phenomena. When phenomena are processed as simi-
lar to previous one, it is because the cognizant agent has formed a type for that 
phenomenon that it is activated by some features of the perceived body, for instance 
the shape, and in be activated memory and attention are controlled to pay attention 
to salient aspects, i.e. typical aspects, of the phenomenon. In this way, the cognizant 
agent forms expectation about how the phenomenon is likely to change, or how it 
cannot change, entertaining so counterfactual reasoning or contemplating possible 
worlds (entertaining what if something happened). Through the imagination, cog-
nizant agents are not simply subject to what the senses present to them: they learn 
 
14 In a letter to Herzog Johann Friedrich (April 1679), Leibniz presents his universal language, 
and art of discovery, as follows A I 2 168: “Car mon invention contient l'usage de la raison tout 
entier, un juge des controverses, un interprete des notions, une balance pour les probabilités, 
une bous-sole qui nous guidera sur l'ocean des experiences, un inventaire des choses, un tableau 
des pensées, un microscope pour eplucher les choses presentes, un telescope pour deviner les 
eloignées, un Calcul general, une magie innocente, une cabbale non-chimerique; une écriture 
que chacun lira dans sa langue: Et même une langue, qu’on pourra apprendre en peu de 















































 2. Nature as the Intentional Object of Types 125 
to command attention and memory, taking voluntary control of their cognitive pro-
cesses, and making forecasts into futurity.  
Thus, even though I cannot sense-perceive what is happening at the railway 
station while I am sitting at the library, I can still imagine what might be happening 
there: I imagine entering the station hall, seeing people coming and going, getting 
onto the train, greeting their loved ones. Indeed, I can even distinguish imagining 
from sense-perceiving: I know that what I imagine about the railway station does 
not correspond exactly to what is happening there. And yet, the fictional entertain-
ment of situations and events lies at the core of the sense of coherence constituting 
real phenomena – the same is, to some extent, at play when I perceive a train at the 
railway station, and I can imagine one. Mental entertainment of both real and im-
aginary phenomena rests on types, as I will argue, and is the reason why cognizant 
agents learn to connect states of affairs and events. 
Let us summarize what we have argued thus far. If a soul is permanently stu-
pefied, then this happens because it has no cognitive resources available to order 
the constant stream of information, which is afforded through its minute perceptual 
activity. On the contrary, when the soul has cognitive resources, it can identify what 
causes a stupor, “locating” it within a broader corpus of knowledge by connecting 
it with other phenomena and their alteration. Types – themselves as forms of cog-
nitive filters – reduce the amount of information cognizant agents need to process 
when experiencing bodies. Types do this by instilling in the cognizant agent a sense 
of how the body may change from t1 to t2. To give an intuitive example, if I see a 
piece of paper five feet away from a fire, I do not expect the paper to burn, although 
paper per se can burn. Types afford an ability to recall and cognitively call upon 
stored information about things’ habitual changes and are a cognitive necessity 
within Leibniz’s metaphysics and theory of cognition. They are necessary insofar 
as they contribute towards the construction of our telescope. To this end, types en-
hance the cognizant agent’s point of view in their acts of anticipation, inference, 
and are moreover crucial to making predictions about physical phenomena. Thus, 
for the remainder of this and the next chapter, my primary goal is to flesh out Leib-
niz’s theory of how types’ interiorization is related to space and time. I shall more-
over clarify the imagination’s peculiar cognitive constraints, distinguishing these 
parameters from those of the intellect. 
2. NATURE AS THE INTENTIONAL OBJECT OF TYPES 
If we return to the topic of coherence, especially considering it from the perspective 
of our foregoing analysis, then we can say that, at any time when we have an expe-
rience and do not feel any form of suspicion or surprise caused by a phenomenon’s 
behavior, we are actually processing and ordering that phenomenon as cohering 
with “its customary nature”, as Leibniz puts it in On the Method of Distinguishing 















































126 IV. First- and Second-Order Coherence I: Time, Space, and Types 
nomenon in compliance with certain filters that we have refined through acquaint-
ance with the external world. Indeed, these filters enable cognizant agents to ex-
press phenomena’s common nature.  
We can label these filters “types”. Types are the result of the joint work of 
imagination, memory, and attention regarding the data furnished by sense-perceiv-
ing what Leibniz calls “perceptible wholes” (analyzed in chapter II). They corre-
spond to the capacity of considering the phenomenon as having a nature common 
to other phenomena. Types are ways of imagining phenomena and their interaction 
through bodies. The body, as argued in the previous chapter, is itself an expression 
of substances’ respective forces. The idea that we are going to work out in more 
detail is, roughly, that if, from similar effects we can infer similar formal causes, as 
Leibniz writes in NE 309, then from bodies’ resemblances we can infer those bod-
ies’ common nature.  
More specifically, what Leibniz calls “nature” is distinct from a thing’s essence, 
although it remains importantly related to an essence, and can be inferred from the 
typical, observable physical states of bodies (NE 309). It is an expression of what a 
body, qua type of body, can or cannot do, and is based on inferences relating to a 
phenomenon’s resemblance to other phenomena. Phenomenal resemblance is 
grounded in the outer appearance of phenomena. Types, qua interiorizations of 
common nature, collect and store observable states and properties of phenomena, 
which are considered similar and therefore of the same type. Types are therefore 
knowledge of a general kind since nature constitutes a midpoint between what per-
tains to something owing to what it is (its essence), and what pertains to it thanks 
to its existence, i.e., the context in which the thing exists: 
That is how the matter is viewed by philosophers, too, when in their often-repeated distinction 
between what pertains to essence and what to existence they associate with existence 
everything which is accidental or contingent. Very often one does not even know that a 
universal proposition which is known only through experience may not be accidental too, for 
our experience is limited. For example, in a country where water never freezes, they would 
arrive at the proposition that water is always in a fluid state; but this is not essential, as is 
discovered by coming to colder lands. However, we can take the accidental in a narrower way, 
so that there is a kind of middle ground between it and the essential: this middle ground is the 
natural, meaning that which does not necessarily belong to the thing but which nevertheless is 
inherently appropriate to it if there is nothing which prevents it. Thus someone could maintain 
that fluidity is not really essential to water but is at least natural to it. One could maintain this, 
I repeat, but still it is not something which has been demonstrated, and perhaps the inhabitants 
of the moon, if there were any, would have grounds for believing that they were just as entitled 
to say that it is natural for water to be frozen. (NE 433–4/A VI 6 433–4) 
Types can be understood as “possibilities inherent in the resemblances” (NE 323/A 
VI 6 323), as well as interiorized rules that enable the expression of a phenomenon’s 
nature. Phenomenal resemblance serves as a ground for the first categorization of 
concrete beings into similarity classes, which are not essences, and their knowledge 
rests on experiencing beings. As Leibniz notes, “a great deal of care and experience 
is needed if one is to mark out genera and species in a manner which comes fairly 















































 2. Nature as the Intentional Object of Types 127 
will soon see, the necessity they imply is physical rather than metaphysical, or so I 
will argue. 
Taking types to be the cognitive performance owing to which souls are able to 
distinguish between beings on account of resemblance hints at the idea that types 
are highly complex interiorizations of phenomenal behavior. This behavior is so 
complex and dynamic that types cannot be considered as images, nor indeed as any 
kind of mental representation of phenomena that is explicitly entertained by the 
mind and employed to compare presently perceived phenomena, in order to appre-
hend whether the phenomenon conforms to the type. Although types process the 
sensory presentation of bodies and their sensible properties, they are not therefore 
images. The argument for this is well-known, but worth remembering (Bolton, 
2017). 
Types are related to the observable changes of things, as well as to their sense 
perception by sensory beings. If this is correct, then the type is first involved in the 
tracking of a body’s movement. However, the type is not an image of the body as 
entertained by a cognizant agent. Any image of a phenomenon can be taken by the 
mind as an exemplification of a phenomenon’s type. For instance, I can draw a 
human body and tell you that the type we are after – human body – looks like my 
drawing. The problem with this explanation is that, however far-removed from par-
ticular properties and traits the drawn image may be, it will necessarily represent 
one and only one position that the whole and its parts can occupy at the same time 
in space.15 The hands cannot at once be placed over the head as well as dangling 
down the sides of the body. Most existing human bodies can assume these postures 
(albeit at different times), and the coherence we thereby develop of the relevant type 
does not merely concern one mode of presentation between the relations of whole 
and parts, but any possible position that the whole and its parts can take. These 
changes do not preclude taking a body, postured thus-and-so, as similar to previ-
ously-experienced bodies, whether or not they are positioned similarly. Moreover, 
these different representations are, no less than one another, actualizations of the 
type in question. In short, a type is the capacity to consider various postures of a 
whole-parts as possible states of the whole-parts; each state is moreover taken as 
produced by previous states and generating successive states. We will elaborate on 
this soon. 
At root, a type concerns whole-part relations of a certain body. This is true of 
relations within the body, as well as being in virtue of experiencing and observing 
bodies’ behaviors, which affords knowledge of relations between the body-type and 
other previously-experienced, contiguous body-types. For instance, we learn that 
paper behaves differently when soaked in water than when it is near a fire. So, if a 
drawing is able to be taken by a subject as exemplifying a type, then this must be 
on account of the mind already having a type that accounts for any presentation of 
the class of things falling under it. The class of things related to a type is, therefore, 
determined thanks to a cluster of sensory presentations, the most relevant of which 
 















































128 IV. First- and Second-Order Coherence I: Time, Space, and Types 
is, as I shall argue in chapter V, the body-shape as divided into its constitutive parts. 
To foreground that discussion, I shall make one prefiguring remark. On Leibniz’s 
account, shapes are detected multimodally. Owing to this, even though vision seems 
to dominate in our experience of bodies, there can be types of non-visual sensory 
presentations, such as sounds, tastes, or smells, and these can be ordered on a scale 
that varies with regard to different measures of quantifiability, including intensity 
and duration, frequency, and so on. However, as we are going to see, the interiori-
zation of property-types is parasitic upon the interiorization of body-types insofar 
as they rest on the capacity for distinguishing parts into a body. This is the reason 
why, for now, we will focus on the apprehension of body-types. 
When a type is active during the processing of sensory presentations, all this 
means is that the mind has learned to see the actual presentation of a particular body 
(say, a cup) not simply qua a shape with sensory qualities; it is seen as a type of 
body, cups, because (i) the actual shape and parts of the cup bear similarities with 
previously-experienced cups; (ii) the sensory presentation of the cup is coperceived 
along with other bodies that are typically associated with the cup. Furthermore, 
conditions (i) and (ii) activate certain expectations and predictions regarding the 
cup’s behavior in contexts in which the body of the perceiver may form a relevant 
part. In short, we do not mentally entertain types as kinds of general images; we 
simply learn to see bodies qua types of phenomena manifested through an acquired, 
habitual acquaintance with body-shapes, sizes, and qualities. Thus, types are dy-
namic rules of tracking phenomena’s behavior, as interiorized through experience. 
These rules are unconsciously active when we experience new phenomena and al-
low us to take the new phenomenon as a habitual one. Our typical and habitual 
acquaintance with phenomena renders attention and memory selective, shifting 
their respective focus from common traits among bodies, as based on similarity, to 
what distinguishes phenomena as being of a certain type. 
A type is thus an interiorized ability to express the nature of the body qua a 
general kind of body. It is manifested as a recognition of the body as belonging to 
a similarity class; a prediction of how the body changes internally, i.e., its parts 
move coherently given the type of body, as well as how it changes externally, i.e., 
coherently with the nature of other, surrounding bodies. And yet, given the com-
plexity of types (despite the fact that types are not consciously entertained) it is hard 
to make them adequate to the cognitive demand that types must produce a filter for 
reducing and diminishing an array of information, thereby ordering and controlling 
the amount of information that would otherwise overwhelm the cognizant agent, 
rendering them stupefied. Thus, in order to argue that types are filters, we need to 
focus on the role that spatiotemporal constraints play in the sense-perception of 
bodies. The connection to space and time will allow us to argue that in processing 
wholes we do not entertain all possible outcomes that a given arrangement of the 
whole and its parts can have; we rather assume a general framework provided by 
















































 3. Space and Time: A First-Order Coherence 129 
3. SPACE AND TIME: A FIRST-ORDER COHERENCE 
We ought to consider how minds form general notions of space and time in order 
to show that space and time act on the level of the sensory apprehension of bodies, 
that is, before minds acquire explicit notions of them. Owing to this, space and time 
act as constraints on the imagination in tracking sensory presentations of beings as 
perceptible wholes. In so doing, they serve as rules for interiorizing the first-level 
coherence of bodies, that is, how parts of a whole move in relation to spatial and 
temporal constraints. First-order coherence also serves as the basis for interiorizing 
second-order coherence. This is based on the way that bodies (qua types of bodies) 
move and change. The parts of a human body, for instance, move differently to 
those of a dog-body or snake-body. Nonetheless, both types of body move coher-
ently with spatiotemporal rules. Second-order coherence hence constitutes more 
specific knowledge of how a body qua type (whether canine, human, or ophidian) 
can or cannot change. To better understand the relation between first- and second-
order coherence, let us analyze how general representations of space and time are 
learned. 
Across a diversity of papers and passages, Leibniz describes the process by 
which human minds learn to conceive of space and time. While the most well-
known text is a passage of the fifth letter to Clarke,16 I prefer to discuss an earlier 
text, Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae (1677–1681?). There, Leibniz not 
only proffers the conception of imagination that interests us here (indeed at an early 
point in his philosophical career): he also begins to draw an important connection 
between time, space, and the human capacity to perceive bodies. A body in this text 
is not simply the appearance of a whole, but a more complex expression of the 
perceptible whole as subject to space and time.  
According to this text, physics is said to be connected to geometry, arithmetic, 
and metaphysics: “Physics is subordinated to arithmetic or algebra insofar as it 
cocerns magnitude, to geometry insofar as it concerns situation; to metaphysics in-
sofar as it concerns resistance, i.e. action and passion” (A VI 4 B 1394/LoC 237). 
In each of these domains, claims Leibniz, cognizant agents rely on different princi-
ples of certitude. The principle of certitude in physics is that phenomena have a 
certain “consensentia vera”, i.e., they are co-sensed together as true. Physics more-
over has its own categories: body; world; time; space; and individual (A VI 4 B 
1396). In short, the human capacity for distinguishing individual bodies moving 
through space and over time – as well as the capacity for organizing them into a 
world distinguished into successive temporal states – is the object of the physical 
 
16 Leibniz’s Fifth Letter to Clarke, § 47, GP VII 400/ed. by R. Ariew (2000: 45–6). The beginning 
of the text is of interest to us: “Voicy comment les hommes viennent à se former la notion de 
l'espace. Ils considerent que plusieurs choses existent à la fois, et ils y trouvent un certain ordre 
de coexistence, suivant lequel le rapport des uns et des autres est plus ou moins simple.” Fur-
thermore, in the letter to Clarke, the act of co-perception constitutes the starting point for any 















































130 IV. First- and Second-Order Coherence I: Time, Space, and Types 
sciences, permitting the distinction of dreams from actually-obtaining states (A VI 
4 B 1396).  
Within this framework, the perception of a moving body is a phenomenon of 
the imagination and its constraints insofar as these phenomena appear situated. The 
body has a situation when we perceive it as an image: “an image is the continuation 
in the organ of the action of the object even when it has ceased. Imagination is the 
perception of an image” (A VI 4 B 1394/LoC 237). The perception of an image is 
what we named “the groundwork of the imagination” in chapter III, i.e., the sense-
perception of bodies as shapes with sizes. This groundwork explains how we can 
perceive phenomena as consensentia vera, viz. coperceiving their truth. But what 
does it mean to say that we can coperceive phenomena as true? What Leibniz means 
here is more or less what he writes in On the Method of Distinguishing Real from 
Imaginary Phenomena. Consensentia vera involves the perception of phenomena 
as coherent or as being in agreement. When we sense-perceive phenomena, we tend 
to accept our perceptions, for those perceptions do not generate in us any affection 
of suspicion. The fact that Leibniz outlines an argument for why we need to believe 
in the existence of that which we sense-perceive suggests that we should read the 
foregoing text in accordance with Leibniz’s better-known On the method: 
The causes of the phenomena, too, must be outside you, and also outside any other conceiver, 
since they appear co-sensed by many, and, with your nature being limited, no reason can be 
provided for so many new appearances cohering among themselves. Hence now there arises 
the consideration of a certain generic space whenever certain particular situations are assigned 
to the phenomena, and one observes the distance and angles of things, which do not change 
without a cause. Thus if we posit something in a fixed and enclosed place, we do not doubt to 
find it in that very place, unless some force or another event (casus) do not supervene. Also 
this space is common to all things, and those phenomena themselves we call them bodies to 
which we can assign a situation (situ), like a star; there is no body which is not cognized as 
being in that general space and which has some distance from other bodies. […] But since 
changes occur, which varies the situation assigned [to the body], in this case, to avoid confu-
sion, we devise a mode of distinguishing those things which happen prior or posterior or sim-
ultaneous, by referring everything to changes of those things which are apprehended as uni-
form, such as the movement of the stars. And this consideration of the things with each other 
is called time, which is also generic, and comprises the whole of everything nothing can happen 
which is not prior or posterior or simultaneous to any other given thing. (A VI 4 B 1396–7/LoC 
242–3 translation slightly modified) 
The passage addresses the same body of problems of “On the Method of Distin-
guishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena”. Its philosophical claim is that there 
must exist other perceivers, as well as causes of the phenomena we experience. For, 
if we assumed that such causes did not exist, then we would not be able to provide 
an explanation for anything that appears to us as internally coherent. Space and time 
are used as criteria to explain why phenomena are coherent and why supervening 
causes – things that occur independently of our existence and will – can make sense 
of the order of succession and relations among the phenomena we experience. How-
ever, space and time are no existing framework outside the cognizant agent; they 
are a categorical framework that agents develop from appearances of wholes. What 















































 3. Space and Time: A First-Order Coherence 131 
size. The cognizant agent assigns a situation to the shape (that is, she renders it a 
geometrical object subjected to the logic of the imagination) by putting it in a rela-
tion to other appearances in her perceptual environment. Indeed, following the quo-
ted passage, Leibniz continues by saying that  
Now with the aid of time and place we can also distinguish individuals, and decide which are 
the same and which are different; if I have two eggs in front of me that are similar or equal 
throughout… (A VI 4 B 1397/LoC 243). 
Thanks to the analysis conducted in chapter II, we are already familiar with the 
claim that the mere situation of two bodies constitutes a sufficient criterion for their 
apprehension as two distinct bodies, in spite of their congruence. We now know, 
furthermore, that the body is situated through the act of expressing it as a finite 
shape. As we have argued, detecting unities into an amalgam of sensory perceptions 
is the groundwork of the imagination, and explains why the imagination can pro-
ceed to compare shapes. The final, relevant aspect of the passage is the role thereby 
given to causation. If no external cause supervenes, then the object stays in the same 
position (situ); if a cause supervenes, then it moves. The notion of cause, like those 
of space and time, however, is not an explicit concept that the mind as-yet applies 
to bodily apprehensions. Such notions are rules for constructing sense-perceptions 
as appearances of bodies, which permits their tracking across space and time. 
The text is relevant not only because it explains how we form a representation 
of space and time: it introduces the notion of bodies (corpora) as more structured 
phenomena than mere individuations of a shape. Bodies are phenomena that cannot 
but be conceived as shapes occupying a position in space (situs), thereby bearing 
relations to other shapes/bodies that likewise occupy a position in space (distance), 
whose changes transpire either before, after, or at the same time as other changes, 
i.e., in time. Bodies do not, therefore, undergo alterations without explanatory, eti-
ological grounds. Our finite human minds depend upon the imagination, owing to 
which we cannot detach our conception of bodies from spatial and temporal rela-
tions. Even if the concepts of space, time, and causation were explicitly learned 
after the mind had experienced bodies, this would mean that space, time, and cau-
sation already actively functioned as constraints upon the imagination, i.e., as con-
ditions of possibility for the appearance not of shapes but of more complex phe-
nomena, viz. bodies. As we will see in chapter IV, by “innate ideas” Leibniz means 
those constraints on the imagination and intellect that are always active in cognition, 
but are only known explicitly by rational minds following a great deal of experi-
ence, abstraction, and reflection. 
Bearing in mind that space and time are rules rather than concepts, we can fur-
ther clarify the kinds of rules they are. Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae 
(1677–1681?), which we cannot survey analytically, offers five rules that determine 
how bodies can appear to the imagination, which change in accordance with space 
and time:  
(i) A body is in space and time iff, in an act of coperception, it appears as having spatial relations 
to other bodies (simultaneously situated at a certain distance from other bodies). In short, it is 















































132 IV. First- and Second-Order Coherence I: Time, Space, and Types 
(ii) Whatever is in space is either a whole or a part. It is a whole if it has parts; it is a part if it 
belongs to a whole;17  
(iii) The body has parts iff they are both extended and continuous. This means that the parts 
“bend” rather than “divide”, moving apart from the body;18 
(iv) Movements of parts and wholes are continuous and homogeneous, i.e., they trace ideally 
what appear to perceivers as continuous lines, constructed in ideal space over time; 
(v) Movement qua change, while a body is at rest, depends upon a supervenient cause: a state 
occurring in accordance with (i–iv). 
The first upshot of these rules is that the Leibnizian notion of body is not Cartesian: 
bodies are not comprised of one, sole property – extension – because they are not 
three-dimensional. Bodies are in fact four-dimensional: they have length, depth, 
breadth, as well as temporal extension. A body is whatever appears to the imagina-
tion as having extension in both spatial and temporal respects. It is hence a bundle 
of states changing continuously in compliance with space and time. As we will see 
in the next chapter, spatiotemporal continuity is all-important to the notion of a 
world and is moreover required for constructing more structured expectations be-
tween states, viz. causal relations. 
Rules (i)–(iii) result from what we have already argued from chapter II until 
now. Rule (iv), in turn, derives from what Leibniz says in the text quoted above. 
There, the apprehension of the spatial alterations of the same body depends on the 
continuity of the body’s movement. This homogeneous change, as we will see in 
chapter V, is the reason why the imagination is capable of keeping track of the body 
and its changes, and why it takes them as changes of the same body. The apprehen-
sion of temporal duration as the same body changing place does not result from a 
comparison of different images of the body apprehended at different times. This 
kind of tracking is a spontaneous activity of the imagination, because such an ac-
tivity is affine to the imagination’s own logic. The appearance of homogeneous, 
linear movement of the body inclines the mind to take it as the same body changing: 
the body does not disappear in one place and then reappear in another; it moves in 
what appears to us as continuous, linear movement. This homogeneity of movement 
reduces bodies’ movements to the representation of an ideal continuum through 
which the body must move in order to reach a different position. This continuum is 
called space and it is imagined as an underling substratum of bodies. There might 
be different ways in which a body can move from position A to position B: it might 
be a direct, straight line, or a curved line. In any case, the body must trace a contin-
uum. That bodies are homogeneous means that, independently of their peculiar 
shape or size, they are similar insofar as they change coherently with (i)–(v). 
 
17 Leibniz’s main claim in this paper is that coherence leads the mind to form an idea of “mundus”, 
understood as the totality of phenomena. A world, however, is not an actual whole (something 
we can sense-perceive) but a regulative idea regarding the kind of phenomena that can and 
cannot exist in the world. 
18 The example of a moving chord, used by Leibniz in Metaphysical Definitions and Reflections 















































 4. Space, Time, Causation: Leibniz’s Empirical Principle 133 
Why is the foregoing relevant? These clarificatory remarks are important because 
this ideal continuum grounds the first-level coherence of bodily movement, and 
thereby governs our expectations regarding how bodies may move. Independently 
from the nature of the body, viz. whether it is a tree or a hyppogryph, any movement 
traces what appears to us as a homogeneous, continuous passage between two lo-
cations. For instance, a body cannot disappear at position A and at the very next 
moment appear at another distant location. A body moving in this way would ap-
pear as suspicious to the cognizant agent. 
Homogeneity of motion, as afforded by space and time, provides an initial an-
swer to the question regarding how the imagination’s own constraints, which are 
active in coperceiving bodies, control incoming sensory information. Homogeneity 
establishes expectations regarding phenomenal alteration. If, in order to move from 
position A to position B, a body needs to move past all points between A and B 
(which necessarily lie on a continuous line of whatever shape), then locating the 
body at time A permits certain expectations I have of its forthcoming move. If I see 
someone walking, for instance, then I am able to track her movement owing to her 
legs moving in a certain way. If the right leg is in front of the left leg, then I expect 
the left leg to move gradually to the front of the right leg. The salient point here is 
that linear, homogeneous motion, the perception of which is afforded by our ex-
pression of beings as bodies on a space-time continuum, limits the combination of 
possible alterations that a body can undergo from t1 to t2. This requires that, in 
seeing a body, I do not simply see a shape: I see a phenomenon related to other 
phenomena insofar as they all adhere to certain rules. What the interiorization of a 
type ‘body’ allows to predict thus is not how a body will actually change from a 
certain arrangement of its parts: its parts can vary in too many different ways. What 
it will predict is the mode of change: independently from the direction of the part 
or the whole, the change must be linear and homogeneous. 
Therefore, when a cognizant agent interiorizes a type for ‘body’, the type con-
sists in an ability to take any experienced body as similar to any other body, at least 
with respect to their being subject to space and time. ‘Body’ is hence also a type. It 
is a type insofar as it corresponds to the cognizant agent’s capacity of expressing 
what is common to all beings as perceptible wholes: their being subject to spatio-
temporal rules. Bodies’ common nature is their similitude with respect to space and 
time. This general framework of bodies as four-dimensional objects is required to 
interiorize more specific kinds of bodies and so more specific rules of how bodies 
recognized as having specific natures changes. This furthermore allows cognizant 
agents to predict and expect certain kinds of bodily behavior. In the next section, 
we will further probe the grounds for these kinds of expectations, focusing on rule 
(v) and associative causation. 
4. SPACE, TIME, CAUSATION: LEIBNIZ’S EMPIRICAL PRINCIPLE 
Spatiotemporal rules ground those causal changes that see bodies in motion and at 















































134 IV. First- and Second-Order Coherence I: Time, Space, and Types 
by Leibniz) that what has happened will happen again in the same way (NE 49 and 
NE 51). This is important because, as I shall argue here, this kind of causation does 
not imply necessity, only association. Owing to this, non-human minds are too ca-
pable of its apprehension. 
In NE, the aforementioned principle is used to distinguish between analytic rea-
soning, which is based on the isolation of requisites for something’s existence, and 
mere association.19 More specifically, associative causation is, at this level, a mere 
connection between two states that repeatedly occur either together or successively. 
The cognizant agent simply expects state B whenever state A occurs; they do not 
cognize state A as a cause, nor as that which produces the existence of B. It is mere 
expectation. This is also the way in which non-human animals, and “simple empir-
ics”, connect and predict events:  
While men are capable of demonstrative knowledge [science], beasts, so far as one can judge, 
never manage to form necessary propositions, since the faculty by which they make thought 
sequences is something lower than the reason that occurs in men. Beasts' thought sequences are 
just like those of simple empirics who maintain that what has happened once will happen again 
in a case which is similar in the respects that they are impressed by, although that does not 
enable them to judge whether the same reasons are at work. (NE 51/A VI 6 51) 
In Reflections on the Souls of Beasts, a short text written in 1710 and already pub-
lished in Dutens (1768), Leibniz writes more explicitly: 
Since this point has not until now been very well explained – while some remove even sensation 
from beasts, others ascribe even reason to them and report many cases in which beasts seem to 
connect certain consequences – it should be known that there are two completely different sorts 
of inferences, empirical and rational. Empirical inferences are common to us and beasts, and 
consist in the fact that on sensing those things that have on several occasions been experienced 
to be connected we expect them to be connected again. Thus dogs having several times been 
beaten when they have done something displeasing, again expect a whipping if they should do 
the same thing and so they refrain from acting; this they have in common with children. (RSB 
§ 14/Dutens 232) 
Leibniz was aware that induction may have different sources and that the simple 
repetition of events, which are temporally proximal, may lead a cognizant agent to 
create a connection between the two events. The connection is tantamount to ex-
pecting B whenever A occurs, as when a dog expects to be beaten if it has already 
been beaten. The expectation, however, does not amount to an awareness that state 
A produces B: it is not yet a notion of causation. Indeed, Leibniz thinks this is why 
empirics are easily fooled by experience: 
But as it often happens that such things are only connected accidentally, empirics are often 
deceived by this, just like beasts, with the result that what they expect does not happen. Thus, 
if I give food to a dog doing something, this indeed happens accidentally as a result of my free 
will; but as soon as the dog has become habituated to the action I wished to teach it, I no longer 
give it food when it acts correctly, although until then it may expect this to happen. (Ibid.) 
 















































 4. Space, Time, Causation: Leibniz’s Empirical Principle 135 
Human beings are furthermore inclined to empirical expectations, as it emerges 
with unexpected violence when they move to another country, where social expec-
tations result from a different set of protocols and habits: 
Likewise, if some Dutchman boarding a ship is carried off to Asia, and taken to a Turkish city 
looks for beer in an inn just as he would at home, he will in this way be deceived, for he will 
expect something from the inn which is connected to it only accidentally, and is not found in 
the same way in Turkish inns as in Dutch ones. However, a human being, insofar as he does 
not act empirically but rationally, does not rely solely on experience, or a posteriori inductions 
from particular cases, but proceeds a priori on the basis of reasons. (Ibid.) 
The inference that I can find beer in an inn (so lifesaving in the Netherlands!) be-
comes a deception in another country, whereby I realize the non-necessity of the 
connection between inns and beer.  
Years before Hume, Leibniz had already addressed the distinction between 
mere connection and causation, rejecting the idea that connection is all there is to 
causation. However, connection brings about an associative causation, that is, a link 
between two events based on habitual experience. This is a remarkable feat for cog-
nizant agents because it serves to instill stability and order both into nature and the 
cognizant agents’ own cognitive processes. As yet, however, this order is not ra-
tionally grounded. If we return to the passage from Metaphysical Definitions and 
Thoughts, in which Leibniz claims that we do not expect a body to move without a 
cause, then we will see that the notion of causation there involved is merely associ-
ative, based on acquaintance with the past. 
Let us, for now, return to movement. Alterations in states of motion and rest 
typically require temporal succession and an event that causes the change. It is only 
typically thus owing to the frequency with which we experience the event. Experi-
ence furnishes expectations given what has happened thus far. This comes down to 
the frequency with which one state succeeds another. In normal cases, the status of 
a body at rest, A, is anticipated by the movement of another body, B, as it ap-
proaches A. Thanks to the logic of the imagination, the typical scenario experienced 
by cognizant agents is that a body, A, changes its situation immediately after an-
other body, B, appears so close that the cognizant agent cannot perceive any dis-
tance between A and B, although they do suddenly perceive a change in A’s state 
of rest and in B’s motion. The imagination takes this type of change as typical be-
cause it is, besides its frequency, affine to its logic: it is the most consistent with 
those spatiotemporal, continuous changes (as presented in (i) and (iv)) insofar as 
the imagination can coperceive two bodies that move coherently within the space-
time continuum. What is important here is that this causation rests on a mere asso-
ciation between state A and B, as based on time, and, to this extent, involves the 
imagination: 
The thought sequences of beasts are only a shadow of reasoning, that is, they are nothing but a 
connection in the imagination – a passage from one image to another; for when a new situation 
appears similar to its predecessor, it is expected to have the same concomitant features as be-
fore, as though things were linked [liaison] in reality just because their images are linked in the 
memory. It is true, moreover, that reason counsels us to expect ordinarily that what we find in 















































136 IV. First- and Second-Order Coherence I: Time, Space, and Types 
infallible truth, and it can fail us when we least expect it to, if there is a change in the reasons 
which have been maintaining it. (NE 51/A VI 6 51, my italics) 
As Leibniz notes in the Monadology, “we are all mere empirics in three-fourths of 
our actions […] when we expect daylight tomorrow, we act as empiric, because this 
has always happened up to the present” (Monadology § 28/L 645). However, while 
connections between events and expectations – as afforded by experience and 
forged through the imagination – is a tremendous boon to practical beings who need 
to navigate the world, it is nevertheless vulnerable to error. However, in spite of its 
potential fallibility, it is far from being an impediment to achieving truths, at least 
when exercised correctly. As I argue in the next chapter, if cognizant agents did not 
first exercise their tendency to be “empiric”, they could not attain to more stable 
knowledge. Expectations grounded on the principle, “what has happened will hap-
pen again”, may be vital for pragmatic purposes or “fast reasoning”, but mere ex-
pectations cannot reveal the “necessity” for why something happens as a conse-
quence of something else. Indeed, even if association could lead us to knowledge 
of necessary truths accidentally, we would still not be entitled to say that the truth 
achieved through empirical means is of a necessary kind (RSB § 14). For, necessity 
requires something more than mere connections forged in the imagination. What is 
required is the input of intellect.20 
Once we turn our attention to the question of how the foregoing principle func-
tions in the apprehension of motion, we will recognize that its fallibility rests on the 
fact that no change vis-à-vis states of rest/motion occur mechanically, that is, by 
way of bodily collisions. A human body, for instance, can self-move independently 
of any observable change in its surrounding. Indeed, in the passage from Metaphys-
ical Definitions and Thoughts, Leibniz leaves it an open question what kind of cau-
sation is here involved: whenever we see a change, we think a cause supervenes. 
This does not mean the cause cannot be internal, such as when my will moves my 
body to fetch some water.  
The foregoing observation is important because this notion of causation can 
also be extended to things that we neither observe nor experience in the same way 
as we experience bodies. Consider, for instance, the way in which rational agents 
ascribe thoughts to others.21 I see you grabbing a glass of water and therefore judge 
that you are thirsty. This inference rests on a more basic assumption that a change 
needs a cause. Consequently, if I see a change (viz. your body moving and reaching 
for some water), and I do not perceive anything that moves your body coherently 
with the movements you produce, I do not thereby abandon my assumption that 
there is a cause. This is because my assumption rests on the ultimately stable prin-
ciple that “what happened will happen again in the same way”.22 I rather assume 
 
20 See also Oliveri (2016: 2.3); Bolton (2017). 
21 See Oliveri (2016: I.5) and Roinila (2007). 
22 The argument from introspection of Monadology § 16, which infers the existence of other per-
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that there must be a cause moving your body – a substance that moves your body 
through your being thirsty. The reason for not revising the principle is hence more 
subtle than blindly assuming the principle’s invariant truth: I have resources to find 
a cause for your grabbing the glass; a cause that affords preservation of the princi-
ple. I can observe, for instance, that my body too moves without external influence, 
but rather through internal strivings, as when I feel thirsty. Henceforth, I generalize 
and assume that your body – being similar to mine – can also move for the same 
reason.  
This argument coheres with that which Leibniz gives in “On Distinct Percep-
tion”, as outlined in chapter II. We claimed there that we implicitly judge other 
bodies to be substances because we attribute to them the status of substance that we 
likewise experience in ourselves.23 Without broaching metaphysical questions re-
garding body-mind interactions (which constitutes a further step in a rational 
agent’s process of discovery, which leads rational agents to revise their notion of 
efficient causation, giving way to varieties of causation), the relevant point for us 
is that space and time, as constraints, support the apprehension of causal relations 
between moving bodies. These spatiotemporal parameters can serve the imagina-
tion as further constraints in its activity of determining and interiorizing types. 
Associative causation leads the mind to believe that changes in bodily states of 
rest and motion require contact between two bodies. We expect that material bodies 
do not move without a cause of their movement, i.e., if movement is produced, then 
we presuppose a cause. At this level of explanation, we are not making hypotheses. 
We simply expect movement when we witness body-body collision owing to those 
rules grounding the “coherence” in accordance with which phenomenal change is 
possible. By “coherence”, Leibniz simply means the cognitive state of the agent 
that, in sense-perceiving worldly phenomena, carries certain expectations and pre-
dictions regarding how bodies behave. Expectations rest on spatiotemporal rules 
and they underpin the interiorization of the type ‘body’. That cognizant agents have 
a type for body simply means that, if they see a material body at rest, occupying a 
place, then they expect that the body will continue to occupy that very same spot 
unless something happens. This is because they already expect that, when a cause 
supervenes, a body changes. Time is therefore a further dimension of bodies. All 
 
dans la substance simple, lorsque nous trouvons que la moindre pensée dont nous nous apper-
cevons enveloppe une varieté dans l’objet. Ainsi tous ceux, qui reconnoissent que l’Ame est 
une substance simple, doivent reconnoitre cette multitude dans la Monade” (GP 6 609/L 644). 
The driven premise to conclude the existence of other perceiving monads is the assumption of 
introspective knowledge of our own mental states as proof for a variety of phenomena. For 
bodies act and interact with our own body, there must be other perceiving souls. 
23 We should recall the passage we read in chapter II: “Distincta itaque perceptio fit, dum aliquid 
nostri simile rebus attribuimus, nos enim scimus esse subjectum variorum attributorum, itaque 
similiter objecta consideramus tanquam substantias quasdam sive res. [A perception is distin-
guished (distincta) in this way, insofar as we attribute something similar to our substances, we 
indeed know we are the subject of various attributes, so in a similar way we consider objects 















































138 IV. First- and Second-Order Coherence I: Time, Space, and Types 
that the type requires is an inculcated attitude to expect a further state, consistent 
with how bodies move in space and time from one state to another.  
5. CONCLUSION 
Cognizant agent are bundles of organic and cognitive functions, whose harmonious 
cooperation results in an ability to bring order to a vast amount of sensory infor-
mation. To this end, a cognizant agent’s faculties – memory, attention, and imagi-
nation – interplay in learning how to predict and expect phenomenal behavior. Hav-
ing outlined this general framework, in this chapter we focused on how space and 
time contribute to structuring sense-perception, viz. by interiorizing a type for 
“body”. For any single body to be coherent, and therefore real, it must behave con-
sistently with those spatiotemporal constraints described in (i) – (v).  
In the next chapter, we shall add certain qualifications to this first-order coher-
ence, which alone cannot account for how cognizant agents interiorize more spe-
cific types. While first-order coherence is a necessary condition for the cognition 
of certain types, it is inadequate for distinguishing between phenomena that exist in 
the actual world and fictional phenomena of possible worlds.  
The most succinct way of explaining why first-order coherence is necessary but 
not sufficient for grounding the sense of coherence that can distinguish real from 
imaginary phenomena is to elaborate on the example of suspicious phenomena de-
ployed by Leibniz in On the Method. A hippogryph moves coherently with space, 
time, and associative causation. But if coherence only depended on space and time, 
then coherence would still not explain our suspicion were we to see a hippogryph. 
This suspicion must hinge upon an implicit assumption that what we perceive can-
not exist in, or is not a phenomenon of, the actual world.  
The next chapter fleshes out this argument through an analysis of what Leibniz 
considered to be the relation between imagination, the kinds of conceivability it 
accounts for, and the kinds of modalities to which it affords access. This will prove 















































V. FIRST- AND SECOND-ORDER COHERENCE II: 
MODALITIES AND TYPES 
Space, time, and associative causation act as rules for determining the first-order 
coherence of phenomena. First-order coherence concerns how bodies can or cannot 
move and change in compliance with spatiotemporal constraints. When cognizant 
agents apprehend perceptible wholes as embedded in the ideal continuum of space 
and time, the imagination performs an act more complex than the work of segmen-
tation described in chapter II. Our sense-perception of bodies is more structured 
than simple apprehensions of perceptible wholes (shapes with sizes) because the 
cognizant agent forms expectations regarding how bodies change state (for exam-
ple, between motion and rest). Bodies move homogeneously and linearly across 
what appears to us as a continuum. Moreover, they do not change without cause. 
Hence, in experiencing perceptible wholes, cognizant agents learn the nature com-
mon to all bodily phenomena, independently of their specific type. For, while 
snakes, human beings, imaginary hippogryphs, and indeed the moon, are each ex-
amples of bodily phenomena, and each moves in its own peculiar way (celestial 
bodies revolve, human beings walk, hippogryphs fly), they nonetheless all move in 
accordance with spatiotemporal rules as described in (i)–(v) of the previous chap-
ter.1 
The foregoing chapter concluded by pointing to the limits of first-order coher-
ence. While first-order coherence is necessary, it is not sufficient to account for the 
suspicion occasioned by incoherent phenomena, viz. the suspicion that Leibniz 
thinks we would feel were we to sense-perceive fictional phenomena, such as a 
hippogryph. To explain why cognizant agents react suspiciously to certain phenom-
ena but not others, we need an account of second-order coherence, which regards 
the determination of species within the genus ‘body’. The motivating idea here is 
that suspicion is produced owing to the cognizant agent’s sense-perception being 
about a hippogryph, rather than merely a body. The cognizant agent who is suspi-
cious in seeing a hippogryph must, therefore, possess resources for recognizing and 
evaluating the possible/impossible existence of what they experience even before 
they have the relevant analytic tools for pursuing their enquiries, viz. concepts.  
The relevant question therefore becomes: what kinds of distinctions within the 
general genus ‘body’ are cognizant agents capable of apprehending, and by which 
 
1 For an analysis of the codependence between corporeality and the work of the imagination, see 
Meier-Oeser (2011), especially where he argues that “having a body” is something related to 
“being an intentional object of the imagination”. I think this is partially true. If bodies are four-
dimensional entities, then bodies are ideal too. I think, however, that bodies – the intentional 
objects of the imagination – track something mind-independent, i.e., changes expressing forces. 
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mechanisms can they account for more specific, albeit still pre-conceptual, ways of 
categorizing beings? If cognizant agents can recognize a hippogriph, then they must 
be capable of some sort of categorization. My hypothesis is that types are acquired 
abilities to gather beings into similarity classes in virtue of observable, phenotypical 
resemblances. After all, the idea that concepts are “similitudo rerum” has a venera-
ble, Scholastic tradition.2 My hypothesis is that Leibniz adopts and modifies this 
theory within his own philosophy of mind and language.3 An interesting upshot of 
this view is that, on my understanding, Leibniz takes the acknowledgement of sim-
ilarities as a mere step towards conceptual knowledge, while falling short of con-
ceptual knowledge itself. This removes any potential ambiguity in Leibniz’s phi-
losophy of mind of the kind that concepts are images, while also clarifying that 
Leibniz furthermore departs from Descartes’ theory of ideas.4  
We can begin by providing an argument for why Leibniz’s notion of coherence 
must exceed its first-order characterization (sect. 1). To this end, we can analyze 
Leibniz’s notion of a world and his theory of modality, arguing that it accounts for 
varieties of necessity (sect. 2). The analysis conducted in sections 1–2 serves, first, 
to flesh out our argument for why first-order coherence cannot alone provide the 
mind with the notion of coherence, as implied in the distinction between real and 
imaginary phenomena. Second, this enables us to deduce further constraints for sec-
ond-order coherence, viz. sameness, difference, and similarity (sect. 3).  
 
2 The theory of concepts as “similitudo rerum” is associated, within the Scholastic tradition to 
issues regarding intentionality and the theory of species. The theory of species was rejected by 
Descartes and the new philosophy through the introduction of ideas as intentional objects (for 
a reconstruction of the issues at hand, see Adriaenssen (2017); for a reconstruction of the Scho-
lastic theory of intentionality, see Perler (2001)). Leibniz’s apparent endorsement, albeit with 
various modifications, of certain Scholastic positions would once more reveal his suspicion 
towards Descartes’ approach to ideas, as well as his attempt to rehabilitate the philosophy of 
the School. 
3 That Scholastic philosophy had a great influence on many of Leibniz’s philosophical doctrines 
– from the rehabilitation of substantial forms to his theory of possible worlds – is a well-known 
issue. Indeed, as we will see, it encompasses many aspects of Leibniz’s doctrine, from modal-
ities to his notion of substance. On the rehabilitation of substantial forms, see the contributions 
collected in Nita (ed. 2015). On modalities, see Schepers (2014), discussed below, and Mugnai 
(2013). On Leibniz’s theory of universals and its relation to medieval theories, see Di Bella 
(2017) and Oliveri (2016: I.2). 
4 In NE 267/A VI 6 267, Leibniz remarks that ideas that distinguish, sc. allow for recognition, 
such as the confused ideas of colors, are not per se distinct, being the criterion for distinct ideas 
the capacity to distinguish marks within the idea (A VI 6 255–6/NE 255–6): “Ainsi quoyque 
selon nous les idées distinctes distinguent l’objet d’un autre; neantmoins comme les claires 
mais confuses en elles mêmes le font aussi, nous nommons distinctes non pas toutes celles qui 
sont bien distinguantes ou qui distinguent les objets mais celles qui sont bien distinguées c’est 
à dire qui sont distinctes en elles mêmes et distinguent dans l’objet les marques qui le font 
connoistre, ce qui en donne l’analyse ou definition; autrement nous les appellons confuses.” 
That images are not reliable in categorizing species is evident from the fact that someone can 
bring a plant from the Indies that looks exactly like another plant we know, and yet the plant 
from the Indies is from a different species. For a discussion of historical theories regarding the 
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The main conclusion of this chapter is twofold. On one hand, the relation between 
types and modalities will prove that the logic of imagination cannot provide agent 
with logical necessity but only with a lower degree of moral certainty. This obser-
vation has important implications for what we argued in the foregoing chapter. Hav-
ing expanded Leibniz’s empirical principle, we have argued for another reason why 
Leibniz’s philosophy of mind, and more specifically his theory of intentionality, are 
committed to a pre-conceptual form of knowledge. Indeed, it is this that explains 
why Leibniz thinks that both human and non-human animals share a gray area of 
knowledge. This kind of knowledge is close to being rational. It is, however, distinct 
from properly rational processes, which, on my understanding, require concepts, or 
what Leibniz calls “distinct notions”, resting upon intellectual principles. The logic 
of the imagination that we have highlighted thus far does not rest upon intellectual 
principles (sect. 4). It is this claim for which I will argue in this chapter. The work 
laid down in this chapter will furthermore serve to explain how cognizant agents 
learn types (chapter VI), while helping to clarify why types fall short of conceptual 
knowledge (chapter VII). 
1. FIRST-ORDER COHERENCE AND ITS LIMITS 
First-order coherence is necessary but not sufficient in accounting for why cogni-
zant agents are able to distinguish between real and fictional phenomena. To flesh 
out Leibniz’s argument, we must consider the relation between first-order coher-
ence and what Leibniz calls a “world”. Whenever we feel suspicious in experienc-
ing a phenomenon, such as if we were to see a flying hippogryph, our reaction 
would amount to a pre-conceptual evaluation of the phenomenon as unfit for the 
world. A world is not something we can experience in its totality: it is the appre-
hension, by the agent, of phenomena as regularly connected. This apprehension 
rests upon cognizant agents’ capacity for considering the world as composed of 
beings whose modifications correspond to states of the world from which other 
states follow. In this way, cognizant agents are almost always in the business of 
evaluating new phenomena as either being fit or unfit for the world in which they 
live. The imagination is involved in this process insofar as it contributes to con-
structing the idea of a world and, thereto, in evaluating the conformity of objects 
and events as being compatible or incompatible with parts of the world. 
Leibniz defines “world” (“mundus”) as “the aggregate of all bodies, which, if 
it is infinite, is not one being as an infinite straight line or the biggest number (nu-
merus maximum) is not [one being L.O.]” (Omnes cognitabile est vel ens, vel non-
ens, A VI 4 B 1509). The world – considered as the totality or aggregate of bodies 
– contains bodies insofar as it contains the past, present, and future states of bodies. 
Past and future states do not exist unless there also exist cognizant agents who con-
ceive of the present as connected to the past and future. Therefore, the world is ideal 















































142 V. First- and Second-Order Coherence II: Modalities and Types 
Prior in time is what is incompatible with the position of something else, and it is simpler than 
this. The other one is said posterious in time. Simultaneous are those things whose supposition 
is co-necessary, a supposition which is posited by the series of things. Time is an imaginary 
being, as it is space, qualities, and many others. We know  because of the unifomity of change 
whether one is prior, or posterior, but as many different changes are simultaneously uniform, 
there is a cause for that simultaneity and priority: clocks indeed do not determine priority and 
posteriority; they just point at them (Definitiones notionum metaphysicarum atque logicarum, 
A VI 4 A 629). 
The gist of this passage is that cognizant agents determine the priority and posteri-
ority of states in virtue of the connections thereby established between states, and 
not simply because clocks mark out the succession of events in time. The composi-
tion of states, as categorized into prior, simultaneous, and successive states (for 
which we require the notion of causation that produces this order) is a world.  
The notion of a world, as that of a body, requires the capacity, on the part of 
the cognizant agent, to represent bodily states as compatible in both their synchro-
nous and diachronous existence. What does this mean? It means, for instance, that 
my left hand cannot simultaneously be both open and closed, as in a fist. These two 
states cannot be simultaneous parts of a world as modifications of the same body 
(my hand). They can, at most, be diachronic states. Cognizant agents expect the 
hand to be modified in one way or another – not both simultaneously. By the same 
token, a mug can be five inches above the table because I am holding it in my hand. 
If I open my hand, then I expect the mug to fall because I see the mug and hand as 
connected. Indeed, insofar as the mug is in my hand, the hand and the mug are a 
compositum, that is, two parts of a composite body, respectively determined by 
compatible and incompatible states. To illustrate, the suspended mug while my hand 
is open constitutes an incompatible combination. When Leibniz says that we have 
a notion of a world, he does not mean that we have to presently imagine all the 
states that exist in a given moment of the world. He simply means that we have 
rules for isolating local conditions, considering them as connected to other states 
and events, and as fitting into a more general structure, which is provided first of 
all by space and time. However, while necessary for constructing the notion of a 
world (construed as an ordered totality of phenomena), space and time are insuffi-
cient for isolating the necessary preconditions for beings’ states, as well as their 
connections to other states, as we are going to argue. 
The general notion of a world is further distinguished into a world in general 
and a world “with respect to us and our place”, viz. the actual world as conceived 
in accordance with the cognizant agent’s viewpoint. The actual world is divided 
into transidereus (beyond the stars), and sidereus (the visible, or aspectabilis). The 
latter is constituted by parts: coelus and tellus (Omnes cognitabile est vel ens, vel 
non-ens, A VI 4 B 1509). The visible, actual world therefore “consists of more solid 
and coherent bodies, of elongated bodies like stars […] of liquids” (ibid.). Moreo-
ver, in Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae, Leibniz claims that:  
The collection of all bodies that are conceived (intelliguntur) as being in space, i.e. those that 
have mutual situation, is called the world, and there are various states of the world at various 















































 1. First-Order Coherence and its Limits 143 
for physics to treat, so that from present states we may infer past and future ones to life’s ad-
vantage. For he who can finally make predictions with success must be said to make progress 
in nature. (A VI 4 B 1399/LoC 242 translation slightly modified) 
Here, “a world” is an ideal object of cognition that collects all bodies and their 
states into a whole. As such, a world is neither something given in experience, nor 
something we really imagine. It is rather an ability of a cognizant agent to consider 
experienced bodies as collections of states; objects that must furthermore fit into a 
bigger picture, with both synchronous and diachronous aspects, that is, as parts of 
a whole. As we have seen, the basic structure of a world is given spatiotemporally 
insofar as these structuring conditions enable the construction of connections be-
tween bodily states. Therefore, the notion of a world is related to the topic of pre-
diction, and, consequently, to both imaginary and real phenomena, as Leibniz 
claims in On the Method of Distinguishing between Real and Imaginary Phenom-
ena. Here, he affirms that even if the visible world were a well-ordered dream or 
phantasm, we could nonetheless claim its reality if we had a way of predicting phe-
nomena: 
Yet the most powerful criterion of the reality of phenomena, sufficient even by itself, is success 
in predicting future phenomena from past and present ones, whether that prediction is based 
upon a reason, upon a hypothesis that was previously successful, or upon the customary con-
sistency of things as observed previously. Indeed, even if this whole life were said to be only a 
dream, and the visible world only a phantasm, I should call this dream or this phantasm real 
enough if we were never deceived by it when we make good use of reason. […] [A]ny phe-
nomena which conflict with those that we judge to be real, and likewise those whose fallacy 
we can understand from their causes, are merely apparent (A VI 4 B 1503/L 644). 
Reality regards existence in the actual world. If real phenomena are those phenom-
ena that may (although they do not necessarily) exist in the actual world, then we 
can be said to have an idea of the actual world if and only if we have ways of pre-
dicting and expecting possible features of this world. This prediction may be based 
on reasons or hypotheses (that is, propositional forms of knowledge that are based 
on logical inference). Otherwise, it can hinge on “the customary nature of things”, 
as Leibniz claims in his closing remarks about the hippogryph. Let us recall this 
passage in the light of what we have argued thus far: 
A phenomenon will be coherent when it consists of many phenomena, for which a reason can 
be given either within themselves or by some sufficiently simple hypothesis common to them; 
next, it is coherent if it conforms to (consuetudinem servat) the customary nature of other phe-
nomena which have repeatedly occurred to us, so that its parts have the same position, order, 
and outcome in relation to the phenomenon which similar phenomena have had. Otherwise 
phenomena would be suspect, for if we were to see men moving through the air astride the 
hippogryph of Ariostus, it would, I believe, make us uncertain whether we were dreaming or 
awake. (L 363–4/ A VI 4 B 1502; my italics) 
As we argued in chapter III, Leibniz’s reference to “customary nature” in connec-
tion to the parts and movements of a phenomenon suggests that these kinds of pre-
diction rest on the logic of the imagination, which apprehends perceptible wholes 















































144 V. First- and Second-Order Coherence II: Modalities and Types 
analysis by inspecting the role that similarity and comparison play (vis-à-vis previ-
ous phenomena and the idea of a world) as cognitive prerequisites for such predic-
tions. In order to predict and expect, cognizant agents must be capable of breaking 
the world down into its constituent parts – individuals and their modifications col-
lected into types – while still considering those parts as limbs of an ordered whole.5  
The idea of a world is, hence, a complex phenomenon implying the capacity to 
imagine phenomena as connected and ordered by rules, the most basic of which are 
spatiotemporal, governing the physical movements of bodies.6 Even when cogni-
zant agents only implicitly know the rules by which phenomena behave (for neither 
a child nor a dog has any clear understanding of space and time, but they are still 
capable of predicting events), that they follow those rules is evident, on Leibniz’s 
view. This is because they manifest attitudes and expectations towards phenomena 
and their states, which accordingly guide their actions.7 Space and time, as very 
 
5 As I have argued, the dialectic between wholes and parts is derived from the Platonic idea of 
discursive reason, which structures each degree of knowledge, as described in MKTI (what 
Leibniz calls “perfect intuitive knowledge”). Roughly, the point is that to achieve any form of 
knowledge, a cognizant agent must be capable of analysis and synthesis as co-dependent mo-
ments, in “seeing” the whole while considering the part, and “seeing” the part while considering 
the whole. In this way, the mind is in the business of recognition, distinction, and order, which 
are required for clear and distinct knowledge. See Oliveri (2020). 
6 Given the scope of this chapter, I can remain neutral on how we are to understand a world. One 
reason for this is that the notion of “world” implied here is one that finite minds can form. It is 
not the notion of a metaphysically-possible world, as in the mind of God. Furthermore, even if 
we can distinguish three main approaches among scholars on what a world is, none of these 
interpretations denies that the notion of a world requires connections of some sort, whereby 
those connections are ruled by laws (whether logical, physical, or metaphysical), as each inter-
pretation respectively claims. Logical approaches claim that worlds are sets of compossible 
individuals and states, insofar as conjunctions of those individuals and states do not produce a 
contradiction (Rescher 1979; Mates, 1986). Compossibility is hence modelled on possibility as 
the absence of contradiction. Other scholars (e.g., Hintikka, 1975; Wilson, 2014) object that 
the notion of compossibility as the absence of contradiction is not appropriate for capturing 
compossibility. Compossibility regards the compatibility of individuals and events based on 
physical laws that govern the world. According to a given set of laws, there will be events that 
can be part of the world, and events that cannot. Packing strategies (McDonough, 2010), on the 
contrary, reject both logical and lawful approaches, and assume that worlds are collections of 
substances. The more substances the world entails, the more perfection the world exhibits. This 
collection has nothing to do with laws, only with the basic properties of substances. We can 
compare substances to tiles that must fit into a given space (the world). Those tiles are compat-
ible insofar as they tesselate within the given space. Even though McDonough’s point is rather 
intuitive, I still do not understand how a tile can fit into a space determined by other tiles if 
there are not certain rules governing their relations, even if they are simply the geometrical 
rules of space and time. Despite these differences in interpreting what kind of connections are 
proper to the notion of a world, none of these interpretations denies that the notion of world 
entails connections of some sort.  
7 The topic of affects or passions – e.g., suspicion, love, fear – as conative/cognitive attitudes 
that shape cognizant agents’ responses to worldly and non-worldly oriented states, has as-yet 
not received due attention among Leibniz scholars, although it was a common topic for early 















































 2. First-Order Coherence and Modalities 145 
general rules inhering in sense-perception, explain why we consider bodies as being 
in agreement in space, as well as for appearing successively. Therefore, if we can 
imagine a world as a collection of bodies and their states, then this representation 
rests on first-order coherence.  
While space and time are decisive indicators of the reality of phenomena, they 
alone cannot explain the sense of suspicion that cognizant agents would feel were 
they to see a hippogryph. Owing to this, space and time cannot alone account for 
predictions and the reality of phenomena as part of the actual world. Why? Because, 
based alone on spatiotemporal rules, a flying hippogryph is possible, compatible, 
and coherent with spatiotemporal rules. For, I can well imagine it moving coher-
ently with space and time. Thus, first-order coherence cannot be the reason for our 
suspicion towards certain phenomena. If whatever I imagine is spatiotemporally 
coherent, then space and time alone cannot provide reasons for why what I imagine 
cannot be part of the world. Such phenomena are only impossible if we take into 
account something exceeding merely spatiotemporal constraints, viz. its coherence 
or compossibility with the types of phenomena that exist, or may exist, in the actual 
world. This is what Leibniz calls the “customary nature of things”.  
To understand second-order coherence, we need to clarify the relation between 
spatiotemporal constraints and Leibniz’s theory of modality, showing thereby that, 
while first-order coherence provides some constraints, these are inapposite for cap-
turing phenomena’s respective reality or fictionality. In experiencing the incoher-
ence of a certain phenomenon, I consider the phenomenon incompatible (sc. impos-
sible) with a set of phenomena that I consider proper to the actual world. This sort 
of impossibility – I argue – is physical and weaker than logical impossibility. This 
is because it rests on hypothetical necessity, not logical necessity. Spatiotemporal 
coherence is to existence what contradiction is to true propositions: a mere condi-
tion of their possibility, not a proof of their existence/truth.8 
2. FIRST-ORDER COHERENCE AND MODALITIES 
The topic of coherence in relation to an actual world raises the question of the kind 
of modality involved in connecting phenomena through predictions and expecta-
tions, which is based on imagination. In his letter, The Elements of Geometry of the 
Duke of Bourgundy, Leibniz evaluates the relation between spatiotemporal rules 
and eternal truths: 
Uniformly ordered continuity [space and time, L.O.], although it is only a supposition, forms 
the basis of eternal truths and necessary knowledge, and is the object of the divine understand-
ing, whose rays illuminate our understanding too. It is no more a substance or actual thing 
outside the mind than is abstract and ideal number, and yet time and space ground sciences 
made up of truths which act as rules for existing things, since the divine understanding, whose 
 
1.2–5). For Leibniz on love, see Leinkauf ([2004: 275–301] 2012); Brown (2011) and Golden-
baum (2009). 















































146 V. First- and Second-Order Coherence II: Modalities and Types 
objects they are, is the source of existing things (Leibniz to Sophie, 31 October 1705 LSS 329/II 
4 353). 
Space and time, which are the conditions of ideal continuity, can ground the sci-
ences because they act as rules for connecting existing things, as well as providing 
a basis for eternal truths. In On the Method of Distinguishing Real from Imaginary 
Phenomena, Leibniz clarifies that predictions based on hypotheses, and on “the 
customary nature of things”, cannot provide metaphysical certainty because they 
cannot be demonstrated via a reduction ad absurdum: 
We must admit it to be true that the criteria for real phenomena thus far offered, even when 
taken together, are not demonstrative, even though they have the greatest probability; or to 
speak popularly, that they provide a moral certainty but do not establish a metaphysical cer-
tainty, so that to affirm the contrary would involve a contradiction. (L 644/A VI 4 B 1503) 
To explain why predictions are only probable, and why the logic of the imagination 
cannot provide knowledge of eternal truths (and thereby no metaphysical certainty, 
only moral certainty), we have to first look into Leibniz’s project of reforming mo-
dality.  
Leibniz thought of modalities as distinguished into four interrelated, yet fairly 
distinct, notions, which form two couplets: possibility-impossibility; and contin-
gency-necessity.9 The first couplet is framed in logical terms: possibility consists 
in whatever does not entail a contradiction, and, consequently, can exist. Whatever 
entails a contradiction is logically impossible, and therefore cannot exist neces-
sarily. Logical possibility is therefore the condition for possible existence, and is 
related to the second couplet, which is framed in existential terms: whatever exists, 
but whose non-existence can nonetheless be conceived without contradiction, is 
contingent; whatever exists, but whose non-existence cannot be conceived without 
contradiction, is necessary.10  
 
9 Schepers (2014: 18–41) insists on this distinction, which has been routinely overlooked in the 
literature. Despite the lack of scholarly attention to this distinction, it is relevant because im-
possibility is a strong kind of necessity, viz. logical necessity, albeit only one form of it. There 
are, furthermore, metaphysical necessity and physical necessity, the latter being weaker than 
the former. Metaphysical necessity is weaker than logical necessity but stronger than physical 
necessity. On Leibniz’s notion of modality, see also important works by Poser (1969: 436–51) 
and (2016); on modality see also Nachtomy (2011) and Bender (2016). 
10 A VI 4 865: “Possibile est quod non implicat contradictionem, c on t i nge ns quod non esse 
non implicat contradictionem. Impossibile quod implicat. Necessarium quod non esse implicat 
contradictionem.” A VI 3 126–7 (trans. Nachtomy, “Leibniz’s Theory of Modality”, in The 
Continuum Companion to Leibniz, ed. Look C., Brandon (London/New York: Continuum, 
2011) 163): “Necessarium ergo illud vocabo, cuius oppositum implicat contradictionem, seu 
intelligi clare non potest; Ita necessarium est ter tria esse novem, sed non est necessarium me 
loqui, aut peccare. Possum enim intelligi esse Ego etsi non intelligar esse loquens, sed ter tria 
intelligi quae non sint novem, est ter tria esse, quae ter tria non sint, quod implicat, idque nu-
meratio, id est reductio utriusque termini in definitionem, unitates scilicet, ostendit. Contingen-
tia sunt, quae necessaria non sunt. Possibilia sunt, quae non est necessarium non esse. Impos-
sibilia sunt, quae possibilia non sunt, vel brevius: Possibile est, quod intelligi potest, id est (ne 
























































The first couplet is the strongest, in epistemological terms, because it is intrinsically 
related to logical necessity. The logical couplet typically concerns propositions and 
holds that, if denying a proposition yields a contradiction, then it follows that the 
proposition is a necessary truth. Leibniz was adamant that there is a set of necessary 
truths that rests on the logical couplet. Identity is a necessary truth, for instance, 
because denying an identity claim yields a contradiction. However, on Leibniz’s 
understanding of modality, there is another notion of impossibility that is related to 
existence. According to this kind of modality, in supposing the existence of a set of 
things or conditions, we can deduce the existence or non-existence of something 
else. Contrary to logical impossibility, the supposed thing or event is not impossible 
per se: it rests on the principle of sufficient reason, which means that the denial of 
existence does not yield a contradiction. It is therefore impossible only on the sup-
position that something else exists, and that this is connected to existence either 
empirically or by way of reason:11 
Absolute necessity is when we cannot conceive of a thing otherwise, as it implies a contradic-
tion in terms, e.g., three times three equals ten. Hypothetical necessity is when we can conceive 
of a thing otherwise per se, but per accidens, if other things outside it are presupposed, it is 
necessary, e.g., it was necessary that Juda would have sinned, if we assumed that God had 
foreseen it[,] or (vel) if we assumed that this Juda was considered to be the best. The series of 
things is not necessary of absolute necessity. Many other series are indeed possible, which is 
conceivable (intelligibiles), as from this act [of conceiving L.O.] their “execution” does not 
follow. (A VI 4 B 1377) 
Logical necessity differs from hypothetical necessity. In virtue of the difference 
between necessity and impossibility (the former capturing logical relations, the lat-
ter existential connections), other worlds are possible. This split notion is therefore 
crucial for resisting necessitarianism, that is, the idea that the actual, existent world 
 
quod possibile non est. Necessarium cuius oppositum impossibile est, Contingens cuius oppo-
situm possibile est.” 
11 Di Bella (2005: 67–95) reconstructs a terminological cluster deployed by Leibniz to capture 






















































148 V. First- and Second-Order Coherence II: Modalities and Types 
is the only possible world. In freeing the notion of possibility from that of existence, 
thereby rendering it merely logical and distinct from contingency, Leibniz hoped to 
provide a framework for arguing for the (logical) possibility of infinite possible 
worlds: whatever finite human minds can conceive of without contradiction can 
exist regardless of existential conditions.12 The conceivability of other possible 
worlds can provide a premise to argue for the contingency of the actual world, and 
hence for God’s freedom in choosing the world.  
I shall now reconstruct this argument according to Schepers (2014: 3–18), who 
presents the transformation of the two couplets from Aristotle’s De Interpretatione 
and Metaphysics through Scholastic authors, such as Thomas Aquinas, Roger Ba-
con, and Abelard. As Schepers argues, the very distinction between contingent and 
possible stems from logical treatises concerning entailment. What we learn from 
his reconstruction is that a neat separation of possible from contingent (the former 
defined by logical relations, the latter by temporal relations of existence, i.e., intra-
world connections), allows Leibniz to treat necessity and contingency as formally 
equivalent. Anything that exists can be considered as contingent per se, because its 
non-existence does not produce a contradiction, as well as hypothetically necessary, 
since, on any given set of premises, we have sufficient conditions to infer the thing’s 
existence with a certain degree of necessity.13 Thus, the actual world is both con-
tingent and necessary (Schepers, 2014: 18–41). As Schepers further notes, this ac-
count of modality paves the way for a more fine-grained treatment of truth: when 
dealing with contingent truths, the same thing might and might not have been; it is 
simply more or less probable.14 
 
12 GP III 573–74: “le seul meilleur existe, mais non pas que le seul meilleur soit possible, ou bien 
c’est changer la signification des Termes. J’appele possible tout ce qui est parfaitement conce-
vable, et qui a par consequent une essence, une idée: sans considerer, si le reste des choses luy 
permet de devenir existant.” 
13 Interestingly enough, Schepers (2014: 18–41) begins his contribution by observing that Leib-
niz’s theory of modality and notion of contingency seems to challenge the idea that everything 
is either true or false: tertium non datur. Schepers deny that this is the case for Leibniz, and he 
is right. Nonetheless, we can say that, from the perspective of the finite, human mind, Leibniz’s 
epistemology of modality opens up a gray area of probable events that are either true or false, 
in strict logical terms, although they are not parts of the world. Therefore, the chief task of 
Leibniz’s epistemology consists in “an investigation of the conditions that enable human beings 
to acquire them” (Bolton, 2016). 
14 To prove that probable truth were among Leibniz’s main concerns, consider that, in presenting 
his universal language to Herzog Johann Friedrich in Februar(?) 1679, Leibniz stresses (among 
the many advantages of the calculus) its utility in helping us to achieve truth not only in those 
fields where we can rely on “raisonnement, par une espece de calcul infallible”, but also in 
what is simply probable: “Car par la nous pourrions estimer les degrés de probabilité, ce qui 
est une chose également importante et negligée dans la morale et dans les affaires” (A I 2 122). 
Similarly, during the Fall of the same year, Leibniz writes (L 260): “We need a new logic in 
order to know degrees of probability, since this is necessary in judging the proofs of matters of 
fact and of morals, where there are unusually good reasons on both sides and we are concerned 
only to know on which side to tip the scales. But the art of weighing probabilities is not yet 















































 2. First-Order Coherence and Modalities 149 
Given this framework, the argument runs as follows. Cognizant agents can imagine 
states of affairs without having experienced them. I can imagine myself not writing 
this book, for instance. A possible non-existing state of affairs can be considered 
part of another non-existent, yet possible, world. Therefore, other worlds are possi-
ble. For God could choose between many different worlds, each of them well-
formed and internally consistent, but He must have a reason to create only one 
world. God’s reason is that only the best possible world can exist. God chooses the 
best among all possible worlds because – given His goodness and goals – there is 
only one world that fits the description of being the best world. The other worlds 
are simply incompatible with God’s goals, although they are not in contradiction 
with God’s understanding. Insofar as other worlds are still logically possible and 
capable of existence, God is not forced to choose the best. He would be forced to 
choose the best, as Leibniz argues, if the best world were also the only logically 
possible world, such as would be the case on the necessitarian theory (where possi-
ble is declined in temporal terms and rendered equivalent to the series of things that 
have existed, do exist, or will exist). Hence, the proposition “God could have not 
not-chosen the best of all possible world” is morally, but not logically, necessary. 
It is logically possible and contingent; therefore, it is not impossible.15 We can sur-
mise that Leibniz simply distinguishes between the true and the good. What is good 
regards existence and is not determined by logical rules alone. That which is alone 
determined by logical rules are abstracta. Identity and contradiction, as we shall 
soon see, concern concepts and abstract essences; what exists is only compatible 
with logical principles. Thus, whether or not we accept the foregoing argument, we 
can nevertheless appreciate the impact that a split-notion of necessity has on epis-
temology, as well as on the human mind’s employment of modal arguments. This 
is because the distinction produces varieties of both necessity and of the ways that 
minds may conceive of those varieties. 
In De Summa Rerum (1675), the young Leibniz, contrasting what he believed 
to be the widely-held notion of modality, already endorses the split-notion of ne-
cessity. The necessitarian notion of modality conflates what is possible with its tem-
poral understanding: Only what was, is, or will be is possible. 
“Impossible” is a two-fold concept: that which does not have essence, and that which does not 
have existence, i.e., that which neither was, is, nor will be because it is incompatible with God, 
or, with the existence or reason which brings it about that things exist rather than do not exist. 
One must see if it can be proved that there are essences which lack existence, so that it cannot 
 
management of business.” The idea of estimating the “degree of probability” was much-dis-
cussed in Leibniz’s time, and goes back to the mathematical work of Pascal and Bernuoille. It 
is further reflected in Leibniz’s mathematical work, especially regarding the establishment of 
a national pension system. 
15 As Schepers (2014: 14–41) observes, what is decisive for the success of Leibniz’s argument is 
the formal/logical equivalence of contingency and necessity. God does not choose what he 
wills, like Descartes’ God, but what he understands to be best. Owing to this, his choice is 
















































150 V. First- and Second-Order Coherence II: Modalities and Types 
be said that nothing can be conceived which will not exist at some point in the whole of eternity. 
All things which are, will be, and have been, constitute a whole. Whatever is incompatible with 
what is necessary is impossible. There is a reason which brings it about that this, rather than 
something else, exists. The origin of impossibility is twofold: one from essence, the other from 
existence or positing as actual. (DSR 7/A VI 3 463–4) 
I can conceive of unicorns and yet they do not exist. The fact that I can conceive of 
them is proof of the possibility of the essence “unicorn”.16 I can collect natural ev-
idence that makes me conclude, with some certainty, that unicorns have never ex-
isted and are therefore impossible in the sense of the existent – they were not, are 
not, and will not form part of the chain of beings that populate the actual world. In 
a parallel fashion, there are things whose impossibility I can conclude just from 
considering their essences, and others that I can conclude simply on account of a 
set of conditions obtaining. Consider the following statements: “it is impossible that 
three times three equals ten”; “it is impossible for this fire to burn my hand because 
it is too far away from my hand”. Both are impossibility claims, but, as Leibniz 
suggests, they imply a different variety of impossibility and, hence, necessity. This 
is because the latter statement is only contingently necessary, that is, it offers a 
reason for why the state might not obtain in the world.17 
If I understand Leibniz’s overall point correctly, then things that exist, will ex-
ist, and have existed form a chain that we can label “the actual world”. From the 
point of view of cognizant agents, the world is composed of existing phenomena. 
How can the agent know which phenomena can exist, sc. are real? Leibniz’s answer 
is that the agent has means for predicting which phenomena can fit into the world. 
The cognizant agent learns to connect a set of existing and experienced states to 
other states that follow from that set. This set of phenomena functions as an ante-
cedent in a hypothetical conditional,18 although the kind of connection implied may 
take various forms. For, it may be of a strong kind, that is, resting on reason and 
knowledge of essences; it may be based on a selection of properties considered as 
requisites for the existence of another thing; or they may be merely empirical con-
nections based on an inclination to expect another state when experiencing a given 
one. In any case, it is worth noticing that the antecedent, which is, in all cases, 
something existent, is necessary because “what was done cannot be undone” (DSR 
8/A VI 3 464). The necessity of the antecedent warrants some degree of certainty 
of the consequent, although the likelihood of error depends upon whether the prem-
ises are empirical or a priori: 
However, a human being, insofar as he does not act empirically but rationally, does not rely 
solely on experience, or a posteriori inductions from particular cases, but proceeds a priori on 
the basis of reasons. And this is the difference between a geometer, or one skilled in analysis, 
and an ordinary user of arithmetic teaching children, who learn arithmetical rules by rote but 
 
16 In a letter to an unknown correspondent (October 1707; forthcoming in II 5), Leibniz clarifies 
that all species exist in God’s mind as an ordered chain of distinct ideas. We will discuss this 
topic in the next chapter. A similar idea is also proffered in NE 307; 474/A VI 6 307; 474. 
17 For a discussion of necessity in relation to contingent necessary truths, see Bolton (2016). 















































 2. First-Order Coherence and Modalities 151 
do not know the reason for them and consequently cannot decide questions that depart from 
what they are used to; such is the difference between the empirical and the rational, between 
the inferences of beasts and the reasoning of human beings. For even if we experience many 
successive examples, we still are never confident of lasting success, unless we discover neces-
sary reasons, from which we may conclude that the matter cannot be regarded differently. Thus 
brutes (as far as we can observe) do not acquire knowledge of the universality of propositions, 
because they do not understand the ground of necessity. And even if empirics are sometimes 
led by inductions to universally true propositions, this nonetheless happens only accidentally, 
not by the force of entailment (RSB § 14/Dutens 232). 
To summarize, cognizant agents have various resources for connecting things and 
events whose knowledge requires empirical data. The means used to reach stable 
predictions affects degrees of certainty, and thereby the kind of necessity the con-
nection involves. A cognizant agent’s degree of certainty regarding their predictions 
impacts their practical life insofar as they tend to plan their actions in accordance 
with those predictions, as well as in accordance with the degree of probability of 
their expectations. The more successful cognizant agents are in making predictions, 
and the more they can be said to know the actual world and what can exist, the 
better they can act. De Summa Rerum expresses this very thought in arguing that 
“existence” is not simply “to be sensed”: things exist that “are consistent, or that 
our predictions about them are true, as our predictions of eclipses […] We appear 
to prove their existence insofar as they follow from our sensations as either a nec-
essary or a probable consequence” (DSR 8/A VI 3 464). The foregoing reference to 
the eclipse is one of Leibniz’s favored examples for explaining the distinction be-
tween simple empirical knowledge – such as when we expect the sun to rise – and 
scientific knowledge. Our prediction of an eclipse is indeed the result of a geomet-
rical and mathematical calculation based on the existence of certain entities and 
their states: the sun; the earth; the moon; and the sun’s revolution. Mere empirical 
relations become necessary to our understanding via a translation or expression of 
those entities’ existence and relations, known via experience. The first translation 
consists in a geometrical representation of the solar system (geodic bodies that 
move regularly in elliptical orbits), and then, by virtue of this translation into geo-
metrical objects, into a mathematical calculus predicting movement. Let us not for-
get what Leibniz says to this end: “Physics is subordinated to arithmetic or algebra 
insofar as it concerns magnitude; to geometry insofar as it concerns situation; to 
metaphysics insofar as it concerns resistance, i.e. action and passion” (A VI 4 B 
1394/LoC 242). Through expression, the necessity of the prediction is warranted 
by the formality of the calculus and the geometrical means for making the predic-
tion. Since the connections within the calculus are necessary as warranted by logical 
principles (such as identity and contradiction), if we predict the eclipse in virtue of 
a calculus, then the degree of necessity of the prediction cleaves closer to logical 
necessity.19  
 
19 As Leibniz explains at A VI 6 478–9/NE 478–9: “Je tiens que l’invention de la forme des 
syllogismes est une des plus belles de l’esprit humain, et même, des plus considerables. C’est 















































152 V. First- and Second-Order Coherence II: Modalities and Types 
This is, however, not the only way to predict phenomena. Indeed, Leibniz refers to 
“things as they follow from our sensations”, the text affirming our capacity to pre-
dict bodily behavior (e.g., we can predict what might follow from a perceived en-
vironmental state) without the deployment of formal-logical or mathematical 
means, which are respectively based on deduction as well as propositional 
knowledge of concepts and essences. Our predictions first achieve a lower degree 
of probability by referring to “the customary nature of things”, which is furthermore 
grounded in the logic of the imagination, which accounts for spatiotemporal rela-
tions between bodies and their parts. After all, the passage’s chief message is that 
existence is more than the mere sense-perception of a being. Rather, it is an implicit 
judgment/expectation that the nature of the being is coherent with the set of phe-
nomena we know to be part of the actual world. It is coherent simply because we 
can form expectations. This does not preclude our having diverse means for con-
necting and predicting states. 
Predictions can rest upon various kinds of necessity that are not of a logical 
kind. The presence of such variety gives us cause to hypothesize that, regarding the 
order of discoveries (about which we will elaborate shortly), cognizant agents may 
access some degree of modal reasoning without full-blown logical understanding 
of the logical modal couplet and, thereby, of necessary truths. In other words, we 
can grasp some form of contingency/necessity based on imagination and experi-
ence. This knowledge, however, is not equivalent to that of a stronger logical/met-
aphysical kind. If space and time are insufficient for determining phenomenal con-
nections, then the imagination must rely on other constraints that permit the interi-
orization of things’ common natures. 
3. SECOND-ORDER COHERENCE AND ITS CONSTRAINTS 
Although first-order coherence is not sufficient for distinguishing between real and 
imaginary phenomena, the consideration of what can exist vis-à-vis space and time 
allows us to deduce those other constraints of the imagination: sameness; differ-
ence; and similarity. These constraints – which are parasitic upon space, time, and 
causation – are involved in the interiorization of more specific types of bodies. 
We have argued thus far that space and time are involved whenever we segment 
two bodies by enclosing them into a shape. We saw from our analysis in chapter II 
that segmenting shapes corresponds to the act of coperceiving bodies and making 
 
dire, qu’un art d’infaillibilité y est contenu, pourvû qu’on sache et qu’on puisse s’en bien servir, 
ce qui n’est pas toujours permis. Or il faut savoir que par les argumens en forme, je n’entends 
pas seulement cette maniere scholastique d’argumenter dont on se sert dans les Colleges, mais 
tout raisonnement qui conclut par la force de la forme, et où l’on n’a besoin de suppléer aucun 
article. De sorte qu’un Sorites, un autre tissu de syllogismes qui evite la repetition, même un 
compte bien dressé, un calcul d’Algebre, une analyse des infinitesimales, me seront à peu prés 
des argumens en forme; parce que leur forme de raisonner a esté prédemontrée, en sorte qu’on 















































 3. Second-Order Coherence and its Constraints 153 
them available for qualitative and quantitative comparison. In so doing, we see that 
two bodies are similar or dissimilar with respect to quality or size, or congruent, 
which is when their borders perfectly overlap. I would now like to focus on what 
Leibniz says about the apprehension of perfect congruency. This will help us to 
deduce constraints constituting second-order coherence: 
Now with the aid of time and place we can also distinguish individuals, and decide which are 
the same and which are different; for example, if I have to eggs in front of me that are similar 
and equal throughout, and I want to distinguish them, we must either make some mark on them 
by which they will be rendered dissimilar, or we collect them together in some fixed place, for 
example, with one above and the other below; or finally, if they are to be left free, or if some-
thing allows them to move, as when they are floating in water, then it remains only to follow 
their movement with the eye, which appears a succession in time changing situation, and we 
certainly never find the same body simultaneously in different places, nor from one place in 
another if it does not go through intermedium situations. Furthermore, the collection of all bod-
ies that are understood to be in space, i.e., those that have mutual situation, is called a world, 
and there are various states of the world at various times.  (A VI 4 B 1397/LoC 243 translation 
slightly changed)  
Spatiotemporal rules dictate how things may or may not exist, giving us a glimpse 
into how things can or cannot possibly exist. Two bodies, although they might ap-
pear similar, while being co-perceived (sc. apprehended simultaneously in sense-
perception as occupying two different places) cannot but consist in two distinct 
bodies, not one and the same body. By the same token, the same body that occupies 
two different positions at the same time is considered impossible because the agent 
does not conceive of it as one and the same body.20  
From these reflections regarding what first-order coherence permits us to im-
agine, we can deduce that there is at least one necessary truth we cannot learn on 
account of the imagination alone: identity and contradiction. For, whatever is sense-
perceived as occupying a different position in space at the same time is apprehended 
by the imagination as always distinct from any other coperceived body. Indeed, if 
all acts of the imagination rest on coperception: the act of comparing two, perfectly-
alike bodies is never sufficient for inferring that the two bodies are one and the 
same. Neither can one infer identity from experience, i.e., coperceptibility cannot 
be the act by which cognizant agents apprehend identity relations. The kind of 
sameness the imagination accounts for is sameness as either coincidence or as per-
manence over continuous change.  
Sameness as coincidence, and difference as non-coincidence, are respectively 
matters of the phenomenal presentation of shapes and the overlap of their borders. 
Coincidence is therefore related to geometrical similarity, that is, to something we 
can visualize. Consider what Leibniz writes in the paper Elementa Nova Matheos 
 
20 I would like to stress that Leibniz has in mind concrete beings, like two leaves, not abstract 
mathematical entities. It can surely be the case that I draw two circles on a paper, perfectly 
alike, and consider them to be identical. Nonetheless, I need to draw two circles and sense-
perceive the two figures, which are distinct on the paper. To exist as images, they need to be 















































154 V. First- and Second-Order Coherence II: Modalities and Types 
Universalis after having argued that different, simultaneous locations of two, per-
fectly-alike things constitutes a valid epistemic criterion for their distinct existence: 
When also things do not differ even in number, so they differ by chance in our expression or 
they appear different from different respects, these are said to be coincident. In this way, the 
ellipsis sectioned from the cone coincides with the ellipsis sectioned from the cylinder, and this 
appears evident when the cone and the cylinder are conceived to cut themselves obliquely. (A 
VI 4 A 514–15)  
Sameness and difference are principles distinct from identity and contradiction, as 
the latter ground conceptual containment.21 Indeed, only the latter constitutes prin-
ciples for structuring thought and grounding necessary truths; thought does not con-
sist in the sensory presentation of phenomena, but in the propositional apprehension 
of essences. Owing to this, we can add to the list of spatiotemporal constraints, 
which govern the imagination, the grounds for second-order coherence. These con-
straints must be understood as limits on the imagination when dealing with existing 
phenomena, i.e., what the imagination cannot cognize/imagine vis-à-vis obtaining 
phenomena. These constraints are not necessary principles, however (that is, their 
denial does not produce a contradiction). We cannot imagine two bodies as occu-
pying the same place. We do not know whether it is logically impossible for two 
bodies to occupy the same place. Let us reframe these limits more positively as 
follows: 
(vi) Difference: whichever two bodies the mind apprehends simultaneously in space are appre-
hended as different and distinct, i.e., as two;  
(vii) Sameness: whatever body the mind apprehends as moving continuously is apprehended 
by the mind as being the same;  
(viii) Similarity and dissimilarity: two bodies, which are coperceived as having the same shape 
or being congruent, are considered to be similar or the same insofar as their borders coincide.  
That which can or cannot be imagined as existing depends on how that which be-
comes apparent via sense-perception is then processed in accordance with spatio-
temporal constraints, as outlined in (i)–(v) (see chapter IV), and furthermore ac-
cording to the above-listed second-order constraints. The capacity to imagine is re-
lated to modality insofar as imagining is the act by which agents can expect and 
predict what will or will not exist.  
The constraints on the imagination that we have deduced point to an important 
tenet within Leibniz’s theory of imagination. Imaginative processes do not directly 
rely on the principles of identity and contradiction. Indeed, this is the reason why 
the imagination may lead us astray, causing us to believe contradictions. Contin-
gency, as something that is in agreement with spatiotemporal rules, and possibility, 
as that which is contradiction-free, rest upon distinct principles: sameness/differ-
ence, on the one hand, and identity/contradiction, on the other. The connection be-
tween possibility and contingency is established by the fact that whatever exists, 
 
21 Mugnai (2016) and Rabouin (2018) have argued for a distinction between these two notions of 















































 3. Second-Order Coherence and its Constraints 155 
whether necessarily or contingently, cannot but be contradiction-free. However, not 
everything that is free from contradiction actually exists. To prove that identity and 
contradiction cannot be derived from the empirical concepts of sameness and dif-
ference, consider Leibniz’s reply to Locke, who, by contrast, believes it to be pos-
sible to abstract the principles of contradiction and identity from the proposition, 
“the same is not the different”: 
I cannot really see how the proposition the same is not the different is the origin of the principle 
of contradiction, and “easier” than it: for it appears to me that one goes further in asserting that 
A is not B than in saying that A is not non-A; and it is because B contains non-A that A is 
prevented from being B. Furthermore, the proposition that the sweet is not the bitter is not 
“innate” in the sense we have given to the term “innate truth”; for the sensations of sweet and 
bitter come from the outer senses, so that the proposition is a mixed conclusion (hybrida con-
clusio), in which the axiom is applied to a sensible truth. But as for the proposition “the square 
is not the circle”: it might be called innate, for in thinking it one applies the principle of con-
tradiction to materials which the understanding itself provides, as soon as one becomes aware 
that these ideas – which are innate – contain incompatible notions (NE 82–3/A VI 6 82–3).   
This is, to be sure, a complex passage, and it is difficult to appreciate the extent to 
which it brings grist to our mill. So, let me explain how we should understand it. 
Leibniz here distinguishes the proposition “the same is not the different” from the 
principle of contradiction, “A is not non-A”. This is because, he claims, the former 
is thornier than the latter. “A is not non-A” is “easier” than “A is not B” because it 
is self-evident and simple. “Easier” here must be read as meaning ‘simpler’ or ‘less 
complex’, as suggested by the rest of the passage regarding conceptual containment. 
When we say that two things are the same, or that they are different, we convey 
more than a claim regarding self-identity, i.e., the fact that there are two things (A 
and B), rather than one – these two things being non-identical. As illustrated by the 
example of the square and the circle, Leibniz argues for the distinction of the two 
principles from the perspective of conceptual containment. Leibniz’s explanation 
is that if we analyze B (a concept, like SQUARE), then we will find out that B 
contains a conceptual mark, C, that remains in contradiction with another concep-
tual mark of, A, where A is another concept, like CIRCLE. B, however, contains 
many other conceptual marks, e.g., D, E, and G. Therefore, saying “A is not B” 
means more than “A is not non-A.”  
Non-A is contained in B in the sense that B has conceptual marks that remain 
in contradiction with the conceptual marks of A: A has no-C (sc. “no angles”) and 
B has 4C (sc. “four angles”) amongst its characteristic marks. Therefore, contradic-
tion is produced not by visualizing A and B as different but rather by analyzing the 
two concepts into conceptual marks that are mutually-exclusive: “has four angles” 
means “has angles”, while “absence of angles” means “has no angles”. “A is not 
non-A”, or “the circle is not non-circle”, is therefore simpler than saying “the square 
(B) is not the circle (A).”  
Moreover, the proposition “the square is not the circle” is innate, Leibniz ar-
gues, because it rests analytically on the principle of contradiction. Indeed, it pre-
supposes it. It is moreover because the concepts are innate: CIRCLE and SQUARE 















































156 V. First- and Second-Order Coherence II: Modalities and Types 
us to comprehend the sense in which these concepts are innate, but I shall leave that 
discussion for chapter IX. The important aspect for our present discussion is that, if 
the rational agent is capable of decomposing both concepts to find conceptual 
marks that contradict one another, then the cognizant agent can be said to have a 
concept.  
Leibniz’s appraisal of the simplicity of intellectual principles, such as identity 
and contradiction, is especially informative when read with regard to his distinction 
between the order of discovery, i.e., the temporal and developmental order accord-
ing to which a subject discovers and acquires truths, and a natural order of 
knowledge, i.e., the logical and epistemic dependence of truths and propositions on 
intellectual principles independently of their order of discovery. Furthermore, re-
garding the order of discovery, more complex knowledge is related to sense-per-
ception. Owing to this, a subject’s attention is attained even before she acquires the 
capacity to attend to more abstract and intellectual principles: 
The truths that we start by being aware of are indeed particular ones, just as we start with the 
coarsest and most composite ideas. But that doesn’t alter the fact that in the order of nature the 
simplest comes first, and that the reasons for particular truths rest wholly on the more general 
ones of which they are mere instances. And when one wants to think about what is in us im-
plicitly, before all awareness, it is right to start with the simplest. For general principles enter 
into our thoughts, serving as their inner core and as their mortar. Even if we give no thought to 
them, they are necessary for thought, as muscles and tendons are for walking. The mind relies 
on these principles constantly; but it does not find it so easy to sort them out and to command 
a distinct view of each of them separately, for that requires great attention to what it is doing, 
and the unreflective majority are hardly capable of that (NE 83–4/A VI 6 83–4). 
This means that the proposition “the same is not the different” can be apprehended 
before the proposition “A is not non-A”, the former being primary in the order of 
discovery. However, the former proposition is not equivalent to contradiction. Alt-
hough things that are different are so because they have parts that remain in contra-
diction, saying that two things are different is not tantamount to saying in what 
respect those two things are in contradiction. In the logical order, then, the principle 
of sameness and difference depends logically on contradiction only insofar as, for 
any two distinct things, if we can provide an analysis of the conceptual marks com-
posing the concepts respectively associated with those things, then we are, perhaps, 
capable of locating those contradictory marks. 
Although analytical understanding of difference depends on the principle of 
contradiction in the natural order of knowledge, rational subjects can understand 
and apprehend two things as being different before they are able to give reasons to 
explain their differences. From this perspective, truths about facts, such as “the 
sweet is not the bitter”, can be elevated to a degree of necessity even if only in virtue 
of a “mixed conclusion”, which rests on both sensory apprehension and certain in-
nate ideas.22  
A “mixed conclusion”, as I understand it, consists in an implicit judgment about 
the difference between two things or properties apprehended as different through 
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non-logical, non-analytic means, which is then expressed as being different through 
logical and analytical means, such as language.  
Thus, in seeing a square and a circle drawn onto a piece of paper, for instance, 
we apprehend them as different owing to the logic of the imagination: we are capa-
ble of apprehending the two shapes as different in an act of coperception. The shape 
therefore functions as a reason insofar as it sense-perceptually expresses what is 
later made analytically distinct via certain conceptual intensions: the presence or 
absence of angles. Only when we finally have more analytic reasons to see why the 
circle is not the square, we thereby also apprehend the necessity of the statement 
“the square is not the circle.” This truth is said to be innate on Leibniz’s view, and 
is opposed to the example of the sweet and the bitter, because the concepts 
SQUARE and CIRCLE are not derived from experience, while suit and bitter are.  
In like fashion, we can distinguish the sweet and the bitter on account of sense-
perceiving them as different. In tasting the sweetness of a pineapple and the bitter-
ness of a lemon, we can tell the two sensations apart. However, to consider sweet-
ness and bitterness as general properties instantiated by diverse bodies, more is re-
quired, viz. identity and contradiction. This is why the conclusion is mixed.  
Sweet and bitter are, for Leibniz, sensations of the confused kind. This means, 
amongst other things, that they cannot be analyzed into further conceptual marks, 
as with the concepts of CIRCLE and SQUARE. Therefore, our reasons for distin-
guishing between them is owing to differences we experience in sense-perception. 
As I have argued elsewhere (Oliveri, 2016a), despite the contents of sensations be-
ing unanalyzable, cognizant agents can form, and denominate, general notions of 
sensations. However, the fact that we have a name for general notions still fails to 
provide us with concepts. The act of distinguishing conceptual marks within the 
content is necessary for having a clear and distinct notion, which is a concept, and 
this act differs from distinguishing extended parts into a whole.23 Yet, rational 
agents deal with them as if they were concepts because they are represented by 
means of general names. We have general names for them in the same way as we 
have general names for “man” or “chair” or “circle”. In giving sensations a general 
name, we treat them as ideal entities: as something over and above their inherence 
in concrete existing bodies, and hence as abstract and general essences that deter-
mine what sweetness and what bitterness are. When we form the proposition, “the 
sweet is not the bitter”, sweet and bitter operate as abstract names, and, in dealing 
with abstracts, we enter the ideal realm of essences, as governed by the logical prin-
ciples of contradiction and identity.24  
 
23 I think it is, following NE 267/A VI 6 267. Scholars usually feel more liberal on this point, 
arguing that generality of content is sufficient for having a concept. Bolton (2011b) argues that 
sensations are concepts, but they are not distinct (a similar view is proffered by Barth (2017)). 
This disagreement is, however, irrelevant to point at stake. The only important aspect here is 
that we cannot distinguish within the content of sensations, a point on which scholars are unan-
imous. 
24 In Oliveri (2016a), I argue that we do not have a concept for sensation: we rather have a name 















































158 V. First- and Second-Order Coherence II: Modalities and Types 
If this separation between imaginative and logical principles is correct, then imagi-
natively-grounded forms of reasoning are performed in agreement with, and yet 
independently of, an explicit grasp of logical-propositional forms of reasoning and 
inference, whilst also allowing for forms of pre-conceptual relations and connec-
tions among phenomena. Imaginative forms of reasoning do not amount to thought, 
for this requires logical forms of reasoning that are based on concepts. Concepts 
require conceptual containment and hence identity and contradiction. If ‘logical’ 
means whatever affords the stable knowledge of necessity, then they are not the 
only source of knowledge.  
Thus, sameness, difference, and similarity structure the imagination in perform-
ing its groundwork of segmenting shapes and apprehending perceptible wholes. 
Through these synthetic acts, the imagination spontaneously compares wholes, tak-
ing them as being the same and different in terms of shape and size, i.e., something 
perceptible as the sweet and bitter, or the square and the circle. Moreover, the con-
tinuity of space and time guarantees that the imagination further apprehends the 
successive changes of a body as changes of the same body thanks to its moving 
through continuous transformations. The continuous movements can be appre-
hended as such because shape is used for considering the body to be the same body. 
At each moment, the body does not change shape. If it does, as when I take a tomato 
and turn it around, these changes amount to continuous transformations in compli-
ance with geometrical-perspectival laws. In this way, the consistency, or coherence, 
of changes explains why one is able to track the movements of a tomato and take 
them as changes of the same body, even if the tomato changes shape. This moreover 
explains why one would be surprised if the tomato suddenly turned into a red 
square. In experiencing a sudden discontinuous change, one would doubt whether 
the thing experienced remained the same.  
Sameness, difference, and similarity – along with spatiotemporal rules and as-
sociative causation – act as constraints on the imagination. Indeed, they are im-
portant because they give us a framework for overcoming the limits of spatiotem-
poral constraints as grounding first-order coherence. The spatiotemporal logic of 
the imagination is required for determining the set of things that can exist qua em-
bodied. Indeed, this grounds first-order coherence. However, the set of things that 
can exist per se is wider than the set of things that can exist in the actual world. The 
former set allows for “unicorns”, “hippogryphs”, and “heavy bodies moving up-
wards when suspended in the air”, but these are not part of the set of things that can 
exist in the actual world. While these phenomena are imaginable with regard to 
first-order coherence – that is, they cohere with space and time – a cognizant agent 
has no such phenomenal expectations in the actual world.  
 
were a concept. However, what we have is simply a general name that refers to instances of 
sensations. Recognition and generality alone are not sufficient marks of conceptual knowledge, 
for which we require distinctness, or the analysis of notions into intensions. For a different 
















































 4. Conclusion 159 
It is at this level that Leibniz introduces the notion of coherence to the customary 
nature of phenomena. Only when we consider the common nature of the type 
“body” can we say that bodies – as they customarily behave in the actual world, and 
of which we have experience in virtue of sense-perception and the constraints on 
the imagination – do not move upwards when suspended in the air. When we con-
sider the world to be a totality of the types of things that can actually exist, we do 
not expect to see hippogryphs and unicorns. We do, however, expect glass to fall 
and shatter when dropped from a height.   
In other words, sameness, similarity and difference are used to interiorize what 
types of bodies there are and to recognize presently perceived bodies as types. Only 
when one has the ability to recognize a body as an instance of a type, one can also 
locate that type in a world and form more detailed predictions of how that body will 
interact with other presently co-perceived bodies. The next chapter will provide an 
analysis of how types are interiorized. 
4. CONCLUSION 
First-order coherence, which is based on spatiotemporal constraints alone, is insuf-
ficient for capturing the notion of coherence to which Leibniz refers in the context 
of distinguishing between real and fictional phenomena. This is to say that space 
and time ground a first-order coherence. There is then a second-order coherence, 
which is parasitic upon space and time, and is moreover grounded on other imagi-
native constraints, viz. sameness, difference, and similarity. These further con-
straints allow the cognizant agent to capture things’ nature and interiorize things as 
types. Through the filter of types, cognizant agents determine the set of things that 
can exist as natural phenomena in the actual world, owing to which they rightfully 
expect and predict what kinds of phenomena – given a set of experiential conditions 
– can or cannot form part of the actual world. 
Having now fortified our understanding of the logic of the imagination and its 





























































































VI. SIMILARITY, MOVEMENT, AND THE INTERIORIZATION 
OF TYPES 
What we have described thus far – especially through chapters II to V – are the 
three moments that constitute the development of a cognizant agent’s apprehension 
of their perceptual environment. The first moment consists in the exercise of agents’ 
synthetic capacity to segment sensations – which are afforded by the senses – into 
shapes. In so doing, individual beings are expressed as perceptible wholes. As ex-
plained in chapter II, perceptible wholes consist in an amalgam of sensations, and 
therefore constitute a kind of confused perception, which must become distinct.  
The process by which confused perceptions of perceptible wholes become dis-
tinguished or distinct perceptions constitutes the second moment. This consists in 
tracking perceptible wholes through spatiotemporal variations, which involves 
comparing them in acts of coperception, thanks to which wholes may appear close 
to one another in space at the same time. Spatiotemporal tracking is the basis to 
apprehend wholes as bodies, that is as sets of states that are compatible or incom-
patible with other states of the world. This framework allows cognizant agents to 
compare beings as similar or dissimilar, owing to which they can start performing 
various associative activities, and through which they are able to store information 
about how a body (qua an expression of a nature common to many individuals) 
changes. By apprehending the common nature of various phenomena, cognizant 
agents interiorize types.  
Types represent the third moment in a process of sensory apprehension by cog-
nizant agents. Types are abilities for considering actually-experienced phenomena 
as instances of a class of phenomena that are associated in virtue of their similarity. 
This association of phenomena enables cognizant agents to recall information, as 
well as form expectations of how a phenomenon may change from one situation (t1) 
to another (t2). On account of this process, originally-confused perceptible wholes 
become a distinct kind of perception because (i) the cognizant agent learns to dis-
tinguish between the relevant parts and properties of phenomena qua phenomenon 
of that type; (ii) this distinction within the phenomenon enables the cognizant agent 
to form expectations and predictions; and (iii) the cognizant agent forms an idea of 
a world, through which she learns to see phenomena as either fitting or not fitting 
parts of the world, whereby “world” can at first be limited to combinations of ex-
perienced phenomena, about which I shall elaborate shortly.   
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part highlights Leibniz’s theory 
of how we learn types and the importance of similarity. The second part addresses 
some difficulties raised by his theory.  
Part one is dedicated to similarity and argue that cognizant agents’ capacity to 















































162 VI. Similarity, Movement, and the Interiorization of Types 
ualization of things’ common nature (sect. 1). It is limited to the sensory apprehen-
sion of bodies qua instances of a common nature. The reason why cognizant agents 
first interiorize types for bodies, and only then types for properties, is the imagina-
tion’s proclivity for apprehending shape over other aspects of bodies that are like-
wise imaginatively available. In other words, types are first and foremost ways of 
sorting sense-experienced individuals into similarity classes, and then, through 
comparison, constitute ways of non-conceptually analyzing bodies qua bodily types 
into their constitutive parts and properties. Through a survey of New Essays, I will 
argue that a cognizant agent’s capacity to detect types is exercised spontaneously 
and before her capacity to apprehend individuals (sect. 2). This aspect will turn out 
to be a decisive constrain on the imagination and its combinatoric work, as it 
emerges in the second part. 
Part two highlights why what we called perceptibility is a kind of conceivability 
(sect. 3). In keeping with the idea that there are varieties of necessity, so too are 
there varieties of conceivability that account for the apprehension of relations. In-
deed, types are rooted in the apprehension of beings’ similarity, and hence depend 
on the kind of conceivability Leibniz calls “perceptibility”, i.e., an apprehension of 
sensorially-experienced phenomena as existing. The imagination’s capacity to de-
tect relations constitutes its combinatoric and synthetic character. Therefore, we 
shall move on to the productive nature of the imagination (sect. 4). Despite working 
closely with what the senses put forward in perception, the imagination is a combi-
natoric faculty, which enjoys freedom in its activity of combination. The freedom 
of the imagination consists in drawing inferences by imagining combinations of 
phenomena that it has not yet experienced. However, because the intrinsic sponta-
neity of the imagination may lead cognizant agents astray, they therefore need ex-
perience to enhance their ability to reliably predict real phenomena. The analysis 
put forward in part one will provide an answer to why cognizant agents are mostly 
in the business of re-enacting the past, rather than entertaining new unexperienced 
combination. 
1. HOW DO WE INTERIORIZE TYPES? 
We have argued thus far that a type is an acquired ability to perceive a phenomenon 
in a distinct way. Types are moreover interiorized via the processing of sensory 
experience through the cognizant agent’s innate powers, which we have labelled 
the “logic of the imagination”. The perception that a phenomenon is distinct tran-
spires when either of three conditions obtain: (1) when a cognizant agent is able to 
distinguish parts or properties within the actually sense-perceived phenomenon, 
thereby recognizing the phenomenon as being of a certain type; (2) when a cogni-
zant agent is able to evaluate the phenomenon as either existent (by predicting/ex-
pecting how the phenomenon/its parts are likely to change); or (3) as non-existent, 
namely in being surprised when perceiving a phenomenal change. Distinctly per-
ceiving a phenomenon is more than simply apprehending the appearance of a per-















































 1. How do we Interiorize Types? 163 
We understand under the name of “thing” (res) what appears, or (vel) from this it can be un-
derstood, that, in acknowledging the deception and error, we would say that something ap-
peared, but we nonetheless didn’t have the right to say that it did exist [when it appeared L.O.]. 
The nature of a thing is in the same thing the cause of its appearances. From where the nature 
of a thing differs from its phenomenon as a distinct appearance differs from the confused one; 
as the appearances of the parts differs from the appearances of the situation or (seu) of the 
relations to external things; it differs as the perspective on a plain of a city from the rooftop of 
a tower placed perpendicularly in the middle [of the city] differs from its infinite horizontal 
views which pleases in diverse ways the eyes of the travelers arriving from one or the other 
venue of the city. This similarity is suitably strong for understanding the distinction between 
nature and accidents. (Specimen demonstrationum de natura rerum ex phenomenis A VI 2 303–
4/L 142 slightly modified) 
The beginning of this passage harmonizes nicely with the example of the hippo-
gryph that we read in On the Method of Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phe-
nomena. If one believed for a moment that they had seen a hippogryph, then they 
would still not have the right to claim that that hippogryph exists because its exist-
ence contrasts with other subjectively-held expectations, which respectively rest on 
the nature of the phenomena in relation to the actual world. In short, simple appear-
ance is no sufficient criterion to claim something’s existence, which in turn rests on 
the apprehension of the thing’s nature. As Leibniz remarks, nature is “the cause of 
the appearances”, and, in describing it, he invokes the metaphor of a city and its 
multiple views. Each appearance is simply one of many perspectives on the city, 
while the nature of a phenomenon corresponds to perceiving the connections be-
tween those appearances, such as when we observe the city from the top of a tower. 
Leibniz is so fond of the similitude between these viewpoints and the city-map that 
he employs the analogy multiple times in highlighting the relation between nature 
and its accidents, essences and nominal definitions (NE 294), and God’s epistemic 
relation to the world and the mind’s epistemic relation to it (Monadology; PNG). 
All of these uses hinge upon Leibniz’s notion of expression, insofar as one item 
(whether nature, a real essence, or God) expresses the totality and unity of a multi-
tude (multiple appearances, an infinite number of nominal essences, the world). 
Types, as interiorized capacities to recognize things’ natures, are nothing but cog-
nizant agents’ acquired abilities to reach the metaphorical rooftop of the tower from 
which they can visualize the connections and structures of a city that is otherwise 
only partially given in sense-perception. This ability consists in unifying or synthe-
tizing phenomenal appearances by apprehending them as multiple manifestations 
of the same, common nature. Thus, in explaining how we interiorize types, I shall 
also provide an answer for how cognizant agents reach the top of the tower. I pro-
ceed in two parts. First, I outline what I take to be Leibniz’s theory regarding how 
we learn types. I then bring in textual evidence to corroborate my interpretation. To 
this end, I focus on what Leibniz says about the abstraction of general ideas in the 















































164 VI. Similarity, Movement, and the Interiorization of Types 
2. SIMILARITY AND THE INTERIORIZATION OF TYPES 
The interiorization of types begins with coperceiving beings’ shapes as similar or 
common. Shape is taken as a sign of those individuals’ common nature and func-
tions as a sign for associating changes in movements and properties over time to a 
shape taken typical of a class of individuals. In experiencing a constant and habitual 
association between a shape and the ways in which a perceptible whole changes, 
the cognizant agent’s memory stores pieces of information associated with that 
shape. The more a cognizant agent experiences, the more she enhances her 
knowledge of things’ nature, and thereby the more accurately she recognizes, pre-
dicts, and expects phenomenal change. On this view, cognizant agents apprehend 
types for concrete beings and individuals before (or concomitantly with) types for 
properties. 
To illustrate, let us imagine a child,1 or someone in an early phase of life, sitting 
in a room where there are objects of three different shapes: cubes; spheres; and 
cylinders. There are many cylinders, cubes, and spheres, and all differ between one 
another in terms of size, color, tactile qualities, and materials. If we want to explain 
how the child interiorizes types for cylinders, cubes, and spheres, then we should 
tell the following story. First, the child segments bodies by detecting their shapes. 
Each shape is an appearance of a complex whole; it is never isolated. Shapes are 
always given in a complex act of co-perceiving other bodies and their shapes. The 
reason why bodily shape grabs the attention over other aspects of the body is that 
shape is more distinct than other sensations and because it provides the child with 
a unity, as we argued in chapters I and II. Shapes are furthermore subject to other 
imaginative constraints, especially similarity. As a constraint on the imagination, 
similarity spontaneously causes the child to compare shapes’ appearances, and pay 
more attention to those that resemble one another. Moreover, in grasping the body 
and moving it, the child learns to associate sensations provided by other sense-or-
gans – touch, taste, and sound – to the shape. Its ability to track the shape as the 
same, homogeneously-moving body, while also comparing bodies to one another, 
allows the child to further distinguish parts and properties within the shape, and 
associate, the shape’s various states and movements. The tracking of shapes is in-
teriorized as a body having states that differ in time and from the kind of body we 
are dealing with: a sphere rolls, while a cylinder remains at rest (if not acted upon 
by a force). Movements spark attention and are taken as characteristic of the body’s 
shape because they are affine to the fourth dimension of bodies: time. Once this 
connection is established, when perceiving the shape “sphere”, the child expects the 
sphere to roll. 
 
1 Leibniz often compares children to non-human animals, as in Nova methodus discendae 
docendaeque iurisprudentiae, A VI I 269: “Cum autem primis annis infantes parum à brutis 
differant (ratione sese ob defectum experientiae tanquam materiae in qua exerceatur, 
linguaeque seu symbolorum per quae exercentur, parum adhuc exerente), et pueri quoque 
















































2. Similarity and the Interiorization of Types 165 
If the child learns to associate types of movement with types of shape (rather than 
to, say, the tactile qualities of the body), then this is because the association between 
rolling and the shape constitutes a more constant association than that which exists 
between its ability to roll and its tactile qualities. Spheres will roll regardless of 
whether they are rough or smooth. And so, through comparison, the child learns 
that two bodies may have different shapes and proportions. In comparing them, the 
child further learns that modifications in each shapes’ quantity can occur without 
there also being modifications in quality. A cylinder, for instance, may change size 
without changing shape. 
What I have described thus far simply repeats what Leibniz says in describing the 
logic of the imagination, as in Elements of a new mathesis (A VI 4 A 513, quoted 
and discussed in chapter II). Indeed, as Leibniz already held in his Ars Combinato-
ria (1666): “we have also […] a unique way of penetrating into the arena of nature. 
This is because the more one has perceived the parts of a thing, the parts of its parts, 
and their shapes and arrangements, the more perfectly one can be said to know the 
thing”.2 Indeed, even if Leibniz revised his position by arguing that direct experi-
ence of things is insufficient for giving cognizant agents either “perfect knowledge 
of a thing”, or knowledge of the logical necessity that things are subject to, as ar-
gued above, he never denies that exprience is necessary for knowledge of natural 
kind: “the essence of gold is what constitutes it and gives it the sensible qualities 
that let us recognize it and which constitute its nominal definition” (NE 294).3  
2 In De arte combinatoria (1666) A VI 1 187–8, quoted and translated in Mugnai (2017: 177). 
3 See also MKTI, A VI 4 A 589–90/L 293: “a posteriori vero, cum rem actu existere experimur, 















































166 VI. Similarity, Movement, and the Interiorization of Types 
Therefore, in tracking bodies via their shapes (and thereto their similarity or dis-
similarity, i.e., their observable qualities), the child cancels out inequalities between 
perceptible properties, and, in so doing, interiorizes a type for the class of similar 
things. In other words, she learns that there are bodies in her environment that con-
form with, or are similar to, a cylinder-type and others that are similar to a cube-
type (which are hence dissimilar from a cylinder-type). A type is not an image, but 
more abstractly a kind of skeletal or deep-body-structure that makes a body a body 
of a certain type because it is the expression of a formal cause (viz. inner constitu-
tion). In detecting a common shape and its qualities, cognizant agents track a formal 
cause or a substantial form. Through this, an agent can interiorize a type as the 
expression of a common cause, that is the nature common to similar things.  
How can we say that someone possesses a type? Because in sense-experiencing 
an actual body, they expect changes accordingly to the type of body. The disposition 
to expect certain changes over others signifies that the agent recognizes the thing 
as a certain type of thing. In seeing a sphere, for instance, the child has a type insofar 
as the detection of a shape disposes her to expect certain changes but not others. 
The child, for instance, expects the sphere to roll when placed on an inclined plane 
but not to roll when submerged in water – expectations she would not have in per-
ceiving a cube. Moreover, only when an agent learns to distinguish one body-type 
from another, thereby forming associative expectations of that body-type, does the 
agent begin to compare different bodies qua types, owing to which she is able to 
distinguish between typical and accidental changes. A lemon is expected to be yel-
low and a tomato red. Human bodies typically have two arms and two legs, while 
snails do not. In comparing bodies and finding differences between them, the child 
analyzes bodies into parts and properties and, in so doing, she abstracts those parts 
and properties from the whole to which they belong and considers them as such. In 
this way, she acquires types for parts and properties, too. For these become elements 
that constitute corporeal substances, which can be recombined and rearranged by 
the imagination thanks to its productive and reproductive spontaneity (more on this 
soon).  
The process outlined above implies a dialectic between similarity and differ-
ence. Similarity between bodily shapes predominates because similitude grasps the 
agent’s attention more than dissimilarity. Even if I do not have a type for tomatoes, 
my attention is nevertheless grasped by a similarity of shape when I see two toma-
toes. If I do have a type for tomatoes, then, in seeing two tomatoes – one violet and 
 
cognitio adaequata, habetur et cognitio possibilitatis a priori; perducta enim analysi ad finem, 
si nulla apparet contradictio, utique notio possibilis est. An vero unquam ab hominibus perfecta 
institui possit analysis notionum, sive an ad prima possibilia ac notiones irresolubiles, sive 
(quod eodem redit) ipsa absoluta Attributa Dei, nempe causas primas atque ultimam rerum 
rationem, cogitationes suas reducere possint, nunc quidem definire non ausim. Plerumque con-
tenti sumus, notionum quarundam realitatem experientia didicisse, unde postea alias componi-
















































 3. Similarity, Abstraction, and General Notions 167 
one red – my attention is sparked by the violet color of the first tomato. This pre-
ponderance of similarity over dissimilarity in interiorizing types qua an expression 
of things’ common natures is decisive for making sense of a few pages in the NE 
where Leibniz discusses (vis-à-vis Locke) the origins of general names. It is there-
fore a passage that offers a textual basis for corroborating what we have argued thus 
far.4  
3. SIMILARITY, ABSTRACTION, AND GENERAL NOTIONS 
Despite his declared goal of discussing general names, the discussion in Book III 
of the New Essays on Human Understanding – Leibniz’s critical response to 
Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding – focuses on the abstraction 
of a general idea to which a name is then appended. The context of the discussion 
is relevant because it is in this text that Leibniz aims to resist the new empiricist 
philosophy, according to which all our knowledge can be derived from experiential 
data provided by the senses. Within an empiricist framework, the role played by the 
similarity of shapes, as well as the frequency of experiential data and associations 
that constitute habits, are decisive aspects in the explanation of how minds abstract 
general notions. Surprisingly enough, Leibniz does not dismiss the importance of 
similarity and habits in making contrasts between his and Locke’s theory. Indeed, 
he ascribes to them a different value that is afforded by a different way of under-
standing abstraction.  
On Locke’s account, abstraction is an operation of the reflexive mind which, in 
experiencing many similar individuals, distinguishes and abstracts properties com-
mon to the class to which those individuals belong. Abstraction for Locke therefore 
operates in virtue of similarity.5 Those properties are then gathered into a general 
idea, to which the mind gives a name. In the act of abstracting and giving a name, 
the idea becomes general, and so too does the name. “Man” is a general name be-
cause it is a sign of a general idea enclosing qualities like “being rational”, “being 
an animal”, “having two legs”, and “being capable of laughter”.  
Although Leibniz agrees with Locke’s overall thesis, viz. that names are gen-
eral because they signify general notions,6 Leibniz and Locke disagree on the pre-
cise process by which general notions are abstracted. While, for Locke, abstraction 
proceeds through an analysis of individual properties, and then the synthesis of 
 
4 I outlined a similar analysis already in Oliveri (2016) and Oliveri (2016a). Both works, how-
ever, lack the analysis of types that I offer here. Indeed, the analysis provided here is decisive 
for fully understanding the passage. 
5 As a further proof, consider the discussion in A VI 6 234–5/NE 234–5, in which Leibniz and 
Locke discuss whether we would recognize as “man” an animal, like a parrot, that shows ra-
tionality, although we would be inclined to call a “man” an animal of the shape of a human 
being that nonetheless does not show any sign of rationality. 
6 The term “idea” must here be understood as a “notion” or “concept”, viz. an intentional, mental 















































168 VI. Similarity, Movement, and the Interiorization of Types 
common properties into a general idea, Leibniz, by contrast, tells a different cogni-
tive story; one that moves from synthesis to an analysis of things in terms of their 
parts and properties. Synthesis is, for Leibniz, easier than analysis.7 
As we have outlined thus far, the groundwork of the imagination is to synthetize 
an amalgam of sensations into perceptible wholes, that is, shapes as having a size. 
Concrete beings are therefore given in experience as the appearances of shapes. 
We further argued that perceptible wholes are mere appearances when they are not 
objects of distinct perception. Recall that having distinct perceptions requires cog-
nizant agents to undertake a process of comparing wholes and then to apprehend 
them as similar. Since the imagination is first and foremost sensitive to shapes’ 
similarities, the imagination is spontaneously driven to collect individuals based on 
the similarity of shapes. Therefore, on whatever the imagination exercises its cog-
nitive powers, the result is a synthesis of properties and parts into a shape, or of 
individuals into a class. This is because shape is spontaneously taken by the imagi-
nation as exemplary of a class of individuals. More specifically, when a cognizant 
agent is presented with a multitude of similar individuals, she spontaneously takes 
the shape as a sign of something more general that the individuals share, viz. a 
common nature.  
Agents’ cognitive states essentially rest on generality. Indeed, Leibniz rebuts 
Locke (who claims that general names are an improvement of language) in claiming 
that they are “required for their [languages’] essential structure” (NE 275). In the 
remainder of Book III Ch. 1–3, Leibniz gathers his observations about the constitu-
tion of languages with the aim of refuting Locke’s claim that we begin abstraction 
thanks to being directed to ideas of individuals. That we do not have ideas of indi-
viduals, Leibniz argues, emerges from an etymological analysis of proper names. 
Proper names have their origins in general names, which are used as an appellative 
or distinctive mark for that individual. Brutus, for instance, is given his name as a 
distinction for his stupidity, while Caesar takes his name from the fact that he was 
born via an incision.8 What this observation points to is that, if we had ideas of 
individuals before those of general entities, then nomination should reflect this or-
der and proceed from proper to general names. But etymology shows that the cor-
rect order is the other way around: we first have names of general entities before 
we have the names of individuals. Therefore, we cognize generality before individ-
uality. When we say that abstraction begins with particular things, particulars are 
not individuals because, if they were, as Leibniz notes, then: 
we would not be able to say anything. This is because new ones are being encountered at every 
moment – new individuals and accidents and (what we talk about most) actions. But if by ‘par-
ticular things’ you mean the lowest species (species infimae), then, apart from the fact that it is 
often difficult to determine them, it is obvious that they are themselves universals, founded on 
similarity. And then, since it is just a matter of more or less widespread similarity, depending 
 
7 See De arte inveniendi in generale, A VI 4 A 358. 
8 See NE 275/A VI 6 275 and NE 289/A VI 6 289. Here, Leibniz argues that etymological re-
search on proper names proves that proper names originally are general terms. They are latterly 















































 3. Similarity, Abstraction, and General Notions 169 
on whether one is speaking of genera or of species, it is natural to mark all sorts of similarities 
or agreements, and thus to employ terms having every degree of generality. (NE 275/A VI 6 
275; my italics) 
There is a cognitive reason why agents do not begin abstracting from ideas of indi-
viduals. If they did, then ideas of individuals would need to be present already to 
cognizant agents as particular mereological compounds of qualities. Since every 
individual is unique, individuals will be a unique compound of qualities. If individ-
uals were given as unique mereological compounds of qualities, and if generality 
were the product of a process, which began by comparing mereologically-unique 
compounds (which, from the very beginning, were apprehended as bearers of a 
multitude of particular qualities that are constantly changing), then cognizant 
agents would simply be overwhelmed by the differences manifested by individuals, 
even when they compared individuals of the same class. Cognizant agents would 
fall into a state of insurmountable stupor – similar to that of stupefied souls deprived 
of cognitive filters, as explained in chapter IV. “We would be able to say nothing”, 
Leibniz remarks in the quoted passage. His solution is to reframe the notion of ab-
straction thus: 
I do not deny that abstractions are used in that way, but it involves an ascent from species to 
genera rather than from individuals to species. You see, paradoxical as it may seem, it is im-
possible for us to know individuals or to find any way of determining the individuality of any-
thing except by keeping hold of the thing itself. For any set of circumstances could recur, with 
tiny differences which we would not take in; and place and time, far from being determinants 
by themselves, must themselves be determined by the things they contain. The most important 
point in this is that individuality involves infinity, and only someone who is capable of grasping 
the infinite could know the principle of individuation of a given thing. (NE 289–90/A VI 6 
289–90) 
We are now familiar with the idea that in order to determine a particular sensory 
content, such as a color or tactile sensation, we do so only “by keeping hold of the 
thing”, viz. by actually experiencing the color or tactile modification. We also know 
that this kind of knowledge is confused. This means that it does not present any 
distinction between parts and properties. Therefore, when Leibniz says that “it is 
impossible for us to know individuals or to find any way of determining the indi-
viduality of anything except by keeping hold of the thing itself”, I interpret this 
passage as saying that an individual, such as Peter or Claire, can be distinguished 
insofar as we have a sensory presentation of either Peter or Claire, but this presen-
tation is a confused kind of knowledge. It is an appearance: a confused synthesis of 
sensations that is enclosed by a shape, as we described in chapter II. The reason 
why cognizant agents need to first express individuals as perceptible wholes is that 
any particular thing encloses infinity, and infinity cannot be the object of a finite 
mind unless it is expressed via a finite cognitive surrogate. 
Since individuality encloses infinity, if the human mind abstracted, through 
analysis and selection, the common qualities of different individuals, moving on to 
the synthesis of those common qualities into a general idea, then it would be im-
possible for the mind to move forward in the process of abstraction, since the act of 















































170 VI. Similarity, Movement, and the Interiorization of Types 
not be able to consider one thing as being the same over time.9 Indeed, attention 
and memory have so much information to process and compare that it would be 
impossible to tease out resemblances. Even space and time cannot help in the de-
termination of such differences because, qua ideal entities, they are rendered dif-
ferent or alike owing to the things that they contain and are considered different or 
alike.10 
Leibniz’s hint about similarity (and about “an ascent from species to genera”) 
is a reference to the logic of the imagination as reconstructed thus far. Leibniz thinks 
that we begin with something general, from a synthesis of a multitude of traits that 
the agent forms spontaneously, in virtue of her expressive power, like in sense-
perceiving. The synthesis is a shape that functions as a surrogate that she then 
moves to analyze into those parts and properties that make themselves remarkable 
to her cognitive capacities because they occur with more frequency than other traits 
or are more distinct than others. Cognizant agents begin with a general idea of na-
ture, that, to follow the example of how the child learns a general notion “human 
being”, it is found in the specific constitution of their mother and father. A child is 
then able to ascend to more general notions (like “animal”) or descend to individu-
als, albeit with a structured order. To generalize, cognizant agents start by appre-
hending individuals as similar and dissimilar (in virtue of the similarity of shape). 
They can then move onto isolating parts and properties that are typical of those 
individuals. This is because agents apprehend them not as appearances but as phe-
nomena with a common nature, i.e., as sharing a common cause for their appear-
ances. 
Thus, against Locke – who argued that we form ideas of individuals as if they 
were images in our head, and then, by abstracting from space and time (and indeed 
anything particular), we form the general idea MAN, to which we attach a name 
“man” – Leibniz replies: 
When the child proceeds by abstraction from observing the idea of man to observing that of 
animal, he has arrived at the idea of human nature from the more specific idea which he ob-
served in his mother and father and other people. That he had no precise idea of the individual 
is shown by the fact that he could easily be deceived by a moderate resemblance into mistaking 
some other woman for his mother. (NE 290/A VI 6 290) 
In short, the child, in observing the common, outer appearance of her mother or 
father, already has an expression of “human nature”. From the very beginning, the 
child works with an expression of common nature, not an expression of individuals. 
Therefore, in abstracting, she proceeds from a general idea “man” to abstract a ge-
nus as “animal”. She does so by observing outer appearances. This insistence on 
 
9 On this topic, cf. also the paper by Nachtomy (2006). 
10 A VI 6 230/NE 230: “Le precis de l’identité et de la diversité ne consiste donc pas dans le temps 
et dans le lieu, quoiqu’il soit vrai, que la diversité des choses est accompagnée de celle du temps 
ou du lieu, parce qu’ils amenent avec eux des impressions differentes sur la chose. Pour ne 
point dire que c’est plutot par les choses qu’il faut discerner un lieu ou un temps de l’autre: car 
















































 3. Similarity, Abstraction, and General Notions 171 
appearances is relevant to explaining what Leibniz says at the end of the passage: 
the child does not have an idea of the individual, which would imply an idea as a 
sum of mereological properties, which respectively characterize the father or 
mother. 
Proof that the child does not have access to idea of the individual – i.e., a notion 
present in the mind as a bundle of properties that the child is capable of distinguish-
ing in the idea and abstracting away from it – Leibniz argues that the child would 
be deceived in seeing an individual perfectly similar to her father. What does Leib-
niz mean by this? He means that the “idea” is first present as a shape – an image of 
an individual – and that is the reason why, if the child stood before her father’s 
doppelgänger, then she would be deceived by this sense-perception because she 
would expect this man to be her father and act as such. Therefore, the child does 
not compare individuals thanks to their qualities. Rather, they immediately see in-
dividuals as similar in shape, whereby they take the shape to be an expression of 
the common nature of those individuals. Accordingly, abstraction does not consist 
in selecting properties and forming them into general notions, which can then be 
expressed by names. It rather consists in sorting individuals into similarity classes 
and then distinguishing into their general nature properties and parts.  
To summarize, when the child sees many individuals of the same species sim-
ultaneously, she spontaneously notices the similarity of coperceived shapes. This 
similarity inclines the child to take those individuals as individuals of the same class 
to which it can attach a name – whether “human being” or “cat” – and, in so doing, 
the child begins the process of associating differences to the (as-yet confused) gen-
eral notion “human being”. In comparing similar individuals, the child detects dis-
similarities and hence is able to isolate common and contingent parts, properties, 
and changes. In short, the child renders the experienced perceptible whole an expe-
rience of a distinguished kind by interiorizing an associated type. The type has such 
associations thanks to habitual interactions with things of a common nature that are 
detected via shape (we shall elaborate on this shortly). 
It is important to note that the term “general idea”, as used by Leibniz in those 
passages from the NE, is not an image and cannot be consciously entertained. As 
an expression of nature, a general idea is a type, i.e., an interiorized ability to un-
derstand diverse appearances as possible ways that a class of things can or cannot 
be. Possibilities are inferred from the resemblance borne by individuals of that class 
to one another, and types express “possibilities inherent in the resemblances” (NE 
323). Shape therefore functions as a “cognition caeca” – a blind cognition – for 
collecting information and for activating the type. In being presented with a body 
that has the shape of a human, if the child is already acquainted with this type of 
body, then, in seeing the body, she will spontaneously process it as similar to those 
seen previously, and, in so doing, the type is simply activated – recalls stored infor-
mation and saves new one. This recognition of the actually-perceived body as a 
type does not consist in a mental representation. There is no internal mental repre-
sentation over and above the agent’s capacity to believe in the thing’s actual exist-
ence, as manifested by assent to phenomenal appearances and expectations of the 















































172 VI. Similarity, Movement, and the Interiorization of Types 
in the context in which they are perceived, and to act in compliance with one’s 
beliefs and expectations about the thing in question. In this way, the type controls 
attention and memory, rendering them more selective: in seeing a sheet of paper on 
my table, I do not expect it to burn because the conditions in which I experience the 
sheet of paper are not sufficiently like those that I usually experience when I see 
paper burning. Since paper is not associated with fire, I do not expect it to burn. If 
it does, then I am surprised and look upon the phenomenon with suspicion, i.e., in 
need of a reason/explanation. I do not feel suspicious, however, if the paper burns 
when thrown into a fire. Types are so means built by the agent’s capacity to control 
new experienced phenomena by reducing them to known structures. 
Types may also play a role in societal interactions. They for instance extend 
beyond the representation of things’ nature by becoming ways of processing signs. 
Gestures, or things that we say or do, can become expressions or signs of an agent’s 
present state or beliefs. This is because these gestures produce in others expecta-
tions regarding how the gesturing agent may or may not act. Consider a simple 
gesture like waving. When the regular oscillatory movement of the hand becomes 
an expression of “greeting someone”, a peer can learn to recognize the gesture and 
act accordingly. “Waving” is, however, conventional. This is because it changes 
across cultures, meaning that human beings establish it as exemplary or typical of 
the mental state “greeting someone”.11 
Types are also ways of enhancing our proficiency in processing phenomena and 
storing new pieces of information. When a type is active in the way described, new 
experiences thereafter enhance the information stored in typical form. In this way, 
we spot and compare a given, perceived body through the filter of information that 
has been stored from previous experience. This information is presented as normal-
ized behaviors of the body qua type: changes or states the body can or cannot man-
ifest. Thus, in processing an experience as being “normal” or “typical”, we become 
more proficient in detecting non-normalizable, supervening changes. To use an 
analogy, when we acquire types, our experience becomes similar to walking down 
the same road to reach the office every day at the same time. You do not even need 
to pay attention to all the details; a simple glimpse towards a house or a tree is 
sufficient for gaining one’s bearings. Attention and memory are much less stressed 
by sense-experience because the agent expects what she actually experiences. This 
makes her more reactive to unpredictable changes: a fallen tree, or a new color on 
a door, may capture her attention. This is because comparison makes her conscien-
tious about details that differ from prior experience. Our sensitivity to these com-
parative differences is stored in types and becomes spontaneously activated through 
triggering experiences that are grounded in similarity. Consider this passage from 
New Essays, in which Leibniz argues that we implicitly rely on acquired “habi-
tudes”, that is habits translated as dispositions: 
 
11 I outlined Leibniz’s theory of how human peers establish linguistic meaning in Oliveri (2016: 
Part III.1–2), and Oliveri (2016b). On the topic of linguistic meaning, see also Dascal (1987), 















































 3. Similarity, Abstraction, and General Notions 173 
Our gifted author seems to claim that there is nothing implicit in us, in fact nothing of which 
we are not always actually aware. But he cannot hold strictly to this; otherwise his position 
would be too paradoxical, since, again, we are not always aware of our acquired dispositions 
[habitudes] or of the contents of our memory, and they do not even come to our aid whenever 
we need them, though often they come readily to mind when some idle circumstance reminds 
us of them, as when hearing the opening words of a song is enough to bring back the rest. (NE 
53/A VI 6 53) 
Now consider the effect of habits on oblivion and unawareness. In describing the 
work of minute perceptions, Leibniz remarks that: 
when they are combined with others, they nevertheless have their effect and make themselves 
felt, at least confusedly, within the whole. This is how we become so accustomed to the motion 
of a mill or a waterfall, after living beside it for a while, that we pay no heed to it. Not that this 
motion ceases to strike our sense-organs, or that something corresponding to it does not still 
occur in the soul because of the harmony between the soul and the body; but these impressions 
in the soul and the body, lacking the appeal of novelty, are not forceful enough to attract our 
attention and our memory, which are applied only to more compelling objects. Memory is 
needed for attention: when we are not alerted, so to speak, to pay heed to certain of our own 
present perceptions, we allow them to slip by unconsidered and even unnoticed. (NE 53–4/A 
VI 6 53–4; my italics) 
Consider the claim: “memory is required for attention”. Now imagine a world in 
which human beings typically moved by jumping. You would not pay much atten-
tion to a human being jumping once thereby acquainted, because any time the im-
agination encloses a shape that you recognize as a human being, you also remember 
the expected behavior of that type of body. The fact that it jumps is therefore con-
sidered to be typical or normal. Things that are typical do not grasp the attention. 
You would, however, be surprised if a human being in this world suddenly moved 
by walking. “Typical” is therefore what we have been routinely exposed to. What 
we experience as typical does not, however, guarantee that we have a stable grasp 
on the essence of a thing, viz. on how things really are. They are nonetheless nec-
essary for establishing habits and constitute a first glimpse into the nature of things.  
On Leibniz’s account, habit is “an easiness in acting, generally it is asked 
whether there also is a habit in being acted upon? I think so” (A VI 4 B 1434). 
Habitus, moreover, is defined as “an acquired permanent readiness to act” 
(“agendi promptitudinem acquisitam permanentem”) (A VI 1 266). Habitus can 
either be corporeal, such as when we learn to practice an art,12 or intellectual, such 
 
12 Nova methodus A VI I 266: “Studiorum ratio est species quaedam rationis status, id est, modus 
perveniendi ad statum actionum perfectarum. Status autem dicitur Habitus”; Ivi 267: “Subjec-
tum habitus est quicquid actionis capax est.” Ivi 281: “Habitus corporis vel sunt circa actionem 
relinquentem ἀποτέλεσμα, vel sunt facti transeunt. Artes opus relinquentes vel naturam promo-
ventem, applicando agens et patiens, et deinde cessando, uti agricultura, horticultura, ars pas-
torita …” and moreover, the ars medica, ars veterinaria, ars pittorica. However, the body is only 
a medium for the execution of those arts (A VI I 283). Consequently, the soul’s habits are more 
important for humans and those habits hinge on memory, discovery, and judgment (A VI I 















































174 VI. Similarity, Movement, and the Interiorization of Types 
as in performing sciences, or experiencing, as we argued, or using a language.13 A 
habit is a certain acquired disposition of a subject to act, and be acted upon, based 
on the capacity for spotting typical behavior. Indeed, when we recall that action and 
passion are relations among how things exist (more on this soon), we are able to 
understand the extent to which the imagination bears a connection to metaphysics, 
viz. insofar as predicting a change is a way of predicting a change in underlying 
substantial forces and how they are connected to other existing substances, includ-
ing our own. 
Types hence control know-how: in predicting how a body will behave, we act, 
or expect to be acted upon, accordingly. Thus, in seeing a fire, I prescind from 
touching it, or, in seeing ice on the sidewalk, I walk with more care. In this sense, 
types constitute further layers of our mental sieve – to recall the metaphor used in 
commenting on Mariotte’s theory of the mind quoted and discussed in chapter IV. 
The sieve’s metaphorical layers help us to better understand how parts of the world 
can act on us through our own organic bodies. Knowledge of what our body can do, 
as well as what other bodies can do (both kinds of knowledge being stored as types), 
controls memory and attention, rendering these functions spontaneous in selecting 
what to focus on in any given situation. If our reconstruction is correct, then types 
function as filters that enhance cognizant agents’ proficiency in processing infor-
mation and making inferences.  
Despite the range of capacities types account for, they fall short of being con-
cepts, about which we will elaborate in the proceeding chapter. Before moving to 
the distinction between types and concepts, we shall draw some conclusions of dis-
tinct perceptions and provide a reason for why the imagination does not lead us 
systematically astray. 
4. SIMILARITY, ABSTRACTION, GENERAL NOTIONS IN NEW ESSAYS 
Following this long excursus into the logic of the imagination, modality, and its 
relation to existence, we now better understand why conceivability is central to 
Leibniz’s notion of a being. Many of Leibniz’s papers – especially those dealing 
with metaphysical distinctions – connect the notion of being to conceivability: a 
being is what can be conceived distinctly, viz. whose concepts can be conceived 
 
reason have habits, which are further per institutionem (Ibid. “It remains to say about the cause 
of the habits proper of human beings: institution”).   
13 A VI 4 603: “Habitus intellectuales quidam sunt, id est in mente sunt, etiam cum non animad-
vertuntur; experientia, intelligentia, scientia, opinio, ars. Exprimere cogitationes est loqui, do-
cere, discere, interrogare, espondere, etc. Haec omnia etiam intus fieri possunt, sed his adde 
pronuntiare, et scribere quae externa sunt. Hoc est efficere signa quae sunt literae, soni articulati 















































 4. Similarity, Abstraction, General Notions in New Essays 175 
without contradiction.14 When we conceive of a being, we consider it from the per-
spective of an essence expressed through the concept that we form of the being. 
Conceiving is therefore different from both perceiving and the act by which cogni-
zant agents evaluate the possibility of a being’s existence. I report a passage of 
Leibniz re-elaboration of Nova methodus. To help the reader visualizing Leibniz’s 
changes, I will signalize the original, changed text in this way; and what is added 
with bold font. From this, it will emerge an interesting systematic substitution of 
the terms sensus and sensibilitas through perceptio and perceptibilitas. This change 
is consistent with an unpublished list of definitions, where Leibniz claims that “Es-
sence is a distinct cogitability. Existence is a distinct sensibility. I can substitute 
conceptibility and perceptibility to cogitability and sensibility” [Essentia est cogi-
tabilitas distincta. Existentia est sensibilitas distincta, pro cogitabilitate et sensibili-
tate possis substituere conceptibilitatem et perceptibilitatem.]15 The text of Nova 
methodus on Learning and Teaching Jurisprudence is: 
Quicquid autem habet Qualitates sensibiles hujusmodi seu quicquid est sesibile perceptibile, 
illud dicitur Ens, . Et haec est perfectissima Entis definition quae est nominalis quodammodo 
Entis definitio seu ab effectu : quoties enim probare volumus aliquid existere, probamus ex eo 
quo quia nos vel alii sensering vel perceperint, aut ipsummet, sensione immediata; aut saltem 
per aliud, quod sine ipso esse non potest, quae est sensio mediata. Et ex qualitates simul sunte 
 
14 On the Method of Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena (A VI 4 B 1500/L 336): 
“Ens est, cujus conceptus aliquid positivi involvit sive quod a nobis concipi potest, modo id 
quod concipimus sit possibile nec involvat contradictionem, quod cognoscimus tum, si concep-
tus sit perfecte explicatus nihilque involvat confusi, tum compendio, si res actu extiterit, quod 
enim existit utique est Ens vel possibile. Quemadmodum autem Ens explicatur per distinctum 
conceptum, ita Existens per distinctam perceptionem, quod ut melius intelligamus videndum 
est quibus modis existential probetur. ” [A being is that whose concept involves something 
positive or that which can be conceived by us provided what we conceive is possible and in-
volves no contradiction. We know this, first, if the concept is explained perfectly and involves 
nothing confused, but then in a shorter way, if the thing actually exists, since what exists must 
certainly be a being or be possible. Just as being is revealed through a distinct concept, so 
existence is revealed through a distinct perception.] Also see De ente, existente, aliquo, nihilo 
et similibus (1685–6, A VI 4 A 570: “Ens est positivum quod distincte concipi potest. Existens 
est quod distincte percipi potest. […] Res est phaenomenon congruum. Phantasma seu Ap-
parens est phaenomenon incongruum.” [A being is something positive that can be distinctly 
conceived. An existent is what can be distinctly perceived. […] A thing (res) is a congruent 
phenomenon. A phantasm or an appearance is an incongruent phenomenon.] The text is part of 
De abstracto, concreto, substantia, accidente, substantivo, adjectivo, et similibus (1685–6, in 
A VI 4 A 569). We can find the same definitions in another series of metaphysical definitions, 
close to De mutationibus (1705, LH IV, 7C Bl. 85–86. 1 Bog. 2o. 4 Sp in VE VI, 4, N. 55). 
Leibniz begins the text by writing: “Ens est quicquid distincte concipi potest. Existens est quod 
distincte percipi potest.” However, as the critical edition shows, he erases this distinction and 
begins with a definition of “terminus”. Five other, short manuscripts, however, begin with the 
same distinction and their content is very close to De mutationibus, see Metaphysicae Defini-
tiones (1703, LH IV, 7c Bl. 89–95). Another interesting text, which presents the same distinc-
tions, is LH IV 7c Bl. 76. 
15 The text is a pre-edition of VI 5 and it is entailed in: LH IV 8 Bl. 102. 1 Bl. 2o. 1 Sp. According 















































176 VI. Similarity, Movement, and the Interiorization of Types 
(seu imagibilitas) constituunt Essentiam, sensibilitas Existentiam, Ut adeo nostri respectu dici 
possit Essentiam rei nobis esse conceptibilitatem (seu imaginabilitatem) ejus distinctam. 
Existentiam ejus perceptibilitatem (seu sensibilitatem) distinctam. Nempe Qualitatum si-
mul sumtarum compositum seu conceptibilitas constituit rei essentiam ; perceptibilitas 
(ut scilicet per rem non stet quominus actu sentiatur) existentiam ejus probat. Sumitur 
hic autem late sensio et imaginatio, pro omni perceptione et conceptu. (A VI 1, 285/ 
revised version after 1700) 
Translation:  
That which has sensible likewise qualities, or is perceptible, is called a being. This is the most 
perfect definition of being, this is a certain nominal definition of a being, for whenever we wish 
to prove that something is, we do so by the fact that we or others sense or perceive it either in 
itself, by immediate sensation, or mediated by the sensation of something else which cannot be 
without it. Qualities taken together at the same time (or imaginability) constitute essence; sen-
sibility constitutes existence. So, with respect to us it can be said that the essence of a thing 
is for us the distinct conceptibility (or imaginability) of that thing, and the existence the 
distinct perceptibility (or sensibility) of it. Indeed, the compound of the qualities assumed 
simultaneously, that is conceptibility, constitutes the essence of a thing; perceptibility 
proves its existence (as evidently it is not a thing’s fault that it is not actually sensed). We 
assume here sensation and imagination in a broad way for any perception and concept. 
(Partially L 89 and 91) 
From 1667 to 1700 Leibniz decides to change his terminology and “sensation” is 
substituted with perception/perceptibility. Through the years, Leibniz developed 
more fin-grained distinctions between degrees of “perception”, as we argued, and 
perceptibility become a more complex operation of the cognizant agent. Likewise, 
the definition of “being” defined as “the most perfect” in 1677 is now a kind of 
nominal definition, and nonetheless, the distinction between the evaluation of es-
sence and existence is maintained. The act by which a cognizant agent simultane-
ously considers qualities as inhering in an essence and evaluates them as contradic-
tion free is that by which the cognizant agent conceives of a concept (conceptibil-
ity). If, for instance, I simultaneously consider the notion of a square circle, then I 
see that the concept entails a contradiction and is impossible. Remarkably, Leibniz 
also uses the word “imaginability” to label the act by which we evaluate concepts. 
The use of “imaginability” could appear in contradiction to what we have argued 
thus far, viz. that the imagination is involved in the sensory presentation of beings. 
I think, nonetheless, that it is not in tension with what we have said, especially when 
we recall that, in the act of reflecting, the cognizant mind needs an object which 
cannot be an idea of the essence (chapter I). The object of reflection is an expression 
– a cognitive surrogate such as a figure, diagram, word, or indeed anything percep-
tible and therefore imaginable, which encodes information that the mind reflec-
tively extrapolates. Consider, for instance, the string of signs “A is A”, which Leib-
niz uses to express self-identity. In interpreting the string as an identity claim, one 
has to sense-perceive the two As as distinct, and this act falls to the imagination, as 
we have argued. The A before the “is” is not the same as the “A” after the “is”. 
Nevertheless, the sequence taken as a unity is considered an expression of self-
identity, which says “A is identical to A, that is identical to itself”. This is an inter-















































 4. Similarity, Abstraction, General Notions in New Essays 177 
identity is, as well as on habitual or conventional ways of representing identity. That 
very string of signs may have signified something else.  
This is important because it means that figures, diagrams, and words can all 
become vehicles of distinct thoughts, not only of distinct perceptions. That why 
Leibniz remarks at the end that sensation and imagination are assumed broadly to 
cover any perception and concept. This implies that rational minds can also express 
things that are not subject to the imagination by means of imagistic surrogates. Ra-
tional minds deploy imagistic surrogates in order to visualize relations between the 
marks of a concept (as argued in chapter I and as we are going to argue in chapter 
VII). Nonetheless, conceptibility remains an act that is distinct in nature from per-
ceptibility. Perceptibility is the act by which the cognizant agent implicitly assumes 
the existence of a being based on the fact that they actually perceive, or can per-
ceive, that very being as coherent. Consequently, an agent can be said to be in the 
business of conceiving when she considers an essence, but she is in the business of 
perceiving when she considers the existence of a being regardless of the representa-
tive vehicles she deploys in performing these acts. As Leibniz remarks: 
Whatever can be distinctly perceived exists; otherwise it will be a simple appearance. Essence 
is what can be thought distinctly in a thing. Existence is the distinct perceptibility or sensibility 
of a thing. (A VI 4 A 28) 
I think we are now able to understand what “distinct perceptibility” consists in. 
Perceptibility is not a simple apprehension of a thing’s appearance at a given time. 
Rather, acts of perceptibility entail an evaluation of something’s existence, such as 
when a cognizant agent apprehends a body as a type of phenomenon inscribed in a 
world governed by spatiotemporal laws, or where specific types of beings – dogs 
rather than hippogryphs – are expected to exist. Perceptibility does not entail an 
analytic understanding of concepts that express essences. In apprehending the ex-
istence of a dog, a cognizant agent is not in the business of evaluating whether the 
concept DOG is consistent. She perceives the dog, first, as a sensory presentation 
of a body, that is, as a being with parts and properties, which vary in accordance 
with what we have called first- and second-order coherence. The relation between 
possibility and contingency, as explained in the foregoing chapter, is the reason 
why there is a connection between perceptibility and possibility: if something ex-
ists, then it is possible; therefore, a cognizant agent can learn to infer the possibility 
of a concept from the existence of its instances.16 Nevertheless, the act by which a 
cognizant agent apprehends existence, and the act by which she apprehends es-
sences, are distinct. The important aspect that we need to bear in mind is that per-
ceptibility provides knowledge of a clear kind because it accounts for things’ recog-
nition, connection, and prediction. It also accounts for knowledge of a distinguished 
kind, since it allows for mereological distinctions of bodies as whole-parts. In spite 
of this, it does not constitute clear and distinct thought nor, thereby, knowledge of 
 
16 De illatione veritatis atque de terminis (A VI 4 A 1822): “Quod existit est Ens seu Est possibile. 
Existit quod percipitur consentienter seu ita ut non inferat contradictionem cum aliis quae per-















































178 VI. Similarity, Movement, and the Interiorization of Types 
essences, as expressed in virtue of concepts into definitions. Conceptual evaluation 
in fact hinges upon a diverse act of conceivability, viz. what Leibniz calls concep-
tibility, intelligibility, or imaginability, which respectively require contradiction and 
identity, principles that are distinct from those constituting the logic of the imagi-
nation: similarity and difference, as we argued in the foregoing chapter. 
As a consequence of this, we can deduce that these unusual terms – percepti-
bility, imaginability, conceptibility – are invoked to distinguish between various 
intentional objects and the acts by which cognizant agents apprehend them. For, 
perceptibility gives access to bodies qua existents, while conceptibility affords ac-
cess to concepts qua essences. Depending on the object that one is conceiving, the 
cognizant agent may infer diverse kinds of relations to which those objects are sub-
ject, owing to which the agent can attain to different forms of knowledge. Moreo-
ver, conceivability of various kinds is the act by which agents compare a multitude 
of things simultaneously, putting them into relations, which involves attention and, 
therefore, memory: 
A relation is that according to which two things are simultaneously thought. As we say, relation 
is the simultaneous being-thought of things, so action and passion is the simultaneous existence 
of two things. Relations indeed consist in this, that is, some exchange. (A VI 4 A 28) 
To notice (advertere) (i.e., to perceive with attention or with relation to something else) is to 
consider a relation to something else. (A VI 4 A 57)   
There are different kinds of conceivability, each of which accounts for diverse kinds 
of relation, furthermore depending on the kinds of things to which the mind is di-
rected. For instance, the comparison of essences reveals different kinds of relation 
than the comparison between beings qua embodied: 
From the thought of many beings taken together there arises relations or affections of beings. 
From co-imaginability or coessentiality there arises comparison, between same and different, 
similar, dissimilar, and opposite, genus and species, universal and singular. From co-sensibility 
or coexistence there arises connection, between the whole and the part, order, one and many; 
necessary, contingency, connection, and cause, etc. From this grows metaphysics in general, to 
which the doctrine of quantity and quality in their widest sense can be referred in logistics and 
the art of combinations respectively. The former deals with propositions and their calculus (and 
hence with the one and the many, the whole and its parts17), the latter with forms (or similarity 
and orders of determination) (Nova methodus discendae docendaeque jurisprudentiae (revised 
version 1695–1708, A VI 1 284).18 
According to the foregoing quotation, in order to apprehend relations the mind 
needs to perform some act by which many beings are considered together at once. 
The kind of conceivability involved determines both the way in which we conceive 
 
17 The logistics of whole and parts refers to Leibniz’s attempt at a mereological calculus, see 
Mugnai (2017). “Wholes” and “parts” refer here to propositional and conceptual containment 
and not to perceptible wholes, to which Leibniz immediately refers afterwards as “forms” (for-
mae). Therefore, the passage does not contradict what we have said thus far. 
18 The text is a passage from Nova methodus discendae docendaeque jurisprudentiae, partially 















































 4. Similarity, Abstraction, General Notions in New Essays 179 
of something – as a sensory presentation of bodily parts rather than a concept com-
posed of conceptual marks – and the sort of relations the mind can apprehend 
through that act.  
Co-imaginability and co-essentiality are acts by which the mind compares es-
sences, such as when they are judged for their relation vis-à-vis genus and species. 
These mental operations are at work when the mind inspects, for instance, the con-
cept ANIMAL and the species HUMAN BEING, as well as when the mind consid-
ers universality and singularity (for instance, in conceiving of this man as an in-
stance of HUMAN BEING). Coperceptibility is the act by which the mind com-
pares beings and their whole-part relations (order, many, contingency), and causal 
relations. It corresponds to the act of segmenting, comparing, and tracking existing 
beings, as we have described thus far, and culminates in the capacity for predicting 
beings’ changes vis-à-vis causal relations. 
On this view, types constitute a way of ordering information in relation to one 
mode of presentation – the common nature of beings as expressed through their 
bodies, rather than essences of beings as expressed through concepts in definitions. 
Each format, whether the presentation of bodies or essences, encodes diverse pieces 
of information, some of which are available only through a single mode of presen-
tation (i.e., a body presented through sense-perception compared with a concept 
expressed by a definition). Others, however, can be transferred from one mode into 
another. Since types regard the common nature of phenomena based on their phys-
ical states (as discussed at the beginning of chapter IV), types are connected to phe-
nomena’s appearances and therefore with the logic of the imagination.  
Towards the end of the passage, Leibniz claims that the apprehension of differ-
ent kinds of relation grounds metaphysics in general. The science of “quality and 
quantity” may be distinguished into logistics (that is, the study of propositions) and 
combinatorics (that is, the study of forms, a distinction that is again in keeping with 
a pre-propositional stage of relations’ apprehension between figures, or what Leib-
niz calls wholes, which, hence, rest on coperceptibility). In the same years as when 
he revised the above text, Leibniz remarks to Locke’s spokesman in NE:  
The scheme of the categories is a very useful one, and we should think of improving them 
rather than rejecting them. It might be that all that is needed are five general headings for beings 
– namely substance, quantity, quality, action or passion, and relation – together with any that 
can be formed from those by composition. (NE 343/A VI 6 343) 
It seems to me that what we have argued thus far comports with the attempt to 
reduce the number of categories to five: two ideal categories (quality and quantity); 
two metaphysical categories (substance and action/passion); and relation. The act 
of coperceiving whole-parts depends on the imagination, which is the combinatoric 
faculty, further resting on the categories of quality, quantity, and relation. In the 
















































180 VI. Similarity, Movement, and the Interiorization of Types 
5. IMAGINATION AS A COMBINATORIC FACULTY 
If there are two arts, viz. the art of combination and the art of logistics, as Leibniz 
writes in the above-quoted passage, then the imagination accounts, first and fore-
most, for the combinatoric art which – considering the importance Leibniz’s attrib-
utes to it from his earlier project of a characteristica universalis19 – is a task still 
connected to logistics. It means that the imagination is inherently active in invention 
and discovery in two ways. On the one hand, it is connected to discovery because it 
accounts for expressions or a synthesis of information into a medium that differs 
ontologically from how things really are. In this way, pieces of information are col-
lected, encoded, and stored into unified and orderly expressions, which are ready to 
be extracted whenever attention and memory are directed to those expressions. On 
the other hand, in virtue of its expressive power, the imagination contributes to data 
mining, or the extrapolation of information, because expression permits it to visu-
alize relations that would have remained hidden to the cognizant agent absent the 
expression. The classical example of a regional map helps to illustrate the overall 
point here. A map allows for measurements that would be impossible, or at least 
very difficult to make, without the expression of the map in two dimensions. On 
Leibniz’s account, however, the reassessment of information at a level more acces-
sible to the cognizant agent is a double-edged sword of sorts: while it can function 
as a point of discovery, it can also prove to be a great source of agential failure. The 
imagination can infer new relations by presenting the cognizant agent with as-yet 
unexperienced combinations, which, however, can easily turn out to be impossible 
combinations. 
Leibniz often points to the shortcomings of the imagination by reporting the 
existence of a division between the imagination and the intellect. Cognizant agents 
tend to invent arguments that satisfy the imagination and fool the intellect. When 
the imagination is satisfied, cognizant agents tend to believe that they have formed 
a perfectly reasonable argument, when, really, they have not.20  
 
19 In On Universal Synthesis and Analysis or the Art of Discovery and Judgment (1679), Leibniz 
introduces the notions of synthesis and analysis, remarking: “I have said more about this in my 
little treatise on the Art of Combinations, which I brought out soon after my adolescence” (L 
229–30). Soon after he writes: “Saepe notavi ingenia inventionis capacia, alia magis analytica, 
alia magis combinatoria esse. Combinatorium magis est sive syntheticum alicujus rei usum et 
applicationem invenire, ut data acu magnetica cogitare de applicatione ad pyxidem.” (A VI 4 
A 545/L 233). See also De arte inveniendi in generale, A VI 4 A 81: “Methodus quaerendi 
duplex est vel Synthetica seu Combinatoria vel Analytica. Ex quibus Analytica est difficilior, 
Synthetica longior. Analytica interdum per naturam rerum exitum reperire non potest, synthe-
tica semper.” 
20 Leibniz to Bulchard De Volder, December 5, 1702: “Quae differunt debent aliquo differre seu 
in se assignabilem habere diversitatem; mirumque est manifestissimum hoc axioma, cum tot 
aliis ab hominibus adhibitum non fuisse. Sed vulgo homines imaginationi satisfacere contenti 
rationes non curant, hinc tot monstra introducta contra veram philosophiam. Scilicet non nisi 
incompletas abstractasque adhibuere notiones sive mathematicas, quas cogitatio sustinet, sed 















































 5. Imagination as a Combinatoric Faculty 181 
In conceiving of atoms, for instance, we can imagine particles of matter that are not 
further divisible, and are perfectly alike, distinguished only by their different spati-
otemporal locations. However, as we argued in chapter V, even if the imagination 
– owing to its constraints – takes two bodies (which may even be perfectly alike) 
as two bodies distinct in number (simply because they are coperceived in distinct 
locations at the same time), the fact that we can imagine it does not mean that two 
bodies may be distinct solo numero. Therefore, the idea that there are atoms that 
differ only because of their locations is rejected by Leibniz as something that satis-
fies the imagination but does not respect metaphysical principles. Without entering 
into the details of this argument, the gist is that we can imagine things that are per-
fectly in agreement with the imagination while contradicting intellectual principles. 
To conceive of intellectual principles, cognizant agents require a different level of 
abstraction and reflection, which imaginative processes typically do not require. To 
assist in making our point, we can borrow Putnam’s thought experiment regarding 
water in a twin world.21 If, on first intuition, a cognizant agent takes twin-water and 
actual world-water as being the same in virtue of their phenomenal appearance, then 
a more considered reflection regarding the essence of water will lead the cognizant 
agent to revise her belief. Although water and twin-water are not the same for the 
intellect (which can consider their essences), these two liquids are perfectly alike 
with regard to the imagination. Owing to this, there is no way for us to distinguish 
between the two types. The imaginable world and the intelligible world may come 
apart, and it is the task of intellectual reflection to understand why things are some-
times different from how they appear.22 
By considering the work of the imagination from this perspective, it seems that 
the imagination constitutively leads us astray. If this is true, then how can cognizant 
agents be successful in the business of making predictions based on types, if types 
themselves hinge upon the imagination? More specifically, if types are so inti-
mately related to the work of the imagination, and the imagination constitutively 
 
mere passivae, motus mathematice sumti; etc. ubi fingere possunt homines diversa sine 
diversitate, exempli gratia duas lineae rectae partes aequales, quia scilicet linea recta aliquid 
incompletum abstractumque est, quod doctrinae causa spectare oportet; at in natura quaelibet 
recta a qualibet distinguitur contentis. Hinc fieri nequit in natura ut duo corpora sint perfecte 
simul aequalia et similia. Etiam quae loco differunt, oportet locum suum, id est ambientia 
exprimere, atque adeo non tantum loco, seu sola extrinseca denominatione distingui, ut vulgo 
talia concipiunt. Hinc corpora vulgari modo sumta, veluti Atomi Democriticorum, globuli 
perfecti Cartesianorum, dari non possunt in natura, neque aliud sunt quicquam quam 
incompletae cogitationes philosophorum non satis rerum naturas inspicientium.” (A II 4 
131/LDV 258–9). 
21 Leibniz designed a similar thought experiment in NE 245/AVI 6 245. He imagines a perfect 
duplicate of the actual world, inhabited by persons exactly alike, who even have the same kinds 
of conscious states. As he remarks, we could not tell these worlds apart. 
22 To distinguish between human and non-human animals, Leibniz often points to the human an-
imal’s capacity for understanding whether something is going to happen even when the cir-
cumstances appear similar to previously experienced situations, see NE 50–1/A VI 6 50–1; NE 















































182 VI. Similarity, Movement, and the Interiorization of Types 
fails to correspond with intellectual principles, thereby leading cognizant agents 
astray, do types provide a kind of knowledge that structurally exposes them to error 
by causing agents to imagine the impossible?  
In order to refute this claim, we ought to recall the notion of split-impossibility 
that we put forth in chapter V. There, we argued that impossibility, understood as a 
split-notion, can take two forms: something can be logically impossible because its 
essence implies a contradiction. Or, it can be impossible in the sense that, while it 
might not exist in the actual world, it may exist in another, possible world. Let us 
focus on this latter kind of impossibility because these kinds of mistakes can be 
corrected by the imagination, while logical impossibility requires the assistance of 
the intellect and intellectual principles. In short, the imagination does not constitu-
tively lead us astray in becoming preoccupied with the second kind of impossibility 
claim, viz. that owing to existence.23 If the imagination leads us astray in the case 
of logical impossibility, then this is simply because it goes beyond its limits: it tries 
to imagine those notions of the intellect that constitute metaphysics, which are nec-
essarily beyond its scope, for they rest on principles that do not straightforwardly 
constrain the imagination.24 
As we argued in the last chapter, an impossibility claim may be about the inter-
nal possibility of a phenomenon, or about the possible existence of a phenomenon. 
Impossibilities of the former kind are based on a logical evaluation of the absence 
of contradiction within the notion. Impossibilities of the latter kind are based on an 
evaluation regarding whether or not the phenomenon fits into a world. What follows 
is an example of impossible existence.  
Consider a human body. It is made up of parts, such as hands, a head, and feet. 
These parts can appear to move autonomously, meaning that we can see a hand 
moving without noticing movement in the rest of the body. Nonetheless, the move-
ments of a hand depend on the rest of the body. For example, a hand cannot occupy 
a distance away from the torso that is twice the length of the arm. To illustrate, 
imagine that you are sitting at your desk. You would like to grab the cup of coffee 
on the kitchen table, which sits five feet away. Deeply immersed in your leisurely 
afternoon tasks, you imagine extending an elastic arm towards the kitchen table and 
grabbing the cup. But, of course, you cannot. If you made such an attempt and it 
worked, then you would feel a sense of suspicion and incoherence in looking at the 
cup as it approached your mouth. Suspicion constitutes a confused state of mind 
that expresses the cognitive fact that what the mind sensorially perceives or imagi-
nes contrasts with certain mental expectations. This renders the phenomenon im-
 
23 It is worth noting that Leibniz holds the view that sense-perception is always veridical. The 
source of error is judgment. For a discussion of this claim, see Di Bella (2016: 713–25), and 
Favaretti Camposampiero (2016). 
24 We have already read the passage in which Leibniz remarks that: “Human beings have the 
natural tendency to explains via the imagination also what is not subject to it” (A VI 4 A 890). 
Moreover, writing to Sophie Charlotte in BSI, Leibniz claims that intellectual notions are not 















































 5. Imagination as a Combinatoric Faculty 183 
possible, albeit only physically impossible. The suspicion you would feel consti-
tutes an implicit judgment regarding the impossibility of the phenomenon experi-
enced, which rests on a typicality. Typically, I am not capable of extending my arm 
five feet. Therefore, the phenomenon is incompatible with the world in which I 
reside. The impossibility claim is not the result of a logical evaluation of an alleged 
contradiction between the concept ARM and the property “being-extensible by five 
feet”. Even when you become an adult who is capable of logical thought and math-
ematical proofs, you nonetheless respond to the enquiry about whether you can 
reach the cup from the desk simply by running through the scenario in your head, 
which involves a simple evaluation of distances and your body. It seems, then, that 
this sense of suspicion in sense-experiencing phenomena rests on interiorized rules 
about how this particular type of body, i.e., your body, moves. “Type” here means 
that your predictions rest both on a general representation of a nature that the object 
in question shares with other existing things, and on expectations regarding how 
that type of thing typically behaves. Thus, all things of that type act in that way, and 
that is how they typically behave. It is not the case, however, that they could not 
behave otherwise.  
Moreover, types are not deducible from spatiotemporal rules per se, as we ar-
gued in chapter V. For, I can draw a body that shows a body stretching an arm 
towards the table; I can also imagine it. Indeed, nothing can stop me from imagining 
that the arm might have moved in that way, except for the fact that it contrasts “with 
the customary nature of the phenomenon”. That is not how human arms move in 
the real world. At this stage, the only reason I have to expect that an arm cannot 
stretch that far is the fact that I have never experienced it. Indeed, when I try to do 
so, I soon realize that it cannot actually be done. 
The fact that we can also imagine what was, is, or never will be given in expe-
rience points to the productive character of the logic of the imagination. In experi-
ence, cognizant agents unpack phenomena into parts and properties, and, in collect-
ing the elements, spontaneously start combining them. The imagination’s sponta-
neity and anarchy constitute its essential attributes since they provide the ground 
for extending our knowledge beyond the limits of what we have experienced. In 
virtue of the productivity of the imagination, cognizant agents can infer what is as-
yet unknown but probable from what they already know, thanks to experience. In 
other words, cognizant agents infer what might be from what is or has been, i.e., 
they form hypotheses that must be tested. The risk they run, however, consists in 
believing that something impossible is also true of the actual world. Yet, such a risk 
is also a decisive mechanism for controlling information and predicting phenome-
nal states. 
The imagination produces (non-propositional) inferences by combining known 
elements in unknown combinations. Therefore, in the act of producing new things 
on account of known traits, the imagination trains the mind to enhance its capacity 
for predicting and expecting possible phenomenal behavior, beginning with a cer-















































184 VI. Similarity, Movement, and the Interiorization of Types 
Knowledge can be taken even more generally, so that it is involved in ideas and terms before 
we come to propositions and truths. If someone looks attentively at more pictures of plants and 
animals than another person, and at more diagrams of machines and descriptions and depictions 
of houses and fortresses, and if he reads more imaginative novels and listens to more strange 
stories, then he can be said to have more knowledge than the other, even if there is not a word 
of truth in all that he has seen and heard. That is because the practice he has had in portraying 
in his mind a great many actual, explicit conceptions and ideas makes him better educated, 
better trained, and more capable than someone who has seen and read nothing – provided that 
he takes nothing in these stories and pictures to be true which really is not so, and that these 
impressions do not prevent him in other contexts from distinguishing the real from the imagi-
nary, the existent from the possible. (NE 355–6/A VI 6 355–6) 
On my reading of this passage, the more we experience, the more we train the im-
agination, and the more efficient and reliable are we at predicting what may, or may 
not, obtain in being presented with new scenarios. Thus, for example, having expe-
rienced that paper near a flame burns, I am better able to imagine that wood near a 
fire likewise burns. The mind does not have to experience a certain combination in 
order to imagine it coherently; once the logic is apprehended, the mind can auton-
omously begin to combine elements. Indeed, in so doing, it proceeds by trial and 
error. A cognizant agent may expect ice to burn as paper does when it is held near 
a flame. Agents are nonetheless able to revise their expectations when they experi-
ence that combining fire and ice produces a different result than with paper. This 
constitutes another reason why agents need to be taught through experience which 
changes are real and which are imaginary, thereby distinguishing imagining from 
believing in the possible existence of what we imagine. Our capacity to express 
concrete beings as perceptible wholes puts us on the right track for gaining 
knowledge of phenomenal nature. However, it also exposes us to the error of imag-
ining what is impossible. 
This analysis, however, is not entirely correct. The imagination would lead cog-
nizant agents astray were it structurally productive, that is, as constantly being in 
the business of combining known elements into unknown combinations. This is not 
the case, however. The imagination is not completely free in its combinations and 
is not anarchic. Its structural dependence upon sensory inputs limits its combina-
toric power to that which is typical or more likely to happen, as based on the eval-
uation of similarity between previously-experienced and given situations. The im-
agination is first and foremost in the business of reenacting the past by means of 
types: stored information about what we learned about things.  
If, as we argued so far, types rest on detecting beings’ similarity, similarity 
functions as a key constraints on what the imagination entertain as possible existent 
and inexistent. The cognizant agent has no control over seeing two things as similar. 
If she intends the shape as expressing a nature common to other, similar things, this 
act is not arbitrary because, as we have seen, the imagination is constrained by space 
and time, as well as by relations of similarity between the formerly- and presently-
perceived conformity between situations and things. The imagination neither in-
vents nor creates fictions, which would provide cognizant agents with scenarios 















































 6. Conclusion 185 
The imagination becomes a productive faculty because it is by nature a combina-
toric and synthetic faculty, working jointly with the senses. The relation between 
the imagination and the (im)possible provides us with an understanding of the na-
ture of the imagination as a synthetic rule-giver, which orders phenomena and its 
nature productively. In so doing, it leads the mind beyond what obtains by imagin-
ing what does not, or even cannot, exist, but it has also means to sort out what is 
merely imaginary and what can be part of the world. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Types are more than rules for tracking phenomenal movements, as based on spati-
otemporal constraints. Types are, first and foremost, a way of sorting phenomena 
into similarity classes. Therefore, the process we described is not as linear as our 
foregoing description suggests. What we have called moments – the acts of seg-
menting, tracking, and interiorizing types – are not always temporally-successive; 
they are rather intertwined. Once we interiorize types, types control memory and 
attention and may be credited for enhancing our capacity for segmenting, tracking, 
and predicting phenomenal behavior in relation to other, co-existing things. In other 
words, cognizant agents, for as long as they experience phenomena, continue to 
improve upon their types. However, agents thereafter form prejudices in the form 
of implicit judgments, owing to which they less readily revise the order they expect 
to find in the world, which has been constructed from their experientially-informed 
viewpoint. Agents tend to act and behave according to the empirical principle, viz. 
“what has happened, will happen again”. In order to force a revision in types, cog-
nizant agents must develop concepts (what Leibniz calls distinct thoughts, i.e., ways 
of selecting more compelling reasons to falsify a theory). Distinct thoughts hinge 
upon reflection and intellectual principles. These principles, however, do not per-
fectly correspond with those that constrain the imagination. Indeed, in the next 
chapter, we shall enquire into why types are not concepts and what concepts 






























































































VII. WHY TYPES ARE NOT CONCEPTS 
In the previous chapter, I argued that, within Leibniz’s theory of human cognition, 
the imagination functions to express particular existing beings through similarity 
classes. The imagination is sensitive to similarities in shape and size. Moreover, 
owing to these parameters, it functions to construct and track phenomena across 
spatiotemporal variation. This tracking is the reason why the imagination can inte-
riorize what I have called types: general rules that become active through habitual 
interaction with bodies in the phenomenal world. The background work of types in 
the act of perception permits cognizant agents to: (i) recognize the phenomenon as 
a phenomenon of a certain type (whether a body or property); (ii) predict the behav-
ior of the body-type or property-type across spatiotemporal variations; (iii) develop 
a sense of coherence for phenomenal behaviors, which grounds our capacity for 
telling apart the real and the imaginary (i.e., phenomena that can obtain in the actual 
world versus phenomena that can be only imagined as obtaining in other, possible 
worlds). This latter capacity is something upon which we improve constantly: the 
more we experience, the better we are at predicting what can and cannot (in all 
likelihood) transpire. 
As human minds interiorize types, they engage in imagine-that cases. They 
learn to imagine both possible and impossible scenarios, evaluating whether those 
scenarios can or cannot obtain. This capacity for the mental modelling of images is 
essential for putting structure into the world, and for obtaining a first-level abstrac-
tion and ordering of phenomena based on type-similarity.  
Similarity, however, is not sufficient for grounding necessary truths, Leibniz 
argues. The limits of the imagination in the derivation of necessary truths is clearly 
stated in a passage of On the Elements of Geometry of the Duke of Burgundy (1705). 
There, Leibniz reports and discusses an argument against the mortality of human 
beings that is based on induction. The argument, as reported by Leibniz, casts doubt 
upon the idea that, because we know that our ancestors died, then we also know 
that we ourselves are going to die. Our ancestors’ deaths bear no causal relations to 
our own lives, so their deaths cannot provide evidence for our own mortality. Leib-
niz observes that, in criticizing the argument based on induction, the author does 
not address the proper relation between the premises and the conclusion upon 
which the argument is constructed. Evidence for my own mortality is in no way 
provided by a causal relation that my ancestors’ deaths bore on my own life. Rather, 
the similarity that characterizes my ancestors and I signifies that there must be a 
reason for this similarity. The reason consists in a common nature that is also the 
cause of our deaths. Since common nature belongs to all similar things, we can 
track analogical behavior in things that are similar. For instance, in our acts of 
tracking and expecting spherical objects to roll, so too we expect that human beings 
die just as our ancestors did, not because our ancestors did. What the mind estab-















































188 VII. Why Types are not Concepts 
The problem is that we resemble them [our ancestors L.O.] a little too much, in that the causes 
of their death also subsist in us. For the resemblance would not be sufficient to draw certain 
consequences without the consideration of the same reasons. (Leibniz to Sophie Charlotte June 
1702 LSS 243/A I 21 343; my italics) 
Only the acknowledgment of a great similarity causes us to infer a common, formal 
cause for all similar individuals. Leibniz’s final remark is decisive for understand-
ing that the imagination is not the source of necessary truth. The similarity of beings 
is only a sign, which the rational agent must interpret by means of other tools, viz. 
innate intellectual principles. These principles enable agents to envisage a reason 
that can count as a cause for this or that phenomenal behavior. The reason found is 
something implied by the similarity of my ancestors and I, but similarity per se is 
not the reason for our deaths: the fact that we have a body that decomposes – subject 
to physical and biological laws – are the prerequisites of that being’s nature, which 
all similar beings share, and functions as the reason for the states of that being. Only 
the intellect can locate these requisites, viz. the causal links between those proper-
ties and various states of the being. Without the preliminary work of the imagina-
tion, which consists in an initial ordering of things based on similarity, the intellect 
would not seek out reasons. This is because, without the simplification work oper-
ated by types, the intellect would be groping in the dark, not knowing what to search 
for. Thus, while similarity serves as the basis for necessary truths, it is not their 
ground. Necessary truths are grounded in the mind’s innate ideas. Similarity ex-
plains how a cognitive subject learns necessary truths; not why truths are necessary. 
To this end, thinks Leibniz that we need a further kind of knowledge: concepts.  
In this chapter, I address the question of what concepts are and the extent to 
which concept-based reasoning differs from type-based reasoning. If our analysis 
is correct, then, in delineating the logic of the imagination, we will have attained a 
very important and systematic distinction within Leibniz’s epistemology and theory 
of human cognition, viz. the distinction between types and concepts, that maps onto 
his distinction between perception and thought. First, however, we need to offer a 
proof that types and concepts truly are two different kinds of acquired cognitive 
abilities. In arguing for this, I shall use a two-step argument.  
The first step consists in showing that types and concepts correspond to two 
different cognitive mechanisms. Types are collections of individuals; concepts are 
not. The main argument that Leibniz provides for this claim is that our capacity for 
detecting similarity enables the gathering of particulars into classes. Similarity clas-
ses can be understood as sets: sets have identity conditions extensionally in virtue 
of their members; instances do not provide identity criteria for concepts. 
The second step consists in arguing for the irreducibility of types to concepts. 
Unlike types, concepts, for Leibniz, are structured networks of terms that express 
essences in the mind of God, thereby capturing the structure of possible world(s). 
Within Leibniz’s framework, concepts express possibilities that we may conceive 
of on the basis of similarity classes, which consist in interiorized ways of expressing 
the nature of a certain kind of object, or certain kind of property, through a variety 
of nominal definitions. Concepts, however, are not abstracted from types. Concepts 















































 1. Types vs. Concepts – Extension vs. Intension 189 
types support imagistic forms of reasoning (based on the manipulation of spatio-
temporal images), concepts enable the manipulation of propositions and the evalu-
ation of reasons that ground their truth.  
Once we have distinguished between the kinds of cognitive tools that types and 
concepts are, I shall argue for the irreducibility of the first-acquired kind (types) to 
the second-acquired kind (concepts). There are tasks that we cannot perform 
through conceptual thought alone. Owing to this, we need types. However, there 
are likewise tasks that types are unable to fulfill, owing to which we need concepts. 
Types are not transformed into concepts: they spontaneously accompany all forms 
of conceptual reasoning. Concepts provide something that types cannot give us: 
identity criteria for individuals.  
Based on types, cognizant agents can consider members of a similarity class as 
similar but not as identical. Only concepts can provide identity conditions for their 
members. In the act of taking a particular object as an instance of a concept, one 
proclaims the identity of the structure/analogy of the object with the concept. The 
concept is defined by some properties that map onto the ontological structure of the 
object, thereby reducing it to an abstract essence. One does this as if the individu-
ality of the object can be reduced to the universality of the essence, as expressed by 
the concept. Even if this knowledge is often provisional and hypothetical, Leibniz 
claims, it nonetheless allows us to predict phenomenal behavior with a higher de-
gree of certainty, or even with necessity. This level of knowledge cannot be reached 
via types.1 It moreover rests on innate, necessary truths. This latter claim shall be 
argued for at length in chapter VIII. 
1. TYPES VS. CONCEPTS – EXTENSION VS. INTENSION 
Against Locke, Leibniz at several points emphasizes that concepts are only based 
in resemblances between particulars. They do not consist in particulars’ resem-
blances. If concepts were constituted by the relation of the resemblance that indi-
viduals bear to one another, then concepts would amount to collective wholes of 
individuals. Recently, Stefano Di Bella (2017) has argued that, since his edition and 
commentary of Marius Nizzolius’s Antibarbarus (1671), Leibniz developed his the-
ory of concepts (traditionally called “universals”) through critical confrontation 
with the theory of universals understood as collective wholes.  
The so-called “collective wholes theory of universals” has its roots in the Scho-
lastic tradition, whereby it is simply called collectio.2 Collective wholes have their 
identity criteria in their members. A universal, say “man”, differs from another uni-
versal, say “lion”, because it is a collection of different individuals. As a corollary, 
 
1 See Bolton (2017: 220–25). 
2 For an introduction, see Klima (2017) and Di Bella-Schmalz (2017: 1–9), for a discussion of 















































190 VII. Why Types are not Concepts 
this theory sees universals being explained extensionally: a universal is (i) a collec-
tion of individuals; and (ii) a general term referring collectively to the individuals 
of that class (Leibniz’s technical terminology is that the term refers “in concreto”, 
that is, to concrete beings). In what follows, I shall build upon the insights reached 
in Di Bella’s work.3 For, while I am in-tune with Di Bella’s work on Leibniz’s 
theory of concepts, I nevertheless argue that, amid Leibniz’s criticisms of a theory 
of concepts understood as a collection, he does not deny that human minds make 
use of collective wholes. Types can be understood as collective wholes, but collec-
tive wholes are not concepts. Concepts, however, can gain an extensional interpre-
tation in virtue of a corresponding type.  
I shall moreover argue that Leibniz equates collective wholes to Locke’s theory 
of general terms. Following Bolton’s (2017) lead, I shall conclude that Leibniz re-
jects Locke’s theory of ideas because Leibniz understands Locke’s ideas as general 
images that can be explained extensionally. On his view, Locke’s ideas are not con-
cepts, and they cannot help to further the sciences. This is because Lockean ideas 
suffer from the same problems as the theory of collective wholes. 
The endorsement of a nominalist ontology seems to lead straightforwardly to 
the acceptance of a theory of concepts understood as collective wholes. Nominalists 
only accept individuals in their ontology, Leibniz maintains.4 Anything that is not 
an individual – for instance tropes and abstract terms, such as “redness” or “human-
ity”, or kinds, like “man” or “virtue” – are merely general names. These general 
names are used as compendia: abbreviations to refer to aspects or properties inher-
ing in the only things that we have in our ontology: individuals. So, when I say:  
(1) Every man is mortal, 
I simply collectively refer to all of those individuals in the ontology that bear the 
property of “being a man” (M) and bear the property of “being mortal” (G). (1) 
claims that (M) and (G) are co-extensional. Sentence (1) has a further meaning. If 
sentence (1) is true, then it claims that there are individuals in our ontology that 
bear (G) if they have (M), and that both properties are co-extensional within a cer-
tain collection of individuals that we call “men”.  
Compare proposition (1) with the particular proposition: 
(2) Socrates is mortal. 
This sentence simply claims that there is an individual, Socrates, and that this indi-
vidual is mortal. It is true iff (i) Socrates exists and (ii) Socrates instantiates the 
property of “being mortal”. Now consider the further proposition: 
(3) Every mammoth has four feet. 
 
3 Di Bella (2004: 15–48; 2017: 198–219). 
4 For a reconstruction of how to understand Leibniz’s nominalism, see Mugnai (1990); Mates 
(1986). Bolton’s argument (Bolton: 1996) for Leibniz’s nominalism: abstracta cannot exists 















































 1. Types vs. Concepts – Extension vs. Intension 191 
This sentence (3) claims that the property of “being a mammoth”, (F), is co-exten-
sional with the property of “having-four-feet”, (H). Nonetheless, there are no mam-
moths in our ontology, for they are extinct; there is no individual bearing properties 
(H) and (F). There is no co-extensionality between (F) and (H). Therefore, (3) is 
false.  
Even if the reading of concepts as collective wholes were plausible, Leibniz 
argues that the interpretation of (1) – (3) exhibits inconsistency. First, consider sen-
tence (1). What is the reference of the quantifier “every” in the expression “every 
man”? If we assume concepts to be collective wholes, then they consist in a collec-
tion of existing individuals designated by a general term, “man”. Therefore, “every” 
collectively refers to all men existing at a certain time in the actual world. However, 
if this is true, then every time a member of the class perishes we get a different 
concept.5 This is implausible, however, because the truth of (1) is grasped inde-
pendently from acquaintance with the individuals to which it refers. 
The theory of collective wholes perhaps fairs better with particular sentences, 
such as (2). The truth-value of (2), however, seems to be susceptible to temporal 
changes as well. If (2) is true as long as Socrates exists, then it is false as soon as 
he dies. This seems to contradict our intuition that “Socrates is mortal” is true inde-
pendently of Socrates’ actual or continuing existence. Sentence (3) faces a similar 
difficulty, for it contradicts our intuition about mammoths. We perfectly understand 
(3). Indeed, we assent to it. However, on an extensional understanding of concepts, 
(3) is false, for mammoths do not exist. The sentence below, (4), is subject to the 
same difficulties as (2) and (3), because it appears to be true in summer but false in 
the winter (when it is impossible to find Carnations): 
(4) Carnations smell good. 
Let us now return to Leibniz. In a passage of NE, he argues that Locke’s account of 
the idea of substances is existential. Locke argues that our ideas of substances are 
always inadequate since there are no corresponding essences in the world (arche-
types). Indeed, if there were, then we could not know them.6 Given the absence of 
real references for our ideas, general names denote collections of individuals. That 
is to say, general terms refer collectively to individuals in our ontology. In spite of 
their being inadequate, ideas of substances can either be real or chimerical. They 
are real when they signify a connection of ideas to which something in the world 
corresponds. They are chimerical when nothing in the world corresponds to that 
connection of ideas.7 If this is true, Leibniz argues, then when we talk of carnations 
in winter, we are talking about something inexistent and therefore chimerical. This 
conclusion is absurd because we grasp the truth of sentences like (4) independently 
of the existence of the individuals to which they refer. Leibniz presents Locke with 
the same difficulties suffered by the theory of collective wholes:  
 
5 This argument is not new. It is also reported in Zimmermann (1854). We will analyze the text 
below. 
6 EHU 361–6. 















































192 VII. Why Types are not Concepts 
If one takes what exists as one’s only guide, one will needlessly diverge from accepted ways 
of speaking; for these do not allow one to say that someone who speaks of roses or carnations 
in winter-time is speaking about a chimera, unless he thinks that he can find such flowers in his 
garden. (NE 266/A VI 6 266) 
Given these difficulties, Leibniz believes that Locke’s theory of concepts cannot 
ground science. For, consider the sentence: 
 (5) Every body falls at a rate of 9.8 m/s2 
On the collective wholes reading, (5) is true iff all bodies falling at a given time 
descend with a rate of acceleration of 9.8 m/s2, which is absurd. Sentence (5) is 
meant to be true independently of actually-existent, falling bodies and, perhaps, 
even independently of the existence of bodies tout court. Even if bodies did not 
exist, on Leibniz’s view, their possibility in different possible worlds holds true.8 
As Leibniz writes in NE 301/A VI 6 301: “The real existence of beings which are 
not necessary is a matter of fact or of history, while the knowledge of possibilities 
and necessities (the necessary being that whose opposite is not possible) is what 
makes up the demonstrative sciences.” Here, “possibilities” and “necessity” refer 
to essences. Indeed, what Leibniz means by the fact that essences or possibilities 
do not depend on instances is clarified in another passage of NE, in which he ex-
plains that there are two modes of predication: one being extensional, the other in-
tensional: 
The common manner of statement concerns individuals, whereas Aristotle’s refers rather to 
ideas or universals. For when I say Every man is an animal I mean that all the men are included 
amongst all the animals; but at the same time I mean that the idea of animal is included in the 
idea of man. ‘Animal’ comprises more individuals than ‘man’ does, but ‘man’ comprises more 
ideas or more attributes: one has more instances, the other more degrees of reality; one has the 
greater extension, the other the greater intension. So it can truthfully be said that the whole 
theory of syllogism could be demonstrated from the theory de continente et contento, of con-
tainer and contained. The latter is different from that of whole and part, for the whole is always 
greater than the part, but the container and the contained are sometimes equal, as happens with 
reciprocal propositions. (NE 486/A VI 6 486) 
In this passage, Leibniz distinguishes between (i) a use of general names that maps 
onto relations of containment between concepts and (ii) the use of names as refer-
ents for existing individuals and their modes of modification.9 Intension can there-
fore be understood as a mark of a concept that can either entail, or be entailed by, 
other intensions. Notice also the conclusive remark that conceptual containment is 
not equivalent to whole-parts relation: if the whole is always greater that his parts, 
the container and the contained can be equivalent (or equipollent, if we use Jungius’ 
 
8 An extensionalist might say that, in this case, the extensional reading could be analyzed in 
temporal terms. For all falling bodies that have existed, exist now, and will exist, it is true that 
they fell, fall, or will fall with an acceleration of 9.8 m/s2. I suppose, however, that this reading 
would render truths dependent upon time. Moreover, it cannot provide any account of the ne-
cessity of the connection between bodies and their physical states. 
9 On the relation between intensional and extensional predication see Lenzen (1983: 129–148); 















































 1. Types vs. Concepts – Extension vs. Intension 193 
terminology), that is they can be synonymous. This theory, which is known as “con-
ceptualism”, can erase the difficulties faced by the theory of collective wholes – or 
so Leibniz argues. 
A conceptualist position holds that concepts express possibility, or what is clas-
sically called essence, consisting independently of (1) a mind’s actual knowledge 
of them, and (2) actually-existing instances. On this view, a concept expresses 
something’s possibility if and only if the definitional marks composing the concept 
do not result in contradiction. A possibility is expressed by an ordered cluster of 
general terms that can be given by definitions. For theoretical and logical reasons 
(related to demonstrations), we assume that for each essence there is a cluster of 
terms individuating that essence alone. In this sense, a cluster is complete even if 
we are not capable of completely unpacking it. Each cluster is moreover separate 
from the existence of its instances.  
Despite the fracture between essences and existence, Leibniz thinks that con-
cepts can either be real or chimerical: 
Possible ideas become merely chimerical when the idea of actual existence is groundlessly 
attached to them – as is done by those who think they can find the philosopher’s stone. (NE 
265/A VI 6 265) 
The same is true of those who think they can find carnations in their gardens in 
winter. In other words, we can still make a distinction between those concepts ex-
pressing essences that are instantiated in the actual world, and those that express 
essences that are not instantiated in the actual world. And yet, we can say that truth 
does not depend on the existence of instances, but on the possibilities that concep-
tual reasoning permits us to grasp. The sentence “Carnations smell good” is not true 
just in virtue of carnations existing: it depends on the compatibility of CARNA-
TION (qua concept) and the property of smelling good. Concepts depend on purely 
intensional entailments, and the networking of simpler concepts that are expressed 
into the network of terms belonging to a system of signs, which are in turn ruled by 
semantics and syntax.10 A system of signs can equally constitute a natural language 
and an artificial language, such as a characteristica universalis. The networking 
and entailment among concepts constitute a structure that allows: (i) a greater de-
gree of abstraction, and hence of logical and metaphysical analysis, than that per-
mitted by types, since we can form expressions that are hyperintensional;11 (ii) a 
 
10 The relation between logic and grammar was a discussed topos in late Scholasticism in light of 
questions related to the order of Aristotle’s Organon. If the Organon is an introduction to rea-
soning, then what is its first book? Is it the Categories (about predication), or is it On Interpre-
tation (about language)? It seems that the correct interpretation of a sentence is a constitutive 
part of the logician’s work, and, at the same time, the truth of the sentence seems to precede 
language and its interpretation. See Oliveri (2014). 
11 Leibniz does not use the word hyperintensional, but he is aware of terms and sentences that are 
equivalent in terms of extension, since they refer to the same individuals, but are not logically 
equivalent because they cannot be substituted in a discourse without changes in truth-value. 
See Nolan (2014: 149–60), who defines hyperintensional as follows: “The twenty-first century 















































194 VII. Why Types are not Concepts 
different kind of conceiving from that permitted by types. If imagining based on 
types is to some extent a matter of mental imagery, and, as we saw in the preceding 
chapter, it is not subject to identity and contradiction but only to agreement with 
those principles, then conceiving based on concepts is independent from imagery, 
and subject to identity and contradiction, although it is not therefore completely 
independent of the imagination. Signs, or indeed other kinds of vehicles, are re-
quired for this kind of conceiving. 
Leibniz concludes that the difficulties faced by extensional theories of con-
cepts, such as Locke’s, can be avoided through a form of conceptualism. Before 
considering in detail why Leibniz believes his theory fairs better with cases like 
(1)–(5), let us examine the assumptions characterizing conceptualism. 
2. LEIBNIZ’S CONCEPTUALISM 
Although Leibniz criticizes the nominalist theory, he provisionally defines himself 
as a nominalist. At the same time, however, he does not feel comfortable with realist 
positions, since they make nature “too profligate” in claiming the impossibility of 
“vacuum among forms”, i.e., the claim that every possible essence must exist:12 
Also, we could not exaggerate nature’s ‘liberality’; she goes beyond anything that we can de-
vise, and all the dominant compatible possibilities are made real on her great Stage. Philoso-
phers used to have two axioms: the realist one seemed to make nature profligate and the nom-
inalist one seemed to declare her to be stingy. One says that nature permits no gaps, the other 
that she does nothing in vain. These are two good axioms, as long as they are understood: nature 
is like a good housekeeper who is sparing when necessary in order to be lavish at the right time 
and place. She is lavish in her effects and thrifty in the means she employs. (NE 323/A VI 6 
323) 
Leibniz’s criticism of realist positions is directed at the claim that every possible 
essence must exist. Therefore, there cannot be any lack, or gap, in nature: every-
thing has an essence and the essences known by human rational beings are nature’s 
real essences. On the contrary, Leibniz is sympathetic to Locke’s idea that, if there 
are real essences, then these do not straightforwardly correspond to the essences 
we, as finite human beings, are capable of knowing. Our knowledge of essences is 
often limited and provisional. It would be absurd to pretend that nature and God are 
constrained by what we can conceive (NE 64). Leibniz, however, thinks that the 
assumption of the impossibility of a vacuum among Forms, proposed by realists, is 
valid, at least if it is not limited to the actual world. Any essence of which we can 
 
than by necessary equivalence: two pieces of language can apply to the same entities across all 
possible worlds but not be equivalent; thoughts can be necessarily equivalent in truth value but 
not synonymous.” See also Berto-Nolan (2021). 
12 This passage must be read in relation to Leibniz’s discussion about the impossibility of vacuum 
formarum, that is, a vacuum of forms (NE 307/A VI 6 307). On his view, this principle is valid, 
but the denial of a vacuum of forms does not imply that every form must necessarily exist. 















































 2. Leibniz’s Conceptualism 195 
conceive is possible, even if not every essence is instantiated in the actual world. 
There are other possible worlds, which are structured according to essences that are 
possible but different from those instantiated in the actual world. Therefore, the 
continuity between Forms is maintained by Leibniz. Indeed, it is actualized in his 
theory of possible worlds and not constrained by only one existent. Concepts, 
henceforth, refer to the human mind’s apprehension of essences, regardless of 
whether they are instantiated in the actual world. This remark leads us to the dis-
cussion of what interpreters have called Leibniz’s conceptualism. 
Even in early interpretations of his work, Leibniz’s position is reduced neither 
to realism nor nominalism. Among these interpreters are Zimmermann (1854) (who 
was a Professor at the University of Vienna and a contemporary of Franz Brentano 
and Alexius Meinong), Schepers (2014), Mugnai (2000), and Di Bella (2004; 
2017).  
Schepers (2014: 227–231) notes that Leibniz’s conceptualism must be read 
along the line of Ockham’s theory of a mental language. According to Schepers, 
concepts are for Leibniz, as for Ockham, termini nullius linguae, terms that do not 
belong to any spoken or written language, which naturally refer to things. Termini 
nullius linguae are concepts proper to a mental language. Schepers assumes that all 
concepts are innate. However, a closer look at some passage of Ockham suggests 
that his account of concepts consists in the mind’s capacity to grasp the similarity 
between things and, through this, the concept is abstracted. This abstraction, Ock-
ham claims, is an occult operation of the mind.13 Since similarities are real and 
 
13 Ockham’s position about lingua mentalis is in fact more complex and debated than Schepers’ 
presentation would lead us to believe. From the following passage, in which Ockham describes 
the formation of general notions, it is evident that notions are in the soul not innately, but rather 
as a way of cognizing the actual world, which is naturally present in rational souls: “[...] iste 
est processus quod primo homo cognoscitur aliquo sensu particulari, deinde ille idem homo 
cognoscitur ab intellectu, quo cognito habetur una notitia generalis et communis omni homini; 
quo existente in intellectu statim intellectus scit quod homo est aliquid, sine discursu. Deinde 
apprehenso alio animali ab homine vel aliis animalibus, elicitur una notitia generalis omni 
animali, et illa notitia generalis omni animali vocatur passio seu intentio animae sive conceptus 
communis omni animali” (William of Ockham, Summa logicae III-2 cap. 29, OP I, 557.) The 
process of concept-formation is described as a hidden (occultus) process, neither observable 
nor consiously perceived by the mind: “natura occulte operatur in universalibus, non quod 
producat ipsa universalia extra animam tamquam aliqua realia, sed quia producendo 
cognitionem suam in anima, quasi occulte – saltem mediate – producit illa universalia, illo 
modo quo nata sunt producit. Et ideo omnis communitas isto modo est naturalis, et a 
singularitate procedit, nec oportet illud quod isto modo fit natura esse extra animam, sed potest 
esse in anima” (William of Ockham, In I Sent. (ordinato), d. 2 q. 7 (OT II, 261)). Interpreters, 
however, tended to assimilate Ockham’s lingua mentalis to Fodor’s language of thought and, 
hence, to understand concepts as innate to the mind, that is, they cannot be acquired via 
experience. Lenz (2008, 309) argues against a mainstream interpretation of Ockham as an 
innatist, thereby denying that there is an inborn mental language, or a systematic capacity to 
form sentences. For a reconstruction of Ockham’s theory of “mental language”, see Perler 
















































196 VII. Why Types are not Concepts 
mind-independent, they are grasped in the same way by all man, and are, for that 
reason, natural. 
This reading has some affinity to Leibniz, as proven by the following passage 
of NE 485: “Insofar as you conceive the similarities amongst things, you are con-
ceiving something in addition [to the things themselves], and that is all that univer-
sality is. You will never clearly present any of our arguments without making use 
of universal truths.” Conceiving of a universal, however, does not give a definition 
or a concept of the universal. So, what Schepers says is only partly true. Similarity 
is what enables us to conceive of a universal; it does not thereby provide us with 
knowledge of that universal. To have knowledge, we need to form a concept, that 
is understanding intensional relations among terms that define the concept. 
A more detailed and pregnant account of Leibniz’s conceptualism is given by 
Zimmermann (1854). Remarkably, Leibniz’s conceptualism is discussed in light of 
the recent (at in Zimmermann’s day) finding of a fragment on the reconciliation 
between nominalism and realism through conceptualism. The fragment is known 
by the title “De generibus et speciebus”, erroneously attributed to Abelard.14 
Conceptualism is defined as a mixture of the positive characteristics of both 
nominalism and realism, with the virtue of avoiding their respective pitfalls. 
Conceptualism considers concepts to be collections (Inbegriffe) of real individuals 
that are collected thanks to similarity in nature. Given this real ground of concepts, 
they are neither mere names – which are only in the mind of subjects – for they 
represent real essences, nor real things, since what exists are individuals.15 
Following this first definition of conceptualism, Zimmermann notes that it does 
not apply to Leibniz’s philosophy. If it did, then Leibniz’s philosophy would suffer 
from the same problems as those inherent in nominalist positions that Leibniz 
himself critizes, viz. that a change in the number of individuals designated by a 
name would force a change in the concepts. To avoid this problem, Zimmermann 
argues, Leibniz understands concepts as collections of essences. Essences are 
instantiated materialiter by the individuals they represent and, therefore, do not 
exist in nature. However, because there is a relation between the material 
constitution of individuals and essences, as manifested in the similarities between 
 
14 The Manuscript was first published in 1836 by Victor Cousin as part of a more extensive text 
collected by a Manuscript held at the Bibliothèque nationale de France (lat. 12268) under the 
name “Fragmentum Sangermanense de generibus et speciebus” and attributed erroneously to 
Abelard. The study of Peter King shows that the fragmentum published by Cousin points to 
four different treatises: ‘Totum integrum’; ‘De destructione Socratis’; ‘Si quelibet duo puncta’; 
‘De generibus et speciebus’. ‘De generibus et speciebus’ is, however, an independent treatise 
and cannot be attributed to Abelard. Working with two different manuscripts (Bibliothèque 
nationale de France, lat. 13368 and Orléans, Bibliothèque Municipale, 266, pp. 153a–166a), 
King reconstructed the complete text. The provenance of the text remains, however, 
controversial. Recent studies tend to attribute it to Joscelin de Soissons, or to one of his pupils. 
For a discussion of the text, see Tarlazzi (2013, 104–9; 182ss.). This aspect is not directly 
relevant to our discussion since Zimmermann believed that the author was Abelard. 















































 2. Leibniz’s Conceptualism 197 
existing individuals, concepts can be collections of essences and have an 
extensional interpretation. 
Although Di Bella (2004; 2017) does not refer to Zimmermann directly, we can 
use his work to clarify what Zimmermann meant by concepts as “collections of 
essences”. Di Bella points out that Leibniz’s philsophy is developed against the 
backdrop of an ontological distinction between essences, beings, and terms. Terms 
(often used by Leibniz as a word for concepts) represent essences because they 
consist in “formalitates”, i.e., intentional distinctions within the concepts that are 
not straghtworwardly extensional distinctions among beings.16 Through this 
operation, Leibniz detaches concepts from instances and considers them mere 
possibilities, as determined by the intensions of which they are composed.  
Leibniz’s conceptualism entails a further assumption (Mugnai 1990; Schepers 
2014). We can only know essences as abstracta. As such, essences cannot but exist 
in God’s mind. Essences are conceived by God eminenter, i.e., in a way 
incommensurable when compared to the human mind.17 Only God can conceive of 
essences as real constituents of individuals. Therefore, as we shall see, there is a 
place for realism in Leibniz’s view: the existence of individuals. Individuals, 
however, do not have to exist in the actual world. They exist in God’s mind as 
complete concepts of individuals belonging to different possible worlds (Schepers, 
2014: 227–231). 
I shall argue that an account of Leibniz’s conceptualism must explain how 
concepts, that is human grasping of essences in the mind of God, have extensions, 
that is apply to indisiduals, whilst keeping extension “outside” the concept of a 
concept. On our view, types qua cognitive processes distinct from conceptual 
processes, account for the extensional interpretation of concepts. Following Di 
Bella and Zimmermann, I shall maintain that Leibniz’s conceptualism does not 
have straightworwardly extensional interpretations. Concepts can obtain 
extensional interpretations when they are associated with types detecting beings’ 
similarity. Similarity is a sign to interpret a concrete being as befitting under an 
essence, and hence to grasp it by means of a concept. Concepts, however, express 
possibilities, not individuals, nor their similarities. 
Concepts are learned thanks to a first ordering on account of types. Therefore, 
they can acquire an extensional interpretation. However, I align with Bolton’s 
 
16 Di Bella (2004, 39). The passage Di Bella is referring to is a note to Temmik, presented in the 
Vorausedition (VE 1082), which says: “Albus Socrates, et Musicus Socrates, sunt unum 
idemque nam etsi Socrates qua Musicus bene canant, et qua albus non canant, verum tamen est 
album Socratem canare et quicquid de Musico Socrate, etiam de albo dici potest, nisi quod 
praedicationes hic excludimus reduplicativas, quibus formales rationes praedicatorum albedo 
scilicet et Musicae peritia distinguuntur. Et sane revera Socrates qua Musicus bene canit est 
enuntiatio praegnans constans ex his Socrates canit, Socrates est Musicus, et Nisi Socrates esset 
Musicus non bene caneret. Itaque non semper alius est Musicus et alius albus, ac proinde non 
sunt disparata.” 
17 Mugnai (1976; 1990); Schepers (2014); Antognazza (2015). Bolton (1996) argues that abstract, 















































198 VII. Why Types are not Concepts 
argument that concepts are not abstracted from individuals in virtue of similarity.18 
Similarities can help in forming types, but they cannot give us concepts. Concepts 
are acquired in virtue of necessary truths and, especially, the principles of 
contradiction, identity, and sufficient reason. When we conceive of not just what is 
common to similar beings but also of relations among conceived universals, such 
as inclusion (as in the case of “animal” and “man”) or identity (as in the case of 
“man” and “rational animal”), we form a concept.  
Following this reconstruction of the literature, we are now in a position to 
pinpoint some general traits characterizing conceptualism. In the remainder of the 
chapter, I shall test these claims and launch my theory of the co-indispensability of 
concepts and types. Conceptualism claims that:  
(i) Concepts are human ways of cognizing essences or possibilities in God’s mind; 
(ii) Concepts are determined intensionally by their definitional marks, that is, their intensions;  
(iii) Intensions are expressed via terms: signs or words that are used not in concreto – to refer 
to instances straightforwardly – but in abstracto – to capture essences’ structures. In short, there 
is a difference in the use of the word “mortal”, as in (2) “Socrates is mortal” and in (1) “Every 
man is mortal”. In spite of the “every”, (1) means that “mortal” is contained in “man”;19 
(iv) Concepts and their definitional marks remain in a network and are acquired in a network 
(Bolton 2011).20 This network grounds the systematicity of thought over associations, as per-
mitted by types, as well as the analysis of conceptual entailment and conceptual connection, 
which vouch for the derivation of new propositions from a given one or from a set of proposi-
tions; 
 
18 Do we abstract notions from individuals owing to their likenesses? On this matter, see Bolton 
(1996), who distinguishes two kinds of abstraction and denies that we can abstract general 
notions from individuals. A first kind of abstraction consists in separating some properties from 
the existing thing; a second kind of abstraction consists in the use of general terms that are 
necessary for hypothetical truths and therefore for science. Contrary to what Mate (1986) 
proposes, Bolton points out that Leibniz refuses only the former kind of abstraction, but not the 
latter. I agree with Bolton and build on her account in showing that the acknowledgment of 
similarities among individuals helps a particular mind to direct attention and the intellect to 
apply innate turths. It is thanks to the support of innate truths that we can acquire knowledge. 
This position is also supported by Bolton (1990; 2018). For discussion about the determination 
of similarities, see Barth (2014, 287). 
19 That is unless the singular proposition (2) is treated as universal, whereby “Socrates” refers to 
the complete concept Socrates and “mortal” is a mark of this concept: “But it is as well to notice 
that singular propositions are counted, so far as their form goes, among universal ones. For 
although there is indeed only a single Apostle Peter, it can still be said that anyone who was 
the Apostle Peter denied his Master. Thus the syllogism: 'St Peter denied his Master, St Peter 
was a disciple, so some disciple denied his Master', although it has only singular premises, is 
deemed to have universal affirmative ones, which puts it into the third-figure mood Darapti.” 
(NE 485/A VI 6 485). 















































 3. Alia est rerum, alia terminorum divisio 199 
(v) The systematicity of thought can be expressed via the systematicity of a system of signs 
structured by syntax and semantics, when the parts of the language are used in accordance with 
(ii);21 
(vi) Concepts may acquire an extensional interpretation, but they are not explained extension-
ally. 
In order to ground his theory of concepts, argues Di Bella, Leibniz introduces into 
his ontology a distinction between essences and beings, on the one hand, and pos-
sibility and existence, on the other. 
While we can divide beings into possible and existent, we can divide essences 
into possible essences and essences that are instantiated in the similarities between 
existing beings. However, as Di Bella and Mugnai highlight, this distinction is only 
made possible by the Leibnizian approach to reality, which claims that “there is a 
great difference between how we divide things (res), and how we divide terms”.22 
I shall flesh out this claim by analyzing (i) – (vi), thereby showing to what extent 
concepts differ from types. To this end, the thesis I seek to defend is that the “great 
difference” in how we divide things and concepts relies on the profound difference 
between the cognitive processes that support tasks of recognition and those sup-
porting conceptual reasoning. As I shall argue, the former is based on types, the 
latter on concepts. 
3. ALIA EST RERUM, ALIA TERMINORUM DIVISIO23 
In order to analyze the Leibnizian motto, we have to contextualize it within Leib-
niz’s ontology. As explained in the introduction, Leibniz distinguishes between be-
ings, terms, and essences. Let us briefly reiterate this distinction.  
Leibniz defines “being” as the ontological bearer of primary and secondary 
qualities. A being is something that either exists or possibly exists. Since Leibniz 
endorses a nominalist ontology (albeit only “provisionally”), beings are not partic-
ular substances, i.e. monads, but countable beings (Rutherford 2008). Particulars 
are concrete insofar as they have – or are imagined as having – a body. By contrast 
with contemporary usage, the term “concrete” seems to be a property of both pos-
sible and existing individuals. Sherlock Holmes – in spite of being a fictional char-
acter – is concrete insofar as he is a possible existent being, imagined as having a 
body that bears primary and secondary qualities.24  
Essences are not beings but collections of definitional marks. First of all, they 
are abstracta, which means that they are incomplete or ideal, lacking thereby the 
capacity of being real or existing. The essence of a square, for instance, is an ab-
stract, while the drawing of a square is a concrete. In other words, it seems that for 
 
21 I argued for this view in Oliveri (2016: III.2). 
22 This motto is the title of a text partially edited by Mugnai (2010: 257). 
23 See LH 4 7c 76–78 partially published in Mugnai (2010: 257–70). 















































200 VII. Why Types are not Concepts 
Leibniz the difference between abstracta and concreta lies in the fact that the letter 
can be embodied. Now, also a square can be embodied, but it does not count as a 
concrete because, as Leibniz writes to Arnauld, abstracta “contains only eternal or 
necessary truths, whereas the concept of an individual contains, considered as pos-
sible, what in fact exists or what is related to the existence of things and to time” 
(A II 2 45).25 An essence, therefore is detached from the notion of existence or 
possible existence, and we have an essence when we are capable of conceiving the 
union of some marks as being free from contradiction and as having some logical 
relations. The essence of MAN, for instance, is defined through the marks ANI-
MAL, RATIONAL, CAPABLE OF LAUGHTER, and so on. By contrast, BEE 
cannot be defined as both a FLYING and NON-FLYING ANIMAL. This is not 
possible, and therefore, does not correspond to an essence, since essences consist 
in the unities of compossible conceptual marks, that is marks that when unified do 
not result into a contradiction. 
Leibniz is adamant that beings and essences are distinct. If an essence were a 
being, he argues, then this would lead to an infinite regress. For, if any essence were 
a being, then there would be an essence of that essence. Again, the latter would be 
a being too, so there would be an essence of an essence of an essence – and so on, 
ad infinitum.26 Let us not forget that, for Leibniz, there are individual essences (qua 
complete concepts of individuals) in the mind of God. 
To sharpen the distinction between an essence and a being, we can add that the 
essence HUMAN BEING and a concrete individual, Claire, differ ontologically. 
This is because the latter actually has a body modified in a determinate way owing 
to various causes, while conceptual changes are not the result of causal changes. 
This ontological distinction, as we will see, raises the question regarding the rela-
tion between the concept and its instances. If I know that the concept HUMAN 
BEING has, among its intensions, the property of HAVING A BODY, then I can 
infer that Claire (qua human being) also has a body. In reverse, the concept does 
not give me the ability to recognize Claire as human being. For this recognitional 
act, I need to experience the individual Claire and form a type about the kind of 
changes Claire may be subject to that I label as HUMAN BODY. Claire, qua a 
concrete human being, has a particular shape and she is subject to causal changes, 
while no particular “shape” belongs to the concept MAN, nor can the concept un-
dergo causal changes. In other words, concrete beings qua embodied are bearers of 
primary and secondary qualities. They are first known via experience and subject 
to the logic of the imagination which, as we have seen, does not respond to the 
principles of contradiction and identity, which, in turn, govern concepts that express 
essences. 
This distinction offers an initial grasp of what Leibniz means in saying that 
“there is a great difference between how we divide things and how we divide 
 
25 Thanks to Richard Arthur and Martha Bolton for inviting me at making this point explicit. 
26 A VI 4 A 994: “An Essentia est Ens? Ita sane si philosophi scholae consequenter loqui volunt. 
Ergo Essentia habebit etiam essentiam, et sic in infinitum, inutili reciprocatione.” The same 















































 3. Alia est rerum, alia terminorum divisio 201 
terms”. If the term “thing” refers to concrete beings, then the division we perform 
when dealing with beings may either be: (i) distinctions of wholes into parts; or (ii) 
distinctions of individuals into similarity classes. As we discussed in chapters II–
VI, these two possible ways of dividing beings are supported by the work of the 
imagination and do not correspond to concepts. Thus, the motto seems to suggest 
that conceptual distinctions are not of the same kind as a mind’s act of gathering 
individuals into similarity classes. If the recognition of instances as being of a cer-
tain type and the formation of concepts are governed by different logics, then how 
can we learn to recognize an individual, say Claire, as an instance not of a type, but 
of a concept? That is, on what grounds am I permitted to attribute to Claire proper-
ties that belong to the concept HUMAN BEING?  
Leibniz’s solution is that we can learn to take certain phenotypical appearances 
of something as a sign of the concept which, better than others, express the thing 
from the point of view of an abstract essence. In particular, in dealing with natural 
kinds, the external shape of beings, which is used to interiorize type, seems to pro-
vide the link between the common nature detected via beings’ similarity, on the one 
hand, and a general abstract essence, on the other. The type therefore mediates be-
tween things and concepts. Indeed, the reason for this lies in the fact that even if 
concepts do not consist in similarities, they are nonetheless formed by experiencing 
beings’ common nature, as interiorized by the type. As outlined at the beginning of 
this chapter, whereby we discussed Leibniz’s criticism of the argument concluding 
that human beings are mortal (based on data-collecting our ancestors’ deaths), sim-
ilarity is not the reason why beings are instances of the same essence; similarity is 
the reason why the intellect must search for a common reason explaining why sim-
ilar beings will be subject to similar changes. If cognizant agents did not first group 
individuals into similarity classes, then they could not search for common reasons 
explaining those beings’ states. Moreover, since the job of a type is to track beings’ 
common nature, the type is spontaneously active in the formation of a concept and 
is therefore spontaneously associated with a concept expressing that common na-
ture in a clear and distinct manner, viz. from the perspective of an essence. It is 
important to keep in mind that Leibniz distinguishes between nature and essence: 
the former constitutes a ‘middle way’ between necessary and contingent states of 
things, depending on how beings interact in the world (subject to physical laws), 
while the latter consists in the rigid cluster of those properties necessarily belonging 
to a thing. In explaining the difference, Leibniz uses the example of water. If we 
can say that, given certain physical conditions that obtain on some parts of planet 
Earth, the status of being fluid is natural to water, then we are not permitted to say 
that fluidity is essential to it. However, a human being born on the moon, in which 
nowhere to be found are those physical conditions necessary for the fluidity of wa-
ter, would believe that water is essentially solid, and that it is unable to undergo any 
change in physical status. This example proves that, when dealing with natural 
kinds, it is difficult to isolate which properties essentially belong to a particular kind 
(see NE 433–4). However, we can still use nature as a guide. The next section will 















































202 VII. Why Types are not Concepts 
by types, can provide initial guidance for postulating an essence and hence for form-
ing a concept. 
4. FROM TYPES TO CONCEPTS 
To explain the move from having a type to forming a concept, let us take into 
account the distinction between water and ice, as discussed in Leibniz’s NE. Water 
and ice have a common nature, for they are two different phenomenological 
appearances of the same kind. And yet, we cannot detect any phenomenal 
similarities between ice and water. We observe that water changes its shape as soon 
as it is poured into a container. We observe it flowing in seas and rivers. On the 
other hand, ice does not change shape so easily; it does not flow in rivers and seas. 
Given these phenomenological differences, we form two different general words, 
“water” and “ice”, because we have pragmatic reasons for having two different 
general names for two different phenomenal appearances. 
Nevertheless, the case of water and ice seems to give us a good example of 
when appearances lead us astray. As Leibniz mentions to Locke, despite having two 
names and two phenomenological appearances, we are not allowed to infer that ice 
and water are two different species. As Leibniz explains: “A great deal of care and 
experience is needed if one is to mark out genera and species in a manner which 
comes fairly close to nature” (NE 310/A VI 6 310). This means that observations 
of appearances’ similarity permit an initial distinction of phenomena into similarity 
classes. Given the different appearances of “ice” and “water”, aligning with 
Leibniz’s theory of the imagination, we actually form two different similarity 
classes for these phenomena. However, once we learn to recognize “ice” and 
“water”, we observe that the former can undergo grandual and continuous 
spatiotemporal changes, which transforms it into something resembling water. On 
the other hand, we can observe that the latter can also be gradually and continously 
transformed into ice under certain conditions. The continous tranformations of one 
phenomenon into the other is the reason why, following extensive observation, we 
take water transformed into ice as being the same thing changing. When we 
thereafter conceive of something persisting in spite of phenomenal change, we 
advance the hypothesis that ice and water are two different manifestations of the 
same nature. In other words, we claim: 
(6) Ice is water. 
What is meant by this proposition? It is an identity statement produced by the 
spontaneous application of what Leibniz calls “truths of reason”. To prove this, 
consider that the proposition cannot be a statement claiming the phenomenological 
coincidence of ice and water, for their phenomenological dissimilarity is the reason 
why we take them as two different things. In claiming “ice is water” we utter an 
identity statement, which is informative both on the side of the extension, and, more 
interestingly, on the side of the intension. In claiming that “ice is water”, I am saying 















































 4. From Types to Concepts 203 
phenomenally as “fluid water”, as well as in the phenomenological appearance 
“ice”. I am not identifying the phenomenology of water with ice. What we are 
claiming is that there is a genus, whereby both water and ice are its particular 
manifestations. When I use the word “water” to refer to this genus, and not to a 
particular phenomenological manifestation, I make an initially-confused reference 
to the essence of water. As Leibniz writes to Locke: “Insofar as you conceive the 
similarities amongst things, you are conceiving something in addition [to the things 
themselves], and that is all that universality is” (NE 486/A VI 6 486).  
What remains to render the confused apprehension of an essence as being of a 
distinct kind is to distinguish it into its constiutive intensions. This is done by means 
of terms that remain in regulated relations to the general term “water”. The capacity 
for considering relations between terms as non-contradictory is the human mind’s 
way of conceiving of essences. Indeed, it is an act distinct from imagining, at least 
as we have characterized it thus far. Imagining is subject to spatiotemporal rules, 
like those deployed to track transformation in ice into water, while conceiving 
responds to principles of identity and contradiction (which are not imaginative). 
What Leibniz calls conceptibility as conceiving concepts and their marks therefore 
equips the rational, cognitive agent with a new tool of discovery: demonstrations 
based on definitions, which are provided by the reduction of terms to identity 
claims, such as “man is a rational animal”. 
The use of identity statements as the foundation for the sciences (both 
mathematical and empirical) is advocated by Leibniz in several places in the NE. 
For instance, in this passage, Leibniz distinguishes between primary truths of reason 
and facts: 
The primary truths which we know by ‘intuition’ are of two sorts, as are the derivative ones. 
They are either truths of reason or truths of fact. Truths of reason are necessary, and those of 
fact are contingent. The primary truths of reason are the ones to which I give the general name 
‘identities’, because they seem to do nothing but repeat the same thing without telling us any-
thing. (NE 361/A VI 6 361) 
Examples of Identities are “What is, is; Each thing is what it is, and as many others 
as you want: A is A; B is B;…” (ibid.). Identities can also be negative statements, 
for instance, “I now turn to negative identities, which derive from either the princi-
ple of contradiction or from ‘disparities’. Stated generally, the principle of contra-
diction is: a proposition is either true or false.” The reason why Leibniz lingers on 
the matter of disclosing the variety of identity is that he wants to prove their use to 
Locke in demonstration. Since identities are truths to which we assent without the 
need for demonstration, they are axioms, that is, things worth taking as true: 
All these can be established with certainty, without any proof, i.e., without bringing them down 
to an opposition (i.e., down to the principle of contradiction), when the ideas are well enough 
understood we do not need any analysis at this point. When that is not the case one is liable to 
error: someone who said The triangle and the trilateral are not the same would be wrong, since 
if we consider it carefully we find that three sides and three angles always go together […]. 
Someone who has been listening patiently so far to what I have just been saying will finally 
lose patience and say that I am wasting time on trivial assertions and that identities are all 















































204 VII. Why Types are not Concepts 
inferences of logic, for example, are demonstrated by means of identities, and geometers need 
the principle of contradiction for their demonstrations by reductio ad absurdum. (NE 363/A VI 
6 363) 
When we claim that “water is water” or “water is ice”, we are not repeating the 
same thing. Rather, we are fixing the word “water” in its technical use to refer to 
an abstract essence WATER, which can then be specified through its relation to 
other definitional terms. Terms, as we will soon see, are the tools used to express 
essences. A concept, therefore, is an acquired capacity to form expressions 
consisting in the connection of terms that refer to essences.27 
Leibniz returns to the topic of axiomatic identities in Book IV, this time 
underlining the difference between imagining and conceiving. He begins by 
claiming: 
 […] the principle of principles really amounts to making good use of ideas and of experiments; 
but if we take this a little deeper we will find that what it involves, so far as ideas are concerned, 
is nothing but the connecting of definitions by means of axiomatic identities. (NE 450/A VI 6 
450) 
The idea of axiomatic identity is explained a few lines later, using as an example 
Euclid’s axiom that straight lines only meet once and – most salient of all to our 
analysis – Leibniz opposes it to the confused ideas of the imagination: 
Euclid, for instance, has included in his axioms what amounts to the statement that two straight 
lines can meet only once. Imagination, drawing on sense-experience, does not allow us to depict 
two straight lines meeting more than once, but this is not the right foundation for a science. 
And if anyone believes that his imagination presents him with connections between distinct 
ideas, then he is inadequately informed as to the source of truths, and would count as immediate 
a great many propositions which really are demonstrable from prior ones. This is something 
which has not been properly thought out by many people who have found fault with Euclid: 
images of this sort are merely confused ideas, and someone who knows a straight line only by 
means of them will be incapable of demonstrating anything about it. Euclid had no distinctly 
expressed idea of a straight line, i.e., no definition of it (for the one he offers provisionally is 
unclear, and useless to him in his demonstrations), and so he was obliged to have recourse to 
two axioms which served him in place of a definition and which he uses in his demonstrations: 
the one, that two straight lines do not have any parts in common, and the other, that they do not 
enclose a space. Archimedes gave a sort of definition of ‘straight line’ when he said that it is 
the shortest line between two points. But in his demonstrations, when he uses elements such as 
Euclid’s, founded on the two axioms I have just referred to, he tacitly assumes that the proper-
ties spoken of in those axioms are possessed by the line which he has defined. (NE 451; my 
italics) 
How do we know that two straight lines do not meet more than once? If we imagine 
them, then we can see them with our mind’s eye. These confused ideas, however, 
cannot provide the foundation for science. A definition can do this job, although, if 
we are unable to find a real one, we can select observable properties of something 
that does the same work as a definition. This is what Euclid did: he assumed that 
two straight lines have no parts in common and do not enclose any space. In tacitly 
 















































 5. Types, Concepts, and Terms 205 
assuming that the essence we are defining has those properties (although we cannot 
say why), we provide nominal definitions which, albeit only provisionally, assist in 
the advancement of knowledge. These ideas are distinct because they are based on 
terms that are themselves distinct, as shall be explored in the next section.  
5. TYPES, CONCEPTS, AND TERMS 
If types are abilities for recognizing, tracking, and predicting phenomenal appear-
ances and connections, then concepts consist in the ability to form expressions of 
essences through the connection of terms. A term refers to an intensional distinction 
within an essence, which can be entailed by, or entail, other intensions. When we 
use names, such as ‘man’, as terms, the name does not refer to a concrete or possible 
being, but to an essence determined by other sub-conceptual marks that remain in 
a regulated relation. If I utter the sentences “That man is tall”, and “man is rational 
animal”, man is not used univocally. In the first case, it has an extensional interpre-
tation, on which account the sentence is true if there really is a tall man. In the 
second case, it has an intensional interpretation and is true if and only if “rational” 
and “animal” constitute a conjunction of possible intensions, that is (i) if, when 
unpacked into their constituents, there is no contradiction entailed, and (ii) if their 
conjunction does not produce any contradiction. I do not need to know whether a 
man exists to know that the essence is possible. 
A rational agent can be said to possess a concept when she has the ability to 
express an essence through the connection of terms in a definition, which can either 
be nominal or real. A real definition, as we pointed out in Chapter I, is one that puts 
us in a position to demonstrate the possibility of an essence, or to derive other things 
that we can demonstrate about the essence. A nominal definition consists in a se-
lection of properties that we conceive of as pertaining to the essence – either through 
observation of its instances or by hypothesis – in spite of the fact that we have no 
way of demonstrating that they essentially pertain to the thing. Since concepts are 
an acquired ability to connect intensions, distinguished using the help of representa-
tive vehicles,28 intensional distinctions and their relations through terms render con-
cepts forms of distinct knowledge of essences, and, therefore, of a different kind by 
comparison with clear and distinct perceptions, such as types. The intensional dis-
tinctions we use to define a concept are distinctions that do not change the extension 
of those concepts: they introduce divisions into what we can imagine as “epistemic 
space”.29  
Let us illustrate with an example. If I say that “every tree is a plant”, then this 
sentence is not informative regarding the extension of the concept TREE. It may be 
informative about the extension of the concept PLANT, because if I did not know 
 
28 To this end, we have focused on the terms within a language. Leibniz, however, was adamant 
that we can also employ other tools, such as numbers, diagrams, or indeed anything that can be 
divided into parts, connected in virtue of rules. 















































206 VII. Why Types are not Concepts 
that trees are plants, then once I grasped this proposition, I would know that when 
I see a tree, I thereby see a plant. Information regarding the extension of concepts, 
however, is only indirectly deduced from intensional distinctions. This is because 
we assume that concepts refer to individuals and their worldly modifications, and 
that there is an inversion relation between intensions and extensions: the more in-
tensions a concept entails, the less individuals it refers to, the less general it is. In 
arguing that the distinction introduced by concepts is not extensional but inten-
sional, Leibniz brings in the example of co-extensional concepts. 
Co-extensional concepts are designated by different terms that can be substi-
tuted within a sentence “salva veritate”, that is, without changing the truth-value of 
the proposition.30 To this end, trilateral and triangular are among Leibniz’s exam-
ples. Although all triangles are trilateral, and these terms therefore both refer to the 
same geometrical essence, there are contexts (like the reduplicative context (Mug-
nai 1990)) in which “triangular” and “trilateral” cannot be substituted “salva veri-
tate”. This is because they refer to two distinct aspects of the same thing, which 
explains why some scholars, like Ishiguro (1972) and Mugnai (1990), observe that 
the “salva veritate” principle is a criterion for the identity of concepts/terms, rather 
than the identity of the thing designated by the name:  
Someone who said The triangle and the trilateral are not the same would be wrong, since if 
we consider it carefully we find that three sides and three angles always go together. And if he 
said The quadrilateral rectangle and the rectangle are not the same he would be wrong again, 
since it turns out that only a four-sided figure can have all its angles right angles. However, one 
can still say in the abstract that triangularity is not trilaterality, or that the formal causes of the 
triangle and of the trilateral are not the same, as the philosophers put it. They are different 
aspects of one and the same thing. (NE 363) 
When we consider a being not through its appearance, but as a collection of es-
sences (to use Zimmermann’s characterization), or formalitates (since Leibniz re-
marks above that they are formal causes; see also Di Bella (2004)), we simply con-
sider the thing in the abstract, i.e., through its essence. In so doing, while we dis-
tinguish aspects that exist together in one being, these aspects are distinct from the 
perspective of essences. 
Another example are terms that are co-extensional and yet be two distinct es-
sences. “justice” and “wisdom”. If it is true that a wise man is a just man, (viz. that 
 
30 Elementa ad calculum condendum A VI 4 A 154: “Si a est b et b est a, potest unum pro altero 
substitui salva veritate. Subjectum substitui potest in locum praedicati seu si a est b, et b est c, 
etiam a est c.”; Calculus ratiocinator A VI 4 A 275: “Idem est quod ubique in alterius locum 
substitui potest salva veritate. Ex. gr. aequilaterum aequiangulum quadrangulum, et: 
aequilaterum rectangulum quadrilaterum, et denique quadratum, haec tria sunt idem, et unum 
pro altero substitui potest. Nam eadem res quae quadrata est etiam aequilatera rectangula 
quadrilatera est et contra.” Specimen calculi universali A VI 4 A 282: “Eadem sunt quorum 
unum in alterius locum substitui potest, salva veritate, ut Triangulum et Trilaterum, 
Quadrangulum et Quadrilaterum.” The topic of the salva veritate criterion of truth for 
propositions is a focus of discussions about Leibniz’s logic. Scholars, including Russell, have 















































 5. Types, Concepts, and Terms 207 
the terms are coextensional, because, on Leibniz’s view, a wise man cannot be un-
just), then they are nonetheless two different terms. This is because their intensional 
analyses differ (Di Bella, 2004). Therefore, if both terms refer to one and the same 
being, then they divide what is ontologically one (a being) into many aspects that 
nonetheless belong to the same individual. However, those terms, when used as 
marks for essences, hold for two different essences, viz. WISDOM and JUSTICE, 
which precludes us from inferring that justice is wisdom, an identification that 
would have given us a logical ground for claiming that “a just man is also a wise 
man”. Based on essences, however, we have no reason to infer that wisdom and 
justice are logically connected.31 
The idea underlying these examples is that, in order to express essences, the 
terms tokened in the sentence must evidence some kind of connection that differs 
from causal or ontological connection. The relation must be one of conceptual con-
tainment or exclusion, that is, what Leibniz calls formal causation, which consists 
in a relation between forms, or what Leibniz calls “possibilities”, that are based on 
the reduction of terms to identity claims and contradictions. Even though it may be 
true that every just man is wise, based on their possibilities, the logic of essences 
does not allow for this inference. However, logic does not exclude the possibility 
that justice and wisdom are ontologically related. This is because, as Leibniz seems 
to argue, it is true that it cannot be the case that there exists a just man who is not 
also a wise man, and yet the fact that a wise man is also a just man is still contin-
gently true (as there is no logical necessity involved). Possibilities and existence are 
not the same thing: if two properties inhere in the same being, then it is not the case 
that in the abstract they must inhere in the same concept, or that they must be logi-
cally related. If there is any relation between essences, then it is also our task to 
determine what kind of relation this is. As we will see in the next chapter, this rela-
tion will boil down to either a metaphysical, physical, or logical connection. 
Before focusing on the reality of distinctions, we need to complete our enquiry 
into Leibniz’s conceptualism, in particular by spelling out its answer to the issues 
raised against nominalist theories. Surprisingly, the first step in providing such an 
answer involves conceding one of the nominalist’s central claims: when we use 
conceptual distinctions to express ontological modifications of beings, we use a 
fiction, because we reduce something concrete, complex, and multifaceted to its 
aspects, whereby we consider these aspects as if they were identical to our concept 
 
31 See De abstractis A VI 4 A 573–5. This distinction is relevant to Leibniz for theological rea-
sons. If the relation between wisdom and justice is of logical containment, then God is neces-
sarily wise and just, such that it is impossible (read: logically impossible) for God to condemn 
an innocent. If, on the other hand, there is no logical relation between them, then it seems that 
it is not impossible for God to condemn an innocent even if it cannot be the case that God 
condemns an innocent. “God cannot condemn an innocent” is then contingent, whereby the 
impossibility is of a moral, not a logical, kind. See De libertade a necessitate in eligendo A VI 
4 B 1453, where Leibniz writes that the damnation of innocents is logically possible, but im-















































208 VII. Why Types are not Concepts 
of that modification or property.32 This fiction, according to Leibniz, consists only 
in treating the concrete being as if it were an ideal essence or a collection of several 
abstracta, but terms, on Leibniz’s account, are not fictional as they are on so-called 
‘ultranominalist’ accounts, such as the theory of collective wholes. For this latter, 
general terms are themselves fictions because they refer to non-existing, mind-de-
pendent entities, viz. essences abstracted from individuals. It is this – not Leibniz’s 
interpretation – that jeopardizes the sciences, reducing them to knowledge of names 
rather than things. On Leibniz’s account, for example, when we reduce a man to the 
concept MAN and, in turn, to RATIONALITY, we consider not the particular, but 
the essence, which qua possibility is mind-independent insofar as the connections 
that defines it are not constructed by minds; they are only apprehended by minds as 
possibilities.33 The essence is real insofar as it exists in the mind of God, but not 
even God has the power to arbitrarily construct it. Essences qua possibilities are 
there to be grasped by God’s intellect.34 While God can grasp them immediately 
and directly, human minds have to reconstruct the realm of possibilities a posteri-
ori, inferring it from observation of what actually exists. 
Furthermore, through this fiction (or, better yet, analogical reasoning, since we 
consider abstracta “as if” they existed in concreto or concreta as if they were ab-
stracta), we decompose complex beings into more simple aspects, which are easier 
to analyze by a finite mind. When we consider one aspect over others, this is be-
cause, in unpacking via conceptual containment those aspects, we are able to derive 
other characterizing facets, which is to say that the aspect we select is more in-
formative about the thing with respect to what we want to know about it. The ne-
cessity of the connection between terms is provided by the principle of contradic-
tion and identity, and not by the actual states of the thing. This means that if I can 
consider Claire as an instance of HUMAN BEING, and I further know that HU-
MAN BEING is CAPABLE OF LAUGHTER, I will believe that Claire can laugh. 
The process Leibniz has in mind is similar to what we do with numbers. If I have 
 
32 Through this fictive reduction, I shall argue, finite human minds acquire necessary knowledge 
about the world and, in so doing, can navigate the world’s variety with a greater degree of 
certitudo. Moreover, conceptual knowledge is the ground for intercourse between minds, the 
constitution of a moral society, and membership in God’s kingdom of grace. 
33 Already in Dialogus (1679), Leibniz argues against Hobbes’ ultranominalism, claiming that 
definitions do not consist in knowledge of names because they express connections between 
ideas, which are independent from how we name them. The same idea was expressed in De 
mente, de universe, de Deo (1675) and will be repeated in NE against Locke. There, Leibniz 
adds a “realist” note, claiming that essences are eternal in God’s intellect, for He cannot choose 
those that are possible, but only those that can be instantiated and exist in the actual world. On 
this, see Mugnai (1990), Schepers (2014), and Bolton (2018). 
34 This piece of theory is a response to Descartes’ Universal Possibilism. According to Descartes, 
God chooses necessary truths. This means that if God had so desired, it could have been the 
case that a necessary truth, like 2+2=4, would be false (see, for instance, Saint-Germaine, 
2016). On Leibniz’s understanding, such a claim is equivalent to affirming the superiority of 
God’s will over His intellect, viz. that truths depend on God’s choice. Leibniz responds that 
even God cannot choose what it is true, since this depends upon the possibilities that God grasps 
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apples, count them, and find that they add up to five, then I also know that I need 
five more apples if I want 10 of them. I know this because the reduction of apples 
to the number five is the reason why I can count 5+5=10 (or 5x2=10). When we 
operate with the concept, we do something along the lines of calculating with terms 
about essences, which subjects our inferential capacity to too many variables, 
thereby jeopardizing our success in alethic inferences. One way of overcoming this 
is to find a mechanical way of controlling risks by finding a language capable of 
showing conceptual containments. Indeed, as is well-known, this was precisely 
Leibniz’s project of a scientia generalis, as constituted by an alphabet of human 
thoughts, that is, a compendium of well-defined terms. In effect, this scientia gen-
eralis consisted in an encyclopedia encompassing a division of sciences and up-to-
date information regarding their knowledge-status. Meanwhile, Leibniz’s charac-
teristica universalis consisted in the invention of a formal language that permitted 
calculation and deduction. People often overlook the fact that a formal language 
without the two other parts simply amounts to a formal-logical tool, which alone is 
unproductive of truth. Nevertheless, the reduction of a subject matter to a formal 
procedure, which captures essences, really does expand our inferential powers, 
thereby making us less prone to error. To this end, the next chapter offers a fully-
fledged theory of error. 
I want to emphasize that it is the act of considering a concrete being as an ideal, 
abstract essence that is fictional, not the connection present in essences (notwith-
standing questions about how they are established, e.g., those found in natural kinds 
are likely less certain than connections established in mathematical essences). This 
view is therefore compatible with a nominalist ontology. That theory states that 
there are actual attributes and modifications of individuals that determine them to 
some states rather than others – to some actions over others – which we then ab-
stractedly categorize as distinct in concept terms like WISE or JUST. It nonetheless 
tries to avoid the pitfalls of nominalism, claiming that essences are nominal (to use 
Locke’s words) because they are mere connections of names. Terms that are con-
nected in virtue of concepts constitute distinct knowledge of essences. This will 
become clearer in the next chapter, where we shall tackle the question of why our 
knowledge of essences is not fictional.  
For now, let us focus on the advantages of Leibniz’s conceptualism. The attrib-
ution of many different properties to one and the same individual would be impos-
sible were human minds incapable of grasping distinctions in essences and consid-
ering those essences as distinct from one another, even though the states we cate-
gorize as instances of an essence altogether inhere in one and the same individual. 
In other words, finite minds can conceive of a logico-epistemological space, which 
is independent of how individuals are sorted into similarity classes, but is nonethe-
less related to those classes (recall the example of water and ice). When rational 
agents divide that space into conceptual regions, which reflect the relations between 
concepts, individuals and their states can be housed in those regions because they 
can be expressed from many perspectives: as belonging to a species or genus, viz. 
as instantiating properties. The apprehension of the similarity between individuals 















































210 VII. Why Types are not Concepts 
to apply necessary and innate truths to the materials afforded by the senses, which 
the imagination synthetizes into a format befitting limited human minds, which are 
bound to generality. When the mind acquires conceptual distinctions, it also gains 
a better way of predicting reality. It nonetheless has a cognitive interest in retaining 
that ladder, for there are tasks that involve needing to return once again to instances. 
Concepts are, therefore, not sets of individuals, as in the theory of collective 
wholes. They are individuated by intensions, which are respectively structured by 
the entailment relations between terms. Our capacity for relating some terms to oth-
ers by means of definitions is what we call a concept. It is worth noticing that the 
mere aggregation of intensions would be insufficient for drawing up criteria for 
conceptual individuation. For this requires identity criteria, provided by a predica-
mental structure, as in a Porphyrian tree.35 A different structure may produce a dif-
ferent concept. Consider, for instance, that our concept is an ability to connect the 
intensions PLANT and TREE in a regulated way. Unless we know the kind of 
predicamental relation that exists between those terms, we cannot say which con-
cept we have, and thereby which essence we thereby express. The sentence “every 
plant is a tree” would express a different essence and hence constitute the manifes-
tation of a different concept of PLANT from the one we have. In our system, 
PLANT is a genus entailing other species, like TREE. On this view, “every tree is 
a plant” but not “every plant is a tree”. Concepts are capacities to express essences 
as the absence of contradiction between connected terms, which are structured in 
predicamental trees. 
If this is correct, then the Leibnizian motto “alia est rerum, alia terminorum 
divisio” refers to two different kinds of distinction: one based on individuals and 
similarity; the other on concepts and their relations, supported by two different 
kinds of cognitive processes. The first kind of cognitive process relies on types, 
while the other relies on concepts. In other words, Leibniz’s hypothesis is the fol-
lowing: there is a substantial difference between the real attributes of beings and 
the divisions of essences. In spite of this great difference, conceptual distinctions 
and their relations map onto beings’ distinctions and changes across worlds. This 
mapping comes at the price of a loss of determinacy, which is, however, payed back 
in terms of conceptual distinctness, which permits a more stable grip on world(s). 
If we were God, then we would know the world in all its detail. Since we are not, 
however, we can only know regions of the world distinctly by reducing them to 
essences. The imagination and the senses bound us to one actual world. 
 
35 Porphyrian trees are not only structured logically but ontologically. Leibniz was actually criti-
cal of the ontological implications of Porphyrian trees, as Di Bella (2005: 36–55) discusses in 
detail. In the next chapter, we will see that Leibniz divorces logic from ontology. This leaves 
Porphyrian trees as valid logical tools for conceptual organization, but they assuredly refer to 
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6. THE CONCEPTUALIST RESPONSE 
We now know all the elements for proving how the extension of a concept can exist 
outside of the concept of a concept: types provide concepts with an extension. Con-
sequently, concepts are not grounded in their instances, but on possibilities con-
ceived logically as the absence of contradiction between terms.  
Similarity is simply a sign for subsuming an individual under a concept; it does 
not constitute the concept. In distinguishing existence from the mere possibility of 
an essence, Leibniz reveals himself to be adamantly against Locke’s idea that con-
cepts do not depend on their instances: 
If you take ideas to be actual thoughts, you are right. But I see no need to apply your distinction 
in connection with the very form or possibility of those thoughts; and that is what we are con-
cerned with when we separate off the ideal world from the existent world. The real existence 
of beings, which are not necessary, is a matter of fact or of history, while the knowledge of 
possibilities and necessities (the necessary being that whose opposite is not possible) is what 
makes up the demonstrative sciences. (NE 301) 
If concepts depended on their instances, then Leibniz’s theory would be subject to 
the same difficulties faced by nominalist theories, such as Locke’s or Nizolius’s. 
The distinction between beings and essences represents Leibniz’s solution to the 
issues raised by collective wholes. Understanding concepts as expressions of 
essences (instead of expressions of individuals) allows us to consistently argue that 
true statements are independent of the actual existence of instances. If truth depends 
only on the relations of entailments and connections of concepts, then the existence 
of individuals does not bear any influence on those relations. On this picture, 
propositions like 
(3) Mammoths have four legs  
(7) Pegasus is a winged horse 
(8) The sum of the angles of a triangle is 180° 
are all true because they simply state that if triangles exist, then the sum of their 
angles is 180°; if Pegasus exists, then it has the property of being a horse with wings; 
if mammoths exist, then they have four legs. These are propositions about fictional 
essences, extint species, and mathematical essences, which do not differ from a 
purely analytical perspective.36 In this way, Leibniz’s theory preserves our intuition 
about the propositions that we can form and consider to be true, even if they are 
about non-existing entities. Nevertheless, it seems to leave us with a bitter taste, for 
we feel like there is a difference between what those statements claim. There is a 
difference between real and fictional beings, for instance, while, if we follow this 
analysis, then anything I can conceive of as being free from contradiction is also 
true. The next chapter will offer an error theory and present certain restrictions on 
our capacity for producing distinctions. On this occasion, this restriction cannot be 
 















































212 VII. Why Types are not Concepts 
internal to the subject: it must be “real”, that is, it regards what Leibniz calls 
metaphysical and physical genera. 
7. CONCLUSION 
Against Locke’s worries regarding the notion of essences, Leibniz argues that the 
limitations of our knowledge of essences are not sufficient for causing us to 
relinquish this notion. In order to rehabiliate a notion of essence that capably 
explains why human knowledge is necessary (albeit often only hypothetically), 
Leibniz propounds a form of conceptualism. I have argued that conceptualism has 
the aim of contrasting what is traditionally called the “collective wholes” theory of 
concepts. On this theory, concepts consist in sets of individuals and suffer from 
difficulties that can be overcome by understanding concepts as structured clusters 
of intensional distinctions, which represent essences rather than individuals. 
However, Leibniz’s conceptualism implies that concepts cannot play this 
recognitory role. For this reason, Leibniz must draw a distinction in kind between 
types and concepts: types are active in the cognitive process of recognizing 
individuals qua individuals of a certain type. This recognition moreover forms the 
basis for acquiring concepts: concepts may be activated in the process of 
recognizing individuals. When we claim that a certain individual is an instance of 
a concept, however, we are performing a different mental act: we implicitly assume 
that the intensional distinctions of the concept map onto real attributes and 
modifications of that individual. In so doing, we are capable of inferring some 
universal, contingent truths about the individual. This is true even if the nature of 
the instance is not as rigid as we assume the essence to be. This “mathematization” 
of the world allows human beings to better navigate the variety of the world, and to 















































VIII. CONCEPTUALISM, REAL DISTINCTIONS, AND ERROR 
The preceding chapter clarified the distinction between types and concepts. There, 
it was argued that, for Leibniz, these distinct cognitive abilities correspond to two 
different logical analyses: the former are classes referring to particular beings or 
modifications, while the latter are clusters of contradiction-free intensions. We fur-
thermore established that, if type-acquisition did not precede concept-formation, 
then (1) rational agents could not form concepts, and (2) concepts could not obtain 
an extensional interpretation. The distinction between types and concepts, I argued, 
is invoked by Leibniz in order to solve issues raised by nominalist theories insofar 
as they seek to determine the truth of universal, contingent propositions. On an ex-
tensional interpretation, some true propositions turn out to be false. Leibniz’s con-
ceptualism avoids this consequence. Still, it is not clear how Leibniz’s solution can 
avoid a particular form of arbitrariness about kinds, as raised by Locke’s spokesman 
in NE. Even if essences in the mind of God are the metaphysical ground of concepts, 
the human ability to conceive of essences still depends upon experiencing individ-
uals and their similarities. This aspect of Leibniz’s theory of concepts subjects it to 
the set of challenges raised by Locke against our alleged capacity to know real es-
sences in his Essay.  
As anticipated, Locke’s criticism insists on a gap between the varieties that 
characterize instances,1 and a sort of freedom in the stipulation of properties that 
necessarily belong to a being in order for it to be considered an instance of a certain 
kind. The cluster of properties selected as essential to a kind are often not coexten-
sive with their instances: a man can become irrational, or may never manifest ra-
tional competences.2 As we have seen, Leibniz responds to this issue by separating 
the extensional from the intensional analysis of concepts. Concepts are abilities to 
form clusters of intensions grounded in the logical possibility of an essence, which 
they express through definitions. Concepts are, therefore, not abstracted from in-
stances; they map onto existing beings in virtue of their association with types. If 
concepts are not abstracted from instances, then Locke’s criticism is circumscribed 
but not thereby surmounted. Rational agents, in fact, do not have direct knowledge 
of essences, Leibniz thinks, because they can conceive of essences a posteriori, viz. 
 
1 Lenz (2009) uses the expression “varieties of standards”, meaning that experience offers vari-
ous possible ways of categorizing particular instances. 
2 EHU 545–6: “in vain therefore shall we endeavor to discover by our ideas; (the only true way 
of certain and universal knowledge,) what other Ideas are to be found constantly joined with 
that of our complex Idea of any Substance: since we neither know the real constitution of the 
minute Parts, on which their qualities do depend; nor, did we know them, could we discover 
any necessary connexion between them, and any of the secondary Qualities: which is necessary 















































214 VIII. Conceptualism, Real Distinctions, and Error 
following their acquaintance with beings’ similarities. The separation between in-
tension and extension is then only the logical counterpart of a solution that entails 
various metaphysical commitments. Indeed, as Zimmermann notes, “logic and met-
aphysics are in their development inseparably intertwined” (Zimmermann 1854). 
The last piece of analysis that sees Leibniz’s theory succeed is an enquiry into the 
metaphysical commitments that such a logic of concepts entails, namely what Leib-
niz calls a distinction between real and logical genus, a distinction that functions as 
a sort of error theory for the conceivability of essences. Our enquiry’s output will, 
then, consist in a metaphysical explanation for why essences do not exist in their 
instances, owing to which they cannot be abstracted from empirical experience. 
Our analysis begins by stressing the role of experience and types for conceiving 
of essences. To this end, we shall probe more deeply the relation between language, 
types, and concepts (sect. 1). In so doing, we individuate a gulf between the for-
mation of general names and the conception of essences: it is not the case that an 
essence corresponds to any general name that we may form for pragmatic reasons 
(sect. 2). Essential distinctions are metaphysically more fundamental than the gath-
ering of individuals into classes. Indeed, in order to understand what they are, we 
need to study Leibniz’s distinction between real and logical genera (sect. 3). The 
contrast between real and logical genera is the key to arguing that Leibniz remains 
faithful to his antirealism about essences. On his view, there are no real essences 
that exist in the being that makes that being a being of that kind; a substance mod-
ified in accordance with permanent attributes constitutes a being. If essences are 
not real, then they cannot be abstracted. They can, however, be constructed as log-
ical devices, viz. concepts that “mathematize” the world, better enabling predictions 
than types, which are based in the logic of the imagination (sect. 4). We conclude 
our chapter with an error theory (sect. 5). 
The main upshot of this chapter is that, when we categorize natural kinds, we 
do so by tracking modifications of a physical genus, what Leibniz calls the “matter” 
of a concept. Categorization expresses this physical genus by dividing it into phys-
ical species that are then mathematized via rigid definitions, which capture essence 
as clusters of conceptual marks. In this way, Leibniz secures the autonomy of sci-
entific enquiry from metaphysics, and, at the same time, the regulative role that 
metaphysics plays with regard to the sciences. To this end, hypotheses and expla-
nations are true if they are simpler than other candidate hypotheses and explana-
tions, which require assumptions grounded in real beings or substances, a conclu-
sion based on Leibniz’s methodological nominalism (Mugnai 2018). Whether or 
not we find Leibniz’s theory palatable, it nonetheless contains certain striking intu-
itions, which we will discuss in our conclusion. 
1. GENERALIZATIONS AND NATURAL LANGUAGES 
At no point does Leibniz deny that our distinctions of beings into kinds depends on 
experience. In Epistolica de historia etymologica dissertatio (1712?), a text that 















































 1. Generalizations and Natural Languages 215 
their mutual evolution),3 he proposes what sounds like a developmentalist account 
of language and cognition. This is based on the idea that, normally: 
the denominations of those things easier to cognize, and the simpler opinion of the people come 
first. (ED § 23, Gensini 1991: 229) 
In the Epistolica, Leibniz uses etymological studies to prove the historical and cog-
nitive dimension of languages. Languages are transformed and expanded on an on-
going basis through the speech acts of communicative, rational agents. More pre-
cisely, etymology proves that the words of our language, which are now used to 
refer to abstract entities or metaphysical categories, were originally established to 
refer to more concrete physical entities. The word “spirit”, for instance, originally 
signified “warm breath”, and was later deployed figuratively to denote “life”, or 
“that which keeps us alive”, viz. the soul. This move away from concrete to abstract 
entities reveals the general rule undergirding cognition, viz. human minds cognize, 
and consequently (1) denominate first things that fall under the knowledge domain 
of the senses, and (2) later in time they categorize and give names to more abstract 
entities.4 
Transposed onto the level of categorization, this view implies that the observa-
ble properties of bodies and their outer appearances are used as a primitive guide to 
divide beings into natural kinds. General names hence first refer to beings’ appear-
 
3 For an analysis and transcript of the text, see Gensini (1991). I analyze the text in Oliveri (2016: 
III.2 and 2016c). 
4 As argued in Oliveri (2016: III.2) and Oliveri (2016b), Leibniz uses etymological enquiries to 
establish that metaphysics and the moral sciences were developed following the establishment 
of a language employed for mundane purposes, which moreover subjects metaphysics and mo-
rality to historical development. More precisely, to be capable of communicating about abstract 
matters (which are proper to morality and metaphysics, such as the notion of the soul, justice, 
and the good) rational peers must impose names onto these abstract subjects. But words are 
established in speech acts that are first directed towards objects and states that manifest a rela-
tion between the organic body and a mind. As a consequence, human beings’ first acts of de-
nomination begin by imposing names onto concrete things. This makes it natural for linguistic 
peers to use existing words in the establishment of new meanings when they need to denomi-
nate abstract entities. Known words are used with a meaning that bears an analogical relation 
to the context and its semantic precedent. In processing a word that is being used in a slightly 
different way, the peer to whom the linguistic act is addressed seeks a new meaning, through 
which the word acquires reference to an abstract subject matter. When we use the word “spirit” 
(whose original meaning is “intangible breath”) in a context that has nothing to do with “breath” 
(such as when it is used to describe what keeps us alive, viz. the soul), we extend the meaning 
of the word, which thereby comes to signify the soul. Figurative speech is hence a cognitive 
tool (rather than a merely ornamental facet of languages) and can be responsible for shifts in 
meaning. The origins of names used for metaphysical discourse, however, subject metaphysics 
and morality to the imagination, after which it is prone to superstition. As names first refer to 
imaginative and concrete beings, human beings tend also to express those things that are not 
subject to the imagination via what it is subjected to, and are prone to mistakes because the 
figurative use of speech inclines them to understand what they say literally. Thus, they wrongly 















































216 VIII. Conceptualism, Real Distinctions, and Error 
ances, upon which rests recognition. If our analysis of types is correct, then it fol-
lows that the origins of general names are tied to types before names are to concepts, 
and are used to refer to essences, which results in a fallible and provisional division 
of natural kinds. The same thought is expressed in NE. There, Leibniz agrees with 
Locke that cognizant agents distinguish between beings by giving them a general 
name well before they have any precise, scientific knowledge: 
PHIL. Languages were established before sciences, and things were put into species by ignorant 
and illiterate people. 
THEO. That is true, but the people who study a subject-matter correct popular notions. Essay-
ers have found precise methods for identifying and separating metals, botanists have marvel-
ously extended our knowledge of plants, and experiments that have been performed on insects 
have given us new routes into the knowledge of animals.5 However, we are still far short of 
halfway along our journey. (NE 319) 
If Leibniz accepts human dependence on experience for categorization, then how 
can he reject Locke’s criticism? In separating beings into species, rational agents 
first rely on empirical data and outer appearances, which can lead them astray or 
present them with borderline cases that challenge the reality of our categorizations, 
warns Locke. Divisions between species seem to result from rational-agential 
agreement, rather than the representation of real essences, as evidenced in border-
line cases (such as monsters). Despite their ancestors belonging to the species “hu-
man being”, monsters do not look like their ancestors and show no signs of rational 
thought, which casts doubt upon whether they can be considered instances of the 
species “human being.” If there are real essences and we know them through defi-
nitions that consist in collections of properties (variously subdivided into species, 
genus, and more specific differences, such as “man is a rational animal”), then what 
makes nature so liberal in the creation of a monster?6 In other words, if there are 
real essences and, moreover, if our definitions represent those real essences, then 
every man must be rational, and there is no room for anomalies like monsters. Bor-
derlines cases seem to prove the arbitrariness of natural kinds.7 We can recast 
Locke’s worry thus: how can we say that the divisions we project onto nature (based 
on similarities) correspond with real divisions? What licenses us to infer that a real 
essence corresponds to our ways of dividing beings? 
 
5 Leibniz regularly refers to the discovery of the generation of insects (thanks to the microscope) 
as proof of the thesis that nothing is ever destroyed or newly created; everything is borne from 
seeds that develop and envelop according to physical laws. See Monadology § 74 (1714, GP 
VI 619); Considerations on Vital Principles and Plastic Natures by the Aauthor of the Principle 
of Pre-Established Harmony (GP VI 540–1/ L 588–9). 
6 EHU 404: “The frequent productions of monsters, in all the species of animals, and of change-
lings, and other strange issues of human birth, carry with them difficulties, not possible to con-
sist with this hypothesis; since it is as impossible that two things partaking exactly of the same 
real essence should have different properties, as that two figures partaking of the same real 
essence of a circle should have different properties.” 















































 1. Generalizations and Natural Languages 217 
Although he rejects the arbitrariness of our categorizations, Leibniz nevertheless 
agrees with Locke that our species-genus distinctions are provisional and, indeed, 
prone to error. This is especially true when we are dealing with natural and social 
kinds, rather than ideal entities, such as in mathematics.8 Our limitations, however, 
are not a sufficiently good reason to doubt that there are essences, since we have 
strategies to make our distinctions more precise, namely by grounding them in more 
stable truths and axioms. To implement this strategy, Leibniz first denies that con-
cepts are abstracted from their instances, as we began to see in the previous chapter. 
The second step constitutes a more ‘classical’ move, namely, we need to argue that 
there are higher genera that ground more specific modifications, owing to which 
beings can be sorted into genera and species. In short, rational agents have ways of 
understanding which distinctions are more fundamental than others and, hence, of 
putting constraints on which distinctions can be accepted as possible and real owing 
to their conformity with the possible modifications of a genus. By including a spe-
cies into a genus, and then this genus into another, we determine which genus is 
more inclusive of other genera. In so doing, our distinctions track something more 
fundamental or, to use a contemporary expression, they carve reality at its joints.9  
 
8 See also Bolton (2017). 
9 Even early on in his philosophical career, Leibniz thought to reduce beings to their higher gen-
era and then ordering them in chains of definitions, see On Universal Synthesis and Analysis, 
or the Art of Discovery and Judging (1679? A VI 4 A 538–9/L 229): “Cum puer Logicam 
discerem, et solerem jam tum altius inquirere in rationes eorum quae mihi proponebantur, ob-
jiciebam praeceptoribus, cur non, ut praedicamenta habentur terminorum incomplexorum, qui-
bus ordinantur notiones; ita et praedicamenta fierent terminorum complexorum, quibus ordi-
narentur veritates; ignorabam scilicet hoc ipsum facere Geometras, cum demonstrant, et prop-
ositiones ita collocant, prout aliae ex aliis dependent. Videbatur autem mihi res universaliter 
fore in potestate, si haberentur prius praedicamenta vera simplicium terminorum et ad ea 
obtinenda constitueretur quoddam velut Alphabetum cogitandi, seu catalogus summorum (vel 
pro summis assumtorum) generum, ut a, b, c, d, e, f, ex quorum combinatione fierent inferiores 
notiones. enim est genera sibi mutuo differentias praestare; omnemque differentiam posse con-
cipi ut genus et omne genus ut differentiam; et tam recte dici animal rationale, quam si fingere 
licet, rational animale. Cum vulgaria vero genera species sua combinatione non exhibeant, con-
cludebam non recte constituta esse. Et quidem genera summis proxime inferiora, forent bi-
niones: ut ab, ac, bd, cf. Genera tertii gradus forent terniones, ut abc, bdf, et ita porro. Quod si 
summa genera, vel pro summis assumta essent infinita, ut in numeris (ubi numeri primitivi 
possunt assumi pro summis generibus, nam omnes pares possunt dici binarii, omnes per tres 
divisibiles possunt dici ternarii, et ita porro, et numerus derivativus exprimi potest per primiti-
vos tanquam genera, ita senarius omnis est binarius ternarius), saltem ordo summorum 
generum, ut in numeris esset constituendus, et ita ordo quoque appareret in inferioribus. Et 
proposita qualibet specie ordine enumerari possent propositiones de ea demonstrabiles, seu 
praedicata tam latiora, quam convertibilia, ex quibus memorabiliora seligi possent.” Leibniz 
pursues this strategy throughout his career, as demonstrated by the numerous tables of defini-
tions for various sciences (physics, metaphysics, natural sciences, and morals). In light of the 
analysis we have conducted here, we can nonetheless conclude that if, in his youth, Leibniz 
thought that the highest genera consist in simple notions (or the attributes of God), then it seems 
that, in his mature philosophy, he abandons this idea for solving terms in abstract and concrete, 















































218 VIII. Conceptualism, Real Distinctions, and Error 
We begin by elaborating on why the separation between the extension and intension 
of a concept constitutes a response to Locke’s formulation of arbitrariness of natural 
kinds, after which we propose a new form of arbitrariness. Thus, the question is not 
about whether our distinctions have a fundamentum in re owing to their grounding 
in similarity:10 the question is about whether our distinctions are fundamental; 
whether they carve reality at its joints. Recognizing this new challenge, Leibniz sets 
out to avoid it by way of his theory of real and logical species. 
2. GENERALIZATIONS AND ESSENCES 
For Leibniz, Locke’s attempt to cast doubt on the species-genus distinction bears 
all the hallmarks of a nominalist revival, such that “universals” are mere names 
resulting from human agreement, while general concepts are nothing but collective 
wholes with extensional referents. For this reason, single cases that do not befit our 
concept of the species reflect the arbitrariness of human distinctions of beings into 
species and genus. Unsurprisingly, Leibniz channels most of his theoretical might 
into revealing that Locke addresses the wrong target: concepts are not grounded in 
individuals and their existence; individuals are distinct from concepts, although 
their outer appearances are signs that those individuals are better expressed by one 
concept over another:  
So far no rational animal has ever been discovered with an outer shape much different from our 
own. That is why, when there was some question of baptizing a child, its pedigree and its shape 
were never regarded as more than signs from which to judge whether or not it was a rational 
animal. So theologians and jurists had no need to give up their consecrated definition on this 
account. (NE 320) 
In chapter VIII, we explored the sense in which Leibniz believes that – on the nom-
inalist theory – propositions about natural kinds are always contingently true. Leib-
niz’s solution is to make concepts expressions not of individuals and their states, 
but of possibilities or ideas in the mind of God. In spite of his solution, there are 
two respects in which experience is relevant to concept-formation: 
(1) experience is necessary for conceptual acquisition, for it allows us to distinguish concepts 
into those that are real and those that are chimerical; 
(ii) the intensional structure of concepts captures the structure of the real world, that is, our 
conceptual apparatus, when accurately unpacked, carves reality at its joints.11 
To reiterate, general essences are conceived of by finite minds as “possibilities in-
herent in the resemblances” among beings. This means that experience of actually-
existing individuals and their similarities (tracked by the logic of the imagination) 
 
10 On this aspect, also see Mugnai (1976; 1982). 
11 The metaphor of carving reality is a reference to Plato’s Phaedrus 265c – 266b). For an inter-
pretation of Plato, see Campbell, Rourke, Slater (2011). Leibniz’s relation to Plato is well-















































 2. Generalizations and Essences 219 
are the primary resources of the human mind for grasping the realm of ideas in the 
mind of God. By contrast with his contemporaries, Leibniz denies that a direct vi-
sion of ideas in the mind of God (cf. Malebranche) or an intuition of some innate 
ideas (cf. Descartes) is the way in which finite, human minds grasp essences.12 As 
highlighted in chapter I, “grasping” means that, in virtue of experience and a mind’s 
innate constraints, a cognizant agent is able to form expressions and use them to 
conceive of identity conditions between things whose appearances are not perfectly 
alike (as in the case of water and ice), but which are thought to share a common 
nature, such as when similarities between human beings are captured as “human 
nature”. Cognizant agents can then use words, diagrams, and anything else that can 
function as cognitive surrogates (albeit organized into a coherent system) as signs 
for intensions, the conjunction of which express the identity conditions for essences 
that exist in God’s mind.  
Since concepts are formed in close dependence with types, types are associated 
with concepts, through which concepts acquire an extension. Even if propositions 
expressing conceptual entailments first refer to essences (that differ ontologically 
from real beings), concepts may nonetheless refer extensionally to real (or possible) 
beings thanks to their being preceded by, and associated with, types. In this way, 
the predicamental structure of concepts maps onto possible world(s) and can be 
used to carve world(s) at their joints. 
Leibniz is, however, aware that Locke is right in claiming that our categoriza-
tions often lose their grip on what there is, owing to which they do not really seem 
to carve reality at its joints. The reason for human fallibility is that thought depends 
on language, the latter of which is established before we have more stable scientific 
knowledge. Examples of this fallibility include believing in what is not possible 
(thanks to an intrinsic, undetected contradiction entailed in the concept), and be-
lieving in existent possibilities that may obtain in other possible worlds (such as 
when we groundlessly attach existence to a logically possible essence, which ren-
ders the concept chimerical). And yet, thinks Leibniz, the risk of error is worth 
taking because, as he stresses, the route to grasping essences is necessarily one of 
trial and error, while abstract knowledge promises greater success in predicting 
events and changes. Even if we are incapable of reducing our risks to zero, there 
are always methods available for controlling risk-factors, which tend to cause us to 
go astray. For instance, grasping metaphysical necessity (at least in the way that 
Leibniz understands it), or what there is at a fundamental level, can provide rational 
minds with a more robust understanding of what can or cannot exist. Indeed, the 
distinction that we are about to canvass between physical, metaphysical, and logical 
genera has this function.  
To understand what there is at a fundamental level, Leibniz thinks that we need 
to understand the mechanisms through which we form general names, based on 
observation. In this way, we can tease out the relation between general terms and 
 
12 As I highlight in Oliveri (2016: II.1), Leibniz is deeply influenced by the Arnauld-Malebranche 
controversy about the Cartesian claim that we have ideas and we know them intuitively. Re-















































220 VIII. Conceptualism, Real Distinctions, and Error 
concepts, thereby showing that it is not the case that an essence corresponds to any 
general name. This is another reason why Locke is wrong to argue that an idea is 
simply a general name defined through properties considered as belonging to a be-
ing necessarily. 
As we have argued thus far, types account for generality before and in absence 
of a concept. Given that cognizant agents are spontaneously attracted to similarities 
between beings, their attention and memory are first directed to general, common 
traits between beings that are compared in acts of co-perception. Indeed, this is the 
reason why types consist in interiorized rules for recognizing and predicting things’ 
common behavior. If types are acquired in relation to experiencing actually-existing 
beings, and concepts do not rest on individuals, then Leibniz’s strategy has the con-
sequence of denying that concepts perform recognitory work. “The objects of ab-
stract, incomplete ideas do not suffice to pick out the entities that are involved in 
all the actions of things”, Leibniz points out to Locke (NE 313/A VI 6 313). This is 
the reason why Locke has trouble with particular cases, for he attributes a task to 
concepts that they simply cannot perform.  
At the same time, however, Leibniz firmly claims that universals are envisaged 
as “possibilities inherent in the resemblances” (NE 323/A VI 6 323). This means 
that the essences we can conceive of depend on our empirical experiences. The 
dependence of the human mind on things’ appearances is the reason why our dis-
tinctions are not as precise as those obtaining in nature. Despite their provisional or 
hypothetical status, our distinctions are always grounded in the reality of things and, 
therefore, there are pragmatic reasons for adopting them. For instance, we can have 
reasons for coining generic words to refer to instances that present as similar. In-
deed, at the pragmatic level, generalizations based on types, and universals based 
on essences, come apart: not every generalization based on a similarity carves real-
ity at its joints, and “popular” notions of species and genus (“folk concepts”) need 
theoretical amelioration by scientists and philosophers, as Leibniz claims in the 
above passage from the NE.  
Generalizations based on types may represent essences, but they do not have 
to. As explained in chapter VI, interiorizing phenomena as types (based on similar-
ities in shape, or properties shared by particular beings) is a cognitive process that 
minds engage in spontaneously. The strengths (as well as the limitations) of this 
process are that we continually exercise interiorization. In co-perceiving phenom-
ena, we spontaneously find similarities between them, the reason being that the hu-
man mind is bound to generality, as individuality is beyond human mind’s reach. 
To illustrate, suppose you enter a room and find five items. Each of them rep-
resents one Platonic solid. Suppose, furthermore, that they are all green. You simply 
consider them to be a class of beings, even though what they have in common can-
not be taken as a distinction in species between these solids and those of a different 
color (say, purple). Further, suppose that (for some reason) you need to refer to the 
green solids collectively in order to distinguish them from the class of purple solids. 
You can form names like “purple solids” and “green solids” to discriminate be-















































 2. Generalizations and Essences 221 
The formation of “purple solids” constitutes a cognitive operation that is equivalent 
to the formation of an accepted genus-species distinction, such as “rational animal”. 
It is equivalent because the cognizant agent finds a genus, or “common matter”, that 
is shared by those beings. In our example, the fact that they are solids is the “com-
mon nature”, and what distinguishes one class of solids from the other, in our ex-
ample, are the properties of being purple, on the one hand, and green, on the other. 
And yet, “purple solids” and “rational animals” are not ontologically equivalent. 
Notice, moreover, that their difference is not logical either, because logic is indif-
ferent to the content of concepts or the properties rational beings select as falling 
under the notions of genus and species. Once cognizant agents establish a class and 
denominate it, they can proceed with an intensional analysis, thereby treating the 
denomination as expressing an essence. One can, for instance, consider the concept 
“solid” as the genus included in “purple solid”. Likewise, one can consider the con-
cept “animal” as the genus included in “rational animal”. These operations are both 
logically valid, since it is not the job of logic to determine which distinctions are 
metaphysically sound. “Purple solid” can be an empirical concept whose possibility 
is demonstrated a posteriori simply by ascertaining the existence of a collection of 
terms. Since one can recognize purpleness as existing on a solid surface, an agent 
can thereby assume that “purple solids” is a logically possible combination of 
terms.13 The reason for claiming a difference between “rational animal” and “purple 
solid” cannot, therefore, be logical in kind; it must be an ontological difference, 
which makes us claim that some collections of beings say something more about 
the world, as in the case of “rational animal”, while other collections are simply the 
result of linguistic economy, as in the case of “purple solid”.  
Despite those general terms resting on distinct ontological grounds, I insist that 
there is no substantial difference in the cognitive act through which we form the 
two general names for those classes. “Purple solid” is a general term referring to a 
collection of beings that I need to address. It rests on linguistic economy, although 
it does not refer to a division that carves nature at its joints. “Rational animals” may 
have been established for similar reasons as “purple solids” by “illiterate people”, 
as Leibniz claims in the NE, who imposed and employed a string of words merely 
for linguistic economy, to refer extensionally to a class of beings. On further obser-
vations, however, cognizant agents took the division as saying something substan-
tial about things that exist in the actual world, and so they made the name a cogni-
tive surrogate for an essence. The imposition of a general name may serve as a 
 
13 It is worth remembering what Leibniz says in MKTI (A VI 4 A 589–90/L 293): “Patet etiam, 
quae tandem sit Idea vera, quae falsa, vera scilicet cum notio est possibilis, falsa cum contra-
dictionem involvit. Possibilitatem autem rei vel a priori cognoscimus, vel a posteriori. Et qui-
dem a priori, cum notionem resolvimus in sua requisita, seu in alias notiones cognitae possibi-
litatis, nihilque in illis incompatibile esse scimus; idque fit inter alia, cum intelligimus modum, 
quo res possit produci, unde prae caeteris utiles sunt Definitiones causales: a posteriori vero, 
cum rem actu existere experimur, quod enim actu existit, vel extitit, id utique possibile est. Et 
quidem quandocunque habetur cognitio adaequata, habetur et cognitio possibilitatis a priori; 















































222 VIII. Conceptualism, Real Distinctions, and Error 
staircase for referring to abstract subject-matter, essences expressed by relations 
between terms.14 In this way, after being established and having a reference in con-
creto, names can be re-used as expressions for abstracta insofar as they are re-
assessed through relations capturing conceptual containment rather than reference 
to individuals or external traits, which are used to recognize instances of a class. 
In a text that we will analyze in more detail below, Leibniz exemplifies the 
distinction between concrete and abstract use with the term “warm”. In saying 
“Warm is a quantity”, one is defining and using “warm” abstractly. The difference 
with its use in concreto is evident insofar as, when one says “this man is warm”, 
one is not claiming that “this man is a quantity”.15 While abstract predication deter-
mines what warm is (that is, the properties that constitute the essence “warm”), in 
its concrete usage we are not ascribing all of the abstract properties to what instan-
tiates the property of being warm. We interpret “this man is warm” as saying that 
“man” has a certain quantitative degree of warmth, since we know that warmth 
admits of degrees.16 Furthermore, in transforming a reference from concrete to ab-
stract, the selection of intensions defining an essence changes: from outward, per-
haps accidental properties, we move onto selecting more essential properties, viz. 
those that do not change, such as quantity.  
Leibniz’s approach has much in common with the classical distinction between 
a shell of accidental properties and a core of essential ones. Indeed, this is what our 
final analysis on mathematical species (sect. 4) will confirm. For now, what I want 
to stress is that the core of essential properties has neither the function of recogniz-
ing nor of determining the existence of instances of an essence. None of the essen-
tial properties of a natural kind can be ascribed to what exists on a metaphysical 
level, and, as we will see in section 3, this is a consequence of Leibniz’s rejection 
of realism about essences.  
Let us begin with recognition. Denying that recognition is a task fulfilled by a 
concept is an extremely important theoretical point because it renders Leibniz’s 
theory of concepts and definitions immune to criticisms regarding typicality effects. 
Criticism based on typicality effects in some way mirrors Locke’s strategy, since it 
claims that failure to recognize instances qua instances of a certain natural kind 
proves the nominalism – not the realism – of definitions, since they fail to provide 
a robust criterion for recognizing instances as instances of a natural kind. To remind 
the reader of the typicality effect: the basic assumption here is that “not all instances 
of concept are on equal footing”.17 For instance, robins are more easily recognized 
and categorized as BIRD than chickens, while apples are more readily considered 
FRUIT than olives. Thus, if definitions are what provide rational agents with a cri-
terion for recognition, then this difference should not take place, since the definition 
to which we appeal when we recognize robins as BIRD is the same as that which 
 
14 I argued for a similar position in Oliveri (2016: III.1) and (2016a). 
15 See De Mutationibus (1705) LH IV, 7C Bl. 85–86. 1 Bog. 2°. 4 Sp. / VE VI, 4, N. 55. 
16 Ibid. 
17 For an introduction to the classical theory of concepts as definitions and typicality effects, see 















































 2. Generalizations and Essences 223 
we appeal to when we have to categorize chickens as BIRD. In the latter case, how-
ever, we fail. But if, with Leibniz, we argue that the role of definitions is to capture 
precise categorizations, rather than providing cognizant agents with a clear set of 
features for recognizing their instances, then typicality effects constitute a critique 
of types, not concepts. Indeed, Leibniz thinks that this is exactly right.  
Leibniz can explain typicality effect and argue that types account for instances’ 
recognition, and, insofar as types depend upon experience and habit, habits may 
prevail over conceptual reasoning. Olives are, for instance, eaten alongside savory 
foods, while fruits are usually sweet and eaten for dessert. Robins fly – indeed, this 
is generally considered a defining trait of birds – while chickens do not. Reasoning 
based on similarity/dissimilarity (in both cases), combined with temporal and spa-
tial association (as in the case of olives), prevails when we need to categorize those 
instances. This is because that is how we experience those beings. For, typically, 
we are neither botanists nor ethologists: our categorizations are contextually and 
pragmatically grounded. This does not mean that our categorizations cannot con-
tradict experience and thereby our intuitions regarding natural distinctions. To use 
another example, whales were once considered to be kinds of fish thanks to their 
living in oceans and swimming like fish (Ishiguro 1972). We nowadays know that 
whales are mammals, and yet people may mistakenly believe that whales are a kind 
of fish. By incorrectly judging that whales are kinds of fish, people inadvertently 
swap the type for the concept: they believe that they are reasoning in virtue of the 
concept, while they are relying on things’ outward appearances, which are governed 
by the logic of imagination. Their mistakes, however, are grounded in the cognitive 
mechanism that we rely on for navigating worldly varieties, viz. via a form of fast 
reasoning which, despite its limitations, largely produces reliable knowledge. Slow 
conceptual or “reflective” reasoning, by contrast, requires time and practice for its 
mastery. That is why it is important to have types and concepts as distinct cognitive 
mechanisms, which are respectively based on distinct logics. Recognition operates 
via the imagination and habit, while scientific knowledge requires a more stable 
ground for its distinctions, which may thereby depart from folk categories. In this 
way, Locke’s worries are well-founded: our divisions are provisional because they 
cannot provide the ground for beings’ internal constitution: 
It is true that we cannot define a species in terms of something which is unknown to us [that is, 
its internal constitution L.O.]; but the outer features serve in place of it, though we recognize 
that they do not suffice for a rigorous definition, and that even nominal definitions in these 
cases are only conjectural and sometimes – as I have already pointed out [NE 300] – merely 
provisional. (NE 311) 
Human agents may have limited resources vis-à-vis determining divisions. Indeed, 
it may be the case that agents need to select one among many different methods of 
categorization. Each method may produce a difference in categorization, since 
methodology determines the way in which we compare beings. And yet, each 
method bears a relation to nature and therefore has a fundamentum in re. We simply 















































224 VIII. Conceptualism, Real Distinctions, and Error 
acts of comparison, just as botanists select plants’ procreation as a main criterion 
for determining differences between species:  
My point was that if this theory proved to be true, and if we learned more about how plants are 
generated, I have no doubt that the differences we observed amongst them would provide a 
foundation for very natural divisions. And if we had the acuity of some of the higher Spirits, 
and knew things well enough, perhaps we would find for each species a fixed set of attributes 
which were common to all the individuals of that species and which a single living organism 
always retained no matter what changes or metamorphoses it might go through. (Reason is a 
fixed attribute of this kind, associated with the best-known physical species, namely that of 
humans; reason belongs inalienably to each individual member of the species, although one 
cannot always be aware of it.) But lacking such knowledge, we avail ourselves of the attributes 
which appear to us the most convenient for distinguishing and comparing things and, in short, 
for recognizing species or sorts; and those attributes always have their foundation in reality. 
(NE 310; my emphasis) 
The above discussion is instrumental to showing that, if scientific categorizations 
constitute the perfection of our capacity for comparing and collecting beings into 
similarity classes, then cognizant agents constantly appeal to this capacity to form 
classes for pragmatic reasons: I ask my husband to look through “the clothes in the 
closet”, or I ask my sister not to wear “black t-shirts”. To be sure, these terms are 
general, since they rest on grasping the similarities of shared properties. They are 
not, however, distinctions that “carve reality at its joints”.  
The formation and use of general names do not therefore provide sufficient 
reason for either inferring that the cognizant agent possesses a concept for the thing 
named, or that an essence corresponds to that general name. General names are 
simply ways of collectively referring to a class of items, while essences are some-
thing ontologically more robust and fundamental than the collections of beings to 
which we refer by way of linguistic tools. Nonetheless, there may be a use of lin-
guistic expressions based on types, which does not necessarily exemplify that a 
concept (viz. that which expresses essences) corresponds to a general name. This 
means that we can learn to use a language to describe and refer to beings in the 
world(s) based on types, through which we are capable of what Leibniz calls dis-
tinct thoughts, all before we learn to express an essence by means of nominal defi-
nitions. This latter act requires the use of terms as abstract, that, as we have seen, 
is different from the use of a term in concreto, which refers to existent beings: 
“When an abstract [term] is predicated of another abstract [term], the predication is 
an essential one, and there is no room for changes. Like when I say that ‘warm is a 
quantity’ or that ‘justice is a virtue’ as the subject could not remain if we removed 
the predicate” (De Mutationibus). What Leibniz means is that there is a difference 
in saying “Socrates is a musician” and “warm is a quantity”. Socrates can lose the 
property of being a musician and still be Socrates. Such an act of predication is not 
rigid as in the case of warmth: if one denies that warm is a quantity, she thereby 
removes the subject itself, for she has denied an essential quality of the subject. 
Coherently with the nominalist/empiricist picture, language per se is not a proof of 
conceptual reasoning, since we can use general words based on some imagistic rep-















































 2. Generalizations and Essences 225 
This is a narrow way of using the term concept and, perhaps, something particular 
to Leibniz’s theory that departs from a more common use of the term “concept”, 
through which one signifies an element composing a meaningful proposition or a 
general representation. I take Leibniz to have this narrow use of the term in mind 
when he insists on the necessity of true definitions for the sciences and metaphysics: 
not every name we use is a term for a concept. Nonetheless, any general name we 
can form is grounded in similarities that are “out there” and not completely arbi-
trary. When we do science or metaphysics, however, we are in the business of 
searching for those concepts that better carve nature at its joints, i.e., which capture 
an essence. Similarity is only a sign – a trace – that we can follow in order to infer 
what exists at a fundamental level. This is the reason why certain folk distinctions 
and impositions of names – based on outer appearances – may overlap with scien-
tific distinctions, although this is not necessary.  
This gulf between language and metaphysics therefore calls for reconciliation. 
In order to provide one, we need to focus on the division of labor between types 
and concepts. Even if generalizations are natural tendencies of human minds, ra-
tional agents have cognitive resources for determining certain distinctions to be 
more fundamental than others. What does fundamental mean here? It means that 
we have reasons to think that our distinctions track something on a substantial level 
(sc. at the level of substance). So, the more fundamental we go, the more accurate 
our distinctions will be. One reason to consider a distinction more fundamental than 
another is its metaphysical simplicity: its assumption explains a wider range of 
modifications than another distinction, for instance. Fundamentality is proved by 
reducing a species to a genus and the latter to another genus, which sets boundaries 
on the possible modifications we can fathom therein, while tracking something per-
sistent. The result is a distinction between metaphysics, physics, and logic, whereby 
metaphysical beings or true unities ground both physical and logical changes, with-
out assuming any direct causal relations between them, nor a perfect correspond-
ence, as shall be argued shortly. 
Approaching essences in terms of higher (or more fundamental) genus shifts 
the issues concerning arbitrariness. Definitions are not judged as arbitrary on ac-
count of their capacity to pick out instances: their being arbitrary is decided based 
upon their fundamentality. The question, then, is whether similarity can help us to 
detect those distinctions that carve reality at its joints. 
As we saw in previous chapters, and especially in chapters III and VII, a first 
step in detecting true distinctions is to use the similarity of shape as a guide, at least 
for natural kinds. Not just any kind of similarity will do. The similarity of shape or 
constant transformations (as in the case of uncountable things, like water and ice) 
give us reasons for distinguishing individuals into types, after which we form con-
cepts of those types. The appearance of shape can be taken as a sign of a common 
formal cause (as Leibniz also claimed in NE 320, quoted above). Owing to this, the 
tracking of shape constitutes an initial ground for dividing things into classes that 
correspond with confused representations of natural distinctions. This theory of 















































226 VIII. Conceptualism, Real Distinctions, and Error 
corresponds with our capacity for tracking similarity. In the remainder of this chap-
ter, we shall elaborate on Leibniz’s metaphysical commitments by arguing that the 
theory of formal cause couples with a theory of reducing changes to modifications 
of three different genera: metaphysical, physical, and logical. This separation will 
allow us to argue that species-genus distinctions are logical expressions of catego-
rization based on the apprehension of physical modifications of beings that are not 
metaphysically committed to the existence of real essences, in which essential prop-
erties necessarily inhere. What exists metaphysically is substances that we can only 
nominally label “man” or “animal”, although we need to keep in mind that there is 
no identity relation between the abstract essence and the substance. Thus, what ex-
ists metaphysically as a man, for instance, may stop being a man, but it does not 
stop being a substance of a rational kind, viz. a rational soul.  
In other words, Leibniz divorces metaphysics from epistemology, and under-
standing from prediction. Our knowledge of logical essences allows us to reduce 
beings to mathematical-like entities, thereby ameliorating the kinds of predictions 
that we can make about contingent truths. Nonetheless, cognizant agents cannot 
have any understanding of how (at the metaphysical level) changes categorized by 
appealing to essences are produced. They only have reasons to presume that there 
is something at the ontological level that produces those changes. And yet this lack 
of understanding does not undermine their knowledge of nature, nor the reliability 
of their predictions, since predictions are still grounded in the logical possibility of 
necessary truths, like identity and contradiction. To prove that there is this divorce 
(albeit reconciled by harmony) we need to understand Leibniz’s distinction between 
logical, metaphysical, and physical genus. 
3. LOGICAL, METAPHYSICAL, AND PHYSICAL GENUS 
In the foregoing chapter, we used the example of ice and water to explain how types 
help us in conceiving of concepts. There, we argued that when one conceives of a 
third item (which is abstract and therefore can neither exist in water- nor ice-form, 
but which is nevertheless water), one conceives of an essence thereafter as defined 
by conceptual marks. Thus, we can now ask: what do we presuppose when we claim 
that there is something homogeneous between ice and water, calling this the essence 
of water? Leibniz says that we presuppose a physical genus, a homogenous matter 
that can be transformed into different phenomena, like water and ice. In an early 
essay, Leibniz says that the matter of a concept or an essence is what first comes to 
mind: 
The matter of a concept of something positive or real or an essence is what first occurs to the 
mind; anything we perceive convenes into this [matter]. This something is what we call being, 
or thing or subject, only after this we come to conceive of substance or the ultimate subject; 
Thereby it seems that we first conceive something’s presence (praesentia), or what it is now, 
and anything that is observed by the mind actually is believed to exist, unless experience 
teaches us to tell apart the mere appearances of the imagination and dreams from real phenom-















































 3. Logical, Metaphysical, and Physical Genus 227 
the diverse, the many, the simultaneous. As when I perceive a bull and a horse, I notice that the 
bull is not the same as the horse, but they are diverse, although they convene in something, i.e., 
that they are many animals or beings. The same, hence, is what can be substituted salva veritate. 
As A is D, and B is D, and C is D, and A, B, and C are the same, D will be one. Are A, B, and 
C singles and diverse, they will be many, from which numbers derive. (Divisio terminorum ac 
enumeration attributorum 1683 – 1685? A VI 4 A 561) 
We can better understand this passage if we begin from the end. When we are pre-
sented with diverse beings, as in the case of a horse or a bull, we can consider them 
as diverse, and so as many, or as one with respect to something that the bull and 
horse both share, viz. a genus like “animal”. When we consider the common nature 
of beings, we conceive of the matter of an essence or a concept, that is, a substratum 
on which all modifications converge. The “matter” is that which remains notwith-
standing change. Owing to this, matter is what we take to exist, because the fact 
that we are actually perceiving something proves something’s existence, as ex-
plained in chapters V and VI. Given its connection to perception, “the matter” of a 
concept or essence constitutes the first aspect that minds cognize. 
The notion of matter or genus is controversial. Indeed, in a later text, De Muta-
tionibus (1705), Leibniz grapples with the question of what persists through change, 
thereby criticizing the Democriteans who argue that concrete matter underlies 
changes.18 On Leibniz’s view, if matter is the ultimate subject of modifications, 
then there is a coincidence between matter and substance; the latter being something 
concrete, it cannot provide any criterion of identity for what persists through 
change. So, the ultimate subject of change, Leibniz argues, must be a substance or 
something that differs from matter, even if we only conceive of substances after 
considering the underlying physical substratum of change. Leibniz discusses some 
examples, like the distinction between virtuous and non-virtuous, on the one hand, 
and water and ice, on the other. He observes that there are modifications of beings 
that can be transformed into one another, and so produce changes in a subject. A 
man for instance can be virtuous and become vicious. Being-virtuous – as a transi-
tory modification – must inhere in something that persists or “survives” (superesse) 
the change, and this is the subject “man” of which those are possible modifications. 
A man like Appius may be virtuous or vicious, but his being a man (and his being 
Appius) persist through change. On a metaphysical level, the idea of something 
persisting while changing has various implications, for instance, “man” or “Appius” 
cannot themselves be modifications of matter. Thus, there must be a substance that 
does not simply persist in those changes: it is moreover indestructible (I will return 
to this point below).19 By contrast, Democriteans, who think that there is nothing 
over and above matter and its changes, differ from realists about essences, the latter 
 
18 See Di Bella (2015) for a more detailed study of the text and a deeper analysis of Leibniz’s 
reinterpretation of hylomorphism. 
19 Leibniz often claims that not only the soul but a small animal (a soul with an organic body) 
remains after death. As he writes to Sophie: “not only the soul but also the animal always sub-
sists. Also, nature never proceeds by leaps, and does not pass from one kind to another [...]” 















































228 VIII. Conceptualism, Real Distinctions, and Error 
making nature profligate, to use Leibniz’s words in NE (322/A VI 6 322). Realists 
think that essences exist in nature and that there is a core of essential properties of 
a being that persists through change. On this point, Leibniz compares the case of 
the virtuous and vicious person to that of water and ice: 
As it can be done that the same passes from [being] a man to [being] an animal, or (aut) if, 
according to Democritus, it didn’t remain anything distinct from matter, the predicament of 
substance would be only of concrete, and concrete would be more persistent than substance. 
Water and ice differ less with respect to virtuous and non-virtuous when we consider the easi-
ness of transformation; they differ more with respect to the similarity we find in the first spe-
cies, ice differs barely from crystal whose difference form water is great. When we treat of 
substances in philosophical terms, we will locate only species in the predicament of substances 
as lasting beings per se one. So, we notice that if the virtuous can be produced from the non-
virtuous, there is something that persists that we say be the man. But when we transform water 
into ice, we cannot designate anything that persists beyond the same resistant thing or the body 
in general. (De Mutationibus) 
The passage highlights two important points. The first is that when we talk about 
the “matter” of a concept as something persisting, we cannot reduce this “matter” 
to a physical substratum of change. There must be a substance that remains distinct 
from the physical substratum. The second point is that there is a difference between 
what persists when a true unity, like a man, changes, and what persists when those 
things that lack true unity, like water or artefacts, e.g., a clock, change. If, in the 
first case, we must assume that a particular kind of substance, i.e., a soul, corre-
sponds to one true unity, then we are not allowed to claim the same for aggregates, 
which are composed of corporeal substances.20 Leibniz advocates that true unities, 
or substances, are the ultimate subjects of changes; that “actiones sunt supposito-
rum”, as he wrote in Discourse de metaphysique.21 Activities require a subject of 
the activity, and true subjects of activity can only be that which remain active 
throughout, viz. substances. In a way, then, this approach to substances is Leibniz’s 
reinterpretation of nominalism as a method, as Mugnai (2018) writes: 
To properly understand the further developments of Leibniz’s philosophy, it is important to 
note that he represents nominalism as a point of view suggesting a method rather than as a 
doctrine concerning ontology (i.e., what there is). Leibniz does not say that a nominalist has to 
abstain from referring to universals and real forms because nothing real corresponds to them, 
but because it is possible to have a simpler explanation of phenomena without employing them. 
In light of Mugnai’s explanation, I understand the reduction of beings to substances 
in Leibniz’s philosophy not as a denial of the reality of phenomena, nor of their 
existence, but as a claim about the unity and simplicity of explanation at which 
 
20 See Divisiones A VI 4 A 576: “Ens est aut reale aut apparens, Reale ut sol, imaginarium ut 
parhelius vel iris aliave phaenomena. Omnis Res est aut Ens per se, aut Ens per Accidens; Ens 
per se quod revera unum est, ut Homo, Animal, Ens per Accidens, quod et dicitur Ens per 
aggregationem, ut multitude hominum, strues lignorum; Machina. Si animalia sunt Machinae, 
si corpora carent forma substantiali, erunt Entia per Accidens, imo tandem ostendi potest posito 
corpus omne esse Ens per accidens, corpus fore rem imaginariam seu phaenomenon ad instar 
iridis.” 















































 3. Logical, Metaphysical, and Physical Genus 229 
metaphysics aims, understood as an autonomous, philosophical enterprise. If the 
various sciences have as their proper subject-matter the variety of nature considered 
from different viewpoints – including dynamics and the physics of bodies, natural 
sciences, medicine – then metaphysics seeks a univocal explanation that explains 
being qua being. Therefore, if various sciences deal with specific manifestations of 
beings, then metaphysics can be said to seek the unifying ground of that variety. 
Therefore, as Mugnai – at least on my understanding – remarks, “Leibniz does 
not say that a nominalist has to abstain from referring to universals and real forms 
because nothing real corresponds to them”.22 Real beings correspond to abstract 
terms, but we do not thereby need to pursue the illusion that real beings exist as we 
conceive of them in the abstract, that is, that essences exist. As Mugnai writes, “it 
is possible to have a simpler explanation of phenomena without employing them”, 
which amounts to saying that there is a real being corresponding to the essence we 
express via abstract terms, even if we cannot assume that that true being exists with 
all the properties that we distinguish in the essence. We can explain phenomena in 
virtue of simpler, metaphysical explanations by grounding them in substances as 
principles of changes and – to draw a parallel with chapter III – we can say that as 
motion requires force because matter constantly changes and does not remain one, 
all transitory modifications of a physical being require something more substantial 
that persists while the concrete being changes, i.e., a substance.  
In other words, the individuation of a physical genus provides a clue for deter-
mining the ontological constitution of what we first observe and assume to be the 
matter of an essence. What Leibniz calls “matter” is just a substratal bearer of the 
possible modifications of a being qua being of a certain kind (whether a dog, human 
being, etc.). In reducing species (DOG) to genus (ANIMAL) and genus, in turn, to 
an ultimately metaphysical genus, viz. substance, Leibniz thinks that we can find 
ways of determining which modifications of a being are transitory and those that 
are permanent. Transitory and permanent modifications – and this is the important 
point for our purposes – do not correspond with essential or accidental properties 
of a being (qua being of a certain kind). The upshot is that we can claim that a 
substance has permanent modifications without endorsing realism about essences. 
Specifically, we can endorse the thesis that a substantial form “man” constituting 
Appius, always persists, without being committed to the thesis that a man must al-
ways be rational, have two legs, or be capable of laughter, in order to be a man. The 
real being “man” exists metaphysically, in Leibniz’s jargon, as a spirit, which is a 
particular kind of substance whose modifications are not identical to those mani-
fested and used to categorize him into the kind HUMAN BEING, or as Appius. 
Only per analogiam can we say that the substance corresponding to Appius is 
MAN, or ANIMAL. This is because the ways that those distinctions are imple-
mented at the metaphysical level are different from the signs we use to infer that 
there are such differences. In expressing the world, minds operate a transformation 
eis allo genos, that is, rendering what there is into a world quoad nos. To unpack 
 















































230 VIII. Conceptualism, Real Distinctions, and Error 
this thought, we need to look at the NE, where Leibniz deploys a distinction be-
tween metaphysical, physical, and logical genus. 
Leibniz introduces his discourse regarding physical, logical, and metaphysical 
genus in order to argue against the thesis that God could create thinking matter. The 
question can be recast as follows. We have significant words like “thought” and 
“matter”: can these be joined up to form a concept that expresses an essence, such 
as THINKING MATTER, as we do with RATIONAL ANIMAL? Posed in this 
way, our question instantiates a more general issue that we have already broached, 
viz. how we can eliminate those distinctions that seem logically possible (since we 
can detect no contradiction thereby) but which are not real. To help explain this 
puzzle, it is worth analyzing Leibniz’s argument for the claim that thinking matter 
cannot exist. He begins by drawing a distinction between modifications and attrib-
utes: 
Modifications must be distinguished from attributes. The faculties for having percep-
tion and for acting, together with extension and solidity, are attributes, i.e., permanent 
main predicates; whereas thought, impetus, shape, and motion are modifications of 
these attributes. (NE 63) 
According to Leibniz, attributes consist in the “permanent main predicates” of a 
substance. His unspoken assumption is that substance refers to the specifically 
Leibnizian notion of a substance, which crucially differs from Locke’s use of “sub-
stance”, which denotes a general name for a cluster of ideas.23 “Substance”, for 
Leibniz, is a metaphysical rather than a logical category. Perceptions, actions, so-
lidity, and extension are permanent attributes of substances, while thought, motion, 
and shape are modifications of their attributes. This results in a distinction between 
attributes: those constituting a metaphysical and physical genus, and those that con-
stitute more specific modifications, which result in phenomena that rational agents 
categorize into physical and logical species (about which we will elaborate in sec-
tion 5, below). Physical genus differs from logical genus insofar as the latter en-
compasses logical and abstract categories, such as space and time, which rational 
agents use to grasp and put order into the world, although what exists does not exist 
as we conceive of it in abstracto. The target of this distinction is the same that will 
engage Leibniz some years later with Clarke, viz. the denial that space and time are 
substances modified into concrete bodies and their changes. Indeed, Leibniz begins 
the discussion by explaining what it means to be of a homogeneous genus: 
[One] should distinguish between physical (or rather real) genus and logical (or ideal) genus. 
Things which are of the same physical genus, or which are ‘homogeneous’, are so to speak of 
the same matter and can often be transformed from one into the other by changing their modi-
 
23 See EHU 425: “The common names of substances, as well as other general terms, stand for 
sorts: which is nothing else but the being made signs of such complex ideas wherein several 
particular substances do or might agree, by virtue of which they are capable of being compre-















































 3. Logical, Metaphysical, and Physical Genus 231 
fications – circles and squares for instance. But two heterogeneous things can belong to a com-
mon logical genus, and then their differentiae do not consist in mere accidental modifications 
of a single subject or of a single metaphysical or physical matter. (NE 63) 
Since this is a convoluted passage, its examples may mislead the reader. Thus, to 
better comprehend it, we need to grasp the underlying cognitive operation for con-
sidering two things as being homo- or heterogeneous. Two things are homogeneous 
if and only if we can transform one into the other. For example, if I have a circle, 
then I can mentally entertain ways of transforming it into a square. This mental 
modelling is similar to having a stuff, such as gold, which can be modelled into 
different shapes. The underlying “matter” is what remains throughout its alteration, 
and we call this its genus. Leibniz explains the same process in De Mutationibus. 
There, he calls the genus the matter or body that persists over change. If there is not 
a way of transforming one thing (like an hour) into another (like a meter), then the 
two things are heterogeneous; they can nonetheless inhere in an abstract logical 
genus like continuous quantity. 
This mechanism of “abstraction” can be applied to almost anything. For in-
stance, I can conceive of variations with regard to “hair”, like color, length, and 
shape. “Hair”, sc. that which is homogeneous, persists in spite of its alteration. 
Thus, I may call “hair” a genus. However, Leibniz argues in the NE that the most 
fundamental genera are of three kinds: physical, metaphysical, and logical. The idea 
is that anything we can conceive of as a substratum of change can be further reduced 
to both a more general physical genus, which consists in the physical matter under-
writing the change, which can, in turn, be reduced further to either a logical or met-
aphysical genus. Physical genus is the “matter” or “body” of change (for instance, 
when deprived of any phenomenal appearances, the matter of water may exemplify 
a modification of a physical genus). Modifications of a physical genus are expressed 
by the mind through space and time which, by contrast, instantiate logical genus, 
viz. “continuous quantity.” Space and time qua ideal quantities (as argued in chap-
ter II) are ideas that the cognizant agent relies upon in tracking beings and their 
modifications. Modifications are then interiorized as types and categorized through 
concepts, which are defined via conceptual marks. What exists cannot exist as ab-
stractedly cognized through the concept. On the other hand, a physical genus may 
be reduced to a metaphysical genus, that is, as a change requiring a true unity or 
substance. When I consider Appius to be a man who moves from being virtuous to 
vicious, I posit – as a condition of possibility – a substratum for his actions: an 
enduring substance. 
The distinction between logical and real genus is introduced to highlight that 
not every distinction we are able to draw (such as that between space and time) 
presupposes the existence of that which we distinguish. While rational agents need 
space and time in order to cognize beings, it is not thereby the case that they exist 
as real substances: 
[Time] and space are very heterogeneous things, and it would be a mistake to think that they 
have resulted from modifications of who knows what real common subject, characterized only 
by continuous quantity in general. Yet their common logical genus is continuous quantity. (NE 















































232 VIII. Conceptualism, Real Distinctions, and Error 
This remark of Leibniz offers us a clue in understanding the function of these dis-
tinctions. “Logical” means that the genus is proper to the mind, but cognizant 
agents are not permitted to say that something concrete exists merely in virtue of 
being abstractly conceivable. Space and time constitute continuous, ideal quantities: 
what they track cannot exist as being itself continuous, but only as a physical genus. 
We now see how this distinction of genera maps onto the distinction between es-
sence and existence, which we have argued for thus far. Space and time are innate 
ideas that are spontaneously deployed by cognizant agents in tracking phenomenal 
changes in relation to existence, that is, to actual modifications of a real attribute, 
viz. matter. In sense-perceiving actual changes, cognizant agents track a body, viz. 
the ideal representation of a corporeal substance whose unity across time is pro-
vided by a true unities or substances. The divisions of matter that we can observe 
(aggregates of corporeal substances) are expressions of changes at the level of met-
aphysical attributes, which pertain to perceptions and endeavors. In this way, when 
the mind tracks a body as a type and then as an instance of an abstract essence, all 
the mind actually does is track what that region of the world – unified by substances 
as expressed by the mind in terms of minute perceptual changes – can do. In this 
way, the mind employs different resources for anticipating and predicting how that 
region of the world may change or behave.  
The distinction of the three genera, therefore, simply demarks that our logical 
categorizations map onto something that does not fully accord with our conception 
of it. To become objects of finite minds, things must be transformed or expressed, 
and this implies that they do not exist in the way that we imagine or conceive of 
them. Nevertheless, our expressions track physical genus – the matter composing 
bodies – as well as a metaphysical genus, which maps onto those substances that 
correspond ontologically with observable, phenomenal changes. 
Metaphysical genus therefore refers to something existing as a substance. Leib-
niz also calls this “a true unity”: something that is not in the mind as an idea, as 
bodies determined by space and time. Metaphysical genus, Leibniz argues, is the 
other attribute characterizing real beings – what exists as an object of possible ex-
perience in a human mind, that is, true substances that are associated with corporeal 
substances. Metaphysical genus consists in those modifications that remain perma-
nent in a substance. As is well known, Leibniz’s view is that permanent properties 
of substances consist in perceptions and appetites; striving forces bring about sub-
stantial change. “Substance” is a genus because it can undergo modifications in the 
attribute of perception. Perception can be modified into thoughts, sensations, im-
ages, giving rise to the degrees Leibniz enumerates in MKTI. On the contrary, the 
attribute of matter, which constitutes the corporeal substance associated with true 


































































Thus, this distinction, as presented in the NE, aims to rule out the possibility of 
“thinking matter”. Thinking matter should be understood as a physical genus whose 
modifications can bring about thoughts, although thoughts are not possible modifi-
cations of matter. This is because matter belongs to a physical genus, which is dis-
tinct from a metaphysical genus, the sole capable of receiving changes that can pro-
duce thoughts.24 If matter and perception are permanent attributes of real beings, 
and they are heterogeneous (because they belong to different genera, even though 
they cannot exist as distinct), then there cannot be any modification brought about 
in shape that transforms a shape or motion into a thought just because the modifi-
cation does not belong to the proper attribute.25 Just as one cannot produce any 
change in gold that transforms it into a statue of clay, so too one cannot bring about 
a change in matter that produces thought. Leibniz’s conclusive remark is important 
for our discussion: 
Perhaps people will laugh at these philosophers’ distinctions: two genera, one merely logical, 
the other real as well; and two matters, one physical (which is that of bodies), the other merely 
metaphysical or general – as if someone were to say that two parts of space have a single matter, 
or that two hours share a single matter. (NE 64/A VI 6 64) 
 
24 Notice that the argument coheres with Monadology § 17, where, through the example of the 
mill, Leibniz argues that modifications in shape, size, and motion cannot produce a perception. 
For discussion of the argument, see Lodge (2014). 
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234 VIII. Conceptualism, Real Distinctions, and Error 
And, while these distinctions may sound like redundant “philosophers’ distinc-
tions”, 
 […] these are not merely distinctions among terms but among things themselves, and they 
seem very apposite here, where confusing them has led to a false conclusion. These two genera 
share a common notion, and the notion of real genus is common to both matters. (NE 64) 
In addition to the specific use that Leibniz makes of the distinction in the NE to 
argue against “thinking matter”, the distinction between real and logical genus, on 
the one hand, and metaphysical and physical genera, on the other, is telling with 
regard to how we have to understand distinctions between natural kinds. As we 
have argued, bodies (or modifications of corporeal substances) are first cognized 
by minds, thereby culminating in the interiorization of types. In the preceding chap-
ter, we argued that after we have interiorized types, bodily similarity is then cate-
gorized through clusters of intensions, which are in turn structured by logical genus 
and species (secundae notiones), and finally expressed through definitions.  
If this is correct, then we primarily track the modifications of a physical genus. 
Our first, intentional objects are not true unities, since they are possible objects nei-
ther of the senses nor of the imagination, while corporeal substances are possible 
objects.26 Thus, when we follow the transformations of bodies and thereby infer a 
common genus (as in the case of WATER or ANIMAL), we are inferring a physical 
species that can be defined through logical relations between a logical genus and a 
specific difference, as in “MAN is a RATIONAL ANIMAL”. It is at the level of 
abstract, logical genus that modifications come to be either essential or accidental. 
Exactly as space and time, natural kinds genera and species are logical and there 
are no essential or accidental modifications at the level of real genus, whereby 
changes are only permanent or transitory modifications of substantial attributes. 
As attested to in the passage of De Mutationibus, Leibniz thinks that any time 
a rational agent detects a common nature and arrives at a species for its classifica-
tion, they may infer that the species belongs to a metaphysical being, viz. sub-
stances. However, none of the intensions that constitute the concepts of the species 
belongs to the real being. In saying that a substantial form corresponds to changes 
that we can observe in the corporeal substance (expressed as a body in space and 
time), we are not thereby permitted to say that the substances cause the changes (for 
we do not comprehend how that could be), any more than we can say that what we 
attribute to the corporeal substance is thereby a property of the substance itself. The 
ascription is without identity. What does this mean? It means that, if I say that Ap-
pius has the substantial form of being that individual man, “Appius”, then I am not 
allowed to infer that any of the intensions of the concept inhere in the substantial 
form, Appius. Appius, viz. the historical individual who exists in a certain spatio-
temporal frame, is rational, virtuous, capable of laughter, but the corresponding 
substance is not. The substance, indeed, is indestructible and immortal: it does not 
survive with all the properties of Appius – not even those we consider essential. By 
 
















































 3. Logical, Metaphysical, and Physical Genus 235 
contrast, the complete concept of Appius will entail all the properties of Appius, 
even those that are not cognizable by finite minds. 
This theory of Leibniz’s is coupled with a central tenet of Leibniz’s metaphys-
ics of substance, viz. that substances are never destroyed, but are simply trans-
formed through envelopment and development into different, larger or smaller ani-
mals, although they never disappear: 
[T]here are sorts or species such that if an individual has ever been of such a sort or species it 
cannot (naturally, at least) stop being of it, no matter what great events may occur in the natural 
realm. But I agree that some sorts or species are accidental to the individuals which are of them, 
and an individual can stop being of such a sort. Thus one can stop being healthy, handsome, 
wise, and even visible and tangible, but one does not stop having life and organs and perception. 
I have said enough earlier about why it appears to men that life and thought sometimes stop, 
although really they continue to exist and to have effects. (NE 305/A VI 6 305) 
This means that Appius remains a man even when the physical Appius dies, and no 
parts of his body remain visible or discernable as parts of Appius’ body. Moreover, 
as we saw in chapter IV, a well-formed organic body, when attached to a soul ca-
pable of rational activities, explains why the indestructible and eternal soul passes 
from a state of stupor to having distinct and conscious cognitive states. This means 
that even when Appius dies and his soul shrinks in a body that lacks the proportions 
and organs that we would perceive as being Appius’ human body, the soul of Ap-
pius still exists and remains rational, although, owing to its new constitution, it is 
in a state of stupor and is temporarily incapable of rational thought. None of the 
properties I assume as constitutive of Appius qua historical man persist; a substan-
tial form whose main attributes can receive the modifications that characterize the 
historical Appius, when developed into an organic human body, always persist. The 
properties of the historical man, whom human rational agents can conceive of and 
discern when they experience Appius, constitute the essence MAN (or the essence 
APPIUS), but the essence does not exist. What exists is the substance. Leibniz is 
therefore right to reject realism about essences. 
Thus, metaphysical enquiries into substances do not aim to determine what man 
or Appius is; they rather aim to provide a unifying explanation for the variety of 
observable phenomena. We want to know what unifying ground all phenomena 
share. From this point of view, we seek a simple cause. For Leibniz, the answer 
comes in the form of substance. This implies that all one can say is that a substance 
constitutes Appius; but one cannot derive any particular claim about specific sub-
stance beyond certain general claims regarding the constitution of substances more 
generally. On Leibniz’s understanding, metaphysics is a general science, owing to 
which it is able to infer certain general truths about substances. The reason why 
metaphysical knowledge is possible, albeit necessarily limited, is that human ra-
tional agents are themselves substances and, through introspection and analogical 
thought, they can deduce what a substance, in rigore metaphysico, must be. In our 















































236 VIII. Conceptualism, Real Distinctions, and Error 
exist. And, just as we experience change in ourselves, we can thereby claim sub-
stances to be the principle of such changes, and, moreover, that they must also be 
found in other beings.27  
Our aim here, however, is not to survey Leibniz’s arguments regarding sub-
stance, the validity of which remains questionable. I rather want to highlight Leib-
niz’s overall approach to this question (which is interesting in its own right) and the 
impact it has on his epistemology. Indeed, Leibniz does not contradict Locke inso-
far as our conceptual apparatus is the product of finite understanding, owing to 
which it is fallible and provisional. He in fact agrees with Locke that we cannot 
know the real constitution of things. With this, however, he means something dif-
ferent. We cannot know how the metaphysical level yields change at the physical 
level, and any knowledge of this would require an infinite mind, such as the mind 
of God.  
If our analysis is correct, then we reached a decisive aspect of Leibniz’s philos-
ophy: the natural sciences and metaphysics are autonomous, despite their being in-
timately intertwined insofar as metaphysics is the foundation of everything. This 
means that scientific and metaphysical knowledge are distinct enterprises. A bota-
nist need not also be a metaphysician to distinguish species, nor must an essayer 
know the metaphysical constitution of substances to recognize gold. And indeed, 
already in Specimen Dynamicum, Leibniz gives a warning to those who misinterpret 
his reintroduction of substantial forms: substantial forms are necessary to philoso-
phize about, but not to explain, phenomena. We should not assume that occult 
causes are acting within something in order to explain their visible effects.28  
 
27 This move is used, for instance, in the Monadology, as explored in chapter V. Leibniz to 
Gottlieb Samuel Treuer, June 1st 1708 (Oliveri (ed.) 2019: 103–4): “Every substance by its true 
name is simple, or a Monad; the compositum is not a substance, but an aggregate or a plurality 
of substances. Furthermore, any substance must act, intimately from its nature or an internal 
act (as just one can demonstrate); and the internal act of the simple substance, insofar as it refers 
to a multitude to be found outside [the substance], entails the representation of those things. 
And this very act is what I call a perception, a representation of the multitude in the one or in 
the monad. This is what we experience in our minds; this is what must necessarily be inferred 
to be in other monads, even if consciousness and reason are not present in them. And as all 
aggregates consist of monads or substantial atoms, it is necessary that there are perceptive be-
ings everywhere, although with different degrees of perfection. We must say about monads as 
the true substantial atoms what the Democriteans claim about their corporeal but fictitious at-
oms: once they are created, they always subsist and cannot perish because of a natural cause. 
And when I say that an organic body is added and always corresponds to each monad, although 
it [the organic body] must change, augment, diminish or transform, this does not happen in the 
way of the soul, but rather of the animals themselves or other similar perceptive beings, [and] 
they always subsist.” 
28 Specimen Dynamicum (L 436): “I agree with those who deny that forms are to be used in in-
vestigating the specific and special causes of sensible things. This I must emphasize to make it 
clear that in restoring to the forms their proper function of revealing the sources of things to us, 
I am not trying to return to the word battles of the more popular Scholastics. A knowledge of 
forms is necessary, meanwhile, for philosophizing rightly, and no one can claim to have grasped 















































 4. Mathematical and Physical Species 237 
If knowledge of forms was necessary for scientific enquiry, then any scientific en-
terprise would be doomed to failure, since perfect knowledge regarding how the 
metaphysical constitution of beings leads to changes in the visible world is off-
limits for finite minds. Despite this limitation, however, the transformations of a 
physical genus that we can track may yield inferential grounds from which we can 
know essences, whose knowledge provides a more reliable basis for predicting how 
worldly regions may or may not change, although predictions remain only provi-
sional. A better understanding of the natural world, moreover, is the main entry-
point to understanding what there is at a metaphysical level, although our 
knowledge of it remains of the utmost generality. Metaphysical knowledge – even 
if it is not strictly required for scientific discoveries – serves as a guide for the 
acceptance or rejection of scientific theories or argumentation. Our understanding 
of the distinction between logical and real genus, for instance, provides us with a 
reason as to why space and time cannot be substances nor the ultimate substrata of 
change,29 nor, moreover, why the world cannot be constituted by purely material, 
hard bodies, such as atoms,30 nor why extension cannot exist.31 If science has the 
scope for determining what there is at the fundamental level, then scientific hypoth-
eses will need a metaphysical test via metaphysical principles like the principle of 
sufficient reason or the identity of indiscernibles.  
4. MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICAL SPECIES 
If metaphysics deals with the categories of permanent and transitory modifications, 
that is, it asks the question of what substances are (such that they are understood to 
be the ultimate constituents of reality), then the natural sciences are concerned with 
phenomena, that is, with what appears or can be observed. In other words, if the 
 
understand that the crude concept of a corporeal substance which depends only on sensory 
imagery and has recently been carelessly introduced by an abuse of the corpuscular philosophy 
(which is excellent and most true in itself) is imperfect, not to say false.” 
29 As proven by the controversy with Clarke on Newtonian gravity and the existence of space and 
time. On this, see Ariew (2000). As argued in the fifth letter to Clarke, space and time as sub-
stances violate the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. 
30 Consider Leibniz’s exchange with Hartsoeker, especially the letter from October 30, 1710 in 
GP III 507. There, Leibniz says that the notion of atoms as perfectly-alike constituents of bo-
dies, which differ only in shape, size, and motion, satisfies the imagination, but is inadequate 
to the intellect (“Les Atomes sont l’effect de la foiblesse de nostre imagination, qui aime à se 
reposer et à se hater à venir à une fin dans les sousdivisions ou analyses; il n’en est pas ainsi 
dans la nature qui vient de l’infini et va à l’infini. Aussi les Atomes ne satisfont ils qu’à l’ima-
gination, mais ils choquent les raisons superieures.”) According to our analysis of the logic of 
imagination, this means that atoms violate some metaphysical principles, viz. the principle of 
the identity of indiscernibles. 
31 Leibniz argues against Descartes that extension is an abstract idea, owing to which it cannot be 
















































238 VIII. Conceptualism, Real Distinctions, and Error 
substance Appius always is Appius or a man (owing to the impossibility of substan-
tial destruction), then there is a limited window of time in which we are able to 
observe and categorize that substantial form through the abstract essence MAN, 
viz. while Appius is capable of being tracked spatiotemporally by our sensory fac-
ulties (perception and imagination). During this time span, Appius changes con-
stantly because he is attached to a body that itself undergoes constant alteration. 
Nonetheless, we still seek a stable criterion for understanding what makes Appius 
different to a lion, or what makes being Caucasian different from being virtuous. 
To this end, we need to draw a distinction between Appius’s accidental and essen-
tial properties, that is, we produce a fiction that treats Appius – or, indeed, any 
modification of a physical genus – as a logical species of the logical genus ANI-
MAL. 
Introducing the distinction between logical and physical genus, Leibniz writes: 
one should distinguish between physical (or rather real) genus and logical (or ideal) genus. 
Things which are of the same physical genus, or which are ‘homogeneous’, are so to speak of 
the same matter and can often be transformed from one into the other by changing their modi-
fications – circles and squares for instance. But two heterogeneous things can belong to a com-
mon logical genus, and then their differentiae do not consist in mere accidental modifications 
of a single subject or of a single metaphysical or physical matter. (NE 63) 
Leibniz here introduces a distinction that he reprises in addressing matters of math-
ematical and physical species. The crux of his distinction is that one can consider 
two different things, e.g., a circle and a square (or Peter and Claire), as two acci-
dental modifications of an underlying physical genus. By imaginatively modelling 
them, I can think of ways of transforming one thing into the other. For, I can model 
Peter’s face into Claire’s, and thereby conceive of something that persists in spite 
of the change. We call this something HUMAN BEING. However, in order to un-
derstand what HUMAN BEING is, I need to treat it as a logical genus, that is, I 
need to characterize it through a cluster of conceptual marks that I take to be rigid. 
Here, ‘rigid’ means that any change in conceptual marks – or introducing a new 
mark in a logical genus – produces a new essence. The addition of a new conceptual 
mark, like RATIONAL, to a genus, like ANIMAL, produces a cut in the genus, 
giving a species, MAN, and another indefinite one produced by the opposite of the 
mark, NON-RATIONAL. In other words, it produces order and affords distinctions 
within a realm of logically possible essences. In conceiving of a logical genus that 
is distinguished into species through the introduction of differences, we conceive 
of species logically or mathematically, by contrast with modelling instances in the 
mind, which yields only differences in physical form.32 
This discussion about physical and mathematical species corroborates the dis-
tinction between types and concepts, on the one hand, and, on the other, the idea 
that concepts are constructs of the human mind, which take the actual modifications 
 
32 Through a detailed analysis of MKTI, in Oliveri (2020) I argued that Leibniz uses the Platonic 
method of collection and division as a criterion for making concepts distinct, as well as for 















































 4. Mathematical and Physical Species 239 
of a physical genus as if it were a modification of an essence-expressing logical 
genus. In this way, agential minds forge a more stable ground for their predictions 
and can be said to have scientific knowledge of the observable world. 
The distinction between physical and mathematical species is used by Leibniz 
to overcome Locke’s criticism regarding essences and definitions. If there is some-
thing like essences in nature, Locke argues, then how do we explain deviance from 
the standard to which we believe nature conforms? Leibniz’s way of answering this 
difficulty is to argue that mathematical species do not depend on their instances, 
while physical species do: 
All this trouble arises from a certain ambiguity in the term ‘species’ or ‘of different species.’ 
When that ambiguity is removed, there will be no further dispute except perhaps about the 
name. One can understand ‘species’ mathematically or else physically. In mathematical strict-
ness, the tiniest difference which stops two things from being alike in all respects makes them 
‘of different species’. It is in that sense that in geometry all circles are of a single species, 
because they are all perfectly alike, and for the same reason all parabolas are of a single species; 
but the same does not hold for ellipses and hyperbolas, for there is an infinity of sorts or species 
of these, each containing an infinity of members. (NE 309/A VI 6 309) 
When we use the term “species”, we may be referring to two very different things. 
If we take the term mathematically, then “man” refers to an essence expressed by a 
structured cluster of conceptual intensions that are organized in relation to genus, 
species, and specific difference. The cluster is rigid, meaning that any change in the 
intensions produces a new and different essence. This thereby produces a change in 
the identity of the concept. Now let us say, for instance, MAN is RATIONAL AN-
IMAL. Here, the terms are rigid and fixed because any change in the intensions 
defining RATIONAL and ANIMAL would designate a different essence (assuming 
that there is no contradiction in the set). The essence becomes possible as soon as 
it is not contradictory, although one cannot infer that the essence maps onto indi-
viduals existing in the actual world merely from the fact that the essence is possible. 
Mathematical species can be exemplified by circles. Any circle is perfectly sim-
ilar to another circle. While circles can get bigger or smaller, their geometrical sim-
ilarities remain. If I change the proportions of a circle so that it looks like an oval, 
the result is a different figure. Likewise, the number of intentions composing the 
concept MAN may be wider or narrower: I can limit myself to the intensions RA-
TIONAL ANIMAL or extend it to RATIONAL ANIMAL CAPABLE OF 
LAUGHTER AND SPEECH. Here, the two concepts remain the same because they 
are similar; the latter is only wider vis-à-vis intension. If I change the structure of 
the cluster, however, as when I substitute RATIONAL with NON-RATIONAL, the 
result is a different essence, whereby intensions contained in RATIONAL become 
impossible modifications of the new essence. 
Physical species do not present the same kind of rigid, mathematical similarity 















































240 VIII. Conceptualism, Real Distinctions, and Error 
produces an ellipse, although of a different kind.33 Ellipses are individuated by the 
ratios between their foci. Any variation in this ratio produces a variation in the spe-
cies to which a particular ellipse belongs. Even though we can still call them “ellip-
ses”, they are not the same individual ellipses. What Leibniz calls “physical spe-
cies” exemplifies the relation between categorization and their instances, while 
what he calls “mathematical species” exemplifies the relation between concepts and 
essences. Instances may vary and still preserve a similarity sufficient to enable our 
recognition of this individual as an individual of that type (such as Claire and Peter). 
This similarity is translated into a rigid, mathematical species that does not admit 
of such flexibility and variety, thanks to it being a rigid cluster whose identity cri-
terion consists in an overlapping of intensions derivable via analytic entailment and 
semantic inferences. The rigid mathematical species no longer refers to individuals, 
but to the essence to which individuals are reduced. Only when we conceive of 
essences can we consider Claire and Peter as if they were identical (not similar) to 
each other as HUMAN BEINGS, as instances of an essence. According to the logic 
of the imagination, we could conceive of them only as different when spatiotempo-
rally perceived, or as similar, but we could not conceive of them as one and the 
same. As objects of the imagination, they are necessarily different and distinct. We 
thereby recognize them as two distinct individuals. Nonetheless, the intellect over-
comes phenomenal appearances and conceives of them as identical. To highlight 
this point, Leibniz argues that, if physical species were like mathematical species, 
then any modification in a particular being would make it of a different species: 
Two physical individuals will never be perfectly of the same species in this manner [in the 
manner of mathematical species, L.O.], because they will never be perfectly alike; and, further-
more, a single individual will move from species to species, for it is never entirely similar to 
itself for more than a moment. But when men settle on physical species, they do not abide by 
such rigorous standards; and it is for them to say whether stuff which they themselves are able 
to restore to its previous form continues to be of the same ‘species’ so far as they are concerned. 
And so we say that water, gold, quicksilver, and common salt remain such, and are merely 
disguised, in the ordinary changes they undergo. (NE 309/A VI 6 309) 
We recognize particulars as similar even if they are not similar in the mathematical 
sense. However, concludes Leibniz, it would be impossible for us to conceive of 
particulars if the term ‘species’ were as rigid as its mathematical counterpart. If it 
were, then we would simply not be capable of conceiving of particulars, because 
we would not have general species to which particulars are opposed. Physical spe-
cies correspond to our ways of considering individuals as individuals of a certain 
type – a confused way of considering an abstract common essence. Physical species 
are therefore distinct from mathematical species because they rely on different men-
tal processes: the former based on types, the latter on concepts.  
Therefore, when we claim that a being or its modification is an instance of a 
certain concept, while we are relying on a type to recognize the instance, we are 
 
33 The contrast between circles and ellipses in explaining the difference between general species 
and species infimae, i.e., individuals, is typical of many Leibnizian writings. For discussion, 















































 4. Mathematical and Physical Species 241 
claiming something different. We are claiming an identity relation between the in-
dividual and the concept. In claiming, “Mary is a human being”, I do not simply 
recognize Mary as a human being: it is as if Mary is identical to HUMAN BEING, 
owing to which I attribute to Mary some of the properties that I can also attribute 
to HUMAN BEING.34 This fictional reduction of Mary to the conceptual-structural 
clusters of conceptual intensions permits the derivation of contingent, necessary 
truths about Mary, as based on the properties that mirror the modifications Mary is 
capable of undergoing. As we will soon see, there is a great complication in this 
theory: nature (that which all existing individuals have in common) is not as rigid 
as we have been supposing in framing this conceptual-epistemic space, based in 
turn on essences.35 Deviance from our rigid designations are possible. Indeed, when 
deviance goes beyond a certain range of frequency or limits, as when it exhibits 
contradictions with our concepts, we have to reframe our concepts.36 As Leibniz 
insists, conceptual distinctions are presumtions: 
I have distinguished earlier [NE 308ff] between the various meanings of the word ‘species’. In 
the logical, or rather the mathematical, sense, the least dissimilarity is enough, so that each 
different idea yields a new species, whether it has a name or not. However, in the physical 
sense, we do not give weight to every variation; and we speak either unreservedly, when it is a 
question merely of appearances, or conjecturally, when it is a question of the inner truth of 
things, with the presumption that they have some essential and unchangeable nature, as man 
has reason. So the presumption is that things that differ only through accidental changes, such 
as water and ice or quicksilver in its liquid form and its sublimate, are of a single species. (NE 
323). 
When we consider species mathematically, we treat them as mathematical or rigid 
essences. Essences are individuated through conceptual intentions and their rela-
tions (as captured by the medium expressing them, that is, a system of signs ruled 
by syntax and semantics). The structured relations between concepts define the es-
sence. Any change in the structure causes a change in essence. Once we learn to 
postulate logical genus and species, i.e., to divide concepts into logical classes de-
fined in virtue of the properties they share, we learn to identify the species not with 
its phenomenology, which is recognized in virtue of a type: we reduce the essence 
 
34 As Leibniz says in De Mutationibus, one cannot attribute all the properties bore by abstracts to 
concretes. It would be a mistake to say that “a man is a quantity” because I can say that “a man 
is warm” and I know that “warm is a quantity”. The distinction between how things exist and 
how things are conceived in relation to essences helps us to avoid these mistakes. 
35 As Leibniz writes in A VI 6 314/NE 314: “Les imbecilles manquent de l’usage de la raison; 
mais comme nous savons par experience, qu’elle est souvent liée, et ne peut point paroitre, et 
que cela arrive à des hommes, qui en ont montré et en montreront; nous faisons vraisemblable-
ment le meme jugement de ces imbecilles sur d’autres indices, ’est à dire sur la figure corpo-
relle. Ce n’est que par ces indices, joints à la naissance que l’on presume que les enfans sont 
des hommes, et qu’ils montreront de la raison: et on ne s’y trompe gueres. Mais s’il y avoit des 
animaux raisonnables d’une forme exterieure un peu differente de la notre, nous serions emba-
rassés. Ce qui fait voir que nos definitions quand elles dependent de l'exterieur des corps, sont 
imparfaites et provisionelles.” 















































242 VIII. Conceptualism, Real Distinctions, and Error 
to a logical or mathematical possibility, which belongs to the realm of ideas in the 
mind of God. This is because what exists metaphysically does not exist as we con-
ceive of it. When we form a concept of a species defined via a structured cluster of 
intentions expressed through linguistic (or any other kind of cognitive) tools, we 
express God rather than the historical world, because we are imitating God’s intel-
lect.37 
Therefore, the distinction between logical and physical species, Leibniz be-
lieves, allows him to surmount Locke’s criticism that rigid, mathematical species 
do not refer to anything in reality. Given the dependence of the human mind on the 
relation of similarity for conceptual formation, a type is associated with a concept. 
Moreover, the type – not the concept – is responsible for the recognition of an indi-
vidual as an instance of a concept. In other words, the concept MAN and the type 
“man” are closely related because, as highlighted, even if concepts are not ab-
stracted from individuals, the generalization types allow for nonetheless constitutes 
a first step in seeking a reason for beings’ similarity. All the type does, however, is 
to idealize modifications of a substance as expressed by a physical genus, and not 
as modifications of a metaphysical genus. In other words, according to the law of 
harmony, we know that something substantial must correspond with the common 
nature tracked by the type and conceived of as an essence via the concept, which 
distinguishes between essential and accidental properties. Yet, we are not allowed 
to attribute to a substance any of the properties we track via types, or that we con-
ceive of as essential owing to the concept. If essences do not exist in re, then they 
cannot be abstracted. What there is at the metaphysical level can neither be deduced 
from the outer appearances of temporal beings, nor from the ideality and abstract-
ness of essences. To conceive of what exists at the metaphysical level, we need 
innate ideas, as we shall argue in the next chapter. The correspondence between 
those genera nonetheless warrants the reality of our distinctions and categorizations. 
5. ON ERROR 
The distinction between types and concepts can provide a general diagnosis for 
possible sources of error and thereby fashions a strategy for avoiding them.  
Error arises when cognizant agents exchange types for concepts, deploying the 
logic of the imagination instead of invoking intellectual principles. As we have ar-
gued, when cognizant agents make similarity between beings explicit by organizing 
conceptual intensions into predicamental, logical structures, the logic they rely 
upon is that of the intellect (based upon identity and contradiction), not that of types 
governed spatiotemporally. Concepts are structured via logical principles of iden-
tity and contradiction. Given the association between type and concept, when the 
type “human being” is active (thanks to our sense-perceiving a shape recognized as 
the body-type of a human being), through memory we recall information about the 
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type, and, thereto, the concept associated with the type is more promptly accessed 
by the mind. On the other hand, when I reason about HUMAN BEING and recall 
the concept, my imagination spontaneously activates a type. The type naturally in-
clines me to associate images through reasoning. The consequence is that rational 
agents can run types and concepts together, believing that they are reasoning about 
the concept, while they are instead imagining instances based on types. The conse-
quence of this exchange of principles governing our reasoning is that we can believe 
in the possibility of things that are not possible. Leibniz levels this idea against 
atomism in saying that atoms perfectly satisfy the imagination, while they do not 
provide a valid theory for the intellect. With this claim, Leibniz alludes to the fact 
that atoms contradict the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, viz. that differ-
ent locations in space and time are sufficient for claiming a real distinction between 
two things. As we saw, spatiotemporal distinction suffices for the imagination, but 
it is not sufficient at the level of the intellect. The latter recognizes space and time 
as ideal and abstract, and hence demands a more substantial difference between 
atoms, viz. substances. In appealing to its innate ideas and principles, the intellect 
cannot be satisfied by atoms as the ultimate constituents of nature.38  
Another source of error is what Leibniz calls obreption and chimerism. As we 
saw, the human mind sometimes uses the same name in abstracto and at other times 
in concreto. This habit of the mind – of taking names as signs of concrete beings – 
implants in it the belief that something concrete always corresponds with general 
names. In short, obreption is a sort of category mistake, which takes something 
abstract for concrete. The consequence of obreption is chimerism, or the groundless 
belief in the existence of instances of a concept, while nothing corresponds to it in 
the actual world. In some preparatory drafts of the NE (A VI 6 30–31), Leibniz 
explains the two mistakes, invoking Cartesian extension as an example:  
Concerning this [the error of the mind L.O.] we must consider that there are in definitions two 
kinds of abuses that we can commit in forming ideas: one is what the excellent Jungius called 
‘obreption’, the other is what I call chimerism; for example, if someone reasoned in this way: 
it is permissible to combine some ideas and to confer a name to the result of the combination. 
Let us take for instance the idea of substance that contains nothing but extension and let us call 
it a body; therefore, the bodies that we find in nature have nothing but extension; in this rea-
soning, we have at once these two errors. The obreption consists in the fact that we conferred 
to the name ‘body’ the definition that appears good to us, which is arbitrary to some extent, and 
we apply it to what other people call by the name ‘bodies’. It is as if in geometry one defined 
ovals as ellipses. […] The chimerism is to have done an impossible combination, since it is not 
possible to have a substance which does not have anything but extension. (A VI 6 30-1, my 
trans.) 
As Leibniz emphasizes, obreption and chimerism are typical in metaphysics39 (as 
evidenced in the very target of this quotation, viz. Descartes’ notion of res extensa 
 
38 See fn 30. In the next chapter, we will return to the role of innate ideas.  
39 Obreption corresponds to what, in the Wolffian tradition, is called “subreption”, an operation 
















































244 VIII. Conceptualism, Real Distinctions, and Error 
as a substance), although they can be extended to natural kinds or concepts in gen-
eral. Leibniz indeed agrees with Locke that we may misrepresent reality by con-
ceiving of possible essences and attaching “existence” to them. We may take a 
structured cluster of intensions to be instantiated in the actual world, when, indeed, 
the cluster is impossible either because it results in a contradiction on a more de-
tailed analysis, or because nothing existent corresponds with it in the actual world, 
as in the case of extension. When this happens, we make a mistaken judgement 
about the nature of things, believing existent what is not. Only in this case are con-
cepts chimerical, Leibniz claims, because existence is groundlessly attached to 
them. Despite the risks of relying upon mathematical species, there are still certain 
advantages in postulating rigid mathematical essences. For instance, the presuppo-
sition of such essences allows us to form new hypothesis and thereby to test them. 
The general rule we need to follow, Leibniz claims, can be labelled the Human 
Conceivability Principle, which states that: 
What we can conceive is not a measure of God’s power, but our conceptivity is based on nature: 
everything which is in accord with the natural order can be conceived or understood by some 
creature. (NE 65/A VI 6 65) 
From our discussion, we can recast the principle as follows: 
Human conceivability principle: conceptual distinctions grasping essences allow human be-
ings to carve reality at the joints. 
This principle has the following corollary: everything God has created can be con-
ceived by a human mind, but not everything a human mind can conceive of can 
therefore be created by God. Mistakes are possible. This does not mean that God is 
a deceiver because He made cognizant agents fallible. Like Descartes, Leibniz 
thinks that God is no deceiver, albeit for different reasons. For Descartes, God is no 
deceiver because He provides human minds with an infallible intellect. When deal-
ing with ideas, the intellect has the power to grasp them in a pure way – without 
error. For Leibniz, God creates finite minds, which can express what exists from a 
finite point of view. In making the world quoad nos, we need to operate a metabasis 
eis allo genos which – of necessity – changes what there is at the ontological level 
(which is otherwise inaccessible to us) into a surrogate that our finite minds can 
conceive. Expression is therefore an intrinsic activity of the human mind under-
stood as a unity of soul and body that is then unfolded onto various degrees. This 
constant construction of a world proportioned to finite human minds is the reason 
why we are prone to mistakes. However, it is also the reason why, among existing 
creatures, minds are more similar to God. God is no deceiver not because he made 
minds infallible but because he made them such that they can correct themselves 
through their own activity. They are therefore perfectible and free. The result is that 
we can conceive of the impossible, which may become a resource for the human 
















































 6. Conclusion 245 
6. CONCLUSION 
In the preceding two chapters, I argued that Leibniz has a story to tell about the 
origins of our conceptual distinctions. This story explains how human beings evolve 
from perceiving particular beings to conceiving of them as instantiations of abstract 
general essences. To this end, types constitute the connection between existence 
and essence. 
Human minds naturally tend to represent discrete matter in continuous space. 
They reduce phenomena to shapes and sizes, tracking their variations spatiotempo-
rally. In so doing, human minds interiorize types: rules for tracking and predicting 
natural, phenomenal behavior. Indeed, types are a first form of abstraction, which 
express beings’ common nature, owing to which they can be understood as a con-
fused expression of abstract essences. Essences are expressed confusedly by types 
because types are not the right kind of cognitive state to produce distinctions within 
abstract essences. The connection between types and essences, however, explains 
how human minds can move from confused representations of essences to distinct 
representations of essences, viz. through conceptual distinctions. This process is 
facilitated by, and supported through, a change in the use of names: from general 
referents to denotations of the similarities between concrete beings, names become 
terms used to refer to conceptual marks structured into definitions that express es-
sences. Types explain how finite minds are able to mentally modify phenomena, 
thereby predicting which kinds of modifications a type can undergo without effect-
ing a change in type. Through abstraction and mental imagery, minds can conceive 
of modifications in types that preserve a material substratum, which is conceived 
as common even for beings of different types. This common substratum is what 
becomes the genus grasped as an essence when logically defined through terms and 
their relations based on identity and contradiction. Because the formation of con-
cepts is intimately bound up with types, concepts obtain an extensional interpreta-
tion through their association with types, a fact that renders human beings liable to 
error. 
Another important result of this enquiry is the separation of real and logical 
genera. While a real genus can be of a physical or metaphysical kind, logical genus 
is proper to the mind and is used in grasping real modifications. The result is a 
necessary transformation of real genera by means of expressions that, while making 
those changes available to a finite mind, also idealize them. Modifications of a 
physical genus are apprehended by the logic of the imagination, which are then 
expressed via conceptual distinctions captured by identity and contradiction. On the 
other hand, modifications of metaphysical genus are proper to substances under-
stood as true unities, resting on principles that are innate, like the principle of indis-
cernibles. To conclude our enquiry, we shall address various issues concerning 





























































































IX. LEIBNIZ’S INNATISM 
Our enquiry into the logic of the imagination has revealed that sense-perceiving and 
conceiving are, for Leibniz, two distinct kinds of cognitive modes. While sense-per-
ception and conceptual reasoning correspond to distinct logics, there is not, for that 
reason, discontinuity between them. For both consist in imagining wholes divided 
into parts, although the nature of parts and the rules governing their connection 
change radically from one logic to another.1 The logic of the imagination concerns 
extended parts, which are opaque to the principles of identity and contradiction. 
Conceptual logic concerns intensional “parts”, which are expressed by terms re-
sponding to identity and contradiction. Syntax and semantics, rules that preside over 
languages, are used for composing definitions and discourse. Languages are not the 
only vehicles for conceptual reasoning: diagrams and images can also become ve-
hicles for concepts, insofar as their parts can be arranged to express relations re-
specting identity and contradiction. Leibniz himself develops a linear calculus to 
express conceptual containment.2 
The separation between the two logics is decisive for arguing that animals have 
a form of empiric knowledge, governed by the logic of the imagination, while deny-
ing that they can develop a robust form of conceptual reasoning, through which 
they might acquire knowledge of necessary truths. If our analysis is correct, and the 
two logics are indeed separate as we have shown, then Leibniz is well positioned to 
attribute to sensitive, non-rational agents a shadow of reasoning, without thereby 
being committed to attributing to them thought or conceptual reasoning.3 Although 
Leibniz follows Hobbes in attributing to non-human animals some mental capacity 
for connecting events, as explained in the introduction, he finds another way to dis-
tinguish between human and non-human cognitive agents: while the former possess 
innate ideas, which transforms the ways in which they sense-perceive and cognize 
 
1 The fact that both types and concepts can be analyzed as mereological wholes, albeit being 
composed of different kinds of parts, is important to avoid violating the continuity principle, 
see Jorgensen (2009). 
2 Cf. De la methode de l’universalité (1674; A VII 7 118/C 125), where Leibniz writes “mais 
commes ces chose ne sont gueres intelligibles sans figures et examples” and he proposes a 
calculus comprised of segments. A similar procedure can be found in Schèmes linéaires des 
syllogismes (C 248) and De forma logicae comprobatione per linearum ductus (1986, C 292). 
3 See NE 51/A VI 6 51. The same thought is also present in PNG (GP VI 600), as well as in NE 
175/A VI 6 175, where Leibniz describes a wild boar who notices a hunter and flees. This must 
prove that the wild boar has some knowledge of the hunter and has expectations regarding the 
consequences that may follow from the presence of the hunter, although he denies that the wild 















































248 IX. Leibniz’s Innatism 
the world, non-human cognizers lack those innate constraints, owing to which their 
expressive capacities remain circumscribed to the level of types.4  
Non-rational animals must, however, possess some of the constraints we have 
highlighted. For instance, they must be capable of the following: the capacity for 
spatiotemporally-apprehending bodies; the ability to detect causal connections, or 
connections of similarity; and the capacity for forming types. Non-rational animals 
lack intellectual innate ideas, owing to which they also lack the capacity for devel-
oping their cognitive processes into rational-conceptual ones. On my understand-
ing, the absence of intellectual ideas, such as identity, contradiction, and substance, 
explains why animals process sense-perceptual information differently to human 
beings. Consider this passage of NE, in which Leibniz says that animals are not 
capable of considering that which is common to many things apart from their actual 
presence in sense-perceived beings: 
They [non-human animals L.O.] apparently recognize whiteness, and observe it in chalk as in 
snow; but this does not amount to abstraction, which requires attention to the general apart from 
the particular, and consequently involves knowledge of universal truths, which beasts do not 
possess. (NE 142/A VI 6 142) 
A lack of ideas is the reason why non-human animals are incapable of considering 
common, general nature apart from its particular instances. Animals therefore lack 
the capacity to develop a conceptual apparatus, as enjoyed by human rational 
agents. We will elaborate on this shortly.  
Just as types influence concepts, so too concepts influence types. Once mas-
tered, concepts change the way that rational agents experience the world, namely 
by enhancing their capacity for societal interactions, predicting events, and plan-
ning for the future. The gradual blurring of boundaries between concepts and types 
causes the interpenetration of conceptual and perceptual processes, the result being 
that “when we come to the point that we perceive the connection among ideas, by 
that very act we already form a judgment”,5 that is, we express what we experience 
through states that either evaluate the coherence of what we experience, or we en-
tertain propositions that affirm or deny something about something else, which are 
subject to truth and falsehood. The fork between the two species of cognizant agents 
therefore increases gradually and constantly. 
Non-human animals not only lack logical notions: they further lack metaphys-
ical notions. The notion of substance, as we saw in chapter III, is involved in con-
structing more stable expressions of the real world. In On Distinct Perception (our 
 
4 A VI 6 274/NE 274: “Pour ce qui est des organes les singes les ont en apparence aussi propres 
que nous à former la parole, cependant il ne s’y trouve point le moindre acheminement. Ainsi 
il faut qu’il leur manque quelque chose d’invisible.” What is “invisible”, as Leibniz remarks in 
A VI 6 173/NE 173, is the intellect, and therefore the ideas of pure understanding: “Ainsi dans 
mon sens l’entendement répond à ce qui chez les Latins est appellé Intellectus, et l’exercice de 
cette faculté s’appelle Intellection, qui est une perception distincte jointe à la faculté de re-
flechir, qui n’est pas dans les bestes. Toute perception jointe à cette faculté est une pensée, que 
je n’accorde pas aux bestes, non plus que l’entendement.” See also Pasini (1996: 152–162). 















































 1. Innate Ideas 249 
focus in chapter II), Leibniz claims that judgments without negation or affirmation 
accompany our sensory experience of the world. By this, he means that, in the act 
of sense-experiencing the world, we form implicit expectations about percepts. 
These expectations consist in general attitudes to which the percept responds in the 
spatiotemporal order, viz. that it is produced by other events and consists in a (cor-
poreal) substance or a unity of parts and attributes considered as belonging to one 
persisting thing. What we implicitly form is the notion of a corporeal substance 
rather than the metaphysical notion of a true unity. It is the imaginable counterpart 
of a metaphysical notion that guides us in constituting beings as stable and unified 
phenomena, which could not be formed implicitly if the cognizant agent did not 
already have some innate notion of substance (about which we shall elaborate 
soon). Intellectual notions are operative in experiencing the world, although they 
are transformed within the limits of the faculty, viz. the imagination when it ex-
presses how the world affects the body.  
If non-rational agents lack innate ideas, as Leibniz suggests, then the way in 
which they process sense-perceptual states differs from rational agents, who are 
capable of giving phenomena a more stable kind of unity than non-rational animals. 
The distinction between rational and non-rational animals exists from the outset. 
Moreover, sense-perceptual processes in rational and non-rational animals are im-
plemented in two different ways, although they can be considered different species 
of the same genus, viz. sensitive souls. The difference in how they sense-perceive 
the world explains why human beings develop conceptual knowledge while animals 
do not.  
This chapter will conclude with an analysis of Leibniz’s theory of innate ideas, 
a discussion we began in chapter I. There, we explained the connection between 
innate ideas and expressions as outlined by Leibniz between Quid sit idea and 
MKTI. Here, however, we propose an analysis of NE, specifically how innate ideas 
guide the developmental story we have told thus far. 
1. INNATE IDEAS 
At least nominally, the doctrine of innate ideas was widely shared among early 
modern philosophers. The qualification here is intended to reflect that each philos-
opher developed her own version of the doctrine. Indeed, as explained in chapter I, 
Leibniz’s account of innate ideas holds that they are not amenable to introspection 
qua intentional objects of the mind. Innate ideas are instead abilities of a cognizant 
agent to form expressions or cognitive surrogates, which refer either to concrete 
beings or abstract essences. These surrogates are intensional objects of cognitive 
processes. This means that expressions take the place of what early modern philos-
ophers designate ideas, which, when deployed in reasoning, allow for the pro-
cessing and extrapolation of information that would otherwise have remained off-
limits to the rational agent (at least, absent the invention of expressions). 
Our ongoing enquiry into the logic of the imagination has unpacked Leibniz’s 















































250 IX. Leibniz’s Innatism 
types, that is, abilities to form expressions of beings as bodily phenomena, and con-
cepts, that is, abilities to express essences in the form of definitions. On this inter-
pretation, both types and concepts are distinct kinds of acquired abilities insofar as 
they depend on experience and habit. At the same time, however, they cannot be 
merely acquired insofar as they are constructed through the cognitive activity of 
agents, activity that is spontaneously constrained by innate rules and principles that 
are ideal, that is, proper to immaterial substances like souls. The consequence is 
that types and concepts are both learned and innate. 
Leibniz believes that this apparent contradiction is entailed by his theory of 
human cognition. He chides Locke’s spokesman, “I cannot accept the proposition 
that whatever is learned is not innate” (NE 85/A VI 6 85). Nonetheless, he under-
stands this contradiction to be an asset to his theory, not a sign of internal incon-
sistency.6 Accepting the contradiction breaches Locke’s dichotomic view of the 
mind – from which it follows that, if a content is learned, then it cannot be innate. 
This dichotomy is used to dismiss the argument against innate ideas. Locke’s argu-
ment rests on the mutual exclusion of what we can call “nature and nurture”, a ter-
minological pairing used as an abbreviation for the fact that there are abilities and 
contents we have by nature, and others that we acquire through experience, whether 
sense-perceptually, culturally, or socially. Abilities that are acquired (nurture) can-
not be innate (nature). This exclusion is therefore ancillary to Locke’s argument 
that the mind cannot possess innate contents.  
On Locke’s account, a cognizant agent can be said to possess an idea or mental 
content insofar as she is (or was in the past) aware of that very content. But innate 
ideas seem to be contents present in the mind without entailing the mind’s inten-
tional awareness thereof. On this definition, the meaning of “innate” is vague be-
cause any idea learned via experience (even sensory contents) could be said to have 
been innate latently in the mind (EHU 49). If there is no clear distinction between 
what is learned and what is innate, then there is no room for learning and experience 
as a source of mental contents. On the contrary, if an idea can be learned, then this 
proves that it is not innate. Strong of this conclusion, Locke’s argument against 
innatism is a book-length proof, viz. Book 2, which demonstrates that the ideas 
commonly considered innate by philosophers, such as ideas regarding substance, 
power, freedom, quality, space, time, and self can be learned through experience. 
And so: if they can be learned, then they are not innate. However, as Leibniz claims, 
the matter is more complicated than this.  
For starters, Leibniz’s innate ideas are not – strictly speaking – contents. As we 
have argued, what counts as “innate” are those constraints on what the cognizant 
agent can or cannot perceive, imagine, or conceive. The mind can only achieve 
explicit knowledge of its limits by reflecting upon its own operations. Leibniz ar-
gues, then, that these constraints – latterly cognized in the form of principles and 
 
6 Although I do not have the space to analyze it fully, I want to flag up that these words of 
















































 1. Innate Ideas 251 
rules – are spontaneously active whenever the cognizant agent forms expressions. 
When the agent has the capacity to reflect on the process of formation of expres-
sion-relations, those constraints become objects of reflection and are therefore con-
sidered to be requisites7 or principles for the formation of more specific expres-
sions. 
Space and time in general, for instance, can themselves be objects of reflection. 
This occurs when the cognizant agent is acquainted with particular expressions of 
bodies and then considers what those peculiar expressions have in common, as we 
argued in chapter VI. When cognizant agents reflect on the common nature of bod-
ies, for instance, they recognize space and time as requisites for bodily expression, 
that is, as necessary conditions for the formation of expressions of beings as bodies. 
Before being explicitly grasped by minds, however, those constraints are operative 
in forming expressions that are the contents of certain cognitive states. Expressions 
bear the trace of cognizant agents’ innate capacity insofar as they are the result of a 
synthesis between innate constraints and how a substance is harmoniously acted 
upon by external bodies. This synthesis of non-subjective instances and top-down 
constraints is possible because, as we have argued, minute perceptions and striv-
ings, which constitute a cognizant agent’s intrinsic activity, mirror changes in the 
external world through the law of harmony. Minute perceptions are spontaneously 
filtered and transformed through the cognitive filters of the agent (recall the im-
agery of Leibniz’s “mental sieve” in chapter IV). This spontaneous filtering and 
transformation of data through the agent’s cognitive activity is nothing but the ac-
tion of a substance that is “clearer” than other substances, viz. a sensitive soul. De-
pending upon the kind of cognitive processes they can develop, substances may be 
called either sensitive non-rational or sensitive rational. The important point here 
is that, through its cognitive/conative activity, the substance always expresses and 
hence situates itself in the world by both expressing its body and its environment, 
and by anticipating and predicting states that are (im)possible within her world, 
either because they as-yet do (not) exist, or because they can(not) exist. Through 
this, the cognizant agent constructs a physical, moral, and historical point of view. 
None of her cognitive states is indifferent to any aspect of the world.8 Any state of 
hers is a response to how she is acted upon by other, cognizant agents who inhabit 
the world, although she may not be aware of them. Indeed, she may even misrepre-
sent the world through errors and mistakes, as described in chapter VIII section 5.9 
 
7 Leibniz defines “requisitum” (that is, something that is required for something else) in A VI 4 
A 308: “a ‘requisitum’ is something prior to the nature of something, that, if it is not posited 
(posito), then this other thing cannot exist (requisitum est aliquid re natura prius, quo non 
posito ipsa existere non potest).” For a thoroughgoing analysis of the term, see Di Bella (2005). 
8 A VI 6 240/NE 240: “Les ames selon mes hypotheses ne sont point indifferentes à l’egard de 
quelque portion de matiere que ce soit, comme il vous semble; au contraire elles expriment 
originairement celles à qui elles sont et doivent estre unies par ordre.” 
9 Phemister (2016) elaborates on the role of minute perceptions and their contribution to a cog-















































252 IX. Leibniz’s Innatism 
The spontaneous activity of the cognizant agent results in a bootstrapping process 
through which expressions produced by the interaction of the imagination with a 
lower faculty are then reassessed by the imagination when interacting with a higher 
faculty, owing to which they are reinterpreted in accordance with principles proper 
to this higher faculty. “Bootstrapping” means to get oneself out of a situation using 
already available resources.10 This terminology captures well Leibniz’s idea of the 
autonomy and self-sufficiency of a substance, since it shows the substance improv-
ing and ameliorating itself using its proper, internal resources, owing to which it 
does not “borrow” anything from the outside. At the same time, it respects what I 
take to be essential to Leibniz’s theory of substance, viz. the interactions between 
all created substances. As an advancement based on lower cognitive processes, 
these latter mirroring the complete universe, it results that also higher cognitive 
states are ultimately grounded in minute perceptual changes. While each cognizant 
agent interprets sensory information from its own viewpoint, the actions and striv-
ings of the substance are never isolated nor independent from other coexisting sub-
stances. The substance is not independent because it is able to develop itself inde-
pendently of all other substances; it is independent insofar as it is not causally de-
termined by other substances, although it freely and spontaneously expresses all 
other substances. I shall elaborate on these thoughts shortly. 
An illustrative example of what I mean by “bootstrapping” consists in the reas-
sessment of general names, which are established through social interactions and 
for pragmatic reasons by rational peers, when used as terms to refer to essences (see 
chap. VIII). As I have argued elsewhere, the establishment of a language (under-
stood as a syntactic and regulated system of signs) requires the so-called pragmatic 
triangle, I-Thou-World.11 An individual cannot alone establish linguistic conven-
tions, because the imposition of names expresses a complex relation to other peers 
within a context. Likewise, the expanding, semantic force of a language must pro-
ceed past accepted and established conventions. So, in using established words fig-
uratively, such as in metaphorical speech, a speaker both acknowledges the con-
vention and uses it to establish a new one.12 Words that are first designed to refer 
to concrete sensible beings are then reassessed and transformed into terms that serve 
a different purpose, namely to refer to different abstract objects (see chap. VIII 
 
10 The term “bootstrapping” is currently used in psychology and linguistics to explain first lan-
guage acquisition within connectionist theories. This is not how I use the term, since it is not 
my intention to associate Leibniz with any contemporary theory. Here, the term is used figura-
tively to describe a process by which a subject ascends in her degree of knowledge about a 
subject matter by using intrinsic, cognitive resources, which are expanded through that very 
process of epistemic discovery. This idea may bear certain similarities with contemporary the-
ories, although it is not intended to. I also invoke this terminology in Oliveri (2016: III.1).  
11 See Oliveri (2016: III.1–III.2.) and (2016b). 















































 1. Innate Ideas 253 
sect. 1).13 Through this process, minds acquire more abstract moral and metaphys-
ical concepts. 
It is precisely this shift in the use of language – which is aimed at expanding 
cognizant agents’ expressive powers – that exemplifies this bootstrapping process, 
which relies on established knowledge as a means for broaching new epistemic ho-
rizons. It further reflects an ongoing dialectic between confusion and distinction, 
the sensible and the intelligible. Confused apprehensions of aspects of the world, 
which cognizant agents achieve through the interplay of the imagination with the 
senses, serves as a ladder for reaching more distinct knowledge about the world, 
which is achieved through the reflective interplay of the imagination and intellect. 
This dialectic is illustrated by Leibniz to Sophie Charlotte: 
There are therefore three grades of notions: the sensible only, which are the objects assigned to 
each particular sense; the sensible and intelligible together, which belong to the common sense, 
and the intelligible only, which are characteristic of the understanding. The first and second are 
both imaginable, but the third are beyond the imagination. The second and third are intelligible 
and distinct, but the first are confused, although they are clear or recognizable. (Leibniz to 
Sophie Charlotte, June 1702, LSS, 2011:  240/A I 21 340). 
The engine of this dialectic – I want to argue – are those intellectual ideas that 
Leibniz defines in NE as ideas of the pure understanding and which, in the letter to 
Sophie Charlotte, include “metaphysical” ideas, such as the notion of the self or 
substance. More specifically, on my view, innate ideas are nothing over and above 
the cognitive activity of a substance endowed with what Leibniz calls “pure under-
standing”, which structures cognitive processes. Changes in the way that innate 
ideas structure cognitive processes are only reflected in the degrees of clarity and 
distinctness of cognitive acts, or in the force of evidence that enables the emergence 
of the principles themselves from the particular act engaging the cognizant agent’s 
attention and memory. When the rational agent engages in reflection upon her own 
cognitive operations and their conditions of possibility – sc. she reflects on herself 
as a cognitive/conative substance – the rational agent gains a more distinct kind of 
knowledge since she hereby acquires knowledge of the principles governing her 
reasoning. To attain to this level of self-reflection, however, the agent must gradu-
ally ascend through the lower and more confused forms of cognition: 
The truths that we start by being aware of are indeed particular ones, just as we start with the 
coarsest and most composite ideas. But that doesn’t alter the fact that in the order of nature the 
simplest comes first, and that the reasons for particular truths rest wholly on the more general 
ones of which they are mere instances. And when one wants to think about what is in us im-
plicitly, before all awareness, it is right to start with the simplest. For general principles enter 
 
13 As I have argued elsewhere (Oliveri, 2014), it is significant that Leibniz analyzes syncategore-
matic terms, like prepositions, as signifying originally spatial relations which, only via meta-
phorical use, are rendered into signs for other kinds of relations. Importantly, the basic meaning 
of prepositions is spatial, since it reinforces the idea that words first signify sensible aspects of 
beings and later more abstract relations among them. The thesis propounded in that article is 
expanded and connected with conceptual development in Oliveri (2016: III.1 – III.2) and Ol-















































254 IX. Leibniz’s Innatism 
into our thoughts, serving as their inner core and as their mortar. Even if we give no thought to 
them, they are necessary for thought, as muscles and tendons are for walking. The mind relies 
on these principles constantly; but it does not find it so easy to sort them out and to command 
a distinct view of each of them separately, for that requires great attention to what it is doing, 
and the unreflective majority are hardly capable of that. (NE 84/A VI 6 84) 
This passage, which echoes Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics,14 claims that innate 
ideas are constraints that are actualized differently at each level. This is because 
“human beings naturally tend (conantur) to explain through things that are subject 
to the imagination also those that they cannot imagine.” (A VI 4 A 890). The reason 
why rational, cognizant agents responded to this tendency, we argued, is that they 
need to adjust the world to their finite viewpoint. In this attempt, intellectual prin-
ciples are transformed by the imagination into a format conforming to the lower 
faculties, like the senses. By using the product of a lower faculty as a placeholder 
for a successive reflective state, the agent can compare similar states from the point 
of view of the act, and thereby abstract and extrapolate those innate principles. In 
this way, innate principles are translated at a higher level of cognitive activity and 
the mind makes distinct what was only grasped confusedly at the lower level.  
The passage further clarifies the apparently contradictory status of abilities as 
being both learned and innate. The contradiction is waived when one notices two 
kinds of dependency relations characterizing knowledge-acquisition. There is a dif-
ference between the historical and logical order of knowledge, thinks Leibniz.15 
The historical order follows the temporal development of a single cognizant agent. 
On this order, which is vouched for even by empiricists, the mind begins its cogni-
tive development by first apprehending those things that fall under the senses. Only 
through reflection on sensible states can the cognizant agent gradually apply herself 
to more abstract matters, such as mathematics or metaphysics. Our reconstruction 
follows this historical order. However, when reflections provide knowledge of the 
rules and principles that constitute lower states, cognizant agents surmise that there 
is also a logical order of knowledge according to which those principles must al-
ready be active, viz. before we become aware of them. Following the logical order 
of knowledge, then, the dependence relation is inverted, because more abstract and 
general principles are required to conceive of more concrete beings, and can be said 
to come first, even if on the temporal order of knowledge (on the ontogenetic per-
spective) they are the latter to be conceived of. 
Take for instance the innate idea of substance. Cognizant agents already grasp 
the innate idea of substance confusedly when they sense-perceive what we have 
 
14 Apost. 71b 35–72a 6: “There are two senses in which things are prior and more knowable. That 
which is prior in nature is not the same as that which is prior in relation to us, and that which is 
<naturally> more knowable is not the same as that which is more knowable to us. By ‘prior’ or 
‘more knowable’ in relation to us I mean that which is nearer to our perception, and by ‘prior’ 
or ‘more knowable’ in the absolute sense I mean that which is further from it. The most uni-
versal concepts are furthest from our perception, and particulars are nearest to it; and these are 
opposite to one another.” 















































 1. Innate Ideas 255 
been calling perceptible wholes, such as a dog. However, at the level of sense-per-
ception (including the imagination), the idea of substance is grasped in relation to 
the senses, that is to something corporeal, like our bodies. Since we are corporeal 
substances and are always attached to an organic body whose changes we perceive 
as belonging to something that persists through the changes, we project this status 
of substance to anything presenting itself in the imagination as being a whole having 
parts. With time, we will distinguish different kinds of substances and realize that 
an artefact, for instance, is just as if it were a substance. Likewise, when cognizant 
agents engage in the act of conceiving of concepts, they transform the innate idea 
of substance into a logical substratum bearer of conceptual marks. On both levels 
of cognitive activity, they do not understand the idea of substance as a true imma-
terial unity, principles of action and bearers of those properties such as they recog-
nize when they engage in metaphysical reasoning. When the innate idea of sub-
stance is perceptually active through the work of the imagination, the notion of sub-
stance simply is their capacity for sense-perceiving the dog as a corporeal sub-
stance, or as a unity in spite of its having parts that can undergo alteration. More 
importantly, the way in which the imagination transforms the innate idea of sub-
stance when operating with a lower faculty, such as the senses, does not disappear 
once they increase their reflective power and are able to shift attention away from 
the sensory notion of substance to a notion of substance conforming with metaphys-
ical principles. In the act of sense-perceiving, they still see the dog as a body be-
cause the imagination is still adapting the intellectual idea of substance to a sensible 
medium, in the same way as the metaphysical notion of substance is adapted to a 
logical category in conceptual reasoning. Only further reflections in light of meta-
physical principles can lead cognizant agents to make intensional distinctions 
within the notion of a substance, conceiving of it as something that cannot have 
parts, be extended, and so on. In this way, they ameliorate their knowledge of sub-
stance through metaphysical enquiry, which rests on principles grasped as objects 
of the intellect alone.16 The result is that metaphysical principles cannot be under-
stood fully while the agent is immersed in a logic that renders them opaque, namely 
the logic of imagination as it is governed by space and time. To grasp metaphysical 
principles, the mind must develop a certain capacity to abstract from the senses. In 
spite of the variety of experiences that each cognizant agent is subject to as histori-
cal individuals, there is a sort of ontogenetic development characterizing rational 
cognizant agents, which is guided by what Leibniz calls “innate ideas”. 
This understanding of innate ideas provides a way of resisting a move towards 
what can be called extreme innatism, while still making sense of a distinction be-
tween a restricted set of conditions necessary to the mind for implementing its cog-
nitive processes (viz. what we have been calling “constraints”), and an acquired set 
of abilities that fine-grain and enhance the cognizant agent’s capacity to construct 
specific responses to different states of the world. This acquired set of abilities com-
prises both concepts and types, which are both learned and innate: they are learned 
 















































256 IX. Leibniz’s Innatism 
insofar as, without experience, the mind could not form the expressions that are 
necessary for acquiring knowledge; they are innate because they are interiorized 
through the activity proper to the mind.  
Consider the case of knowledge about essences. Essences are expressed via con-
cepts as clusters of conceptual marks, which either can or cannot be associated ow-
ing to identity or contradiction. Identity and contradiction are innate to the mind, 
and do not derive from experience. Concepts are hence grounded in the mind, not 
on experience, although they could not be conceived without experiential contribu-
tion. The same can be said for types, which rest on space and time, viz. rules that 
the mind deploys for sense-perceiving phenomena. While types depend upon sen-
sory experience, they are innate insofar as space and time, which are requisites for 
their formation, are innate. Finally, the agent’s set of innate dispositions is both 
acquired and innate, insofar as experience and reflection are necessary for forming 
explicit knowledge of those constraints. Although they are only known once a cer-
tain level of sensible knowledge has been acquired, once we acknowledge them we 
further need to recognize that they must have been active from the outset, since they 
explain how we are capable of certain cognitive states.  
2. A MODERATE INNATISM 
According to what we have said, we can define Leibniz as a moderate innatist. This 
means that he is committed to both the necessity of some innate constraints for the 
acquisition of new abilities, which only count as innate insofar as they depend on 
the set of innate constraints. To use one of Leibniz’s own metaphors, the cognizant 
agent can only avail herself of cognitive responses that are there potentially, just as 
Hercules exists potentially in the marble block (NE 52/A VI 6 52). 
On other scholarly interpretations, it is not so easy to draw a distinction between 
what is learned and innate. Owing to this, Leibniz is often interpreted against the 
backdrop of extreme innatism. What it would mean for Leibniz to be an extreme 
innatist is that every possible mental content of a cognizant agent must already be 
inscribed in her mind in the form of a disposition to actualize a certain content. This 
disposition is then activated by minute perceptions functioning as triggers of that 
disposition. On this level, interpreters disagree on what dispositions are, and they 
divide into two camps. First, there are those who claim that dispositions (and hence 
innate ideas) are simply identical to the minute perceptions of a substance differing 
only in degrees of clarity (Jolley, 1988). Then, there are those who understand dis-
positions to be the ideas that are necessary for forming concepts. Concepts are 
meaningful components of propositions and are hence individuated by categore-
matic expressions of a language, i.e., names.17 For any name that can be used in a 
 
17 Categorematic signs are significant parts of a language, like names or verbs. Syncategorematic 
signs are those parts of a language that change the signification of the words they are associated 















































 2. A Moderate Innatism 257 
sentence, there is an idea in the mind that strives to be actualized whenever it is 
triggered by the perceptual activity of the substance.18 More than one idea can be 
triggered by the same perceptual state, which brings about competitive strivings 
between ideas for their respective actualization.19 The idea that is strongest, or that 
which corresponds to a greater degree with reality, prevails.20 On this reading ideas 
can be complex and being actualized in sentences; they are furthermore dispositions 
to form expressions that are conceptual insofar as they express propositions or 
thoughts into languages (or other vehicles representing thoughts).21 Although my 
proposal is sympathetic to this latter camp of interpreters, and especially with Bol-
ton’s account, there are differences between our proposals, which I shall soon ex-
plicate. The main difference, however, is that, on the dispositional reading, all ideas 
are innate and these are infinite in number, while on my account there are innate 
ideas, on the one hand, and acquired abilities, i.e., concepts and types, on the other. 
Ideas, concepts, and types are respectively all learned and innate, albeit on different 
 
syncategorematic signs are prepositions like “in”, “for”, and “on”. Syncategorematic signs were 
of philosophical interest in Leibniz’s time especially in the context of mental language theories, 
since it was unclear whether syncategorems had corresponding mental signs, or whether they 
were “mere” signs, that is, signs that refer to other signs. Although most Leibnizian scholars 
who discuss the dispositionalism of innate ideas are not explicit about this point, I think we can 
fairly assume that, for them, only categorems have mental counterparts, i.e., ideas. 
18 Ishiguro (1972: 23–7) does not distinguish between ideas and concepts. She uses the terms 
“concepts” and “ideas” interchangeably and opposes them to the words of a language. On her 
view, concepts are dispositions individuated by the words of a language when they are used for 
constructing definitions. She argues that Leibniz endorses a kind of Platonic position, according 
to which concepts are not learned. What we learn is the mastery of a concept by expressing it 
into definitions. Dispositionalism about concepts is also endorsed by Mates (1976: 49). Mean-
while, Mugnai (1976 and 1982) presents a view similar to the one I seek to defend. Bolton 
(2011a and 2011b) cleaves terminologically closer to Leibniz’s text and distinguishes between 
ideas and concepts. On her view, ideas are dispositions to form concepts, while concepts are 
themselves the mental counterparts of the words in a language. Thus, Bolton takes concepts to 
be individuated by words, whereby many words can refer to the same concept, which is merely 
actualized differently depending upon the kind of “competition” that exists between disposi-
tions, bringing about a combination of dispositions. Bolton’s account is richer in detail and has 
more explanatory force than Ishiguro’s. Still, they agree upon two main points: (i) there are 
innate dispositions that account for our conceptual mental life; and (ii) there are as many dis-
positions as there are concepts. Barth (2020) moreover argues that ideas are dispositions to 
form expressions, as already argued by Bolton (2011), Leduc (2011: 582–590; 2014: 53–68), 
Picone (2003: 102–32; 2005: 179–99), and Oliveri (2016: 2.1–2.3. and 2016a). My view differs 
from the foregoing positions insofar I have already argued that innate ideas are constraints and 
that there is not an idea for every concept the mind can form. 
19 Bolton (2011a) insists on this aspect, since Leibniz often uses the metaphor of a conflict be-
tween strivings, as in NE 39/A VI 6 39. 
20 As Leibniz says in De Affectibus (A VI 4 B 1411, 1679): “Perfectiores sunt cogitationes quae 
plus realitatis involvunt.” 
21 Although dispositionalist views focus on languages, a charitable interpretation of their claims 















































258 IX. Leibniz’s Innatism 
grounds. They are moreover individuated by the function they carry out in cogni-
tion. I will now provide a cursory reconstruction of the arguments for extreme in-
natism. 
Arguments for extreme innatism outstrip Leibniz’s simple theory of cognition, 
as grounded in his notion of substance. As soon as we recognize that Leibniz’s 
substances are “windowless”, that is, incapable of interacting causally with bodily 
phenomena, we are forced to acknowledge his commitment to extreme innatism. 
Substances are complete insofar as they draw what they need for their metaphysical 
subsistence (whether perceptions, appetites, or thoughts) from their own depths. 
This thesis is normally expressed through an image of the windowless monad: the 
monad does not have any windows, which means that it neither communicates with 
other substances nor with the environment.22 It henceforth follows that there is no 
direct communication between body and soul.  
The absence of direct causation between body and mind – together with the 
metaphysical completeness of the monad – make a strong case for innatism.23 On 
Leibniz’s view, cognitive changes, like thoughts, result from perceptual changes. 
However, if these changes have their source not in an external affection of objects 
on the senses (since they are produced by the mind itself), then those states must 
somehow already be inscribed in the mind. On this view, even the content of what 
you are reading right now was already in your mind: it is not caused by the words I 
write. Regardless of whether we understand the future mental state as only virtually 
there, the lack of efficient causation between the experienced environment and 
mental states renders those states and their contents independent of experience. 
They are therefore innate.24 
 
22 Monadology § 7 (GP 6 607): “Les Monades n’ont point de fenêtres, par lesquelles quelque 
chose y puisse entrer ou sortir.” 
23 Look (2017) endorses the metaphysical argument regarding the lack of direct communication 
between body and soul. He further argues that another reason why Leibniz must endorse in-
natism of an extreme kind is that the notion of the mind as a blank slate (proper to the empiri-
cists) violates the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. I think Look is right about this, but 
his solution (in arguing that each mind is furnished completely differently to others), is not the 
right alternative. Leibniz thinks that innate ideas and dispositions present differently in each 
mind because each mind possesses them with more or less power or perfection, that is, with 
regard to bringing about more effective cognitive states: “sunt enim quaedam in mente dispo-
sitiones primitivae quae non sunt ab externo. Itaque dicendum est Mentes ipsas per se, ex natura 
sua primitiva dissimiles esse inter se, contra quam vulgo putatur. Cujus rei etiam aliunde certa 
argumenta habeo in promptu. Ut una mens alia perfectior sit fortiorque ad resistendum externis. 
Radix libertatis est in dispositionibus primitivis” (Mentes ipsae per se dissimiles sunt inter se, 
1689–90 A VI 4 B 1639). 
24 Cowie (1999, 50): “Leibniz is sometimes willing to criticize his opponents from within their 
own empiricist perspective, advancing on the basis of poverty of the stimulus arguments an 
innatism that is limited to our acquisition of certain sorts of ideas or beliefs. But in fact his own 
metaphysics, and in particular his view that individual substances have ‘no windows’, is deeply 
hostile to empiricism. So, where he considers them from within a properly ‘Leibnizian’ per-
spective, Leibniz argues that empiricist acquisition theories are fundamentally inadequate. He 















































 2. A Moderate Innatism 259 
Moreover, this argument normally runs alongside a further thesis endorsed by Leib-
niz: solipsism. If a substance can summon any cognitive state from its depths, then 
the external world may not exist, owing to which the mind is only representing the 
world as if it existed (NS § 14). On this view, I merely represent myself sitting in 
this office, typing up this book chapter, hearing people walking around the depart-
ment as they wait for a talk, even if none of those persons and things actually exist. 
If this is right, then could there be a stronger endorsement of extreme innatism? The 
master-argument for extreme innatism is hence the absence of interactions between 
body and soul. But if we can refute it, then we can also reject extreme innatism.  
As we have repeatedly shown throughout our enquiry, the absence of direct 
body-soul interactions is not an absence of a transfer of information between body 
and soul, insofar as body-body interactions are mirrored on the level of the soul 
through the activity of minute perceptions. Minute perceptions, moreover, are not 
simply triggers for actualizing thoughts. The layered structure of the cognitive 
agent’s mind guarantees that there is also an elaboration in the transfer of infor-
mation from one level to another. This elaboration means that each substance de-
velops from its peculiar point of view through its own strivings. This activity may 
properly be called “experience”, since it does not occur without the input of the 
senses, and is simply the expressive nature of the substance.25 If this answer ex-
cludes the idea that learning is impossible, owing to which everything is innate, it 
nonetheless leaves room for extreme innatism, understood as the disposition to form 
concepts. 
The dispositional theory of ideas interprets Leibniz’s extreme innatism as more 
palatable and is overall more faithful to Leibniz’s texts. Leibniz often refers to in-
nate ideas as dispositions, powers, and faculties.26 On this reading, it is not the con-
tent that is innate, but rather a readiness to form a concept corresponding to the 
 
Leibniz does not accept that anything (except God) can act upon a substance since he holds that 
the soul has no windows he cannot accept that experience can provide the soul with ideas or 
beliefs” (ibid.). McRae (1995: 176), for instance, considers Leibniz’s opposition to empiricism 
as sufficient proof of his commitment to extreme innatism. 
25 Jorati (2019) has recently argued that the senses provide the opportunity for thinking about a 
content because they give the content of a thought. In this respect, Jorati argues that there is a 
correspondence between senses and the content of thoughts, and this correspondence consists 
in the mind’s embodied cognition. I am sympathetic to Jorati’s account, as is reflected in Oliveri 
(2016; 2016a; and 2018). There, I argue that the mind is embodied because the senses provide 
the occasion for envisaging a certain content. Our accounts differ, however, on one decisive 
aspect. On my view, the senses alone do not give any content: they provide information that 
limits what the mind can or cannot perceive when that information is expressed via the imagi-
nation. If the senses give content to thought, then it is not clear what the activity of the mind is. 
On my account, the mind constructs its own content simply because it is an expressive force. 
The senses are limits on what minds can and cannot perceive. Furthermore, on my view, expe-
rience coincides with the elaboration on what the senses provide. However, on Jorati’s view, 
mental inputs remain undetermined, since it is not clear what kind of “content” the senses pro-
vide. 
26 References to ideas as dispositions cannot only be found in NE but earlier in, e.g., Quid sit idea. 















































260 IX. Leibniz’s Innatism 
ideas. More precisely, what is innate is a disposition to form concepts like DOG, 
CHAIR, TREE, and HYPERBOLA when perceptions present instantiations of 
those concepts because the sense organs of a cognizant agent are correspondingly 
affected by bodies categorized as such. Being aware of a concept means forming a 
mental content that may have a linguistic form, such as a sentence. On this view, 
however, what is learned and what is innate are still diametrically opposed. For, 
even if it is true that concepts must be learned somehow, learning would not be 
possible were concepts not already innate qua dispositions (Ishiguro, 1972). There-
fore, ideas are the innate counterpart to acquired concepts. 
It is worth stressing that the difference between ideas as dispositions and my 
account of innate ideas (understood as constraints) is principally a question of the 
number of innate ideas. One issue that may therefore be raised is at the level of 
those ideas’ individuation. Supporters of the dispositional view individuate ideas 
on account of their being manifested in linguistic expressions. The view is that, for 
any significant name within a language, there is a concept and therefore a corre-
sponding innate idea in the mind. On my reading, there is a subtle problem with this 
view. Considering the gulf we detected between general names and essences (chap-
ter VIII), it is not the case that an essence always corresponds to the formation of 
linguistic expressions. In other words, the correlation between names and essences 
is not as transparent as dispositionalists seem to assume, which Leibniz himself 
notes in MKTI, arguing that complex names are non-transparent expressions be-
cause they can refer to impossible concepts to which no idea can correspond. So if 
dispositionalists are able to partially address questions about synonymity by argu-
ing that different names can refer to the same essence, owing to which they can be 
expressions of the same thought, then it is more difficult to address the problem of 
conceivability errors, or those mental states by which the subject forms a name and 
believes it refers to a possible concept, while the name stays for an impossibility, 
like square circle. What sort of disposition is a disposition to err? I will return to 
this topic at the end of the chapter. For now, my solution to the issue is that there is 
a small set of constraints (or innate ideas) that are sufficient and necessary for ac-
quiring further abilities, like types and concepts. These are abilities to form different 
kinds of expressions either imagistically (as when we engage in imagine that cases), 
linguistically, or through other signs, such as when we conceive of essences. More-
over, on my account, this small set of constraints is individuated not only through 
their expressions, as both language and image can become vehicles of concepts: 
innate constraints can be recognized only through reflective processes of reducing 
one truth to a more general principle on which that truth depends. This is possible 
because general principles are operative in more particular cognitive acts. This al-
lows for the distinction between innate ideas, concepts and types. Ideas, concepts, 
and types can be said to be both learned and innate, although on different grounds, 
as we have explained. Concepts and types are innate because they depend upon 
innate constraints, which are themselves learned insofar as, without the expression 
of sense-perceptual processes, the mind could not produce more detailed and habit-















































 3. The Mind as a Dark Room 261 
this that the mind acquires knowledge of the general rules and principles to which 
it is subject in reasoning. 
One limitation of my view – a dispositionalist might argue – is that there is no 
clear textual evidence for rejecting the dispositional view. Indeed, Leibniz often 
remarks that we have infinite innate ideas. See, for instance, this passage of NE 
52/A VI 6 52:  
But reflection is nothing but attention to what is within us, and the senses do not give us what 
we carry with us already. In view of this, can it be denied that there is a great deal that is innate 
in our minds, since we are innate to ourselves, so to speak, and since we include Being, Unity, 
Substance, Duration, Change, Action, Perception, Pleasure, and hosts of other objects of our 
intellectual ideas? And since these objects are immediately related to our understanding and 
always present to it (although our distractions and needs prevent our being always aware of 
them), is it any wonder that we say that these ideas, along with what depends on them, are 
innate in us?  
The passage reads as though Leibniz is claiming that every thought is, to some ex-
tent, innate. It can, however, be interpreted as supporting my view, at least if we 
insist on the fact that Leibniz calls those ideas intellectual, owing to which they 
themselves are innate and that anything depending on them is innate as well. From 
this perspective, the passage claims that there is no clear distinction between what 
is learned and innate. Indeed, what is learned is, in some sense, innate. Thus, while 
concepts and types can be considered acquired when we insist on the activity of the 
mind necessary for their formation, they can also be considered innate when we 
insist on the innate constraints they depend upon for their construction. Since the 
text leaves these claims rather undetermined, however, in what follows I shall dis-
cuss two analogies offered by Leibniz that seem to go in the direction of claiming 
a “starting set” of dispositions, which accounts for the acquisition of dispositions 
that are more fine-grained. Furthermore, I would like to propose two central desid-
erata that Leibniz’s theory of innate ideas should meet, and which the theory of 
ideas understood as dispositions seems incapable of satisfying. 
3. THE MIND AS A DARK ROOM 
The first analogy is the well-known example of the mind as a dark room, which, on 
Locke’s account, has only two entry-points: the senses and reflection. Leibniz mod-
ifies Locke’s example thus: 
To increase the resemblance [between the mind and the room, L.O.] we should have to postulate 
that there is a screen in this dark room to receive the species, and that it is not uniform but is 
diversified by folds representing items of innate knowledge; and, what is more, that this screen 
or membrane, being under tension, has a kind of elasticity or active force, and indeed that it 
acts (or reacts) in ways which are adapted both to past folds and to new ones coming from 
impressions of the species. This action would consist in certain vibrations or oscillations, like 
those we see when a cord under tension is plucked and gives off of a musical sound. For not 
only do we receive images and traces in the brain, but we form new ones from them when we 
bring 'complex ideas' to mind; and so the screen which represents our brain must be active and 















































262 IX. Leibniz’s Innatism 
which is a simple substance or monad: without being extended it represents these various ex-
tended masses and has perceptions of them. (NE 144–5/A VI 6 144–5) 
Although at the end of the passage Leibniz points to the limits of the analogy, which 
depicts the mind as material, we can nevertheless draw a parallel here between the 
brain and the mind. The first thing to strike the reader here is the activity and alleged 
plasticity of the mind/brain, as described by Leibniz. While he does not deny that 
the senses and reflection constitute the two sources of ideas, what he positively 
points to is the “elasticity” of the brain/mind, which is constantly reacting and re-
assessing its structure through the accommodation of innate structures in order to 
acquire new affections. This results in an ongoing change in what can be considered 
as the innate structure of the brain/mind, which gradually becomes more fine-
grained (viz. as the brain acquires new folds corresponding to new abilities of the 
mind). As a metaphor for the mind, the passage suggests that it also has a kind of 
elasticity insofar as it adjusts and rearranges new pieces of information, as furnished 
by the senses through the activity of its innate “folds”, which we have been calling 
constraints. The ongoing alterations affecting the body are reflected at the level of 
the mind through the filtering of innate constraints, and are thereby systematized 
and organized into types and concepts, which are nothing other than abilities to 
store and recall information regarding how the identified being is going to change. 
When new abilities are acquired, those abilities are active in future sense-perceptual 
states and “furnish” the mind with more nuanced responses to its environment. 
Types and concepts are therefore habits or facilities for conceiving of present states, 
owing to which we can connect them to other states that the mind either recalls or 
anticipates. Thus, types and concepts constitute the spontaneity and freedom of ra-
tional souls. The more we learn about the actual world, the more we are capable of 
predicting the future and determining ourselves to act accordingly. 
The innate constraints of the mind explain how minds connect and relate events. 
While types provide connections, which are based on experiencing contiguous phe-
nomena, concepts provide connections that have a more stable ground, since they 
can be demonstrated logically. If human animals relate events in a similar way to 
non-human animals in three-quarters of their life, then innate constraints enable 
human animals to develop other forms of connections that, very gradually, render 
them increasingly distinct from non-rational agents.27 The takeaway claim of the 
passage is therefore that general faculties, such as senses and reflection, are not 
 
27 Leibniz’s explicit reference to the brain seeks to take a stance within the scientific debate of his 
time. There were philosophers arguing that every thought left a trace in the brain and, theoret-
ically, every thought could be traced back to this organ. Leibniz rejects the idea of a direct 
connection between the brain’s modification as a material cause for a specific thought, but not 
the idea per se that bodily changes correspond with cognitive changes. He therefore tries to 
integrate the scientific findings of his time into his system. The human brain, like the rational 
soul, must be a more active organ; one that is capable of responding diversely to the various 
impressions of the senses. This diversity of the human brain is reflected at the level of the soul. 















































 4. The Mind as an Architect 263 
sufficient for explaining the complexity of cognition. While Locke is not com-
pletely wrong-headed in saying that minds first and foremost respond to perceptual 
stimuli, he is assuredly mistaken insofar as he thinks that a subject can develop 
complex responses to the environment without appealing to more fine-grained cog-
nitive constraints. 
4. THE MIND AS AN ARCHITECT 
The second analogy is that of the mind as an architect, which Leibniz invokes in his 
exchange with Toland. In 1702, Leibniz writes a letter to Sophie Charlotte (“On 
what is beyond the senses and matter”), which answers a criticism raised by Toland, 
namely that Leibniz’s theory of substance implies the possibility of a disembodied 
epistemic subject. Leibniz rejects the criticism thus: “I believe that everything 
which happens in the soul is always expressed by what happens in the body, and 
vice versa, and that the soul is never without organs or without some sensation 
through the organs”,28 a conception of the soul that we examined in chapter IV. 
Toland considers this answer unsatisfactory and presses Leibniz to give an account 
of what the senses contribute to knowledge if the mind and body do not communi-
cate directly. Leibniz answers that the senses are necessary for filtering information 
such that the mind can awaken from its state of stupor, as unpacked in chapter IV. 
He then adds: 
We have in ourselves before experience and independently of experience this internal light, 
from which there results intellectual ideas and truths, but if experience does not provide us with 
the occasion to exercise this light and to make reflection on these ideas and truths, we will be 
forever stupid. But it by no means follows, as the letter’s author says, that there are grounds to 
conclude from these common progressions of the soul and the body that it is through the body 
and through corporeal things that the soul is what it is and does everything it does. (Leibniz to 
Sophie Charlotte (for Toland), November 1702, LSS 263–4/A I 21 672) 
In What is beyond the external senses and matter, Leibniz expresses this thought 
more concisely:  
However I agree that the external senses are necessary for us to think, and that, if we hadn’t 
had any, we wouldn’t think. But what is necessary for something does not thereby constitute 
its essence. To us, air is necessary for life, but our life is something other than air. (Leibniz to 
Sophie Charlotte june 1702, LSS 224/A I 21 334)  
There are two possible interpretations of these passages: one weak, the other strong. 
On the weaker interpretation, sense-perceptual processes are simply a necessary 
counterpart to the mind’s activity of thinking: the computer must mechanically af-
fect my sense-organs in order for me to have a representation (for instance, a 
thought) that there is a computer and I am typing on it. Nevertheless, these sense-
perceptions are merely triggers of thoughts whose causes are already in the mind, 
and are generated by its own laws. This reading fits with Leibniz’s conception of 
 















































264 IX. Leibniz’s Innatism 
harmony, although I think he intends to say something different. For his words to 
Toland echo what he said to Locke, namely that “nothing is in the mind which was 
not previously in the senses, except the intellect itself” (NE 111/A VI 6 111). In-
deed, he goes on to repeat this claim in an unsent draft to Sophie Charlotte (Leibniz 
to Sophie Charlotte August/November 1702 LSS 261). Just as he wrote to Sophie 
Charlotte in What is Beyond Senses and Matter, ideas can be categorized as either 
sensible, imaginable, or intellective: the latter need experience in order to be objects 
of thought, even if their origins are in the intellect itself. We need sense-experience 
to draw attention to our internal acts and mental processes, through which we focus 
on the rules governing them. If the senses are necessary in order to think about those 
ideas, then they are not essential. This means that these ideas are of a different kind 
to sensible notions, just as air is essential to our survival but is something apart from 
our lives and in no way constitutes it. 
There is, therefore, a stronger way to interpret the claim that sense-organs af-
ford only occasions for conceiving of more abstract subject-matter. Changes occur 
in the perceptual activity of the embodied mind because the organs function like 
filters for external affections: there are objects that interact differently with the var-
ious organs of my body, and this difference is expressed at the level of the rational 
sensitive soul through a gradual transformation of sense-perception, viz. from what 
we have been calling a perceptible whole to something that functions like an expla-
nation of that experience to the mind (consisting in a type or concept). Since Leibniz 
describes the mind as having a dynamical structure, it is not merely passively re-
ceptive to sense-perceptions, which become heightened and more distinct; the mind 
actively forms and processes information bottom-up through top-down constraints, 
and so transforms and simplifies information (sc. it expresses it) into a format suit-
able to memory and attention. In being presented with something simpler than the 
raw material of minute perceptions, memory and attention actively contribute to 
constructing habits by storing information (memory) and recalling it when they are 
adequately triggered to do so. The more specific responses we build, the more 
promptly our memories and attentions are activated, thanks to which it becomes 
easier to respond to future states of the world. Thus, acquired abilities themselves 
become filters that extend the top-down constraints of minds and enhance the pro-
ficiency of substances’ responses to their environments. To reprise an example from 
action-theory, once heavy clouds can be recognized as a sign of rain, then perceiv-
ing heavy clouds activates my type for rain, which inclines me to take an umbrella 
before leaving the house.  
As we argued in chapter VI, spatiotemporal associations based on types – what 
Leibniz calls empirical action – are not the only way that rational animals can act. 
Rational animals are capable of finding more stable ways of analyzing and pro-
cessing data. For instance, they can do mathematics and develop algorithms capable 
of predicting rainy days weeks in advance, when there are no signs of clouds. 
Agents do this by finding ways of transforming data in a way that is suitable to 
reasoning procedures, which are not directly related to a subject matter, but which, 















































 4. The Mind as an Architect 265 
sity (identity and contradiction), guarantee a higher degree of certainty in the de-
duction and extrapolation of new information. In short, reasoning procedures that 
are based on identity and contradiction enhance our capacity for predicting the fu-
ture. Mathematics and other forms of logical reasoning can thereby greatly enhance 
our capacity for interpreting signs and making estimations about the future. Con-
cepts – and the connections they establish through identity and contradiction, ren-
dered by means of definitions – fall under the umbrella of logical reasoning, since 
they allow agents (through a kind of fiction) to consider particular instances as iden-
tical to clusters of intensions, through which they can extrapolate information via 
conceptual analysis. Note that, if analysis is important, then conceptual construction 
requires an a posteriori process that informs minds about the possibilities (sc. es-
sences) inherent in resemblances between existing beings. Even if concepts are not 
abstracted from instances, as we have argued, cognitive agents nonetheless need to 
be informed about what might or could be. 
The strong interpretation therefore places an emphasis on the active, dynamical, 
and productive character of the mind, which invents tools for connecting truths to 
events. Even if “the most abstract thoughts are represented by some traces in the 
body by means of characters”, and therefore always require sense-perception, as 
Leibniz explains to Toland (LSS 269), the mind is capable of initiating a “chain of 
thoughts” to inferentially move from one to another. This productivity relies on 
innate constraints of the utmost generality as well as on more specific, acquired 
abilities of the mind. It is through its activity, then, that the mind can become atten-
tive not only to the content of a specific cognitive/conative state, but to the rules 
governing it. Indeed, it is through this attentiveness that the mind acquires explicit 
knowledge of rules that are in the mind, not as contents but as its own constraints 
and limitations. By reflecting on its own acts, the performance of which depends 
upon perceptual activity, the mind can contemplate itself in its operations with, and 
formation of, concepts. When the mind itself becomes an object of reflection, it 
explicitly distinguishes and acquire notions of its own innate capacities: 
Indeed he [Toland L.O.] also agrees with me that there are materials in the soul which the 
external senses do not provide. For he makes use of the comparison with an architect. For him, 
the objects of the senses are like the materials of a house, and the faculty which understands 
sensations and uses them in its reasonings is like an architect with its rules. And one (according 
to him) should be distinguished from the other. Very well, and that is all I ask for. But it should 
be considered that, in the soul, this architect with its rules should itself be counted among the 
materials, that is, among the objects of thought, since we think about ourselves, and about our 
faculties, rules, thoughts, and reasonings. And these rules are this internal light which estab-
lishes consequences and all the necessary truths I have spoken about in my letter. (Leibniz to 
Sophie Charlotte and John Toland, December 1702, LSS 276/A I 21 724) 
This response, and indeed the entire letter to Toland, echoes the words of NE, in 
which Leibniz insists that we must carefully distinguish the question regarding the 
temporal order of knowledge-acquisition from the question regarding what makes 
it possible that human minds are able to develop general, abstract knowledge. If, on 
the historical order, it is true that rational cognizant agents first acquire knowledge 















































266 IX. Leibniz’s Innatism 
form explicit knowledge of intellectual ideas (including self-knowledge, 
knowledge of mathematical unity, or the principle of contradiction), then temporal 
order is no proof that our knowledge depends upon the senses. If sensible notions 
are explicitly thought before intellectual ideas, then sensible notions are not essen-
tial to intellectual ideas. On the contrary, as soon as we form explicit knowledge of 
innate constraints, we are compelled to acknowledge that all knowledge – even that 
which is sensible – rests on those innate ideas.  
This architectural metaphor of the intellect and its innate constraints constitutes the 
most persuasive textual evidence that I know of for arguing that, although all the 
abilities of cognizant agents are, in a sense, innate, still there is a set of constraints 
that are prior and hence necessary for the development of more specific abilities. 
Should this account still be inadequate for convincing the reader, I conclude by 
discussing two desiderata that Leibniz’s theory must meet, and which should incline 
any remaining skeptics towards my view. 
5. TWO DESIDERATA FOR LEIBNIZ’S THEORY OF INNATE IDEAS 
The first desideratum is what Leibniz calls “economy” or “the simplicity principle”. 
This corresponds to the idea that, in creating the world, God chose the one that 
comprised the least number of assumptions and the greatest variety of phenomena. 
Why should He have violated this principle in creating spirits or minds, viz. those 
substances that are capable of more sophisticated cognitive states? The assumption 
that there is a small set of innate constraints accounting for a huge variety of cog-
nitive states and processes, which the substance can deploy in using its own re-
sources (i.e., the bootstrapping process, as we defined it), reflects this principle, 
while dispositionalist views seem to violate it. 
The second desideratum is related to the question of error. If God provides 
minds with ideas that dispose them to form concepts when experience triggers the 
activation of certain dispositions to strive, then God must also have given minds 
impossible concepts. While this may be unproblematic with regard to concepts that 
express logically possible essences (viz. those that are not instantiated in the actual 
world, but that are possible), then what about those concepts that are contradictory 
and therefore logically impossible and that minds can mistakenly believe to be pos-
sible? Would God not be a deceiver if He created a substance with a disposition to 
err? On my view, while the mind has no such disposition to false concepts, it can 
still determine itself in such a way that results in error. Indeed, this is a consequence 
of its constitutive expressive power, which operates from a necessarily circum-
scribed viewpoint. 
Moreover, I think there is a difference in saying that God created the substance 
with a disposition to form false thoughts, and saying that God created a substance 
that can additionally determine itself to errors and mistakes. On the latter reading, 
God foresees those errors and mistakes, but he does not concur with them insofar 















































 5. Two Desiderata for Leibniz’s Theory of Innate Ideas 267 
of a substance.29 On the dispositional reading, this solution is unavailable because, 
on that account, God must have implanted in the substance a disposition to err. 
To conclude, both analogies reinforce the thesis that: (a) innate ideas enter into, 
and constitute, every single thought, just as muscles and tendons do for movements; 
(b) explicit knowledge of general principles requires a greater degree of attention 
and reflective power; therefore (iii) an explicit knowledge of those principles, if it 
is ever acquired by an epistemic subject, is acquired later on in her ontogenetic life, 
viz. through exercise of the reflective faculties. 
Now, if we return to Leibniz’s other analogy, viz. of innate ideas as muscles 
and tendons, then we can draw a further analogy. Take an infant. Her hands are as 
well-formed as those of an adult, but she is not yet capable of using them as adults 
do. As with the adult, movement is supported by muscles and tendons, which de-
limits the movements that are physically possible (and which are not) for the in-
fant’s hands. In using her hands, the infant figures out which movements are phys-
ically possible, and, with time and practice, she learns to improve her use of them. 
In this case, do we need to say that the infant must be conscious of all her muscles 
and tendons in order to raise a hand or to improve upon her movements? Surely not. 
Indeed, knowledge of manual anatomical structures is frankly off-limits to the ma-
jority of cognizant agents. For while I know my hands comprise muscles, nerves, 
and tendons, I cannot name them, tell you how many there are, nor can I explain 
how they function. This is the kind of knowledge that a hand surgeon must have in 
order to execute her art, but it is not required to simply use the hand. If ideas are 
innate in this sense, then, as a kind of constraint that determines what the mind can 
and cannot think, Locke’s criticism is thereby surmounted.  
Consider another aspect. Suppose the infant will become a great pianist. Could 
we say that mastery in piano playing is “inborn” in the infant’s hands? Articulated 
thus, the question does not make sense, although it does (in a certain respect) cap-
ture why Leibniz thinks that the question about whether a piece of knowledge is 
learned or innate is wrong-headed. In a certain sense, one should acknowledge that 
the particular configuration of the infant’s hand grounds the possibility of move-
ments that she can learn to perform. However, should the infant learn to perform 
those movements, then it is only on account of practice. The skill of playing the 
piano is potentially inborn in the hand of the child and must be acquired through 
exercise. Leibniz himself uses the image of a piano player to describe the habitual 
connections cognitive agents form between language and thought: “Most of our 
reasonings, mainly those involved in major issues, are performed by playing with 
characters, as we play the piano partly by habit, without the mind [soul] being quite 
conscious of it, and reflectively forming its reasons.”30 
Leibniz appears to argue that the same happens with the mind and its own struc-
ture. When an infant begins to articulate her thoughts, she is probably not able to 
 
29 On the topic of limitations, see Antognazza (2014: 176–86). 
30 LH, IV, VII B 3 Bl. 16r, Niedersächsischen Landesbibliothek, Hannover (ed., transl. in Dascal 















































268 IX. Leibniz’s Innatism 
perform abstract reasoning. She focuses first on what the senses present to her. But 
in thinking of a ball, food, and toys, there are at least some innate principles in-
volved. While she may not know the principle of contradiction, for example, she 
will still need to use it if she is to learn to talk with consistency.31 If she has the 
occasion to do so, then the child will later acquire knowledge of logic. Contrary to 
Locke’s suggestion, then, innate ideas are not innate contents. Therefore, Locke’s 
criticism, viz. that, in order to be in the mind a content must have been consciously 
entertained by the mind, is unsound. There are models that show we can use some-
thing without being aware of how this happens: why can this not also apply to the 
mind itself? 
One could object that Leibniz’s example of muscles is inappropriate because it 
fails to address the premise of Locke’s criticism: awareness or consciousness is an 
essential mark of the possession of an idea; a condition that is obviously unneces-
sary vis-à-vis the material parts that constitute the body. The first thing to notice 
here is that the comparison is specifically between something’s material constitu-
tion (which puts limits on what an object can or cannot do), and mental-intellectual 
constitution, which puts limits on what a mind can or cannot think. The ideal space 
of what can be thought must then be filled through the processes we described, 
namely those requiring the senses, memory, and attention. Granted, the second 
thing to notice is that Leibniz’s objective is precisely to deny the coincidence of that 
which we can conceive and that about which we can be aware. After all, the analogy 
between the structure of the mind and the body seems to push exactly in the direc-
tion of the necessity of minute perceptions as states about which the mind cannot 
structurally become conscious, but which nonetheless constitute its activity when 
properly expressed. If there are minute perceptions, then why should it be so im-
plausible that other constraints – proper to other faculties – are also active, without 
thereby needing to be intentional objects of conscious mental states?  
6. CONCLUSION 
Leibniz’s innatism is highly peculiar. It encompasses a sort of bootstrapping pro-
cess between the mind’s own resources and discovering resources anew. This boot-
strapping process is possible because rational cognizant agents have an intellect 
structured by innate constraints, which can later be identified and analyzed in terms 
of intellectual ideas and principles. The presence of a set of innate constraints 
speaks in favor of interpreting Leibniz’s theory as a form of moderate innatism. 
This is because it is possible to distinguish between types and concepts as acquired 
abilities and more detailed responses that are constructed in virtue of a mind’s ex-
pressive activity (sc. experience) and innate ideas, which are those ideas and prin-
ciples that are necessary for the expressive activity itself. Despite this distinction, 
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both ideas and acquired abilities are innate and acquired, a piece of theory that is 
needed in order to resist Locke’s argument against innate ideas.  
Thus, although the textual evidence may be deemed indeterminate for support-
ing my interpretation, three analogies used by Leibniz (viz. that of the mind as a 
dark room, as an architect, and as a hand that has the capacity to play piano) present 
a dynamical model of the innate constraints of the mind. The mind qua substance 
is always active and changing. At the same time, however, it retains everything it 
undergoes. This retention of the past helps it to construct a capacity for anticipating 
the future and acting in the present. Moreover, there is a kind of elasticity to the 
mental constraints that needs to be developed through exercise in order for them to 
function. 
The second remark concerns the ontological status of the mind and its innate 
constraints: there are not two entities, i.e., the mind plus its ideas, knowledge, or 
contents. Just as a hand is constituted by the muscles and tendons composing it 
(such that we cannot say that a hand is a different entity to those parts), so too the 
innate constraints, and the alterations the mind undergoes through the exercise of 
its powers, are not something added to the mind, or different from the mind itself. 
The mind is this dynamical activity of exercising its innate constraints in the process 






























































































CONCLUSION: CONTOURING THE IMAGINATION 
The human being is an imaginative animal. The imagination is an inventory and 
combinatoric faculty; in virtue of these features, it is also a synthetic faculty. Its 
chief task is to synthetize instances provided by other faculties (the senses, the in-
tellect, memory, and attention) and connect them into coherent cognitive processes. 
Without the work of the imagination, the material provided by those faculties would 
be of difficult, if not impossible, access by a finite spirit, like the human cognizant 
agent. 
The infinity of minute perceptions mirroring the affection of the created uni-
verse on the organic body attached to a soul could not be available to memory and 
attention if the imagination did not express the variety and complexity of the actual 
divisions and interactions of material parts in the simplicity and finitude of the sub-
stance. The imagination expresses the world according to the affection of the sense-
organs by segmenting sensations into perceptible wholes, that is shapes having size, 
as bearers of primary and secondary qualities (chapter II). Perceptible wholes are 
then interpreted as bodily or corporeal phenomena when the agent recognizes them 
as the same unities undergoing various spatial and temporal states. A body, we ar-
gued, is hence a four-dimensional object of the imagination (chapters IV and V). 
The regular connections of phenomena would not appear to the mind if the 
imagination did not compare bodies, detect their similarities, and track them in their 
spatiotemporal variations. Through its spontaneous activity, the imagination pro-
duces a further synthesis of the varieties of phenomena into types expressing be-
ings’ common nature (chapter VI).  
The ideal connections of essences could not be conceived by minds if the im-
agination did not use general names as terms responding to identity and contradic-
tion, principles structuring the logic of the intellect (chapters VII and VIII). In short, 
without the imagination mediating between innate ideas and the senses through the 
invention of expressions, the cognitive agent could not construct her world and find 
her place in it (chapters I and IX). The information provided by minute perceptions 
would be overwhelming, condemning her to a constant state of stupor (chapter IV).  
The products of the imagination are expressions, viz. cognitive material surro-
gates, whose main characteristic is to be perceivable (chapter I). They translate and 
encode information in a format available to a cognizant agent constituted as a unity 
of organic bodies and cognitive faculties. Expressions are inventions of the cogni-
zant agent not just because the agent constructs them; they are essential tools for 
advancement of knowledge and achieving new discoveries. The relation between 
imagination and invention is due to expressions that work as cognitive surrogates 
that allow for extrapolation of relations and information that would remain inacces-
sible to the finite mind were they not simplified by the expression. Improving a 















































272 Conclusion: Contouring the Imagination 
capacity to achieve more stable and general knowledge. The better the system, the 
more accurate the knowledge agents can achieve.  
Cognitive tools are only one side of the story. If they can work as discovery 
tools, it is because the imagination has an intrinsic, tormented and complicated re-
lation to the (im)possible (chapter VI). Its main task is to re-enact the past in light 
of the present in order to see into the future. For this tendency to anticipate what 
has not yet come to be, it cannot refrain from variations on the theme, since combi-
nations of elements – known and new – are part of its combinatoric nature. At each 
level, though, its combinatoric and synthetic work is not anarchic.  
At the perceptual level, the imagination has bottom-up constraints consisting in 
the outreach of the sensory organs that compose the body attached to the soul. Sen-
sory functioning responds in part to mechanical interactions of the organs – com-
posing the body attached to a sensitive soul – with other bodies. Additionally, top-
down constraints subjugate the imagination while active in perceiving by submit-
ting sensory information to the logic of the imagination constituted by those “ideas 
of the common sense or of the pure understanding” (NE 128/A VI 6 128). Chapters 
IV and V fulfilled the task of outlining the rules composing this logic. Perceptible 
wholes are instantaneous actualizations of those bottom-up and top-down pro-
cesses, as we described in chapter II, and they are transformed through experience 
into more distinguished expressions of bodies, that is specific types of phenomena. 
Phenomena are constituted by spatiotemporal orders of coexistence. Their intrinsic 
temporality instils in the imagination the tendency to connect those instantaneous 
products into a larger picture we call a world.  
From its intrinsic relation to time, the imagination derives its tendency to im-
agine combinations it has never experienced before. The imagination constantly 
imagines the possible by synthetizing the past with the future, insofar as it interprets 
the present as the effect of a past cause and the cause of a future effect. The imagi-
nation, having no voluntary control on this spontaneous association of events, learns 
from its conjoint work with the senses to distinguish real from imaginary phenom-
ena, since it learns to tell apart what is the object of possible experience and what 
is not. The eagerness and anxiety of anticipating the future makes it a faculty in-
volved in predictions and scientific discoveries, as well as in the envisaging of fic-
tions, of ideal entities of mathematics, and of imaginary possible worlds. By imag-
ining what could be, the imagination thus frees agents from the limits of their or-
ganic body. The risk is to conceive of the impossible. 
To justify the actions of the imagination and to comprehend its limits vis-à-vis 
an intellect that, following analytic rules, is sometimes slower in finding reasons to 
support possibilities the imagination envisages, we must take into account the 
equivocity of the modal couple possible/impossible. Leibniz distinguishes (im)pos-
sible into two main couples: logical possibility and impossibility, according to 
which whatever entails a contradiction is necessarily false; and contingency and 
hypothetical necessity, according to which whatever is precluded to exist when con-
sidered from the point of view of a set of conditions, is existentially impossible. On 
this latter meaning of impossible, what does not exist is not necessarily contradic-
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notion of the (im)possible opens the path to a variety of necessity – from logical 
necessity to hypothetical necessity and metaphysical necessity. Hypothetical neces-
sity is no strict logical impossibility and comes in degrees of probability (chapter 
V). The imagination is involved in predictions that have only a certain law degree 
of hypothetical necessity given by the logic of space and time, since more stable 
forms of knowledge, resting on necessary truths composing logical and metaphys-
ical necessity, are precluded to the logic of imagination. More stable demonstrations 
require concepts or a system resting on logical possibility whose pillars are logical 
identity and contradiction and whose understanding remains beyond the domain of 
the imagination. 
Although the logic of imagination does not respond to identity and contradic-
tion, necessary to the formation of concepts, the imagination is not passive in con-
cept formation. It contributes to the development of these other cognitive processes 
by providing the intellect with perceivable expressions. Without the use of expres-
sions, the intellect could not exercise its power. Most of a person’s capacity to apply 
more stable intellectual principles to what is per se not subject to them depends on 
the capacity of the imagination to translate one subject matter into a format subject 
to those intellectual principles. One example of this work is the application of math-
ematics to nature, as in the case of predicting eclipses (chapter VI). In this transla-
tion, the imagination is thus constrained by bottom-up and top-down instances, as 
it is evident in the process of concept formation outlined in chapters VIII and IX.  
The common nature of phenomena, as expressed by types, is a first hint towards 
a conception of distinctions in species and genera. These latter are constructed by 
the imagination, working together with the intellect, as clusters of conceptual marks 
denoted by terms. Terms are general names that, as signs, respond to the imagina-
tion and its spatiotemporal logic, although when used in definitions, they are re-
assessed and re-interpreted through top-down constraints, like the principles of 
identity and contradiction. To explain this aspect, we referred to the string ‘A=A’ 
used by Leibniz as a symbol for logical identity. Since for the logic of the imagina-
tion the two As are two distinct things because they are co-perceived at a certain 
distance, the cognizant agent cannot conceive of them as one and the same while 
resting only on the imagination, no matter how similar the two As might appear. 
The deployment of intellectual principles signalled by the ‘=’ points the agent to 
take the string as a unity claiming that A is identical to A, that is to itself. This 
grasping of an identity rests on a logic which uses the imaginative tools as a stair-
case to reach truths which are “beyond the senses and matter”, to use the words of 
the letter to Sophie Charlotte, viz. intellectual (more on this soon). 
Identity is the gaining of conceptual reasoning that idealizes or mathematizes 
the concrete world by expressing it as being composed of essences, whose inter-
connections are independent both from the historical world and from the language 
that minds establish to signify concrete beings. Their interconnections are ideal and 
expressed in definitions. Losing existential concreteness, expression of beings via 
conceptual reasoning gains in knowledge distinction through relations of composi-
tion and conceptual entailment. The result is a separation between concrete (histor-















































274 Conclusion: Contouring the Imagination 
by intellectual principles. This separation is necessary to have a stable ground for 
natural sciences, as Leibniz argues against Locke, without losing a grip on the actual 
world. Types anchor conceptual reasoning to reality and experience, since they 
guarantee that our distinctions are well-grounded in the actual existence of distin-
guished phenomena (chapters VIII and IX).  
Existing beings individuated by types and conceptualized as instances of es-
sences are not the ultimate ground of reality. When canvassed through the lenses of 
metaphysical reasoning, existing beings require true unities, principles of changes 
or, in Leibniz’s jargon, substances. Chapter VIII contributed to clarifying some 
“distinctions in the things themselves” (NE 64). Logical, metaphysical, and physi-
cal realms are neatly divided for Leibniz, and yet they interact through ruled corre-
spondences that should guarantee the reality of minds’ cognitive processes.  
The logical realm is the realm of cognizant agents, or what Leibniz calls “sen-
sitive souls”, both rational and non-rational. Souls are substances with greater cog-
nitive capacity than simpler substances, as we saw in chapter IV, and part of their 
cognitive power derives from their being attached to a more cohesive and unified 
organic body (“nested”, in Leibniz’s jargon). Despite their finitude and thanks to a 
body more organized than those of lower organic forms (like plants) or other non-
organic forms of lives (like minerals or artefacts), sensitive souls are capable of 
more complex interactions with their environment, insofar as they have some fac-
ulties that better express what corresponds to external changes. In processing mi-
nute perceptions via the diverse forms of expressions we outlined in the work, souls 
do what all substances are meant to do in proportion to their ontological status: they 
act by building habitual responses to their environment.  
The mechanisms by which souls express the world are ideal, like space and 
time. Space and time are central to express the world from the point of view of the 
soul, to locate it into the constant flux of phenomena;1 and yet space and time are 
only ideal framework to express changes that occur at a level distinct from the log-
ical one, what Leibniz calls a physical genus in NE. Modifications of a physical 
genus are variations of matter that Leibniz describes as actually infinitely divided 
into parts that are themselves internally divided and constantly changing through 
mechanical interactions (chapter III). As the organic body is part of this flux and 
constantly changing, Leibniz holds that bodies are constantly changing and acted 
upon in a way that is reflected at the level of minute perceptions that are then first 
synthetized into sensations. Sensations are then synthetized into perceptible wholes, 
and these into types through the story we now know. In so doing, the cognizant 
agent builds habitual and more efficient responses to types of phenomena she might 
encounter as they are conceived to be parts of her world (chapters V and VI). 
The phenomena resulting from the operations of minds are in a sense ideal and 
real, as we argued in chapters III and VIII. They are ideal because cognizant agents, 
 
1 On this aspect, see De Risi (2011: 208–16), who argues that monads locate themselves by ex-
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I insist, need to transform changes happening at the physical and metaphysical lev-
els into expressions proportional to their limited cognitive skills. Bodies formed in 
virtue of types and definitions formed in virtue of concepts are therefore modifica-
tions of what Leibniz calls a logical genus, that is continuous quantity (space and 
time, in the case of types), then categorized through logical principles into concepts. 
Modifications of cognitive processes respond to these ideal constraints while corre-
sponding to modifications of a real genus. Expressions are ideal simply because 
they cannot exist as minds conceive of them because – to conceive of them – minds 
need to appeal to ideal and abstract ideas and principles, like space and time, or 
identity and contradiction. Expressions, the products of minds’ actions, are, how-
ever, not merely ideal because they refer to ruled and constant correspondences to 
what exists.  
Despite the different target of the present query, our analysis contributed to 
bringing a little more clarity to the issue of idealism vs. realism, insofar as it shows 
that existence and reality are themselves equivocal terms. Substances and beings 
both exist and are real, but in their own peculiar ways. Substances exist as true, 
permanent and indestructible unities. Substances as such cannot be the intentional 
objects of minds, so they are not strictly speaking in time and space, and hence 
cannot be said to exist as countable beings or those things minds can conceive of in 
spatiotemporal order. Substances do not have spatiotemporal existence, but meta-
physical subsistence, while beings have spatiotemporal existence but no metaphys-
ical subsistence, unless they can be reduced to metaphysical entities, i.e. substances. 
In being reduced, however, beings lose their phenomenal properties, or, when they 
are not lost, as in the case of rationality for the human soul, they are radically trans-
formed in their monadic subsistence. To this aim, Leibniz introduces a distinction 
between transitory and permanent modifications of substances. Transitory are those 
properties that minds can detect in a physical genus as signs of metaphysical pro-
cesses. In this respect, some beings that minds perceive are ideal and depend on a 
certain kind of unity that the mind attributes to them, as in the case of water or the 
body of a human being. However, those beings are not less real or exist less than 
substances; they exist differently than substances. To reiterate our example, Ap-
pius’s soul is indestructible and immortal; in Leibniz’s view, it is always active and 
changing, although other souls can conceive of Appius only during the timespan in 
which the soul of Appius animates an organic body ‘large’ enough to aptly affect 
other organic bodies attached to souls that are capable of distinct sense-perceptual 
states. The way in which cognizant agents can conceive of Appius is not how Ap-
pius exists in its permanent monadic and physical life (the soul is always attached 
to a body, however small and insensible it might be). 
What we usually call ‘being’ is said to exist and to be real insofar as it corre-
sponds to physical processes that can be sense-perceived and conceived as parts of 
a world, i.e. insofar as minds can conceive of them as coherent and hence predict 
their transformations as types of phenomena. Substances do not exist in this way. 
They exist as true unities whose permanent and transitory changes respond neither 















































276 Conclusion: Contouring the Imagination 
minds could not conceive of anything if changes in true substances were not ex-
pressed as bodies in space and in time. To express, minds need the mediation of 
physical material interactions that correspond to metaphysical changes. Something 
must correspond to bodies, and this something cannot be straightforwardly sub-
stances. Substances alone cannot be intentional objects of other substances, unless 
their modifications are carried via a medium to a soul. This medium is material 
modification that affects the material body attached to the soul, modifications that 
are expressed by the soul through its minute perceptions because of harmony. 
Therefore, a physical genus or matter must correspond to the cognitive expression 
of the world as made up of bodies. What this ‘matter’ is is not decided by the present 
work. One thing is clear, however: whatever matter is, it must be constituted by 
substances since it has ruled interactions with other material parts that are translated 
by minds into the diversity and variety of phenomena, then categorized via concep-
tual distinctions. The ontological status of matter is multiplicity and constitutive 
lack of unity; matter exists but in a way that does not have persisting unity over 
time if it were not constituted by substances. The result is that minds never express 
‘pure’ matter or ‘pure’ substances because both could not be perceived: matter can-
not be perceived without the action of forces and forces cannot be perceived without 
the effect transmitted by mechanical interactions on the body associated to the cog-
nitive soul. Minds simply cannot understand how material changes can be continu-
ously reduced to substantial changes, a knowledge proper of a divine mind (see 
chapter III). The result is that our distinctions and categorizations of natural kinds 
and modes capture changes that are transitory to substances and whose variety is 
more fine-grained than the abstract ideal forms in which we are capable of conceiv-
ing those changes. Those changes are what substances can produce, but they are 
not permanent to substances.  
Constrained by their logical notions, minds can simply conceive things as either 
material or substantial. So, on rigorous metaphysical reasoning, only substantial 
changes exist. But metaphysical existence is not a truer or more real form of exist-
ence; it simply is another way of existing which is not the way in which phenomena 
exist, or essences exist, or God exists. Minds strive to find a stable ground for what 
there is, and must reckon a fundamental ground for phenomena: substances inferred 
by introspection to our own activity; before recognizing a true notion of substances, 
though, we need to go through manifold expressions of substances at diverse levels: 
from types to concepts. All these levels ‘exist’, but on different grounds. Metaphys-
ics simply provides a unifying ground for the variety of phenomena. The order of 
explanation of metaphysics rests therefore on principles that are neither strictly log-
ical, like identity and contradiction, nor spatiotemporal; they are metaphysical, like 
the principle of identity of indiscernibles, that cannot be analysed either through the 
logic of imagination, nor through logical identity, because both produce abstracts 
and ideal entities, while the principle of indiscernibles aims at determining the ex-
istence of maximum concrete entities: substances. 
The metaphysical constitution of the world is, thus, not precluded to us. We can 
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cluded to us: expressions guarantee a perfect correspondence between the ex-
primendum and the exprimens, and that in cognizing we are dealing with real things 
even when all we have is a mental surrogate. We would make a category mistake 
to think that beings exist as we perceive or conceive of them, although they may 
have real and existing referents. Our main error is hence a form of anthropocen-
trism: believing that the world is made only for rational substances since it perfectly 
corresponds to the world quoad nos, the one we experience.  
From these different notions of existence, we derived a relation between meta-
physics and natural sciences. Knowledge of substances qua substances is a form of 
general knowledge provided by metaphysics and it is independent from scientific 
enterprises. The result is that in rigore metaphysico, only what acts and has unity 
can exist. At this level, modifications are modifications of substances. But at the 
ontological level, beings and their modifications exist and are real. Beings have 
causes, enquired by sciences independently from metaphysics. States of beings are 
causes and effects of other states of beings that they exist insofar as they are coher-
ent and can be predicted by cognizant agents.  
Our enquiry into the logic of imagination has further metaphysical insights into 
the distinction between what Leibniz calls sensitive rational and sensitive non-ra-
tional souls, since it allows distinguishing between perceiving and conceiving as 
two kinds of cognitive modes.  
Sense-perception and conceptual reasoning respond to distinct logics and yet 
there is no discontinuity between them. Both consist in imagining wholes divided 
into parts, although the nature of the parts and the rules of their connections change 
radically from one logic to the other. The logic of imagination deals with extended 
parts that are opaque to the principles of identity and contradiction. Conceptual 
logic deals with intensional ‘parts’ expressed by terms responding to identity and 
contradiction. Syntax and semantics, governing languages, are used to compose 
definitions and discourse. Languages are not the only vehicles for conceptual rea-
soning; diagrams and images can become vehicles for concepts, insofar as their 
parts can be arranged to express relations respecting identity and contradiction. 
Leibniz himself develops a linear calculus or something similar to Venn diagrams 
to express conceptual containment. 
The separation between the two logics is decisive to argue that there are infinite 
degrees of souls that differ in the ways they express the world: 
There can be infinite degrees of souls […]. The soul has the ability to connect together different 
states of the body, so that past and future exist together by its help, the past by a kind of remi-
niscence, the future by presentiment. And although it is true that a body also relates its past and 
present states, there is however this difference: In body there is nothing but a present state, even 
if it is an effect relating a cause of the past, and likewise, a cause relating an effect of the future. 
But in a soul every state is represented per se, past as past, future as future, present as present; 
each state not only is expressed as a consequence, but it is also represented. (There Can Be 
Infinite Degrees of Souls 1686 LoC 299/A VI 4 A 304) 
Degrees of clarity in the way souls represent past, present, and future states is the 















































278 Conclusion: Contouring the Imagination 
erned by the logic of imagination, while denying that they can develop robust con-
ceptual reasoning and acquire knowledge of necessary truths. If our analysis is cor-
rect and the two logics are separated as we proved, then Leibniz is in a good position 
to attribute to sensitive non-rational agents a shadow of reasoning, without being 
committed to attributing to them thought or conceptual reasoning. And yet a ques-
tion emerges: why do rational agents develop higher forms of reasoning, while sen-
sitive non-rational agents do not? The question is more urgent if we consider the 
developmental story we have outlined so far. If there is such evolution, why do 
rational agents develop some cognitive skills while non-rational agents do not? 
Leibniz’s answer is that non-rational animals lack innate ideas. Non-rational 
animals must possess some of the constraints we highlighted: they must be capable 
of some sort of spatiotemporal apprehension of bodies; of causal connections, of 
similarity, and they must be capable of some form of types. Non-rational animals 
lack intellectual innate ideas, thereby lacking the capacity to develop their cognitive 
processes into rational conceptual ones, differing hence in the way they represent 
the world. On my understanding, the lack of intellectual ideas, like identity, contra-
diction, substance, is the reason why animals process sense-perceptual information 
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Through the reconstruction of 
 Leibniz’s theory of the degrees of 
knowledge, this book investigates and 
explores the intrinsic relationship of 
imagination with space and time. The 
inquiry into this relationship defines 
the logic of imagination that charac-
terizes both human and non-human 
animals, albeit differently, making 
them two different species of imagina-
tive animals.
Lucia Oliveri explains how the emer-
gence of language in human animals 
goes hand in hand with the emergence 
of thought and a different form of 
rationality constituted by logical infer-
ences based on identity and contradic-
tion, principles that are out of reach of 
the imagination. The book concludes 
that the presence of innate principles 
in human animals transforms the 
way in which they sense-perceive the 
world, thereby constantly increasing 
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